**Governor Jon S. Corzine Archive**
***Charting a Progressive Social Agenda***
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*(transcript edited by: Kristoffer Shields)*

**Governor Jon Corzine:** Thank you John [Weingart] and Ruth [Mandel] and all of the folks at Eagleton. This is a terrific exercise and they are extraordinarily patient with a guy whose schedule is sometimes less than organized. And to all of you that are here let me say, thank you for your participation. And most of all, and I think I said this at the first [roundtable], there's nothing in my administration that I have a right to take credit for—other than the mistakes and failures—because the people around this table and others of your colleagues did a remarkable job and I am extraordinarily grateful for those efforts in those four years, some of you with me a little longer in the Senate. Some of the things that we worked on actually moved seamlessly from one venue to another.

Maybe the most important thing I'd like to say about today is that the things we are talking about today are the reason I got into politics, the reason to be a former senator and a former governor. I had always carried a sense of responsibility; if I were in the political stump I'd say, "To those who much is given, much is expected." And that there need be attention to those who are left behind or who are not quite able to accomplish everything they should because of the way our society works. I think the team that I worked with—both those of you here today and otherwise—recognize the kind of debate we're having in society today about inequality and practical things that needed to be done to make things happen. Anne [Milgram] and I were reminiscing just for a second about how when we first went to the United States Senate, we had to deal with racial profiling. And speak out about it. And we developed legislation to deal with it. And we were really at the cutting edge. And then we got another opportunity to actually work with those issues. I look at Kevin [Ryan] and moving from foster care to adoption and now seeing what Kevin is doing at Covenant House and all of the things that so many of you are doing make me so proud that the themes that we began with are carrying on further into other people's lives and other activities.

The only problem I have today, particularly as I look to the group on criminal justice, is that there's one person missing. I guess he can't be here [due to judicial ethics rules]. It's [Chief Justice of the New Jersey State Supreme Court] Stuart Rabner, who created an enormous catalyst to pull great minds and people together and work together and is doing that as we go forward. But I hope all of you know how proud I am of each of you, whether you're on the panel or you're not, for what

you did in our administration, for the work that you've done. And my biggest regret—and I really mean this—is not winning reelection because I think the things that we were working on take more time than four years in all fairness. Changing laws, changing structures and institutions, is a challenging task in a short period of time and we did a lot. I look at Julie [Kashner] and I think about paid family leave. And I'm not going to go off on things that you all will talk about, but we were way, way ahead. And some of you probably saw my little attempt at getting back in the public eye: I wrote an editorial on the death penalty that was published this weekend. We were working on this stuff from the moment and at sort of the point of the spear with regard to the criminal justice work that everybody did remarkable things on. So I'm going to stop there. A, thank you. B, I'm proud of what you did and what almost all of you are doing with your lives as you carry forward with an agenda that is helping others. Thanks.

<applause>

**John Weingart:** Thank you. Let's turn it over to Anne.

**Anne Milgram:** Great. First of all, thank you to Eagleton. I have not sat in his room since my senior year in college when I was affiliated with the Eagleton Institute of Politics. And I loved it. It's great to be back. I had forgotten how magical this space is. Second of all, it feels kind of like a wedding or a family reunion.

<laughter>

I have to be a little careful with what I say since this will be videotaped for posterity. We'll make the jokes later. But it's fantastic to see everybody. And it really feels like yesterday. The two things I would say before we jump in—and I'll do a quick introduction of everyone to my left before we start—is first of all, governor, I think we all recognize what a tremendous job you did as governor for those four years. But I will tell you that over the past week as I've gone back and I've looked at everything, I cannot believe how much you got done. I really cannot believe it.

**Governor Jon Corzine:** We got done.

**Anne Milgram:** With your leadership, everyone in this room. But none of that would've happened without your vision and your leadership. And really, when we talk about criminal justice, so many of the things we talk about—and I do so much work nationally today—New Jersey was thinking about and doing 13 years ago and that's an extraordinary thing. And you deserve so much credit for that. I'll say one other thing which I think Stuart Rabner can't be here because he's the Chief Justice and they have this silly rule in New Jersey, I think we can criticize this. They have a

silly rule that the judges can't come. And I think it's a shame because there are so many great members of your administration who are now on the bench and who would offer a lot of insight. But I would just make one note about Chief Justice Rabner, who you nominated to be the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. He's been re-nominated. Now, he's got life tenure. And he just published a report on bail reform in the state of New Jersey that is extraordinary. No state—and I should say, Ricardo [Solano] is my lawyer for my part in bail reform, thank you Ricardo. The case is still pending so we won't talk too much about that part of it. But what Stuart and the legislature and the governor did, and they all deserve credit, is completely transformational. They have essentially eliminated bail in the state. Their jail population is down by 44 percent. There have been virtually no increases in people failing to appear or crime. So the state is safer. There is deeply less racial discrimination within our system. And it's really an unbelievable, important rebalancing of the system that candidly should've happened across the country years ago. But I'm so honored and proud of the Chief Justice for the work he's done. And that is also, I think, a tribute to you, governor. So I'm not going to say anymore nice things about you now lest I embarrass you too much. I want to say one thing about David Wald. This day would not be complete without him because he has all the institutional knowledge of law and public safety. And when I cannot remember what we did, and that happens sometimes, I don't know if I've washed it out or if I've intentionally forgotten things, but I call David or I call Ricardo or I call John Vazquez. And the person who usually wins with the right answer—no offense—is David.

<laughter>

So feel free to interrupt me at any point if I say the wrong thing because it's totally possible.

<applause>

We have a great group here, all of whom I worked really closely with and feel so fortunate to have here today. Ron Chen, who is now back at Rutgers Law school. Ron was the public advocate for much of the time that I was in the state of New Jersey. Lisa Macaluso was the head of policy for the juvenile justice commission, which was within the Attorney General's office. And she spearheaded—and we'll talk about this—the juvenile detentions alternatives initiative, which was transformational for juvenile justice and the state. Ricardo Solano, my lawyer and my good friend, was also the first assistant attorney general. And Ricardo oversaw a lot of our law enforcement work. And then, of course, Ken Zimmerman, who had done many things as a lawyer before he joined the state and many things as a philanthropy executive since. But at the time he was in the state, he was the

governor's counsel and led many of the things we're going to talk about today. Hi, Tom Shea. Nice to see you.

**Tom Shea:** Hi, everybody.

**Anne Milgram:** Just like old times.

<group laughter>

So I wanted to start by asking everyone—and I'll start with Ken and then work my way to Ron. I always think one of the best things you can ask people when you go back in time is to tell the story of an incident or an event that best captures something for them. And so here it's what can you tell us that most captures, in your mind, criminal justice under the Corzine administration?

**Ken Zimmerman:** Well, thanks Anne. Governor, it's great to see you. Eagleton, thanks. But, unquestionably, as you started, it is actually the memory of the signing of the legislation about the abolition of the death penalty. And just to put it into context, that was the first legislative abolition of the death penalty since Furman v. Georiga, since 1973. And it only happened because the governor was insistent upon it. And there were two particular dynamics that stick with me. One was the actual legislative signing ceremony, as everybody is aware. Normally that's something that attracts every legislator possible to take credit for it. Neither the Senate majority leader nor the leader of the Assembly showed up for that legislative signing. And it's a reflection that it only took place because of the governor's deep commitment and understanding of the legislature and a number of others about the fact that this was important to him. I think there was very good work done with the death penalty moratorium commission and Reverend [M. William] Howard [Jr.]. But the other piece of this that is the personal memory is that I was sitting on my office on the Friday before the Monday signing and I got a call and my assistant came in and said, "It's somebody from the Vatican and they want to talk to you." And I couldn't quite figure out why the Jewish lawyer in the governor's office is getting a call from the Vatican.

<group laughter>

It turned out that they were calling because they wanted to see if we had any objection to the lighting of the Roman Colosseum on Monday at the same time that the bill was being signed. It's apparently something they regularly do when the sanctity of life is being recognized. We couldn't figure out any legal dynamic that would prevent us from weighing in. But I think it's a reflection that the significance of the legislative abolition of the death penalty was not something only important in

New Jersey or only important in the U.S. but had international ramifications. And that, obviously, is something that I was incredibly privileged to be part of.

**Anne Milgram:** That's wonderful. I'm going to come back and ask you more questions about it. But let's carry on now. What sticks in your mind the most?

**Ricardo Solano:** So, for me, it's also another piece of legislation. It was the legislation that was signed towards the end of Governor Corzine's term ending the consent decree that had been entered into between the state and the federal Department of Justice with the state police and the racial profiling issue. And the reason it was so important was because they were at a crossroads where it was time to get out from under the oversight of the Department of Justice but there was also a need to ensure that the progress that had been made wouldn't slide back. And I think it's indicative of so many of Governor Corzine's law enforcement policies that are carried forward by the attorneys general—Rabner and then Anne—which was a balance between making sure that you partnered with law enforcement to get accomplished the necessary law enforcement goals but also do it in a way that was responsible to society and to the community. And that racial profiling legislation, which took a lot of hard work because there were so many parties interested in, managed to balance those two and return the state police back to their own governance and recognize all the reforms they had made internally and with the AG's office. But it also put in a mechanism in the AG's office to make sure that oversight was there and that we wouldn't fall back to the risk of the racial profiling that had gone one.

**Anne Milgram:** Great. Lisa.

**Lisa Macaluso:** Thank you Governor Corzine and thank you Anne and thank you Eagleton. I think the moment that stands out the most for me is in 2008 when New Jersey became the first model site for the juvenile detention alternatives initiative (JDAI) to go to scale. There are a lot of things that went into that, but the meaningful part to me was that they held a press conference. And in the press conference, Anne was there at the press conference and Chief Justice Rabner was there at the press conference. And it really sent a message to the country that in New Jersey the people at the top care about kids. The people at the top understand what unnecessary and inappropriate use of secure detention is. And the people at the top were pushing that agenda just as much as folks at the local level in the counties and the folks in the agencies. That legacy actually left us to become a model site and host states from all over the country. So to date New Jersey has hosted 15 different states who are seeking to replicate the work that we did here.

**Anne Milgram:** Lisa, can you just describe a little bit of JDAI, the juvenile detentions alternative initiative? Kevin, I think, once called it a miracle of

government and I would agree with that. But maybe you could just tell us a little bit about what it is.

**Lisa Macaluso:** Sure. About 25 years ago, the Annie E. Casey Foundation started a reform movement, a set of strategies to eliminate the unnecessary and inappropriate use of secure detention. And at that time, you may remember that John Dilulio was getting everybody primed for a super predator wave where kids were all going to need to be locked up and folks were investing tons of money in building detention facilities. Detention facilities were also very overcrowded, very dangerous, both for the staff and for the kids who were in them. And so for the first 10 years of that work, the Casey Foundation only worked at the local level implementing these core strategies. And New Jersey was fortunate to be selected to try to bring the juvenile detention alternatives initiative to scale, meaning that we wouldn't just do it in a county or two but we would make this the way that the state did its business. And so the model, the designation of a model site is really to show people that this is not an anomaly. That this is something that's replicable and that other states can follow.

**Anne Milgram:** That's great. Ron.

**Ron Chen:** Well, while Ken and Ricardo and Lisa have spoken about events that are sort of culminations that resulted in a very demonstrable achievement. When I reflect back on how I remember the Corzine administration, I think back on a beginning, a planting of a seed. And it's an issue that at the time I worked a lot with Anne and Ricardo on, which is how law enforcement dealt with our immigrant population and particularly the specific debate was how the state should implement section 287(g). To what extent should state law enforcement be involved in enforcing our federal immigration laws against immigrants who could not establish a lawful presence. And when I say that at the time it didn't seem like an achievement—well, it was an achievement. Anne issued a directive. And Ricardo and Anne and I and others in my department and in theirs had a big debate about the appropriateness of state law enforcement getting involved when a lot of us thought, including Anne, that in large measure state law enforcement—this really should not be their business, to develop a relationship of trust. On the other hand, I recognized there were all sorts of pressures. We had some local municipal officials who had, in my mind, very misguided views of what the roles should be. And, also, the reality is that law enforcement is intended to protect people. So Anne issued a directive whose language you probably have nightmares to this day as we went over word over word and we discussed at length what reasonable belief might be or might not be. And I'll admit right now I did not completely agree with the language at the time. But it was the beginning of a process. It's how we were setting the stage for a very, very difficult policy argument. And when I say that it was the

planting of the seed, we know now, 10 years later, that there that that seed has given fruit, blossomed, whatever metaphor you want to use.

<laughter>

**Ron Chen:** The current N.J. attorney general Gurbir Grewal in November issued an immigrant trust directive which I won't say superseded Anne's directive but it sort of graduated it to the next level, in which basically state law enforcement now is sort of out of business except in very, very defined circumstances of enforcing federal law. And I remember sending Anne an email when I saw that she issued a statement that completely supportive of Attorney General Grewal's new directive. It's the type of thing where an achievement—you're right, it couldn't happen in four years but it didn't happen in ten. And I see a lot of that of the work that I was working on, things that we started, that might not have been brought to fruition by January, whatever it was, 2010 but is coming to fruition now.

**Anne Milgram:** Thank you Ron. You know, I would add my own which is—

**Governor Jon Corzine:** I did want to say that I thought Ron was going to mention that when we first set up his new office that he didn't have a secretary. He didn't have a computer. And it took at least six months to get most of it.

**Ron Chen:** I said my piece on it the first time. No double jeopardy.

<laughter>

**Anne Milgram:** And there's still time. There's still time. I would add that my greatest recollection really relates to the city of Camden. And there are few things with Camden but when I became AG on day one, a prior attorney general, Peter Harvey, had superseded the Camden, New Jersey Police Department. And he had taken it over because Camden was the most dangerous city in America and it had been the most dangerous city in America consistently for many years. And we spent a lot of time in the governor's office talking about not just public safety in Camden but also just governance in Camden and what it would look like for the state to supersede the entire city. And it was an extraordinary experience. And I say without question that the hardest work I've ever done was the work that we did in Camden. We started—and I'll tell you a story I remember, with you [Governor Corzine] and I, which was we both went down separately for the swearing in of the county prosecutor Warren, whose last name I cannot remember, David.

**Ricardo Solano:** Faulk.

**Anne Milgram:** Thank you, Ricardo. Warren Faulk ,who was the county prosecutor. I have like half of everything in my head. It's like a giant mad libs. So if everyone just helps me we'll get through it.

<laughter>

So Warren Faulk was being sworn in and the swearing in wasn't until four o'clock in the afternoon. Do you remember this? Okay. So this is how these—

**Governor Jon Corzine:** Remember, I'm 72.

<laughter>

**Anne Milgram:** It's a race to the bottom. <laughter> So I went down in the morning and I drove around with then Police Captain Scott Thomson, who is now the chief of police, and we drove throughout the entire city and we heard sirens but we never saw a single police car. In the most dangerous city in America. And of course we ran the department. And I walked in later that afternoon—and we also saw a hand-to-hand buy-and-bust which I'll never forget of a kid who should've been in school, literally sell drugs right in front of an unmarked police car. And everyone in America, generally, knows what an unmarked police car looks like. Everyone at that time in Camden definitely knew. And it was just a sign of just how bad things were. And I walked into the county prosecutor's office and I was still thinking all these things in my head. And the first thing you said to me is, "I've been here for two hours, I haven't seen a goddamn police car." Sorry, I shouldn't curse for the video. And actually you might have said worse. Do you remember this?

<laughter>

**Governor Jon Corzine:** "Frigging."

<laughter>

**Anne Milgram:** Yes. And it was all I could think as well. We spent time that day talking about, what are we going to do? And how are we going to remake the police department? And we struggled and John Vazquez was a part of it. Ricardo was a great part of it. Ken was a part of it. But over those four years we reduced violent crime in Camden by 41 percent, homicides by 46 percent. And probably most importantly I think we showed that the city can be safe. And today it is the safest it's been in decades. And so, to me, I could tell a lot of other stories about Camden and maybe we'll get to some of them because they're incredibly colorful but that, to me, stands in my mind as really understanding what public safety and caring for a

community meant and that was a great example of one of the transformations. And, by the way, so much of that was only possible because of the governor's support in so many different ways, hiring police officers, suspending state civil service, getting new police cars, completely re-deploying how the police department worked.

**Governor Jon Corzine:** I'd like to just add one element there because it's important to understand how leadership does have to work by your actions. We also took down that prison which was not—

**Anne Milgram:** That's right. It was on the waterfront.

**Governor Jon Corzine:** —used but was just a complete aggravation to the people who lived in the community, served no earthly purpose for any real reason. And this team gave me the basis to be able to get something done that sent a signal that we weren't trying to dump all of the problems of the state into a place that was already troubled. I just, as, an add-on. And I do remember that drive.

**Anne Milgram:** You can jump in anytime. I'm going to come back to you Ricardo on the state police consent decree because I think one of the things that's worth just noting is that when the governor made this push to institutionalize the consent decree, nobody wanted to do that. And so can you talk us through DOJ's position on it, the state police's position. It's an important part of the conversation. Ron is right that we're talking about the conclusions, which are important. But I think some of the process here is worth noting.

**Ricardo Solano:** Yes. As you mentioned, the state police absolutely felt like—and it was understandable—that they had been under a microscope for 10 years. That they had made all of this progress in terms of monitoring their conduct, reviewing stops, making sure that race wasn't playing a factor in how traffic stops were occurring on the turnpike or elsewhere. And so they were very adamant and their union was, and minced no words at the fact that they thought enough was enough and that they had an opportunity to get out of the consent decree completely. And there was some merit to that and it was certainly, like I said, understandable. I remember my assignment from the [attorney] general was, like in other areas, just get it done.

<laughter>

It was just get it done and let's fix this because it made perfect sense from a policy perspective that while that was an option, that there's too much of a risk that it could slide back and why take that chance? And so we had within the attorney general's office—which is still there—an office of professional law enforcement, I

forget the acronym—Law Enforcement Professionalism, I think is what it was. And they were already doing a lot of the work there so we felt confident that they could continue to do it and that it made sense. And so we were able to work with both the legislators—I remember at the time Assemblyman [Gordon] Johnson had a lot of interest in this. And we had to deal with those interests.

**Anne Milgram:** Senator [Ronald] Rice had a lot of concerns.

**Ricardo Solano:** Senator Rice. A lot of the areas that were impacted and who represented constituents who were impacted by this and were very fearful because it wasn't just a couple of years. It was a long history of this racial profiling. And I was proud of the fact that I was able to play a small part in getting that done by sort of bringing together all of these interests. And we were able to, at the end of the day, to put it together and really draft conditions on getting out in the consent decree and use that as our leverage, to say, "If you want to get out of it," which they really did, "You're going to have to accept this." And ultimately we brought the state police around. They had complete buy-in by then. The unions reluctantly were dragged in, the union representatives, but they came along. And, ultimately, the governor was able to sign a piece of legislation that is still in effect today and I think that office continues. It was important because for all the work that the administration had done, it was important to get it done then because it would've gotten done at some point and it otherwise might've got done without the protections that were able to be built in.

**Anne Milgram:** Yes. I'll never forget the call I got the head of the special litigation section of the Department of Justice, who oversaw the consent decree, saying, "We don't want this. We just want it done," because at that point the state police had done an extraordinary job of compliance. And I remember having a conversation which was basically, we're all sensitive to that but the governor wants to make sure it doesn't happen again. And how do we sort of institutionalize it in the state? And so that, I think, was a significant accomplishment on your part to navigate what was a tricky—and the governor's part—to navigate what was a complex issue.

**Governor Jon Corzine:** Anne, can you refresh my memory because I think we were an early mover with regard to using cameras in cars. Right? And that was part of this whole consent decree process.

**Anne Milgram:** Yes. So when the special litigation section at the Department of Justice entered into a consent decree with the state police, they essentially required a pretty sophisticated computer statistics program. And the monitors, also, decided to put cameras in the police cars. They were one of the first states to do it statewide. Every state police car had cameras. And then what they would do is pull every stop and they had the first-line supervisors regularly auditing them and

checking. And if they found problems, they moved to correct them quickly. And it was really those two things that were the transformative pieces. And I'll tell you a funny aside. Ricardo may remember this. At the beginning, all the cameras mysteriously broke every time the troopers were going out. And then finally someone had to say, "Well, if you go out with a broken camera or the camera is broken while you're out, you get docked a day's pay." And then miraculously they were the best cameras that had ever been purchased in the United States of America.

<group laughter>

But it really was transformational. And I would say this. There's not a single state trooper who would go out without a camera today. They know it protects them more than anything. And so it's just the initial—I think that's also true of body cams now. But it's the initial sort of hurdle.

**Ricardo Solano:** Yeas If I can just add, I think the law enforcement, the state police, definitely came to appreciate them. And I know from talking to law enforcement, they like the cameras, either on their body or in the car. Because as often as it implicates somebody for doing something inappropriate, it exonerates them for not having done something that they're being complained or charged with.

**Anne Milgram:** I'm going to come back to you Lisa on juvenile detention for a minute because I think we talked a little bit about JDAI. Can you talk a little bit about the drop in the state population that we saw during the time you were in New Jersey?

**Lisa Macaluso:** Sure. When we first started this work in 2004, slightly before the Corzine administration, the average daily population of kids in secure detention was over 900 kids, around 925. So what that means is that on any given day in New Jersey there were 925 kids, just about, in secure detention centers, county run detention centers around the country. And when we looked at this—the reason to do this, to try to get folks to want to do this work, what we found was that arrests had been declining for 10 years. Index crime arrests had been declining for 10 years, which were the more serious kinds of juvenile arrests. But at the same time detention admissions were going up, average daily population was going up. And what we were trying to do was build ourselves out of it. So the number of detention beds in the state increased about 58 percent during that timeframe. And, of course, when we looked at the data the kids who were being affected were kids of color and girls. Those were the kids who were in there every single day, those 925 kids. And so just to fast-forward to sort of the end, right, so the impact work of it. Today there are 230 kids in secure detention on any given day. Two hundred thirty. Now, I will say that this still impacts primarily kids of color. Not so much girls. The girls are

not necessarily being detained at the same level that they used to be but we have a big problem still in dealing with race equity and minority overrepresentation and that's something that's work that continues now.

**Anne Milgram:** Yes. I remember the first time, I think, you briefed me on the disproportionate minority incarceration. I don't remember if it was 97 percent minority? Maybe you recall the percentage minority, but I just remember thinking it can't be right.

**Lisa Macaluso:** It's still 90.4.

Animal **Anne Milgram:** Ninety point four percent minority.

**Lisa Macaluso:** Yes, ma'am.

**Anne Milgram:** Yes. So I agree there's a lot of work left to be done. The work that you did, Ken, with the Department of Corrections. I know not directly criminal justice but I think it's really important to talk about because I think about—and we'll come back on some of the law enforcement side in a minute—but if I think about those four years, we saw incredible drops in crime which beat national averages. We also saw incredible drops in population both in juvenile justice and in the Department of Corrections. So if you could talk us through the work there.

**Ken Zimmerman:** Sure. And it's interesting just to build on it because these are complicated systems. It was actually in preparation for this I realized I was actually the co-chair of the transition team on corrections which had slipped my mind for some reason.

<laughter>

Corrections, as in many places, is a troubled agency. It doesn't get the attention. It only gets the intention when bad things happen. And as a result when budgets are limited, what gets cut out is everything that is devoted to assisting those who are being released and 99 percent of everybody is being released. And as a result recidivism starts being driven up. And so I think there was an early recognition from the governor, from the now Chief Justice Rabner, and others, that this was an opportunity to both reduce crime by addressing the threat of recidivism but also to pay attention to what was going on in the system itself. Some of it had to do with simple budgetary matters, to restore things that we needed to have, even though it's unattractive. Avoid the trap, though, of trying to build yourself out of the overcrowding that exists. And ultimately recognize that reducing the level of the populations in prison the right way is actually directly connected to reducing the level of crime. And so while there were multiple things that took place, it started

with actually creating a reentry council at the governor's level and that only came about because of the level of attention that the governor wanted to pay to it. And it meant within corrections there was a deep need for starting to do things like risk assessment, starting to do discharge planning based on the social science that suggested what happens to somebody 8 to 12 weeks out is the most important piece of this. It had to do with changing the law so that the max out percentage was being reduced. But it also started to deal with the parole board, an institution that had largely been ignored and yet a substantial portion of the people coming back were for technical parole violations. And I think at that time the state of New Jersey had the largest percentage of folks who were incarcerated for drug offenses. And all told—and I was going back and looking at the data and having some national work—New Jersey was one of the states that had the largest percentage of reduction in the overall levels of incarceration of any state in the country. And it's another example of how it was really in the lead of many of those trends that are now accelerating.

**Governor Jon Corzine:** If I might interject. I was at a Rutgers basketball game or something sometime in the last two months and a young lady came up to me and said, "I'm in charge of—" and I don't remember the acronym now, "—the educational programs in the prisons," which we started, I think, in Ken's work. And she cited that they now have graduated something, if my memory serves me correct, around 350 people from college since we had been there. There were something like 50 lawyers and there were 20 PhDs and she was beside herself with joy on how she thought this was working and that came out of the efforts that we were working on. And when we looked at the prison system.

**Ken Zimmerman:** David Socolow can do the mad lib on this one.

**Anne Milgram:** David, can you jump in?

**David Socolow:** Yes. Governor, that program that was started in your administration is New Jersey STEP.

**Governor Jon Corzine:** Yes, exactly.

**David Socolow:** President Obama created the Second Chance Pell Initiative which corrected in a pilot way the program, the change to the Pell grant program that prevented incarcerated individuals from getting Pell since 1994 in the crime law. And two of those sites are in New Jersey and are under the NJ-STEP program. So it was built on—

**Governor Jon Corzine:** That was exactly what the young to lady was telling me.

**David Socolow:** I'm sure it was.

**Anne Milgram:** And, actually, a lot is the reentry work that Ken just mentioned—you may remember you had a strategy for safe streets and neighborhoods and it was a three-part strategy: law enforcement, prevention, and reentry. And there was a huge amount of work that happened in the Department of Labor that David led in the DOC with the AG's office. We actually—I remember this because I'm still in touch with the first woman to hold the job—but we hired full-time staff to coordinate statewide and it was really, at the time, a very revolutionary thing to do, which all these years later it seems like every state has now come to this point. But I remember having a conversation at one point and it might've been with you, David, where we were talking about how the folks that would go to the Department Of Labor didn't know that no one was knitting together all of these pieces of the puzzle. So there was one person experiencing—and I think about this a lot now in criminal justice—but one person is experiencing multiple institutions as though everything is siloed and trying to work so hard to knit that together. Do you want to add anything else on reentry since we've got you? You've got a hot mic.

**David Socolow:** Yes. Just on that point, one of the insights that we tried that I think is now a national trend was this whole idea of really intensive job coaching that is following people at the actual worksite when you get them placed once they've reentered and they've gotten a job. It used to be that people would count a job placement as a terrific victory. And people who are getting a job in the civilian workforce for the first time after years of incarceration have reentry and transition issues. And the job coaching model that we followed is actually the model that is often used for individuals with disabilities when they get into the workforce: really intensive, paying attention to those relationships and it's worked really well.

**Anne Milgram:** That's great.

**Steve Goldman:** We had some of that, too, Anne at the Department of Banking and Insurance because a lot of the insurance companies would not allow people who had been incarcerated to come back into the workforce in certain positions. They couldn't be truck drivers. They couldn't be in any kind of fiduciary position. So we were working to get those restrictions lifted, too.

**Anne Milgram:** That's right. That was also part of the strategy. We looked at a lot of the Department of Corrections programming as well, which remember when we first looked at it, people were being licensed for jobs that they couldn't actually perform because of restrictions, which made no sense.

**David Socolow:** Or jobs that didn't exist that essentially the training was based on looking for the keys under the streetlight because the light is better, not because

that's where you lost the keys. And so they were training for what was convenient and easy to train people for within the confines of a prison, rather than what were the jobs that were likely for people to get when they got out.

**Ken Zimmerman:** One of the things that's striking is just noting how many different cabinet agencies were involved. And that only comes because there's leadership. I remember at DOC, one of the key issues people have leaving prison is whether they have an identification card, something that seems very simple. But unless DOC is really committed to taking that on as an issue, all the rest of the things that people would want to provide—but certainly, and Anne I know this from your own experience, in so many places that kind of coordination is something that's the easiest thing to fall through the cracks. It can only happen if you've got the credibility of saying, "The governor wants have this to happen." And that leads many people who would otherwise never come close to the issue to start engaging in it. It doesn't mean that we got all the way there in many respects but I think we started it, consistent with Ron's observation that you plant seeds that bloom flower.

**Steve Goldman:** What was interesting when we started to look at it was after people got word that we were trying to fix it I remember getting calls from employers saying, "I've hired these people and I can't—I've hired them anyway because there's a shortage in my particular industry and I'd really like if they could be insured so I really hope you can get this done."

**Anne Milgram:** It's amazing. You know, at the end of the Obama administration I sat in a White House meeting about getting federal IDs for people. And I remember sitting there and thinking how is it possible that all of these years later what we were talking about in 2008, that you were still talking about on the federal level happening. And I think it's still in progress and the federal law doesn't exist yet. I think it's part of the new legislation. It's one of the pieces, which is pretty extraordinary. Anything else on DOC?

**Ken Zimmerman:** I think that it was an ongoing thing. One of the challenges was who we were going to recruit as the first commissioner in the Department of Corrections. I just want to say that it was an introduction to the challenge of trying to find talent for a position such as that. It's a complicated system. Multiple parts of it were under consent decree. I remember spending more time than I ever would've imagined about healthcare in prisons and the contract coming up which was a huge issue given how poor in multiple respects that is. So I think it was about the idea that some of these things are so structural, so embedded, that they can't be solved simply. And it leads to the kind of messy things that don't reach the public attention to pick up. But I think with some good hires and the level of attention paid there was real movement.

**Anne Milgram:** Yes, I agree.

**Ron Chen:** I'll add my reentry—actually the statute forbad the public advocate from initiating any litigation on corrections. That was before my time. But they did put the office of the corrections ombudsman in my department, so he took me to—I think I eventually visited a majority of the state correctional facilities. And to pick on what Ken was saying, some of the issues that prevent reentry would sound trivial to us, the ID card issue. The issue that I sort of got angry about for a while, but I will admit in the end I don't know if I could do anything about it: the phone system. Inmates were being charged like $50 for a phone call with their family and it could be to Brooklyn or something like that. It was an outrageous amount of money when you would think that what you would want to do is enable them to keep their structures and relationships and to be able to reintegrate quickly. And we made it so difficult through—I never was really able to dig down and how that contract happened. I've heard it's sort of been fixed partially now. But I think it speaks to a comprehensive approach and I'd like to say that if we had another four years I think all of us who had some part of that would have gotten together and come up with an even more comprehensive plan.

**Anne Milgram:** Yes. And it remains a massive issue nationally. I mean this is still debated every day. Ricardo, can you talk us through, I mentioned the safe streets and neighborhoods and you and I did a lot of this day-to-day. We made a very conscious shift both internally in the AG's office and statewide with how we thought about law enforcement and communities and maybe you could talk us through that.

**Ricardo Solano:** Sure. But they [inmates] also get charged in the state for emails. I think it's like 25 cents an email, if you can believe that, to send an email today. So one of the things, and this is a real benefit that you have in New Jersey that you don't have in other states, is that your attorney general oversees all 21 county prosecutors and all law-enforcement departments throughout the state and all police departments. And so the attorney general has the authority to issue directives that they have to follow. And it's invaluable and I think the administration made a concerted effort to use that to the best of our abilities. And in a time where you have every municipality suffering from limited resources and nobody wants to spend more money on the budget or have to raise taxes to spend money on things like law enforcement, there was an absolute need to make smart decisions on how you use law enforcement resources, how you deploy law enforcement. So I think it was two-pronged. One was on that to make sure that the money was being spent on things that actually got results. It's great that somebody's going to buy a bunch of cameras, the "eye-in-the-skies" in Camden, I remember. But if I remember the first rollout, I think your head exploded. They were going to put them all in the one area and Cooper Hospital that least needed it. It made no sense from a crime perspective to put it all around an area that's pretty well lit.

**Anne Milgram:** My head did explode. I remember that.

<laughter>

**Ricardo Solano:** And that's the kind of decision that if you weren't looking at it and the folks underneath you weren't looking at it, five years later somebody would've said, "Wait, why do we have 10 police cameras out of 12 in this one vicinity? It makes no sense." And so there was a focus on looking at the data where the crimes were occurring, not just in Camden, but everywhere, but particularly in Camden and said, "All right, we have a limited amount of resources. Let's figure out where we can maximize our use." And I think all along without was also a different way of looking at how all 21 counties, particularly in the violent cities, were dealing with gang violence and violent crime. And it's often too easy, and I didn't appreciate this before I got there, but it was often too easy to focus on low level criminal drug dealing. Yes, it's a crime but you end up with high incarceration rates, high juvenile detention rates, and you don't get a return on that investment. So you expend a lot of law-enforcement resources, judicial resources, and you end up putting some 18, 19-year-old in jail for a year for a low-level drug offense. And so the idea was to hold county prosecutors accountable, and I remember they may not have liked some of it, but all of the police departments had to appoint somebody. Once a month—we started a gang stat where in the 21 major cities or 20, I think it was, cities—they had to come together, all the local law enforcement folks, and the feds could participate in this as well; and have a conversation about, "All right where is the drug activity? Where is the real gang activity, the violent crime occurring? What are we doing to stop that?" It was sort of a great lesson in how to have more intelligent policing. You use the data you have, share the data, which is a whole other piece that we were able to accomplish, but really use that to focus on the most violent folks. That will have a trickle-down effect on the other lower level drug activity.

**Anne Milgram:** And I think the statewide stats—I don't know if you remember this, I checked it last night. But between 2006 and the beginning of 2010, murders were down 13 percent statewide and violent crime was down more than 8 percent. Nationally crime decreased during that same period of time but not like that. And I think it's really a tribute to having both the structure of the state and really shifting the focus to violence and taking it off narcotics.

**Ricardo Solano:** And they needed somebody to hold them accountable. And it was from your office that you have folks going down and literally meeting with them at least once a month and sometimes more frequently, once a week with a certain city.

**Anne Milgram:** Yes. I think we went to every county prosecutor's office on that as well. I have a recollection of going to Salem and them saying, "You guys are the first folks we have met from the state AG's office."

<laughter>

We were welcome.

**Governor Jon Corzine:** Anne or Ricardo, my memory is foggy on this, again. But what sticks out in my mind is we talked about, what was it, within 200 yards of a school. And we changed that law, which probably did more for cutting away these low-level drug dealing crimes. I can't remember what the metric was, but it was such that there were about four inches of square space in Newark where you weren't subject to the application of that law and that was true in every community across the state. And you didn't have to be a genius to say that we either eliminate this or you get it to a point where it's like a block or something across the school. Otherwise the whole urban community was automatically subject to severe incarceration obligations from that.

**Anne Milgram:** So you may not remember the beginning of this story. It's imprinted in my mind. We pulled all of the data on the state incarceration for you and we were trying to understand the depth of the disproportionate minority incarceration which exists statewide here and in many other states. And this was cataclysmic. This was the thing that we could see that was just the outlier from everything else, which was that everyone arrested for drug sale in Camden, Newark, or Trenton was arrested under the school zone law and the penalty was just I can't remember—

**Governor Jon Corzine:** It was like double or triple what it would be if you were picked up [elsewhere].

**Anne Milgram:** It was extraordinary. And it was mandatory. And so it was just an immediate path to a very lengthy term of incarceration. Whereas, if you were arrested in a rural county, in a suburban county, you were not prosecuted most often. You weren't always under a school zone. And so you said to me, "Get it done." You may remember, and this is an interesting thing that I think is worth saying, which is that we had a lot of bipartisan support for a lot of the reform work we did. And we both did intense progressive reforms and law enforcement reforms. But I remember that there was some resistance in the Democratic leadership in the state legislature. And you may recall sending me to North Jersey for a series of meetings with members of the state legislature. And I remember them like it was yesterday. And basically just saying to folks, look, this is unfair. Here's the data. Here's the conversation. And really negotiating a path to stop it from being

mandatory, to give judges discretion and really essentially take out school zones. And my recollection is you signed it on your last day in office or the day before. It was one of the last things that you were able to do. And it has had an incredible impact on the levels of incarceration and on disproportionate minority incarceration.

**Governor Jon Corzine:** For the purposes of those that will hear this over the fullness of time and are studying governors, it's actually this discussion that tells you why state government is so—how it can be so impactful. Because with a little dose of data and a little common sense of examining whether it's cameras on street corners, or understanding how laws actually work, and then lead to multiple ripples of injustice to broad sections of our society, they have to be broken up into small enough pieces that you can actually understand what the details are. It's nice to talk about them theoretically but all of this stuff has a real practical reality.

**Anne Milgram:** And I should add this one thing which is this is another example where not many people were our friends. If you recall, the prosecutors were not fans of this, particularly the prosecutors in the major cities. They liked having the ability to try to flip people to become cooperators. "If you don't cooperate with us, you'll face eight years versus one." And the police officers were not so sure about it, either. Again, everything's been fine. And it was all done through conversations and negotiations. But it's a great example of taking on an issue, also, where it wasn't like the stars were aligned when you started. They just got there at the end.

We've talked about a number things. There are couple things I want to make sure we touch on and I'm not sure who is best to talk about this. But one of the ways in which I think from a really difficult circumstance we got a little bit lucky, was that the financial crisis led to the stimulus law which led to about $33 million coming to the state of New Jersey for use for law enforcement. Basically, we had essentially full reign over where that money went and it passed through the AG's office. And you may not remember this but I called the Department of Justice because you said, "Find evidence-based programs." And so I called the Department of Justice. I had worked there. And someone said, "Well, we really like the Boys and Girls Club." And I was like we really like them, too, but we cannot give them $33 million.

<laughter>

It seems excessive. That may not be the right way to solve all the problems in the state of New Jersey. See, in my old age I'm just talking the truth. <laughs> But we had a lot of money and we put a lot of money into prevention and expanded prevention programs for kids. Julie or Kevin may remember some of those. We put a lot of money into the reentry. And so it wasn't just the council. It was also putting money behind it. And then we put money into some of the law enforcement work including things like gun tracing and other projects we did.

**Ricardo Solano:** Speaking most to the law enforcement part of it, I do remember it was—for people who don't appreciate it, because they think of the attorney general as law enforcement—sitting at those staff meetings and it was literally spent one-third on law enforcement; one-third on reentry with Wanda [Moore] or Shevar Jeffries talking about reentry and what they were doing there; and then one-third on prevention, talking about the stuff we were doing on the prevention side. I think just on the law enforcement side, it was to the point of you need data in order to, one, put your resources smartly in the right places and also justify why you're doing it. So a lot of that was done with this money. Some of it was used to collect data. I remember it was the gunshot cameras where they would turn automatically to wherever there was a gunshot. And it basically got to the point where in Camden, you could pretty quickly—within minutes—figure out where the crime was occurring and then redeploy officers there. And you needed that with the lack of manpower. And along with that it was just the idea that the more data you give to police officers and to the folks that are deploying them, the better you're going to be at preventing crime. Not just arresting folks but actually preventing it by putting law enforcement there.

**Anne Milgram:** One other thing I always think about was—Governor, you may remember this—the E-trace program. It's worth just talking about for a minute because it was one that people from ATF [Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms] still give me a hard time about. At the time, the way that gun tracing worked in the state of New Jersey and nationally was that ATF would let a local police department query the origins of a gun and they would send the information back to that local police department. So if you think about New Brunswick and Edison being right near each other, New Brunswick wouldn't know about guns recovered in Edison. Edison wouldn't know about New Brunswick. It makes no sense because, obviously, people commit crimes across county boundaries and town boundaries all the time. So what we realized is that New Jersey was an integrated state. The AG's office was integrated. The state police was integrated. And so we had the state police do the queries and so they queried for all 560-something police departments in the state and it went back to the state police. And then the state police shared the information statewide with all the police departments. And so for the first time—and we were the first state to do this—we were able to essentially trace guns statewide and be able to say, "Okay, this gun pinged in Newark, but it's also pinged in Trenton." And to provide that information to law enforcement.

**Ricardo Solano:** Yes. And it was crazy that they weren't doing that. And so if the gun were used in a possession crime in a Passaic County town, you would not ever know if in Essex County the gun had been used in an actual murder. And there would be no way to trace that. And that, again, goes to the benefit of having everybody coordinate in the attorney general's office so you could issue a directive requiring that that be done. And I remember there was a lot pushback from the

ATF. I don't really understand why, but they didn't want to have to go through the trouble of doing that. And I think some of the counties and police departments didn't necessarily like that additional step, but it certainly was important to gather that information.

**Anne Milgram:** And it allowed the state police to build a really comprehensive gun repository of information statewide. Do you remember that?

**Governor Jon Corzine:** Yes.

<laughter>

I would love to hear this group talk—you've hinted at it a few times but the politics of all of this is amazingly difficult. It's difficult when you want to monetize turnpikes. It's difficult when you want to change school funding formulas. But dealing with criminal justice issues, whether it is arguing with Sharon, my wife, about the death penalty…

<Laughter>

**Anne Milgram:** By the way, I'm always with Sharon.

**Ricardo Solano:** Me too.

**Anne Milgram:** I'm just going to say it on the record.

**Sharon Elghanayan:** We're from New Jersey and everyone is going to see this.

**Steve Goldman:** For the record, team Sharon.

<laughter>

**Governor Jon Corzine:** I thought the politics inside it was bad. Anyway, trying to bring a reform agenda on issues where people have this emotional context to how they address it—some reasonable and some not. Can we have a little bit of discussion about that?

**Ken Zimmerman:** I'll kickoff for whatever it was the couple of years that I was there. Anne, when you were talking about the importance of evidence, I think that's true. But I think evidence only takes you so far. And one thing I was reflecting on is that I think there were mechanisms by which the proposals we were seeking, we were trying to get legitimacy. And we frequently use commissions of people from the outside as a way of bringing folks together. And, obviously, if you're appointing

them, you have some ability. But if you skew it too far, then it doesn't have any [legitimacy]. So in the death penalty, for example, you remember Reverend Howard chaired the death penalty moratorium commission. But we had prosecutors and spent more time trying to keep the prosecutors neutral even though they actually reported to the attorney general, but had people who had lost family members on it. And on something like the death penalty, at the end of the day the legislative leadership allowed people to vote their conscience so I think that was the key piece. Because I don't know what would've happened had the traditional political play gone out.

Also in the racial profiling piece. I think Jim Johnson had been appointed to do a set of hearings. I think it's really hard in some of these instances. I think that it was viewed as being very much the focus on an urban community and really focusing on the racial equity elements of it that at times didn't play all that well. But at the same time when you were able to combine the revenue consequences of some of it with the idea that it was the right thing to do, with the idea of engaging people—that was the best play that we could make. And at least for the parts that I was involved with around the death penalty, around the racial profiling piece, around some of the early legislative pieces, that was the way we did it. But nobody is pretending it was easy. There were plenty of legislators who pushed back.

**Anne Milgram:** I would agree a huge amount on both the commissions and also on the listening. I remember just being in every church in Camden for the better part of a month. And people were upset. We always dealt with complicated issues. But we were open to hearing people and I think that's really important.

You can't undersell, I think, two other pieces. One is that people really believe that your motives, Governor, were good. That you cared about the policy, you cared about the people, and it did go a long way. So in addition to having the data we never walked in a room, I never walked in a room with a state legislator or anybody else where they thought that there was some deal the governor was going to cut or some benefit to him. It was always a policy question and a substantive policy question and I can't say how much I think that matters. And, look, I remember a member of the legislature walking into my office—you may remember this Ricardo. Basically, we wanted some bill to be passed and we were having a conversation. And the member of the legislature saying, "Well, I have this business," and we basically said that's the end of the conversation. We don't have conversations like this. We deal in policy, not politics in that way. But I do think that people knew that your heart was pure and that you wanted to do the right thing and I think that helped us a lot. I also think it's worth noting that we did build some unusual alliances. And so there were Republicans who voted for our criminal justice reforms for both—to make some laws, some of the intelligence gathering and the data-driven work better, to offer more witness protections. And to change laws around

the DOC. We really were able to sort cross the aisle on a number of things that, I think, mattered. What do you think?

**Governor Jon Corzine:** The most important example is the death penalty. Kip Bateman and Bob Martin were absolutely essential elements of allowing for that bill to get through the Senate. And we won by one vote, so two Republicans on the bill. And Kip Bateman actually was a very, very strong advocate.

**Anne Milgram:** What made you decide to do it in the first place? What motivated you?

**Governor Jon Corzine:** Well, as anybody who's ever talked to me about politics knows, this is one of those issues that I wrote my first paper at 15 years old on why this was inhumane and cruel and unusual punishment and inconsistent with fundamentalist Christian values that I grew up in. And so it always was there. It was a platform even in my Senate campaign. I made a deal out of it and got roasted regularly in debates and other places. But I also always looked at it as emblematic of the unequal application of justice not just with regard to capital punishment but with regard to the kinds of things that we've talked about in drugs or other issues. And so you had to take those on. These things actually ended up being—the kinds of things we were talking about [such as] school zones. We got more pushback from Democrats in many instances then we got from Republicans on conceptual framework because people thought we were undermining their neighborhoods. It's one of the things that I heard us talk about.

But how you build coalitions on these sort of criminal justice, ethical, and moral issues that relate to the judicial system and the application of crime are really, really tricky ones for people who are studying how you govern. I see it popping up on the marijuana issue; the same coalitions breaking down across party lines.

**Ken Zimmerman:** Just one observation: partly the push allows unlikely people to step in. So victims of crime, for example. I think one of the hardest meetings I ever took on your behalf was with people who had lost family members and were supportive of the death penalty. But you have to be able to listen to people at the end of the day. And it turns out that, I think, once you listen there were a surprising number of victims of crime who were actually supportive of the proposals as long as they felt listened to and as long as they felt like you were not ignoring them. And so some of the proposals that came out the death penalty moratorium commission had to do with victims of crime at the end of the day. And so I think that becomes part of the building block if one's attentive to it.

**Anne Milgram:** How important was it—I think I was the attorney general designee on that commission. And I remember attending some meetings where we ultimately

decided not to vote since we were responsible for the enforcement of the law. But I remember a really key moment of understanding that some of the surviving family members were deeply against the death penalty because there had not been an execution for many years. And I remember being surprised by what a powerful catalyst that was for their opposition to the death penalty. How important was that in building—I just remember sitting in the meeting and thinking I had never thought of it from that perspective.

**Ken Zimmerman:** Absolutely. Certainly the victim community was not monolithic. There people that were going to come out against it. But it was so significant that there were people who were going to support the abolition, just frankly from a political perspective. If you didn't have people on both sides, it would be very, very difficult, I think, for some legislators to be able to stand up to that sort of moral sense. They were people that you just needed to listen to. And I think people legitimately felt like they were being taken through the ringer every single time that there was a potential delay of an execution or another appeal that was being done. And I have to say it was where Reverend Howard's leadership was so key because he placed it in a moral framework. He's a remarkable man. And I think frankly without his type of call to bring people together and to have real listening on the commission, that you would not have come out of the commission with the kind of unanimity that was necessary to push it forward. But part of it was, in fact, that the people who had had family members who had been killed were willing to stand up. I'm sure you also remember the very last minute issue that we had was a recognition that—I think there were only eight people on death row at that time. And so all of a sudden on the Friday before the Monday we realized that we had to make a decision about the commutation of those eight people. And it turned out as a matter of legal principle that had they been commuted they would've gone back to the sentence that would've been the next most serious in effect which would've allowed them, theoretically, to be paroled. And so we had to make a legal call. And I remember talking to you [Anne] considerably over that weekend. Could you commute the sentence to life without parole? So I think those were all sensitivities that were part of the overall calculus.

**Anne Milgram:** I don't know if either of you remember this, but I think it's worth just asking how you got—and maybe the answer is that it was a very different time. But it's pretty unheard of today in American politics to let people vote their conscience, to have parties not require people vote party lines. Did you have to manage that? I can't imagine this one was easy.

**Governor Jon Corzine:** I'm going to give credit to Ray Lesniak on this because he had worked the Senate leadership on both sides for a very long time. And that would not have happened without his lobbying more than my lobbying. And he deserves an enormous amount of credit for having done it. I think Kip Bateman,

also, did an effective job of making that case for a number of years preceding this that led up to it. So to me it is an example—far too infrequent—where those of us who are blessed to have a chance to take state leadership and national leadership really do need to do more reaching out across aisles to make things happen. Important things only really get done on the toughest things when you can have that happen. And to sustain them, as we've seen with the healthcare law now. And I suspect will be the case with regard to the Trump tax bill. It's not only getting them done it's sustaining them over a period of time. And I think we're in a good position on the death penalty because it was done in that format. And there was plenty of really, really strong moral support on both sides of the aisle.

**Anne Milgram:** The one thing I just remembered as you were talking about bipartisan work was the expansion of drug courts, which was something that happened under your administration. And, also, a great number of moves to increase the ability of treatment space and treatment beds for individuals who were criminal justice involved. And I know that one of the bills subsequently was passed after we left, but that a lot of the work actually started [under you]. And I remember getting a call not long after we had left and someone saying, "What do you think of this?" And my saying, "It's a great idea. It was Governor Corzine's. Here's the draft of the work that was done." But that, I think, also, is something that sometimes we forget about the bipartisan work.

**Lisa Macaluso:** I wanted to just add to that. Juvenile justice reform was not done through a legislative mechanism. I'm not a lawyer. I only play one on TV. And so the fact is that in juvenile justice reform, our work was really focused on getting adults to change their behavior. And if anybody has ever tried to do that, that's really hard.

<laughter>

So I wanted to just sort of lift this up. It's not the big P-political, but the small-p political, about the importance of the leadership in that moment when we're trying to get people who are, in this case, putting lots of kids in detention and telling us constantly the kids who were there—the kids who were deprived of their liberty—are the kids who need to be there. When we're looking at this and saying there's another way. And sort of helping them to sort of move from that place of, "I'm absolutely right on this and you don't know what you're talking about," to, "Maybe I can make a small change. Maybe I can do something a little bit differently." And I think the data in that case really helps because everyone has an anecdotal story about some kid who did something and that's what they're going to stick with even though the rest of the kids don't look like that. So I just wanted to share that sort of small p-political aspect.

**Governor Jon Corzine:** Lisa, was there another issue—again, my memory has faded, but I think we worked on this with Kevin [Ryan]. We were mixing youth with adults preceding trials on a regular basis, if I'm not mistaken, which we put an end to. Was that part of the juvenile justice initiative?

**Lisa Macaluso:** There's a state steering committee that currently oversees this work. They did a bunch of research on the Waiver Law and who was where and how much prosecutors were using it, in which there were giant variations. Some prosecutors never use it. Some prosecutors use it all the time. Some kids stayed in detention two years. Some kids were processed through in two weeks. So they did that research. And in the past five years, they finally changed the legislation. And so now all kids who are on the waiver track—they've changed the age. They raised the age for that. They've changed the number of crimes that you could be charged as an adult for. And they've also, in that law, talked about the fact that kids need to—if you're going to be on that track, you need to be in the juvenile justice system. So they'll await their trial in detention. And if they are found guilty of a lesser included offense, they will spend their sentence at the juvenile justice commission. So they've really changed how they do that. But that really was horrible. And I just wanted to say for the record, Kevin did call this a miracle of government, but he was very skeptical.

<laughter>

**Anne Milgram:** It all comes out. Do you want to rebut that?

**Kevin Ryan:** No. I was very annoying as the child advocate. It's hard to now think back that there were 14, 15 kids being held in cells that were 14 by 10 with Post-it notes in Camden County saying, "Good job keeping your cell clean." It was licensed for 37 or 38 kids. There were 131 kids in there. It was really a perversity of humanity and the reform is stunning. Really stunning. And you deserve an enormous amount of credit for it.

**Anne Milgram:** I agree. And so you do you, Governor. I'll say this also. I remember looking at the dropout rates in Camden. Because one of the things we spent a lot of time focusing on was why there were so many kids—Camden has one of the high schools that is a dropout mill. I think just half the kids were graduating. And seeing that at ninth grade there was this huge drop off in schools and this huge uptick in the juvenile justice population attributable to Camden. And a third of our kids were from Camden at the time we started, which is just—when you start to look at the data, it can't be right. And I do think that the data mattered a lot. I think criminal justice is a fascinating space where anecdote has driven for so long and people's instinct has driven so long that it's really hard to push it back without access to real data and information.

One of the other things which I'm sort of having—my memory is coming back, David. I still need you; if you remember anything else you should feel free to jump in in a second. I think we also required that all defendants be audiotaped during interrogations. And it seems like something, if you watch TV now any crime show it happens everywhere. But it did not happen in most places at the time. It was very unusual to require everything to be put on video. And the reason I remember it now is walking into one of the police departments, they had asked me to come for something and they were so annoyed at me. It might've been actually Justice Rabner when he was AG, but I took the brunt of this one, which is fair. They had literally popped holes in the walls to put the cameras in. And they had done it in such a way as to essentially destroy the rooms that they had put them in. But, again, this is something that now has been embraced by law enforcement. And I think it's really important. When you think about wrongful confessions, having everything be memorialized is critical.

**Ricardo Solano:** I was just going to say, if you think about if you're trying to change adult behavior, changing law enforcement behavior after 23 years of doing it one way is even that much harder.

<laughter>

**Governor Jon Corzine:** And many political units that we have, as well. How fragmented. Even though the AG has oversight, you have so many multiple departments and jurisdictional issues. It's a lot different than in New York City, where you have a police commissioner who imposes on their eight-and-a-half million people. We have God knows how many.

**David Wald:** Eight-and-a-half million police chiefs.

<laughter>

I would just like to say that Safe Streets and Neighborhoods in itself, at its core, was a balancing act. You had law enforcement, prevention for kids, and reentry trying to hold hands of people getting out of jail and not letting them fail again, robbing me and going back to jail. And I think with law enforcement, it's a really tough nut. We're giving them new tools to do a better job. And I think that's why they finally started to come around. And there's one other political consequence—this being the Center on the American Governor. What happened to Safe Streets and Neighborhoods when the administration changed?

**Anne Milgram:** Yes. Is that a rhetorical question?

<laughter>

I never know. But you're right. It's a good question to ask. And I think, to Governor Corzine's point at the beginning, that four years is really not enough time to change everything. There are a number of stories I could tell about Camden, but I remember the biggest concern I had leaving was what would happen to Camden. And if you followed it, the next governor made huge cuts to the police department. And it took a long time. There was eventually a separate county department that was formed. But it was not without a lot of politics and struggle to get the city back on track. We talk a lot about consequences to elections, but particularly with policy, I think it's an underappreciated thing of how long it takes to do good public policy. And that even the best-formed coalitions can be tough to keep together when administrations change.

**Governor Jon Corzine:** What was our biggest swing and a miss in criminal justice?

**Anne Milgram:** I think there are a couple. I could give you probably one in a lot of different things. I think we did an extraordinary job in juvenile justice. But if I had it to do again, I would have tried to have closed every facility. In hindsight now knowing what I've come to learn, I think we went incredibly far, but candidly should've gone farther. I think Atlantic City was a city that was desperately in need of additional work and time from both the law enforcement and just a community safety perspective and that was high on our list of things to do. But we were always committed to finishing Camden first, to basically putting a Chief back in on Camden. You and I talked, I think, repeatedly about the fact that we did have 8.5 million police chiefs; actually, only 566. But the sort of localized nature of government in New Jersey was deeply problematic for law enforcement.

**Ron Chen:** Five hundred sixty-five now.

**Anne Milgram:** Right, 565. Right. But I do think that that's a systemic change I would have liked to have seen us make. I wish there was more that we could've done on guns. I think we started the conversation around behavioral health. But I think if you look at the criminal justice system and access to guns in America, there are significant things that need to happen. There's a really long list. This could be hours, I think.

<laughter>

Anyone else? Things that you wish we'd done or that we missed on?

**Ricardo Solano:** I think the last one that you touched upon with the guns. I remember at the end we started to have a conversation about—one of the things we find out through e-Trace is all the guns are bought in certain states outside, like Pennsylvania, Virginia—

**Anne Milgram:** Not New Jersey.

**Ricardo Solano:** Everywhere else but New Jersey. So the trafficking of guns into the state is a huge problem. And I remember we started having a conversation, but it just wasn't enough time to get that done.

**Ken Zimmerman:** One thing, I actually don't know how far it got, but the idea of coming up with a realistic sentencing commission structure. It was always something that do-gooders were sort of trying to put in. I don't think we figured out the right way to work a straight something in which the meaningful consequences of sentencing could be actually institutionalized in some form. And as a result I don't think we got as far as we might have in actually reducing some of the really draconian sentencing provisions. And the other thing I wonder about as I think back at least during my tenure was the ability of using the pardon or commutation power more widely. Having looked at what the Obama administration had done, I wasn't as aware of what that could do as a matter of sending a message as to who was in prison and humanizing it in a way that could've been a really effective complement. And I think that can be done actually as a way to shift the public narrative as opposed to always doing it through the legislative challenges.

**Lisa Macaluso:** I would say race equity, reducing racial disparities and including youth voice and community voice and people affected by the policies and the changes that we made were things that had we really known better and maybe been a little bit further along in our sophistication, we would've been able to have that be inclusive in the foundation of the structure that was put together to get this work done.

**Ron Chen:** Just in the criminal justice area, I can't think of swings and misses. It's, as I said before, situations in which we only really have the time to start the debate and not the time to finish it and there's still open questions.

**Peter Woolley:** Along the same lines, Anne, maybe we can ask what is it you note that was undone after you left office that really sticks in your memory?

**Anne Milgram:** I would offer Camden initially as the one—and I spent a fair amount of time before the transition with people in Camden, asking them to sort of take over the safety of the city knowing we wouldn't be there, which is something I had never done, candidly. I'd spent a lot of time in Camden but I had never gone and said, look, "We've now shown that it can be safe. This is up to you. You have the political power and the money to do what needs to happen." And, ultimately, I think that those people were successful, largely, in making Camden come back from what were terrible budget cuts. I will never forget—and I will not say too much because we're being recorded—but I was sitting on a New Jersey Transit train the

summer of 2010 and getting a call about the budget cuts to the police department. And basically having someone pose this question to me of, what would it be like to have a county police department? And spending an hour—I missed my stop getting off the train—but spending an hour thinking through, well, here are the things I would think about. And here's why I would actually do it. Here's why I think that there may be no choice but to make an incredible change, which is not something I would've supported easily but for those cuts. And I do think Camden has an extraordinary—now, we're looking at this 13 years later, but it was a rocky road done, I think, more for politics than for the substance of what was right for the people of Camden. So that's the one that sort of hurt my heart for a while.

**Governor Jon Corzine:** In all fairness, though, the merger of the local and county police has ended up working.

**Anne Milgram:** I was supportive of it.

**Governor Jon Corzine:** Yes. Even the police director we picked, I think, is number two in the county now.

**Anne Milgram:** Yes.

**W1:** You're saying it has not worked?

**Anne Milgram:** It has worked. And I was supportive of it.

**W1:** Right. That's what I thought.

**Anne Milgram:** But it was necessary because of the cuts that were being made. The distressed cities money that went to Newark and Camden were cut by the subsequent governor. And so that meant that the police officers who had just been hired had to be fired, which meant that all the sort of new blood, the culture change officers were taken out. And then you just didn't have what you needed to make the city safe. And you candidly didn't have enough officers. So the creating of the county allowed them to hire from scratch to sort of re-create the institutions and to build it out the way they wanted. So it was 100 percent the right thing to do. And under the circumstances I don't think there was another choice.

**Governor Jon Corzine:** By the way, though, just to respond to how this works, I will predict that by the time the current governor or the next governor is sitting here working on their archives, there will be a controversy develop in Camden County about local control of their own police department and how resources are allocated. That was always going to be the case. And I probably would be unsympathetic if it were presented to me further down the road. But I guarantee

that that will pop its head and be a serious issue, particularly if there's ever a pickup in the crime rate in Camden and the core city.

**Ron Chen:** I don't know if this is criminal justice, but it was almost exactly 10 years ago that the immigration blue ribbon panel that I chaired, that you appointed, presented its report. And one of its controversial recommendations was driver's licenses for undocumented immigrants. And I remember we presented it to you. And you were really quite candid with the commission members who were there that this is just not something politically that you were going to be able to press.

**Governor Jon Corzine:** In 2009.

**Ron Chen:** In 2009. And I think we understood that. I think we understood why. We felt we had to make the recommendation while knowing that that was not the time for it. And it's just another example of now it's gotten through the state senate. When they get themselves reelected in the fall maybe it will get through the assembly and there it will be. When I presented that report to you, I was a little depressed because there was this big huge piece of paper that I thought was going to gather dust in the department archives like so many other such reports. And it's amazing how many people have actually said, "You know, let's dust that off," in about the last year, at least in New Jersey. And that a lot of the ideas still have a lot of vitality. So it's just a matter of patience.

**Governor Jon Corzine:** Well, again, that gets to winning elections has a lot to do with what you can get done and what you can't get done. The trade-off is the hardest part of being governor, is you damn well know you're running into brick walls that are going to have repercussions electorally if you do the right thing. And I think we, as an administration, tried very hard for the most part, sometimes foolishly so, maybe, from a political standpoint, to do what we thought was the right thing. And that's self-serving for me to say. But I don't think there were many times that we made as blatant a, "Let's wait on this until after and election," as that particular issue, which I was very sympathetic with. We had already taken on sanctuary cities and embraced things that were undermining political support in a number of places. Anyway, I think one of the blessings of being a governor with this team is that people gave me their best thoughts, their best ideas. And I don't think they were afraid that there were going to get fired or yelled at. I don't know, maybe they'd get yelled at.

<laughter>

But I don't think people were afraid to be able to speak their mind on their issues. And that, I think, is absolutely essential of any executive is to be able to hear the

proper presentation and argumentation surrounding issues if you're going to get to good decisions.

## PANEL 2 – Children, Families, Education & Health Care

**Heather Howard:** Governor, do you want to say anything? Or do you want me to start and you'll not be shy.

**Governor Jon Corzine:** I won't be shy.

<laughter>

I do want to say one thing because Heather was with me from the very start in the Senate, helped build the team, very fundamental to what I said in the very opening remarks here. I got into politics because of trying to make a difference in people's lives that were left behind. And the person who taught me more than anyone else about that and how you could address it was Heather.

**Heather Howard:** Thank you. And that's a great segue because we have some other folks here who were integral. And for this panel—I understand you had a fabulous panel [earlier] that we will try to match, but we have equally distinguished panelists.

**Governor Jon Corzine:** This is like a cabinet meeting. They're in competition.

<laughter>

**Anne Milgram:** Actually, Heather hired me.

**Heather Howard:** I hired Anne. Yes.

**Anne Milgram:** So she's better.

<laughter>

**Heather Howard:** At finding talent. For this panel we thought would focus on a variety of social issues in which Governor Corzine was a leading edge among states. And we've got three fabulous panelists but everybody around the table contributed

and we want everybody to speak up because we know you all played key roles. And I want to do a little bit of an introduction so you know how awesome these people are because I think some of you haven't seen each other in years. So Kevin Ryan, I'll start at the end, is currently the CEO of Covenant House. And so he is making a difference around the world in the lives of youth and really vulnerable populations. So his reach is really global. It's really amazing, Kevin, to see you. And Kevin had been New Jersey's child advocate. And then Governor Corzine chose him to be Commissioner of Human Services. And he helped create and helmed the first Department of Children and Family. So he's going to talk today, among other things, about really the transformational work that was done on the child welfare system. So I look forward to hearing from Kevin about that. Julie [Kashen] was a D.C. person who we pulled into our orbit. We stole her from Senator [Ted] Kennedy. She was a judiciary committee staffer. She had written the first paid sick days bill for Senator Kennedy. And then we pulled her over to be legislative director where, among many things, she still has the scars to show for it when we got the federal commitment to the ARC tunnel. It's reopened now.

**Governor Jon Corzine:** And paid for.

**Heather Howard:** That's right. And paid for. And she's now a senior fellow at the Century Foundation and a leading thinker really across the country in work and family issues and doing amazing work there on childcare and other issues. Janellen [Duffy] was also a D.C. person who we met. She was a presidential management fellow at the finance committee and we sort of knew you on the Hill, but you had deep New Jersey ties, being Monmouth County and going to Princeton's Woodrow Wilson School. So we pulled you in to be the education policy advisor and eventually the director of policy. And you took the lead on the school funding formula, which we're going to talk about today, and other early childhood issues; so we're going to explore that. And sorry, Julie, I should've mentioned that you took the lead on paid family leave. We were one of the first states to do that. So we're going to explore all of these. And then I know Dr. [Fred] Jacobs is not shy. I hope we can also get into the work we did on stabilizing our healthcare system and some of the work, actually, foreshadowing the Affordable Care Act. So the themes we want to explore today are: the hard work that endures today, I think is really exciting; the progressive trends that we were at the head of; your willingness to tackle really intractable problems and that ties back, of course, to the groundwork, the work you did that endures today. And then, finally, I hope we'll get into some of the stories of your personal engagement and how unusual that was and we all have stories there. So Kevin, I want to start with you because as soon as the governor was sworn in he faced a really difficult situation in our child welfare system. Can you talk about what we did in those first six months?

**Kevin Ryan:** Yes, sure. When the governor was inaugurated, there was a consent decree that the previous governor had entered into and a federal judge had signed off on that had committed New Jersey to make comprehensive reform to its child welfare system. It had gone badly. The state was alleged to be in pervasive noncompliance. There was a federal takeover motion pending, a receivership motion pending. And just some of the highlights of what was broken: there were hundreds of thousands of phone calls coming into the hotline alleging that children were being badly abused in New Jersey. There were tens of thousands of investigations. New Jersey was very close to a historic high in the number of kids in foster care. It had one of the country's worst maltreatment in care rates. So children coming into care were being abused and neglected in the foster care system in New Jersey, more so than in almost any other state in the country, in fact, I think it was 49th. So it was a very serious situation. And I remember in our first conversations the governor was talking a lot about the methods that he used in business to identify solutions to problems that were persistent and the problems in New Jersey were long-standing and they were persistent. I can remember a tour of the Toms River South DYFS [Department of Youth and Family Services] office. Now, remember I had been the child advocate in New Jersey so I was rolling around telling everybody what to do. And now I had to do it.

<laughter>

And there were these folks who—I can't remember there being more than a handful of people who were older than 25 in this office, many of them had tears in their eyes describing caseloads of 60, 70, and 80 children per worker. And it turned out that that that was normative in many parts of the state, in Ocean County and Essex County and Atlantic County. And in Camden County the caseloads were horrific. Imagine as a parent you roll into a classroom and your kid is one of 80 desks in that classroom and here we are asking these caseworkers to make some of the toughest decisions at all hours of the day and night in some of New Jersey's toughest communities and neighborhoods. And we were overwhelming them. But this was a problem that endured under Republican governors; in fact the lawsuit was filed under Governor [Christie] Whitman. But also under Democratic governors. And it had stretched on for a long period of time with deep underinvestment. So here we were trying to figure this out. And the governor talked about how at Goldman [Sachs] there was an area that had been underperforming, he pulled it out and focused targeted resources with a dashboard that was driven towards the measurements of success. And then held leadership accountable, which I was thrilled to hear.

<laughter>

**Governor Jon Corzine:** I was going to cut your bonus. Serious threat.

<laughter>

**Kevin Ryan:** And within no time at all we had that first iteration of a new unit of state government. It was very controversial. There was bipartisan ambivalence to opposition for reasons that made sense. The legislature had been making investments, tens of millions of dollars in new money, year after year after year. The results were poor. And here we were asking them to triple their investment to create a new unit of state government, more bureaucracy, and trust this guy who had a mixed track record with some of them; having been the child advocate, I was antagonistic and didn't have a smooth way in to the legislature. I think that many of the governor's deputy chiefs of staff and Tom Shea spent a lot of time in those first six months giving me some cover. The truth of the matter is, though, that that first budget didn't get signed until there was a significant uptick in investment for the child welfare reform, an amount that the governor was deeply involved in building. And that investment changed the trajectory of the child welfare system. It's true that structure is not talismanic, and you could have a big entity like the Department of Human Services or a more discrete one and either could work. But at the time, the Department of Human Services had a $14 billion budget, 22,000 employees, seven hospitals, the public welfare system; there wasn't oxygen for the child welfare system to get the kind of sustained attention and reform that it ultimately required. And within two years, while important work remained beyond, in two years the state had set on dashboards that Julie and I built and that the governor and I talked about monthly. State records in the number of kids who were adopted. State records in the number of foster families who were available to take care of children. And within 6 months, we were down from 49$^{th}$ to 48$^{th}$ in child safety to third in child safety within 36 months. It was the beginning of a really stunning turnaround. And as the coalition that watched this began to see that change was really possible, good things could happen to kids, we began to do more and different things that I'm happy to talk about. But as I look around the country—I said this to you, Heather in the prep for this—as I look around the country and look at governors who are struggling with child welfare systems that are underperforming and kids who are not faring very well in these systems, both Republican and Democratic governors, the difference in success is about the personal involvement in leadership of the governor. It simply cannot happen. And what Governor Corzine brought to this was a deep personal sense of accountability on his own part but, also, for us to turn this system around. And that game-changed. That game-changed.

**Heather Howard:** Didn't he go with you to court?

**Kevin Ryan:** Yes. No television cameras. No reporters. Which was kind of a thing because this was back in the day when there were newspapers.

<laughter>

There were seven beat reporters who were covering the New Jersey child welfare system in full or in part: New York Times, Gannett, Philadelphia Inquirer, Star-Ledger. And the governor with no press attention would come with me to talk with families and kids on adoption days, on days when children were being reunified with their families. We would call that "home for the holidays." And early on we went to the Camden DYFS office and I was still in child advocate mode. And I remember going into a cubicle and seeing that the names of kids were being tracked on Post-it notes. And I said, "Can you believe this? They're tracking children on Post-it notes." He's like, "Aren't you in charge now?"

<laughter>

I was like, "Oh my God, you're right. Stop looking at that."

**Julie Kashen:** A theme of the last panel was the governor saying to his team, "Get it done." And I think this was an important one. I remember meeting with the monitor. And it was, "Get it done. This is a priority. It has to get better and I'm making this Department of Children and Families so that we could really focus on it and do better." And I remember going around the state to public hearings where there were very, very different opinions about whether this was the right thing to do but just knowing that it was coming from the governor's heart that we had to do this. And watching Kevin lead it and make it happen and then really start to turn things around was just such an honor to be a part of that. It was pretty important.

**Heather Howard:** I remember him saying failure was impossible. Wasn't that sort of the mantra?

**Kevin Ryan:** Yes.

**Governor Jon Corzine:** I will say one thing that Kevin talked about and it was easy, given both the front office support but also the leadership that Kevin brought to it. When you have a problem, you have to isolate it if you want to correct it. You gave the statistics on where it was within an organization structure and it's kind of like a conglomerate in business. It's very hard to have people think in a straight line with regard to the kinds of issues that we had with our children's welfare situation. And I think breaking that up and letting you infuse it with your sense of responsibility from an emotional standpoint and then the genius that both in policy the whole team brought to bear, really, really made a huge difference in the lives of children. And I think that's continuing from what I've been able to poke around and see.

**Heather Howard:** Can you speak to that?

**Kevin Ryan:** Yes. No, I think that is true. By the time your term ended and the next governor's term began, the momentum was so obvious and the coalitions that had been developed—in some part groups that had not gotten along for a long time seeing the possibility of change and reform—had metabolized so deeply in New Jersey that the path forward was, I wouldn't say inevitable because, obviously, deep cuts in investment would have paralyzed the system. But maintaining those levels of investment has paved the way for what exists today. Governor [Phil] Murphy's appointed to lead the system today an incredibly talented leader who grew up in our reform effort and then went out and did amazing work in other states before returning to lead the effort now. And they're very close, very close to exiting the litigation. It's really breathtaking to think about that. And sometimes I can remember how bad the headlines were and how terrible the reality for children was back in the day. And I hear people talk about, "I want to build a system like New Jersey's." And I'm like…

<laughter>

**Heather Howard:** Tom, do you want to say anything about the politics?

**Tom Shea:** Well, I think, just for a little context, you all described that there was clearly objectively, and certainly in the governor's mind, a moral imperative to do something about the problem. But there also was a political imperative. And if you remember at the time that Governor Corzine was elected, there had been the interim period with Governor [Dick] Codey but there was still a bit of a hangover from the McGreevy resignation. And there was certainly a sense, I think, among the population of the electorate that things in Trenton weren't working as well as they could. There were a lot of circumstances where you could see that that was the case, whether it was what was happening as we were talking about earlier with the state police, or with the children's protective services in the state. So there was this idea which was, in a lot of instances, true and also was politically to our advantage to convince the electorate that things in Trenton weren't working with the folks who had been entrusted with the leadership of the state for a long time, many of whom had grown up in the political system in New Jersey. And so the argument on our part was that it was time to bring in somebody from outside of Trenton, somebody with a proven record of leadership in business to bring some other skills to bear in Trenton. And those big, big problems—and the children services was one of the one of the most obvious—made it not just, as I said, a moral imperative to address it, but a political imperative for Jon Corzine as the new governor to come in and say, "We're going to clean up some of these messes that have been caused by a lot of the folks who have been here for a long time."

**Heather Howard:** So let's talk about another one. Janellen, you knew I was coming to you. That played out intensely over six months and then, of course, the hard work of implementation. Janellen, can you talk about what we inherited in terms of the school funding formula and what the process was?

**Janellen Duffy:** Absolutely. Yes, I mean, along the same lines of what we've been talking about is a big huge intractable problem, a system that was badly broken. And I can remember looking at the data in early years, always being so driven by the data, and seeing that. At the point that we came in, over half of the school funding that was being distributed across the state was going to about a quarter of the kids. And we also knew that the demographics had shifted so much that while at one point the lowest income kids were concentrated in the Abbott districts, that was no longer the case. And we had seen that half of the low-income kids existed and lived outside of the Abbott districts. So we knew from the data that the system was badly broken. And I can remember—I think the governor also really knew from the stories he had heard from people, from the towns and cities and the schools that he had been in as a senator and on the campaign. And I can remember him saying, "If we don't fix this, there's going to be a revolution. We have to fix it." It was both a policy problem, it was a political problem, it was a moral problem. It was a very big, big endeavor to take on. Do you want me to go on?

**Heather Howard:** Yes. It does ring true, Tom. Does that ring true with you, your memory of coming in and saying it's intractable but we've got to take it on?

**Tom Shea:** Yes.

**Janellen Duffy:** Yes. I remember, and this was raised in last panel, that there were folks who said, "Wait and do it a second term." But I think there was such a responsibility to really tackle it early. But it was not something that could be handled as quickly as the child welfare reform. It took about two years. We had the special session of the legislature. We had a couple of different iterations of the formula.

**Heather Howard:** How many of us sat around and looked at—

**Tom Shea:** My memory is a little hazy but I feel like there was also some legal reason why we felt like we needed to do it sooner rather than later, in the courts potentially. My memory is a little hazy.

**Janellen Duffy:** Yes. In the first budget, we essentially did flat funding for the schools across both the Abbott districts and the non-Abbott districts. And we went to court. And the governor came, himself, which got—talk about personal involvement. And we said to the court, we said, please let us just take this first year

and we have to do flat funding. The budget situation is really terrible. And let us get the new school funding formula in place. So there was an urgency in addition to the moral imperative.

**Tom Shea:** Right.

**Heather Howard:** And that's why him going was so important, right? Do you guys remember?

**Janellen Duffy:** Yes. And then it took a little while to get the formula in place so in the first couple of budgets we had to sort of take steps towards getting towards the funding formula. And this is what Heather was getting at. I can remember the governor again was so personally and deeply involved in this. And there were towns, in particular, that he used to really worry about. And he was going around thanking everybody. He came up to the second floor, going around to everyone's desk and thanking them for the work on the budget. And he gets to my desk and Heather is standing with me. And he's like, "Pull up the spreadsheets. I want to see how Lacey Township did. I want to see how Egg Harbor did." And we had the slowest computers in the world. And Heather and I are standing there and he's rattling off town after town. And I was like, okay, it's going to turn out okay.

<laughter>

But I remember that so well because after that I always walked around with spreadsheets. These are clearly towns and people and families that he had heard from that were really hurting because they had not had any increases in school funding over the past 10 years. Their property taxes had gone up. And they knew that they weren't getting what they needed in terms of their schools. And so, ultimately, we were successful in getting it done.

**Heather Howard:** Do you want to speak that?

**Governor Jon Corzine:** I don't think people can understand how much this team put in to getting a funding formula that worked both constitutionally and in the context of some basic standards of helping the kids that needed to be helped. It even stands today. It needs to be updated. It needs to be updated based on what the population does. But we put real variable definers on how you were going to allocate the number of kids on food support and a whole series of things. And there were lots of places in New Jersey that benefited enormously. And we didn't end up hurting the places that had great, great needs, too.

**Janellen Duffy:** Exactly. It was very controversial.

**Governor Jon Corzine:** They didn't like me in some places.

<laughter>

**Janellen Duffy:** It was very, very controversial. And I think we took great pains to ensure that it would meet constitutional muster, that the formula was going to really include the right level of resources for low income students. And that took work. It was a very significant period of time that we worked on it. And, again, just to underscore some of the points—we talked about earlier about the politics. And the formula was passed in the lame-duck session between 2007 and 2008. And the bill was introduced about a week before Christmas. And I remember on Christmas Eve, the governor called me and he was out of state, but he said, "Where are we? What has happened today? Anything moving?" And I was like—

**Governor Jon Corzine:** Santa Claus.

<laughter>

**Janellen Duffy:** It's Christmas Eve! I had to say, "Well, it is Christmas Eve. I don't think we're going to see much happening today." But it was like a couple of days later that we came back and it was passed in the week between Christmas and New Year's. And then we used it in the subsequent budget, which was a pretty quick turnaround. And then Anne and her team had to do an enormous undertaking to get ready for court.

**Heather Howard:** Tom, do you want to jump in on the politics?

**Tom Shea:** I just was going to say, I don't want to get too far into hagiography, but if you want me to balance it out with some criticisms later, I'm happy to do it.

<laughter>

But I do think one of the things that is relevant to both the earlier conversation and the conversation we're having now is that one of the reasons, often, that some of these problems are so intractable is that there are problems that are created because there are natural divisions between people; us and them. So in the case of criminal justice, we were talking about the arrests in the school zones, or most specifically in the school—I'm going to call it school formula funding as an homage to Patti McGuire.

<group laughter>

School formula funding is clearly a question of suburban versus urban and white versus black or brown. And the same could be said in the instances in the criminal justice system. And a lot of times those problems are intractable because people are afraid to try and bridge those divides; that it is politically more expedient to not to wade into those waters because they tend to be pretty tricky politically. And I think the one thing you can say about Jon Corzine is that he was never afraid to wade into those waters, one. And he was more interested in trying to figure out, how do we bring these people together? And what do we all have in common as a statewide community versus what's happening in an urban community versus what's happening in a suburban community? So I also think that speaks to something unique that he brought to the table when it came to tackling some of these intractable problems.

**Heather Howard:** Anne can you speak to—because in retrospect it looks like it went all smoothly but it was never a done deal.

**Anne Milgram:** No. Definitely. I would say there's sort of two recollections I have. And, of course, we represented the governor's office and the Department of Education. And I remember the first question I got from either you or the governor, the first time we had to go to court, was should the governor go? I'm pretty sure I said that's not a great idea. The governor doesn't need to show up. They'll do it anyway. But it was a testament to how strongly the governor felt that he showed up and the court went with us. And then when we were preparing for the argument, there are couple points. One is it was by no means assured that the court would be with us. They had knocked down many formulas that had been created before. And so we had tried to craft a formula that would pass constitutional—

**Governor Jon Corzine:** I don't think they actually ever addressed it successfully.

**Anne Milgram:** Yes. So it's easy in hindsight now to think well, of course, they got it right. But we were all concerned as to whether or not it would get done. And we did it the best we could and the way we thought would work. But there was no guarantee. And there were people on the other side who were great advocates for children, who truly believed in kids in urban communities, that were afraid of what would happen. And so there was a certain amount of the fear of the unknown that was just out there. And so the court did ultimately go with us. But I will say this, I will never forget sitting at my desk and the governor calling me and saying, "Who do you think should argue the case?" And I was like well, it's very clear, the head of our education section. She knows everything. The governor was like, "No. I've got another idea. I think you should do it." And I argued the case and I was thrilled to actually have done it, although there were moments in preparation where—

**Janellen Duffy:** I can remember a lot of studying.

**Anne Milgram:** It was a lot of studying. But the court was incredibly receptive to the governor and really believed in what you were doing trying to do. But it was by no means—we weren't sure.

**Janellen Duffy:** It really wasn't. And it was so critical that in the two budgets when we used the school funding formula, we had to fund it as fully as we could in the midst of an economic downturn. It was very dicey. And the other piece we added and I meant to mention before was the preschool expansion we always felt was critical both from a policy perspective, a moral perspective, and also because the court cared very deeply about that. And so the school funding formula included a very significant expansion of preschool opportunities to a greater set of low-income districts. And then, ultimately, to all low incomes students across the state and that law is still on the books and is has been funded in the last couple of years.

**Heather Howard:** Well, speak to that, Janellen. It seems school funding is still in the news but it's actually not the formula, it's the amount going in, right? I mean, where does this come out?

**Janellen Duffy:** Yeah. I mean the School Funding Reform Act is still the law on the books. And after being successfully blessed by the court there's never been a new formula. There have been a lot of troubles with fully funding it. But in the recent years when the discussion has kicked up again around school funding, it's not been about, "Let's throw out the formula." It's been about, "How do we tweak the formula?" There's been a discussion about—we always try to work out how you would potentially ramp down aid over time, the glide path we would call it. That's been in the news. That's been what's been the focus in most recent years. For districts that are overfunded, how do we ramp that down slowly over time? And then this preschool piece. So the infrastructure remains and is really a very lasting significant accomplishment. It's just that there have been tweaks. And now the preschool piece is being funded more fully.

**Heather Howard:** Before we move on, do you want to speak to this?

**Governor Jon Corzine:** The only thing to say is you're hearing here and when Julie starts talking and both what Kevin and Janellen have said, this is why we were here. There was a mess that needed to be addressed with children at a very basic level. That's what government is supposed to do: take on broad-based problems that other people can't help themselves with. Our solution or effort to bring efforts to the school funding distribution is essential for us to be able to take on pre-k. And, by the way, expanding kindergarten full day for the districts that didn't have the resources. These are all part of the same cloth is the point. And I said this earlier and I'll repeat it. We're debating how you deal with inequality in our country. If you don't deal with these kinds of starter set issues, you're never going to have

progress along a more open society and equal opportunity. And that's what these guys did. We had a great legal team to help us do it. I'm very proud of that work because we were really ahead of a lot of other people in doing it and the great competency and care that people brought to it.

**Janellen Duffy:** Can I just add on to that point? I think Anne started to get at this earlier. Not only were we ahead of the curve but the opposition were these groups that had been fighting on behalf of the Abbott districts for a long period of time. They had extensive relationships across the state and within the legislature. And we had to work through a number of issues with them.

**Heather Howard:** Many of them were natural allies that you worked with on so many other issues.

**Janellen Duffy:** Exactly. And some of them were torn because they really liked the preschool piece. They wrestled with the Abbott piece. But it was really interesting to see in subsequent years under the next governor—and even now—there's been a lot written about how it's a model law. It's been very much supported by those groups that opposed it I think because they needed time to judge us. They needed time to see the law play out and be implemented and to fully recognize the potential.

**Governor Jon Corzine:** I will say that there was another piece that was very close to this but others could talk about it another time, but we had a school construction fund that was completely abused and misused. And we took that on at the same time to help many of the same folks and actually got a good start. And that's one of the things I've also been emphasizing. When you lose elections it has consequences, and the inability to carry those through in some instances and the school construction was very real, the whole prioritization of funding the education formula is another one of those places where a November day changes history.

**Heather Howard:** So Julie, the governor just mentioned these broader efforts to address inequality. And you led and had great colleagues working on these issues. Can you talk, in particular about the paid family leave? Or you always corrected me, family leave insurance, right?

**Julie Kashen:** You always got it wrong. Yes.

<laughter>

**Heather Howard:** It was a better framing. Can you talk about those issues?

**Julie Kashen:** Absolutely. And as you called out, Commissioner [David] Socolow was instrumental in that as well and so please chime in as I miss things. But, firstly, I just want to note I think we've been talking about these themes throughout, but some of the themes of this administration really were equality, fairness, justice, protecting the most vulnerable. We thought about—we were there to do the right thing and that's what that meant. We take that for granted because we know this governor and that's who we are as people. But I think it's important to say that out loud because that's what so much of this was and what we were all fighting for and working for together. On paid family medical leave, New Jersey ended up being the second state to pass this. California had passed it in 2004. This is a law that allows new parents to be with their babies, for family members to be with seriously ill family members and to get some wage replacement while they're doing it so that they're not fiscally ruined because they had a life event that they should be celebrating and being a part of. And so this was really important. It's something we started talking about in the Senate office and got to the governor's office. There had been an effort going on in New Jersey for a while led by AFL-CIO and Citizen Action and others. The Time to Care Coalition had been fighting for this for a long time and it hadn't really seen the light of day yet in terms of priority from the governor's office. And so it became something that was a priority, was on our list. It was something we were going to work for and work toward. And so in May 2008 the governor signed the New Jersey paid family leave law and talked about how this was- well, I have his quotes. He said, "I believe the daily reality in the lives of New Jersey families makes this historic law a necessity. I'm confident the self-funded family insurance program—" I didn't write that line—"will improve family life—"

**Governor Jon Corzine:** I was dreaming of this last night.

<laughter>

**Julie Kashen:** "—fill a gap in our social contract with our citizens and attract workers to this state." And I think that's important, too, because there was business opposition to this.

**Governor Jon Corzine:** Oh, just a little.

<laughter>

**Julie Kashen:** And the governor knew that it was the right thing to do. And that the business opposite opposition was coming from the Chamber of Commerce and paid lobbyists. And that if you talk to people who were part of a business, that they recognize, actually, "We care about the people who work for us. And when they have a life event we want to support them through it. And we want to be there for them." And I believe even at Goldman, that this was something that had been

important to him. So despite business opposition, we did pass it. We had to make a lot of compromises along the way. One of my lessons that came out of it was to start really bold because you will end up negotiating. And I remember at times feeling like some of our advocates, our friends were negotiating with themselves a little bit. And there did sometimes tend to be, "Oh, the opposition says this." And I think it's important to recognize the opposition is always going to say that, whether it's 12 weeks, 24 weeks, 8 weeks, 6 weeks. And so I think we went pretty quickly from 12 to 6 because that's what California had. And we might've been able to keep it even higher if we had decided it was okay that business was saying it was a problem because we knew that it could work. But I will say that since the law was signed, more than 200,000 families have been able to take advantage of it and be there for their family members at crucial times in their lives. And I think that's so important.

**Governor Jon Corzine:** Now they're expanding it.

**Julie Kashen:** I was just going to say, more recently those things that we had hoped for back in the day, our starting point, has become a reality. Governor Murphy has built on your legacy of this and gone further, which is really exciting.

**Heather Howard:** How many other states have enacted?

**Julie Kashen:** Right now, six states and Washington D.C. have it. So we were the second to enact it. Washington state had passed a law but they didn't enact it until more recently.

**Heather Howard:** David, do you want to jump in?

**David Socolow:** Well, Julie, I think that was very well done. And I would just say I think that lesson of the compromise is that one of the crazy things with the language, we were constantly trying to meet these objections, bending over backward to say that this is a benefit law, not to leave law. Employers were already were required—certain size employers—to give people unpaid leave, which President [Bill] Clinton signed—the first law he signed in 1993. All we were doing was adding the insurance, the wage replacement money so that people could afford to do it, which was clearly about equity because people with some resources can take a few weeks to be at home and were job-protected already but people without those resources didn't have that ability. And that conversation was endlessly frustrating. Everybody wanted to call it "paid family leave," which sort of fed right into the opposition. And so I take the blame for your statement, governor, of calling it insurance or self-funded insurance plan or some stupid language. But that was all intentional to try to sort of assuage this extremely vociferous, sky-is-falling opposition that we were receiving, as Julie just said, from people who—you now

look at it the law has been in place for 11 years. It's now been doubled and expanded. And the sky has not fallen. And thousands of people have been able to be with their families at crucial times, whether happy or very sad, and have a little bit of protection of their income.

**Governor Jon Corzine:** And this concept will be on the agenda of 2020 at the federal level, which is extraordinary. Not because of us alon,e but it's time has come. And once, again, as I talked about, I think this team put me into a position where we were at the forefront of a lot of things. We'll talk about healthcare in a little bit, too. And we have a lot to be proud of because we were there.

**Heather Howard:** Well, and I think the long arc of your involvement in these issues testifies to how meaningful and real it was. I mean we got to know Julie when she was working for Senator Kennedy on these issues and you were in the Senate and active on these bills. So it makes sense. And I don't know whether earlier you talked about that that the first bill he introduced in the Senate was the End Racial Profiling Act. So that really is a long arc that, not just your time as governor, it does connect. Tom, anything we got wrong on this?

**Tom Shea:** No. Because Julie began her remarks by talking about the philosophy behind this and, I think particularly with this portfolio issues and from the time—I'm thinking back now to the summer of 2000, driving around New Jersey in a Ford Explorer. And from then through the end, both in the Senate and in the governor's office, there was a Hubert Humphrey quote that the governor or senator used very frequently which, I think, is almost sort of an animating principle for this portfolio of work across both the Senate and governorship for Governor Corzine. And that was that "the test of government is how it treats people in the dawn of life, the children; in the twilight of life, the elderly; and in the shadows of life, the sick, the needy, the disabled." And so I think that was the philosophy that he brought to all of these questions both in the Senate and in the governor's office.

**Governor Jon Corzine:** While we're picking on Julie here, not everything had to be invented here. Julie wrote a memo to me. I don't know whether it was Julie or Heather or both of them together, which was typical, about the earned income tax credit. That dumb and happy New Jerseyans had by their own admission left, what, $350 million, $400 million worth of eligible money for earned income tax credits for the people who needed it most. And we were doing nothing to go out and promote the use of the earned income tax credit. And I can remember Julie and I going to these little shops or stores. I can't even remember what group it was that was helping us get people to sign up. And we got someplace between 250 to 300 million of the 400 million on a two or three-year basis that we were there. And so I only say this as not every idea has to be creative, but you have to be committed to making the things that should be working work. And this group of people on these

kinds of issues did that. And I think that's true about the education formula. The concept was right but you had to get it into a format that actually would work to accomplish what you need. And I don't think anybody was willfully—maybe some of the foster participants were willingly abusing the system for financial gain. But in general, the people in the departments weren't. But we weren't executing. We had to execute. And to do that you needed good people and you needed the isolation. My whole point about governing is not only about it being bold with new ideas, which I think we were pretty good at doing, but then you have to actually make the stuff work.

**John Weingart:** Anne made a reference in the last session to how different the media was at that point. I wonder, was it helpful in getting accurate information out or not for these issues?

**Kevin Ryan:** I don't think there would be child welfare reform in New Jersey without the media. And there were times that I—my God, if I knew that I would one day say this out loud, I'd think I was being held at gunpoint at this session because it was painful at times. But the media plays an essential role in holding government accountable for vulnerable people. And children are politically disenfranchised, and abused and neglected children are so vulnerable. And the media was relentless and told a story that galvanized a wide swath of lawmakers around this idea that we needed to create something better, a better world for kids. And we had some of those conversations and I wonder if people—I guess folks know what a good problem solver you are. But I can remember one conversation in which we were talking about all the kids in New Jersey who were legally free; that's what we called children who had been taken away from their parents and their [parental] rights were terminated. We had 3000 of those young people in January 2006. And we had a real shortage of foster families. So many of these kids were going to age out and the statistics nationally on what happens to children when they age out of foster care are dismal. Many become homeless. This is that work that—

**Governor Jon Corzine:** This is Covenant House.

**Kevin Ryan:** Yes, this is what we do. Right. But some of those kids experience suicidal ideation. Some of these young people get involved with the criminal justice system, disproportionately so. So governor, you had come back from a National Governors' Association meeting and you were saying, "You know, some of the governors were talking about the fact that lesbian and gay couples aren't allowed to adopt in their states." And I was like, "Wow." And you said, "Why don't we go target those lesbian and gay families?" And so we marketed our foster care program in states that had closed the door on LGBTQ families. And that's how we set a state record. People were like, "Oh, it's amazing work." No. We just looked to all these families across the country who wanted desperately to be a forever family

to a young person and had their governors and state legislators say no to them. And we said come to New Jersey. And they did and they became permanent families for those kids who, today, flourish. And New Jersey still is at the very top of the states that have children adopted by LGBTQ families across the country.

The other strategy that occurred to us midway through the first year was, you were asking me a little bit about why it's hard to get older kids adopted. And we were talking little bit about that. And you said, "Well, why don't you take your best recruiters who were working with babies and toddlers and why don't you make them family finders for the older kids?" So we took our five best adoptive family recruiters who had been working with infants and toddlers and we placed them in service of the hundred longest-waiting kids. These were children who had been in foster care for no less than 12 years. Some of them had been in foster care for 13 and 14 years. And within 2 years 73 percent of those kids had permanency. And we taught ourselves—that's not a bet that any of us had made going in, but we taught ourselves that if you have the opportunity for investment and you focus the resources, you can help young people achieve permanency. And that also is a program that's very strong in New Jersey today. And as Lisa and I were talking, you know, the third real hallmark of that year was the Foster Care Scholars program. There are thousands and thousands of children who go to college in New Jersey after living in foster care in their whole lives, and the state of New Jersey pays for that and provides a safety net for those young people. And anybody who pays attention to the data on earnings, if you have a GED, a high school diploma, two years of college, four years of college, these kids are moving into economic power in a way that's fundamentally different than if they age out with a GED or worse and that happened in 2006 because of your leadership. So lots of interesting problem-solving.

**Governor Jon Corzine:** It's nice you guys are saying your leadership. It's our leadership.

**Kevin Ryan:** Yeah, no, I know. But I'm probably going to hit you up for a donation at Covenant House.

<laughter>

**Governor Jon Corzine:** Shocking.

**Julie Kashen:** I don't remember as many specifics around the media, but the thing I did think was really interesting was going from the Senate, where we were one of many and really doing such amazing work there but not really being able to break through to the media about it, to then suddenly not being able to turn around without press there. And so just really coming to see—

**Heather Howard:** They're outside your office; they're everywhere. Right.

**Julie Kashen:** —the power of the bully pulpit. And how the things that you were willing to say and to take a stand for really mattered because everyone was paying attention and writing down or recording every word you said. And I think we used that for good.

**Governor Jon Corzine:** This is anecdotal but I'm often asked which job did you like the best? And there ain't no question. And it doesn't mean that the work in the Senate was not really, really important. We had to deal with 9/11. We had to deal with the Iraq War. We had lots of things that were deeply energizing. Darfur. I can go through it. But the difference of being able to use that pulpit for the stuff you believe in is just utterly incredible. And, I don't know, guys start using 200,000 here, you got paid family leave or whatever the hell you call it.

<laughter>

And those things make a huge difference. A huge difference. So you've got to preach that to the kids at Eagleton because there is an incredible leverage within democracy, as messy as it is.

**Kevin Ryan:** I do think if you have a governor who doesn't have the impulses that you have, and New Jersey has a track record of having governors who don't have the impulses that you have toward care for the vulnerable, the diminishment of the media over the last decade poses a real problem for public accountability. People don't know enough about government. And the way people interact now in social media just creates this abiding skepticism about whether government is designed to do good and can do good. It's very dangerous for democracy and the trajectory is bad.

**Governor Jon Corzine:** Well, the media that you do have is so ideological, both right and left, that people only hear the extreme arguments. And they tend to be generalized and not specific enough for people to frame a view about how you should allocate funds for education. It's very hard to get a precise argument when it's so muddled up with the yelling and screaming of ideology.

**Heather Howard:** Tom, do you want to say anything about the press and how we used it then?

**Tom Shea:** No. Kevin made the point but I think it's not just relative to these issues. It's relative to everything. And I think particularly at that point in time whether it was due occasionally to corruption, sometimes to mismanagement, sometimes to both, there was plenty for the New Jersey press core at the time to

cover. And we know now that for them, it was not just a matter of doing their duty as sort of a public watchdog which is, of course, part of their motivation. But there were Pulitzers in those stories for reporters who covered New Jersey state government. And I think you're right. Not having that makes the process weaker across the board for everybody.

**Governor Jon Corzine:** David, do you have any comment on it?

**David Wald:** At the state level, it's not really the ideology that matters. Obviously, we're talking about the wars on cable television news. But in this state, it suffers because the print media is disappearing, the TV media is not very good and so advocates lose a very important platform. I know the reporters who were covering children services. They're not there. Well, one person is left, Sue Jones.

**Kevin Ryan:** Right.

**David Wald:** But in general, they kind of go after the easy stuff down in Trenton, some easy politics rather than trying to get into the nitty-gritty of policy issues. There's a website now that tries to do that [N.J. Spotlight], but I don't think it has a wide circulation. I'm a reader but I'm not the ordinary man on the street. But it has suffered. It's harder to develop support for various programs if you can't alert them to what's not being done right. So it is much tougher these days.

**Governor Jon Corzine:** I still think that the default dialogue, though, goes to the hardcore advocates—I won't use extremists. Even at the local level, it is the people who are prepared to be organized—generally advocates, and generally ideologues. And I think we were caught in the transition of that. This is not the time to be talking about the monetization program but we had crowds of Tea Party folks showing up and set the agenda and carry that agenda. And I think that was damn near the case on the school funding formula.

**Janellen Duffy:** Yes. And in some ways, going into David's point earlier, we had these reporters who you had long-standing relationships with. They were brought in. They were briefed. They knew the details. And then they wrote great stories that were factually accurate. Imagine?

<laughter>

And so that worked to our advantage. And the longer you talked to them, the better the story was. And now you have just a lot of misinformation on social media. And the folks that are very well-organized use social media to their advantage to spread misinformation. We, fortunately, didn't have to deal with that.

**Governor Jon Corzine:** Well, I don't know about that.

**Janellen Duffy:** No, but I mean in terms of we didn't have—

**Governor Jon Corzine:** [David] Wildstein was around.

**Janellen Duffy:** Yeah. Yeah. I just mean social media. We didn't have social media.

**Heather Howard:** Dr. Jacobs, can we make sure you get a microphone. You were Commissioner of Health.

<laughter>

**Dr. Fred Jacobs:** I need another microphone.

**Heather Howard:** You were Commissioner of Health for two years. And then I had the great fortune to follow you and build on your tremendous work. You had been Commissioner of Health for Governor Codey. These were the years before the Affordable Care Act when the healthcare safety net was unraveling.

**Dr. Fred Jacobs:** Yes, it was.

**Heather Howard:** And the impetus was building that eventually created for the 100 years of attempts at the federal level to do healthcare reform. But these were those really difficult years leading up to that when things were unraveling and there was incredible hospital distress. And I think a really innovative approach that we took there that I thought was an important story to tell.

**Dr. Fred Jacobs:** Well, yes, thanks, Heather. As you know, there was an awful lot of problems in the general hospital environment. And hospitals, at the time—there wasn't this big coordination, yet. This big collaboration of five, six, seven hospitals together which create market forces that are really unusual in the hospital industry of the past. And doctors in New Jersey, at the time, were also basically one, two, three person practices. You didn't have the large group practices that you have now. The Summit Medical Group and that was it, basically. So I used to get calls from hospital CEOs regularly, late in the week, that would tell me—and one particular CEO in Jersey City, "I don't have enough money for payroll next week. And unless you can come up with something, we have to evacuate the hospital." I said, "You can't tell me this on Friday."

<laughter>

**Dr. Fred Jacobs:** "You can't tell me this on Friday because first of all you knew it two months ago. If you didn't know it two months ago then you're really in the wrong business because you should've been knowing what the financial projections were. And besides that, I don't have any money. I only have the ability to take charity care and move it up. I don't have any money that the legislature hasn't appropriated for me." So we would have these arguments. And hospitals were on the verge of having problems all the time. So one midweek I get a call from the governor. And the governor would either call me "Fred," "doctor," or "Commissioner," depending on what was happening. And this was a "Commissioner" call.

<laughter>

**Dr. Fred Jacobs:** "Commissioner, I may have spoken a little out of school, but I figured I'd tell you about it." "What did you say, Governor?" "Well, I was in Hoboken." He was living Hoboken at the time. "St. Mary's Hospital—now called Hoboken University Medical Center—and I kind of told them we would save the hospital." "Really? So I'll be right over."

<laughter>

**Dr. Fred Jacobs:** So I go over to the office and what exactly happened? And he says, "Well, you know, they gave me this big argument. And it makes a lot of sense to me. What's going on here?" And I said, "Well, what's going on here in New Jersey is that the reason hospitals fail or don't fail is largely because of the political energy, the juice, that the representative from that district has in the legislature or with the front office; that's why hospitals make it or not. And it has less to do with whether the hospital is actually providing an efficient care-driven quality service, less to do it. Not nothing. And in this particular case, see, this is what's happening he got directly to you. This is a hospital that is weak in so many ways."

**Tom Shea:** "But Commissioner, I live in Hoboken."

<laughter>

**Fred Jacobs:** Don't worry Tom, I'm going to get you into this.

<laughter>

So, he said, "Well, what would you do about it?" As if to say what would you do about it wise guy? And I said, "Well, what I would do is I would get a group of the smartest people in New Jersey representing all of the various constituencies. Put them together in a commission and rationalize healthcare delivery in the state of

New Jersey. Rationalize it." "Yeah, yeah. And who would lead that commission?" So you have to be really, really correct when they ask you that. I said, "Uwe Reinhardt." "Who is Uwe Reinhardt?" That's when I knew I had him.

<laughter>

Because I didn't actually know Uwe Reinhardt. I knew his name. And so I said, "Uwe Reinhardt is the James Madison Professor of Political Economy at Princeton." Knowing his title was very, very crucial. He said, "Well, do you know him?" And I said "No, I don't know him, but I was at a lecture he gave once." He said, "Well, you know him better than I do. Call him." So I go into Tom Shea's office which is, at the time, a great honor. I had never been into Tom Shea's office before.

<laughter>

He wasn't there at the time, which is the only reason I got in. And I called Reinhardt up, got his number and I said, "Dr. Reinhardt, my name is Dr. Fred Jacobs. I'm the Commissioner of Health and I'm calling on behalf of the governor." And those of you who knew Uwe Reinhardt know that he was very deferential to authority like that. So as soon as I said commissioner and governor he was on his best behavior. "Yes, yes, of course. What can I do for you?" I said, "Well, we want you to chair or more rather the governor wants you to chair a commission to rationalize healthcare in the state of New Jersey." He says, "Really?" And I said, "Who better?" He says, "Well, I don't know. When would such a commission begin?" And I said "Well, it would begin, as soon as we can get the commissioners appointed, you know, but soon." Little did I know soon in government speak was what, eight months? It was a long time. I said, "Soon." He said, "Well, next semester I have two courses to give. I have a basic course and I have a seminar." And I said, "Wait a second, you're going to let these Princeton students stand in your way at immortality? This is ridiculous." He said, "Well, I have to speak to the chairman. And I have to speak to the dean." And I said, "Okay, you can speak to the chairman and the dean." He says, "When do you have to know?" I said, "I have to know in 48 hours." So he says, "Okay. I'll get back to you." I go outside. The governor says, "What did he say?" And I said "Well, he said he has to speak to the chairman and the dean, so this would be a great time to call the president of the university." Now, this is where the story diverts a little bit. There's my version which I like a lot better.

<laughter>

And there's Heather's version, which is probably closer to the truth. But ignoring that for the moment, two days later Reinhardt calls me back and says, "You know, the chairman and the dean were very enthusiastic." I said, "Really." and I'm

thinking boy, the governor, what a great job he must've done on this. He says, "So we have to have a meeting now about budget and staff." And I said "Well, we don't have to have a meeting about that."

<laughter>

**Dr. Fred Jacobs:** "There is no budget. And there is no staff. I'll find somebody to help you and we'll find money in the department. Don't worry about that. Let's just set up a meeting for next week." So I go back and I say to the governor, "Reinhardt called me back and he agreed to do it; that must have been a great conversation you had with the university president." My side of the story. "Well, you know, I really never got to speak to her because she didn't call me back." And I said, "You mean, you let Reinhardt make this decision on his own? Oh, my God." But he did. According to Heather, actually they did speak. I ignore that because it sounds much better my way. And so we founded the Reinhardt Commission. We got people appointed to it. We met every month for eight months and we came up with a document that was the rationalization of healthcare in New Jersey. It occupies a very honored place on many shelves around the state. But giving Heather credit, what did you get, four bills passed? That effectuated four key proposals of the commissioner report. And I think the general hospital environment is better because of it, not that it's out of the woods. I mean, there are huge issues in the healthcare delivery system here and around the country. As a matter fact, I heard the other day, Julian Castro, I just happened to be listening, he said, "You know, there's a difference between health insurance and healthcare," an argument we've been making for a very, very long time. You can have all kinds of health insurance, but if there's nobody to provide the care it doesn't mean anything to you. And this is the case with Medicaid expansion without Medicaid providers and all of those issues which were prominent at the time that we were in office and persist to this day.

**Heather Howard:** I can only add to that wonderful telling that what was exciting was that that whole process that you put in place allowed us to move from that crisis management, which Tom will remember well, that the CEO of the Hoboken Hospital would find him in Hoboken to make the plea. And we were able to move from that crisis management to strategic planning and we were able to manage. Nine hospitals closed. And I tell other health commissioners, "Nine hospitals closed while I was commissioner." "How did you survive that?" It was ugly. We still can't go to Plainfield, I think, probably, right?

**Dr. Fred Jacobs:** I don't go to Plainfield.

<laughter>

**Heather Howard:** But it was necessary. We had too many hospitals, and they were lower quality hospitals that weren't serving people and it was draining the entire system.

**Governor Jon Corzine:** By the way, is Hoboken still open?

**Dr. Fred Jacobs:** Yes, it is. Yes, it is. Thanks to you, governor.

<laughter>

**Heather Howard:** So [that was] something that we did that cauterized the wounds, I think, before the Affordable Care Act could pass. But something else that we did that presaged the Affordable Care Act was your real focus on enrollment. In every department—why do we have kids who are eligible for family care but aren't enrolled? And if Jen Velez were here she would echo that that it was a constant why are we not? And that's something now that we're—I don't know if any of you have seen that just recently it was reported that for the first time there was an increase in uninsured kids across the country and we've started to, unfortunately, lose ground. But your real focus on you wanting to constantly know how are we going to get—and that was paired with your obsession with maximizing federal revenue, too. That was a constant theme: where is there federal revenue? How do we bring in more? Tom, to be fair, it didn't always work. You remember the first budget and what you [Fred Jacobs] proposed. The bed tax, right?

**Fred Jacobs:** Well, we didn't want to call it the bed tax. But yes, that's right.

**Governor Jon Corzine:** Fred and David didn't like our names.

<laughter>

**Dr. Fred Jacobs:** There was an issue with that, that's right. And a lot of it was because people weren't telling us the truth. We had situations where we would honestly develop a conversation about maximizing federal revenue depending on maintained beds as opposed to licensed beds, which was the big distinction. And yet the hospital association wasn't always being as square with us as they might have been because there were hospitals who were going to lose under that formula. It wasn't all winners. It was kind of a zero-sum game. And those hospitals that would lose would lose because they were not financially sustainable anyway. Nevertheless, it took going through the whole exercise of the Reinhardt work to, at least, have before us a rational basis for actually engaging in this. Whether you could actually get it done or not subsequently, as the governor said, elections have consequences and that was one of the consequences of that.

**Governor Jon Corzine:** We did, though, I think—and some of this spun out of Reinhardt—but Steve, we did a bunch of stuff on insurance that expanded coverage as well.

**Steven Goldman:** We did a lot. My recollection is that there were 40-something-thousand kids that we were able to get insured under the New Jersey equivalent of the CHIPs program, the FamilyCare program. That was a lot of kids. And we also…

**Governor Jon Corzine:** This is the CHIPs lady.

**Steven Goldman:** Yeah, I know, in the Senate.

**Heather Howard:** Another thing that goes back to the Senate. And then Tom will remember this: when CHIP was up for reauthorization when you were governor—

**Governor Jon Corzine:** CHIP, by the way, is Children's Health Insurance Program.

**Heather Howard:** Yes. When you were governor, the program was up for reauthorization and there was a big debate about whether to harm states that have higher eligibility levels. And you remember, you mixed it up with the National Governors' Association fighting for CHIP and saying it cost more to be poor here in New Jersey. We need more generous programs.

**Steven Goldman:** We had also done a lot of stuff that was sort of a precursor to Obamacare. We allowed students to remain on their parents' policies, I think in New Jersey until age 30, wasn't it?

**Heather Howard:** Yes.

**Steven Goldman:** And we also, I think, the legislation that provided that 85 percent of premiums had to be used for care or else—

**Heather Howard:** Minimum loss ratio.

**Steven Goldman:** Minimum loss ratios. The rest were going to be refunded back to the subscriber.

**Governor Jon Corzine:** That's a big deal. It sounds like not so much but it's really actually quite important.

**Steven Goldman:** Yes, that was a big deal because the big issue was the CEOs of these insurance companies were paying themselves these huge salaries and they're denying claims of people that are legitimately entitled to be paid. And so we passed

that, which also—I think at a lesser number—but was part of Obamacare, too. And there were couple of things to that I don't remember specifically.

**Heather Howard:** We had guaranteed issue and the rating bans.

**Steven Goldman:** Yeah, we had guaranteed issue, which was a huge deal.

**Governor Jon Corzine:** Rating bans was another big, big innovation.

**Heather Howard:** And do you remember, you signed into law one of the first states to mandate coverage of autism treatment and that ended up being—Senator [Robert] Menendez, actually, got that put into the Affordable Care Act based on the New Jersey law.

**Steven Goldman:** We also had something on mental health, if I recall.

**Heather Howard:** Mental health parity.

**Steven Goldman:** Yes, mental health parity which was a huge deal. I used to get calls all the time from people who were—I mean their families were absolutely being ripped apart because they ran out of the ability to pay—

**Heather Howard:** Yes, there were lifetime limits.

**Steven Goldman:** —for that kind of care. And there were those caps. It was terrible, really. And so I think we addressed that, too. We did a lot.

**Heather Howard:** I still remember when the reports came out that New Jersey had the highest rate of autism. You saying, "Get me the expert from Rutgers who can explain this to me." And I wondered how that probably would not have happened under a lot of other governors. "I don't want a memo explaining it to me. I want that person here tomorrow to explain why." And you didn't love the explanation, too. It was, "What can we do about it?"

**Governor Jon Corzine:** Well, it was more rational than listening to Mrs. Imus tell us it was all from the vaccines.

<laughter>

**Heather Howard:** So what have we missed, to the rest around the table? We thought a lot, as you can tell, about some of the key initiatives.

**Ken Zimmerman:** How about UMDNJ?

**Heather Howard:** Yes, please.

<laughter>

Virtually everybody around this table—

**Heather Howard:** Worked on that, right.

**Ken Zimmerman:** I'll just start it off and others should come in, including Tom. But the idea that the U.S. Attorney at the time uncovered very corrupt activity from a really important institution. And I guess what strikes me in the year-and-a-half I spent with the U.S. Attorney and his folks receiving subpoenas and other such niceties along the way was the amount of time and, frankly, political capital you spent in terms of recruiting people to that board starting with Bob Del Tufo and moving on that really had no political upside. It was the type of thing that was going to take a very long time to change. It's a critically important institution. It was an institution that by investing in it, you know, frankly at some point you were going to become associated with including the bad things that had occurred. And, yet, the goal like many of these things was a very troubled agency but it needed to be turned around. And, especially, given who the U.S. attorney was and the strange practice where somehow things ended up in the press before they came to our office to read what the reports were. It was a strange coincidence that seemed to happen on a regular basis. But it was a real, I think, testament, again, to engaging in a really serious problem.

**Governor Jon Corzine:** I also think that the work that you and others did laid the framework for the ultimate combination and merger which we knew was, ultimately, the right decision. It was how do you get from point A to point B without blowing it.

**Heather Howard:** You had to stabilize the anchor institution before you could take that next step.

**Ken Zimmerman:** It was only the credibility of Alan Shapiro and others that were attracted to the board. And they would only do it—they were going to be tainted as well unless they felt that somebody had their back in this way.

**Steven Goldman:** I'll make one observation. I think the prior discussion about the legal side of the administration and this, as well—but I think it's true throughout. It was a lot of collaboration. I don't know how other administrations work, but I always felt that every department felt the need to keep informed with other departments that had related issues. I know Fred and I reached a point where we began to have regular meetings with hospital administrators, insurance executives, doctor groups, just to sort of make sure that issues that were in his bailiwick I'd

know about and vice versa. And I think that was true throughout the administration. And I think, actually, that was something, governor, that really came from you, the idea of solving the problem in a collaborative way as opposed to just trying to deal with your narrow silo of issues.

**Governor Jon Corzine:** That is one of the criticisms that's leveled a government that is legitimate: that people don't talk to each other. And when you have bureaucracies that defend their own turf versus what's the greater good—and by the way it's important the governor recognize it, but the cabinet level operators and managers are the people that have to make the work. It doesn't happen with the governor going on a soap box.

**Steven Goldman:** Yes. But on the other hand, I think the governor has to kind of create the environment where that can flourish because if the governor and the executive is one who's encouraging these turf battles and these fighting all the time, it's very hard to collaborate.

**Heather Howard:** I think that's right. I'm looking around the cabinet. We all felt included in the initiatives and then people are willing to bring something to the table in a way.

**Governor Jon Corzine:** Fred, felt really close to the Hoboken decision.

<laughter>

**Dr. Fred Jacobs:** Hoboken is my favorite place. It's one square mile.

**Heather Howard:** He hasn't even told the story about the time you lent him the helicopter to take him to Cape May and then left him there.

**Fred Jacobs:** I've told that story.

**Governor Jon Corzine:** That's on the previous day.

**Fred Jacobs:** 70 or 80 times. Back to the UMDNJ board, I was on that board ex officio as commissioner during this time. And Bob Del Tufo was the board chair, a terrific board chair. He asked me to lead kind of a select committee on the cardiology program, which was the issue that raised this stuff. There were practicing cardiologists in the community who were given salaries and academic appointments with the express understanding that they would admit patients to the hospital for the cardiac surgical program, which had a very small number of cases—so small that it was always at risk of being closed. So in the process of that, what we wanted to do—the committee—was to speak to the chief of cardiology, who had

a fighting chance of knowing something about this, and the chairman of medicine. And we got word from the U.S. Attorney's office that they were persons of interest and we were prohibited from talking to them at all. So we were blocked from doing a meaningful investigation at the board level because the federal monitor and the U.S. Attorney's office had that in control and weren't letting it go.

**Governor Jon Corzine:** One thing that we didn't talk about when we were focusing on education is—I think we got the prime things. But we also had big debates, Janellen, about charter schools, curriculum, standards. Do you want to inform us a little bit and remind me what I said?

<laughter>

**Janellen Duffy:** Yes. And it's a shame Lucille [Davy] couldn't be here. I know she wanted to be here because she was also deeply involved in all of that. There had been work that had started under prior governors around high school redesign to try to make high schools and the assessments at the high school level more in tune in terms of really measuring the skills that kids would need for college. So you'll remember there was an effort to try to create, instead of just like a generic test at the end of 11th grade, subject-based tests. And we furthered that effort. And at the end of your administration there was all of the work on the Race to the Top, which had started at the beginning of the Obama administration. Of course, we always wanted to make sure we were going after federal money. And some key components were that you had to make sure you were adhering to very high standards as it relates to K-12 education. And we already had pretty high standards, but we went through the exercise of trying to look and see where could we raise the bar? How could we make it even better? How could we become better in terms of the work we needed to do for kids and families but also to be competitive for the Race to the Top? And ultimately, we were not successful with the Race to the Top. But the standards, the work that we did on standards, again, was a precursor to later work that was done. Even when all the states started moving towards the Common Core later, we had already done the work, so there wasn't a big leap to be made by the time further standards had to be raised in subsequent administrations.

With respect to charter schools I think there's a lot of question about that. There was a pretty strong expansion in the number of kids in charter schools during your term and so that was kind of the path that we chose, was to look at the quality of the schools, not necessarily authorizing additional schools, but authorizing additional campuses. I have to pull the numbers but there was a significant expansion of students. I want to say it was about a 20 percent increase in the number of students who were actually being served in charter schools. This was also some of the work that was part of the prevention plan—talk about

collaboration. But there was this recognition that you had to attack issues in the prevention plan from multiple angles as well, and charters were a component of that. So we tackled a lot of issues. We started the path of raising the standards, the charter school expansion, and, of course, all the work we talked about with school construction, school funding formula, and preschool.

**Heather Howard:** And county.

**Janellen Duffy:** Yes. When you are asking before about swing and a miss, I was reflecting on that because, remember, we did all that work to think about consolidation of school districts. We thought we were going to start with low-hanging fruit, getting rid of the non-operating school districts, which were districts that didn't even have schools in them. That seemed doable. We made inroads, but elections have consequences.

**Governor Jon Corzine:** What's the town on the Jersey Shore that Sharon and I drove through on campaign day and there wasn't a house—

**Janellen Duffy:** Loch Arbour.

**Governor Jon Corzine:** They didn't have a school system and we were going to try to combine them with somebody else.

**Janellen Duffy:** We tried to say that they should be—it was actually a funding issue that they weren't paying their fair share. And when we put the school funding formula in—these are homes that are literally on the oceanfront and $1 million at a minimum. And every single house had signs that said—

**Governor Jon Corzine:** "Corzine goes"

<laughter>

**Janellen Duffy:** Right. But that was because, again, the school funding formula was trying to create and look at the wealth of every single community and base school funding decisions in a rational way on whose ability to pay could really be taken into account. But we had a lot of issues with that and with the consolidation of school districts. And so when I think about things that we didn't get to tackle, we had those plans in place to have every county superintendent come up with consolidation of school districts such that it would be from K through 12 so that every district—you know we have these crazy districts with a couple of grades in each district. So many different variations. And I think it would've been exciting to see. I think it would've been interesting to see how that would've played out. And,

again, to the point about implementation, really digging into the implementation of that I think could been very rewarding.

**Governor Jon Corzine:** I think that Janellen is talking about what I consider one of our biggest swings and misses, was this consolidation of government in general. And if there is a single great untapped need—and there are a number in the state—the inability to have some rationalization of a governmental units has got to be right at the top and it leads to breakdowns and everything and makes everything 10 times more expensive than it has—I don't about 10.

**Janellen Duffy:** Do you think we can get Uwe Reinhardt to do it?

<laughter>

**Kevin Ryan:** The creation of the new Department of Children and Families was percolating this way. It's going to cost more money. It's more bureaucracy. And you said to us, look, you have got to do this as efficiently as possible. And you and Tom and Patti are doing a headcount and don't quite yet have the votes that you need. I think we're 13 hearings in on this. I don't really know what else there is to say. "Pretty please, chairman?"

<laughter>

And so I said to the team, "Look, let's just invite the members of the committee into the office and they'll see how we're going to do this." And my team is really psyched. They said, "Look, we got you all free furniture." And I said that's great. So they laid the office out. It was all free furniture. I'm now rolling into the space 20 minutes before three senators are showing up for a conversation around how efficiently we can break up the department. And as I roll in I said, "Where did you get the furniture from?" They said, "Well, it turns out that a former Rutgers president and a former governor had their bedroom and living room furniture available for you." And I walk in and when I tell you that the Palace of Versailles had nothing on my office. I was like, "We can't do this."

<laughter>

So I tack the meeting over to a cubicle and said, "I'm going to work out of here," which I hadn't been planning on doing. And they said, "Great, thank you for that. That was so humble of you, commissioner, thank you for that." And then one of them gave a speech on the floor saying he was supportive and we were doing this very efficiently and there were not going to be new business cards or new signage. And that the commissioner was working out of a cubicle. So in good faith I had to work out of a cubicle for six months. It's funny now.

<laughter>

**Governor Jon Corzine:** So what other swings and misses do you all feel?

**Heather Howard:** Well, I think a lot about all we could've done working with President Obama. So in my role implementing the Affordable Care Act, but so many things that having a strong friend in Washington—what a difference that would've made.

**Janellen Duffy:** Yes. I mean, I would agree. I think there's much more we could've done as it relates to further being competitive in terms of Race to the Top and some of the other reforms that President Obama put into place. I mentioned earlier, I think for me the biggest one is the inability to do more with the school consolidation.

**Julie Kashen:** You know, to me, what that makes me think about is just the need to have funding to do the important work. And I remember there was a period of time in budget mode where the policy team was told, "You've got a certain amount of money to spend." And I don't remember how much it was, but it could only be one time spending because that was kind of the nature of the budget. And we were—this is a weird thing to say—but like kids in a candy store, but for good. We found rape crisis centers that needed furniture.

**Janellen Duffy:** We did specialized grants for best practices. I remember that.

**Julie Kashen:** That's right. And food pantries that we stocked, more than had ever been stocked before. And so just to think about how we could've prioritized things like that had we had more funding to do that over time.

**Governor Jon Corzine:** One of the discussions I think we are going to have is how do you handle a state when you go through a recession and see the kind of fall-off, which is actually heartbreaking. And, actually, if Obama hadn't passed the stimulus bill we would've been—we were already up the river without a paddle.

**Heather Howard:** Remember all the work on getting shovel ready projects.

**Janellen Duffy:** Yes. And scrubbing every piece of that stimulus bill. "Where is the money?"

<laughter>

**Kevin Ryan:** I don't know if you remember, but in the cabinet retreat in January or February 2006, you gathered us together. You were just ominously forecasting

what was coming. And you said, "If these three indicators turn south on us and, obviously, one of them was unemployment, the recession, consumer confidence, I think, some of the insurance funds, we're done. And so let's get going here." And that fueled a lot of very early proactivity on all these fronts. The politics were a piece of it but it was always, "We're on the clock. Let's get moving." And had we been just a little more casual about the pacing of these things, much of this would not have happened because it took that first year of kinetic activity to seed all of these reforms. I think that's true in all of the areas that we've talked about today. It's one of the very important lessons for governors is when you get in, go.

**Governor Jon Corzine:** I agree with that.

**Kevin Ryan:** I know. You're the one who said it.

<laughter>

**Heather Howard:** Jon, that may be a great point on which to end.

**John Weingart:** Yes. That's great. Do you want to say anything in closing? It was a great discussion.

**Governor Jon Corzine:** I just want to go back to the fundamental principle that teams win, not individuals. And when you have people like the folks that have talked around this table today you have a real chance to make a big difference in people's lives. And I watch what you all are doing with your lives now and it gives me great pride. Most of you are working on the same sorts of things in a different venue. And it's a real honor to have been part of this team. And we did a lot of great work and I'd like to hope we can use all of your brains and some of the next iterations in the federal level and other things because there's a ton of work to do. So anyway, thank you all for coming.

<applause>