

The Governor Christine Todd Whitman Archive

A Colloquium on the Campaign, Transition and First Year

May 14, 2012

Center on the American Governor Eagleton Institute of Politics

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Welcome and Introductions

Ruth Mandel: What a pleasure. Good afternoon everyone. I'm Ruth Mandel, director here at the Eagleton Institute of Politics. And what a great pleasure to welcome you to a very special event. We have lots of good events here at Eagleton but there are some that are in the very special category and this one is right up there.

We're here to consider Christine Todd Whitman's election and early days as governor of the state of New Jersey. Governor Whitman, we're delighted and

honored to have you with us for this happy occasion. And also we're very pleased you're joined and going to be joined by other members of your family. So we look forward to hearing from you shortly. Today's program showcases the most recent efforts of Eagleton's Center on the American Governor.

In 2006, the Rutgers' libraries were the fortunate recipient of a gift from former Governor Brendan Byrne who donated papers and other memorabilia from his distinguished career. He and his wife Ruthie raised funds to support processing, cataloging and preserving the materials right here at Rutgers. This coincided with Eagleton's interest in complementing our long standing work on state legislatures with a new focus on state executive leadership. At the outset and actually we continue to be surprised, but we were very surprised to discover that nowhere in this country, some of you have heard me say this and it always bears repeating, nowhere is there an academic center dedicated to the study of the office of governors. And, in fact, there aren't courses on campuses, colleges and universities. So no one studies governors. Eagleton and Rutgers have aimed not only to take on that role but to do it with distinction and to begin with a special emphasis on our own Garden State. And notably while at this center we are building histories we're designing it to utilize new evolving technologies with an online archive of documents, images and publications and a series of video interviews with each recently elected governor and her or his key associates.

We're also ensuring that noteworthy events, including today's program, are recorded and also made available online for present and future researchers, for journalists, for political practitioners who can turn to this national online resource. We're well on our way in compiling the Byrne virtual archive and the Kean archive is not too far behind. The Florio section was also launched late last year. And we're able to take today's step to launch the Whitman archive in large measure because of support provided so many of you who are here in the room.

And we want to thank you. I'm thanking you now. We'll thank you repeatedly during the afternoon for your contributions, for your generosity, and foresight in capturing and preserving this important historical record. Many people have helped to bring us this far. While there's no way to introduce and thank everyone by name I do want to call your attention and acknowledge a couple of Eagleton people. First, my colleague, John Weingart the institute's associate director has been the critical player on the team that is developing the Center on the American Governor. John has taken leadership in coordinating our efforts and guiding us forward towards creating a technically and substantively useful center of information. He's contributed his formidable knowledge of state government and also his famous creativity to building the entire enterprise including today's program. As we begin this session we're deeply in his debt. Also, central to our work on governors has been Dave Andersen. Dave completed his Ph.D. in political science here at Rutgers last year conducting experimental work in political psychology. Now, he's also become one of a handful of scholars in the country who study the role, the history of governors. Finally, the Center on the American Governor has benefited

immensely from the knowledge and devoted attention of Eagleton visiting associate Nancy Becker who has worked with our CAG team. CAG is our loving acronym for Center on the American Governor. She's worked with the team during the past three plus years. Nancy has been instrumental in shaping the Governor Whitman archive and today's program. I'm delighted now to present Nancy to say a few words about the Whitman archive.

Nancy Becker: Good afternoon. I'd like to extend my personal welcome to Governor Whitman and her family and I hope everybody today is having as much fun as I am, renewing old friendships and reminiscing about the Whitman administration. Ruth has explained the work and the role of the Center on the American Governor. My job is to describe the Whitman portion of the virtual archive. One of our goals is to create a virtual record of Governor Christine Todd Whitman's administration so that anyone, anywhere, can log on to the center website and be able to access important documents and oral histories from the Whitman years. Also available on the website will be a complete video record of the programs and seminars we plan to conduct about her administration.

The Whitman portion of the governor's program began about a year-and-a-half ago with a fundraising campaign designed to raise the money necessary to undertake this project. On behalf of the center I would, again, like to thank all of those who contributed for your generosity, especially the Whitman family, Candy Straight, Hazel Gluck, and Brandy Marks who really helped in terms of the fundraising effort. Each section of the governor's program has three parts. The first is archival research including documents, photographs, videotapes and other memorabilia. We've just begun to build the Whitman portion of our website. And you should be able to view her biography, the timeline of her administration, her most important speeches and some photographs and we've just gone live about noon today. We will be having videotaped oral histories of the governor, her cabinet, her close advisors and others with significant roles in her administration. We expect to begin videotaping the oral histories of the governor and key members of the administration this summer. Many of you with us today will be contacted to participate. I hope you cooperate. It's really fun. Most of them are done at Eagleton. Governor we will come to your office. And then third is a series of programs and seminars which will be videotaped and placed on the Web beginning with today. And the seminars or colloquia will be held over the next few years and will highlight and encourage further discussion of key programs and initiatives in the Whitman administration.

Today's seminar is the kickoff event and by its very nature it is only a cursory examination of a few issues during a short period of time. We expect the programs which follow to explore critical issues from all of the Whitman years in greater depth. As we plan for the future, please remember that all of you are experts in your own right. So please send us and share with us your ideas and suggestions. If you have any materials that you would like to either contribute to the archive we'd love to look at them. We'll be happy to return them or keep them as we have all of

the photographs from the Whitman barn. And we expect to be in touch with many of you to videotape your recollections. Please be sure to look at the video in the lobby which tries to capture a few critical speeches and moments from the Whitman administration. This is a preliminary effort. So please be aware that the audio and video portions taken from old tapes are not quite up to the standards to which we've grown accustomed in today's high definition world. One last word before we begin the program. My thanks to you Governor Whitman for your leadership. I look forward to working with you during the next few years to record and reflect on your distinguished career of public service. And thank you all of you for being with us today and thanks for your help support and cooperation in building this important archive.

Ruth Mandel: Thank you, Nancy. This is not a request to take a week off from work or whatever you're doing and clean out everything in your basement because this is an old building with limited space. But to go through what you have and pick the gems. We've had a number of gems contributed already in the course of building this center and we'd be happy, certainly happy to preserve, take care of something that needs to be put up in cyberspace. Now, it's time for us to hear opening comments from the leader at the center of today's program. Certainly, in this company and indeed far beyond this room she needs no introduction. We've included a summary biography of her in your program but perhaps we could view this entire day as the beginning of reintroducing her and her legacy specifically to the wide and enduring arena of cyberspace. It's my honor and privilege to present Governor Christine Todd Whitman.

Opening Remarks: Governor Christine Todd Whitman

Christine Todd Whitman: Thank you, all. We know each other too well. Sit down. Thank you, Ruth, very much. The only I think will say about Mandel-time is it's okay except when the Devil's are playing in the Stanley Cup, the first game being tonight. That's rather important. We've got to be there. I want to start by complementing Eagleton for taking on this, not the Whitman administration, but just the whole idea of archives of the governors. I think it's a part of our basically our governance that gets overlooked too often and can serve an important role and a model for people going forward. And I hope it's not just the academicians and the press who take a look at what's going to be available, but also practitioners because it's a good thing to learn from the mistakes others have made, of the challenges that others faced and learn a little something about it. And so I know they've got a big job. If only half of the boxes that I've sent them get done I've still got more. I don't know what's in them because I've never looked at them but they're all there in the basement and I'd be happy to ship them out. So there's a lot to be gone through and I can only imagine what Governor Byrne, and Governor Kean, and Governor Florio have. And it's going to be a monumental task to do this.

So I'm delighted that you've decided you could go ahead with one more at this stage. I also want to thank all of you for taking the time to be here today. When we were working on my book, It's My Party Too, we found one of the most informative parts of it was when we were discussing a particular issue and brought together people who had been part of that particular point in the decision-making because you can't just trust one person's memory. It's a little bit like going to a-- you know, there's a traffic accident and if you have seven people who were witnesses you ask them and you get seven different versions. But if you bring those seven together and sit them down in one room and talk about that same thing you can start to tease out the facts from the personal prejudices, the things you don't know that are informing your decision. And it's enormously enlightening to do that. And it's my hope that in the course of these various panels that we will start to put a real record together, not one that's interpreted through the prism of the bias that all of us bring to things. But to actually try to get to the actual facts and what was going on at that time and why some of the decisions that we made were made and what the impact and long term impact has been of those decisions on the people of the state of New Jersey. I, for one, hope that they've been good ones but we'll see. We've made our share of mistakes too. We all do. And we all have things we can improve upon and I trust that this effort will be something that will help inform others to take a look what's been done in the past, the kinds of challenges you faced, different ways of approaching those challenges. And also the team-- the importance of the quality of the people that you bring together to address those challenges. And I am enormously proud of the team that we had. So thank you all for having been part of that and for taking your time to be here today. Thank you. I'm getting us back on time.

Ruth Mandel: I was going to say unlike me you're not only on time but you're brief so you're getting us back on time. Before turning to our first panel just a couple of logistical notes, you can see and we've mentioned this event is being recorded so that it will be available online. It's therefore imperative that when members of the audience want to speak or ask questions later on you raise your hand and wait for the microphone, -- because people always get up and they say well I can speak loudly. Even if you own a booming voice it's necessary for recording purposes for you to speak into a microphone. And then please be sure to identify yourself so that our transcribers and online viewers 50 years from now will know who you are. Secondly, many if not most of you in the audience could easily if not all of you in the audience could easily be part of the program. I know that not everyone is going to get a chance to speak today. But as this program moves forward, as Nancy mentioned, we'll be gathering written and oral comments from many people for the archive. Please, we welcome, we encourage you to contact us, contact John Weingart if you'd like to be part of this process so that we can begin collecting and scheduling as we go forward. To save time we've provided a program book with background information about the speakers and panelists and so we're going to dispense with lengthy introductions. And now it's time for our first panel and for that I'm pleased to return the microphone to the moderator of that panel, Nancy Becker.

**Panel One: Politics and Governing: The Campaign, Transition –
Selecting Staff and Planning for the New Administration**

Moderator: Nancy H. Becker

Panelists: *Hazel Frank Gluck*

Jane M. Kenny

Judith L. Shaw

John P. Sheridan, Jr.

James Weinstein

Nancy Becker: As you can see, from the title of this session, “Politics and Governing the Campaign Transition, Selecting Staff and Planning for the New Administration”, this could take hours. And we could spend hours on each subject. But since we only have 50 minutes for this panel I would like each of you to spend two to three minutes telling us what your role was in the campaign and/or the transition. And then I’d like to ask you some questions about each of these areas. And what we envision is that this is really a conversation and my questions are really only to provoke your thoughts. So Hazel, as one of Christie’s earliest supporters and advisors would you start? And we also encourage you to be frank and truthful. And this was not just directed at you, Hazel.

Hazel Gluck: Well, for Christie and John it began earlier but for me it began in January of ‘93 after Christie had lost her election to Bill Bradley. And she had invited me to lunch at Lorenzo’s and we sat and chatted. And I said well, what are you going to do with the rest of your life? And she said to me, “Well, I’m going to run for governor, are you going to run?” And I said, no. It was very complimentary I said no I’m not but I’m going to be with you 1000 percent. So we started with the PAC. And then went to the campaign where I guess the PAC there were only a couple of us. It was John and Christie and me and maybe one other person I’ve probably forgotten. Then we went to the campaign and John Sheridan and I were privileged to co-chair the campaign. And for some reason they wanted to get rid of us. So they made us interview everybody for cabinet positions. That was our role. We were to narrow it down to three people which we did and then the governor-elect took it from there. And in the transition I’m happy to say I have very little to do with and that’s why it went so smoothly.

Nancy Becker: John, why don’t you go next?

John Sheridan: Sure.

Hazel Gluck: You thought you had time to think.

John Sheridan: I did. So my earliest involvement with the campaign came through Peter Verniero. Peter was, I think, looking for some gray hair that he could talk to once in a while about legal issues. And I met the governor-elect. I knew her,

of course, from prior years. But I played a role as counsel to the campaign but it was really a title because the real counsel was Peter. So that was my involvement. During that year, with a little hubris I suggested to the governor that perhaps I could help with some campaign planning during the primary instead of being involved with the primary and a bunch of us worked on that.

Hazel Gluck: Yeah, I forgot about that.

John Sheridan: All I could tell you is about that plan got about a nanosecond of life as Ed Rollins threw it in the bottom drawer. And then during the campaign I suggested, well, perhaps, my best role would be to kind of work on a transition and the governor said, "Shhh". And a bunch of us worked on the transition plan and we had a good plan, I thought.

Hazel Gluck: Yeah, it was excellent.

John Sheridan: And that was my role basically during that timeframe. So it was a very interesting year, I will tell you that. We'll talk more, I'm sure, about the transition.

Nancy Becker: Judy, why don't you go next?

Judith Shaw: Thank you, Nancy. I first became involved with the campaign as kind of a backup to Hazel. We had a very small lobbying firm just having gone through a transition from a republican to a democratic governor. So we moved out of state service. And my job was to run the firm while Hazel is out and about with Christie and others. But I don't know somehow or another over the course of time I began showing up at the campaign headquarters and then writing some speeches. I remember writing one one night and I actually think you could give that speech today again. It was a wonderful speech about choice.

Hazel Gluck: If you do say so yourself.

Judith Shaw: Yeah. I needed quiet to do it and you know that campaign offices are never quiet. So I went out and I sat in Hazel's car. It was night and I wrote the speech and I came back in and her battery was dead. We couldn't leave that night. So then I got more and more involved. And the governor called and asked if I would be chief of staff. This was about-- this was Sunday night. The election was Tuesday. Having had no inclining whatsoever when I got the campaign bus with her the next day I said does this have anything to do with the fact that I could get free donuts, when we were on that bus. But then I started to think of what we had in front of us. And I just made a couple of notes here about what a transition has to do in what six very short months. We had to hire a transition staff. We had to hire the governor's office staff. We had to find office space. We had to plan and execute the inaugural. We had to select a cabinet. And we had to draft a budget message. And that's from

a group of people who probably until two days before the election weren't even sure we were really going to win.

Christine Todd Whitman: It was midnight on the day of the election.

Judith Shaw: That may be a good correction. So as we go through this on the panel I think sometimes the outside world doesn't realize what has to happen in those first six months and you're brand new. But I think we did it a while too.

Jane Kenny: It was two months.

Judith Shaw: Well, I was thinking from early November until you get all the way through these things, giving the budget message and getting the whole cabinet in place.

Nancy Becker: Jane, why don't you go next?

Jane Kenny: Okay. Well, I came into the transition office as a loaned executive. I think we had done some event at Beneficial prior-- excuse my voice-- prior to the election Christie Whitman came to Beneficial Corporation and spoke to a group of about 300 people and there was this fabulous picture in the New York Times the next morning of the governor and all of the people in the business sector and the message she had about the economy and the value that she would bring if elected. And I had known Governor Whitman from the Kean years but this was really a-- the first time I really saw the hope, you know, there was real promise. I thought this might really happen. So I actually volunteered to go down as a loaned executive and really back up because Judy was out and doing things in the transition office and I said I would be willing to help run the transition office. So that's the first time. And when I started working day to day with Governor-elect Whitman I thought this is going to be really cool.

Nancy Becker: Jim, last but not least.

James Weinstein: Well, first of all, I want you to know governor, that the game tonight we're putting on extra trains to get the Devil's fans to New York because I'm in the here and now. Actually, the governor and I worked in the Kean administration but we met each other a couple of times. We never really got to know each other. Hazel who I had a passing acquaintance with introduced me to the governor. We had lunch in Chambersburg back when there were restaurants in Chambersburg to have lunch at. And from there I had had previous discussions, as you'll recall, with a certain senator from Atlantic county. And I was honest with you. I said, I've got to do that. So I got out of that really quickly and went with the winner. But I was behind the scenes during the campaign. I worked when John commenced the transition effort. He contacted me and we worked on that and we worked with Peter. I also, as I recall, was instrumental in convincing Jane that there's no way she should go back into the private sector. This was an opportunity

of a lifetime and she should take advantage of it. But it was-- those were high days and there was, I felt, a great sense as I think we all did at having played a role in electing the first female governor in New Jersey who in addition to being a good governor was a really good person.

John Sheridan: Even if it was a small role, right, Jim.

James Weinstein: Even if it was.

Nancy Becker: Thanks, Jim. I'd like to go back and go through three elements that we're going to cover today. Let's talk about the campaign first. The campaign was really hard fought. It was a difficult one against a very tough opponent incumbent governor. The odds were against you. And the public polls were not encouraging. What happened to turn the tide? When did you know that you were going to win?

Christine Todd Whitman: Midnight in the bathroom. John was there. We were going to sign the papers and we were going to impound the ballot boxes in Newark.

Hazel Gluck: Are you talking about the primary or the general election?

Nancy Becker: Talk about the general election, I think.

Hazel Gluck: When did we know we were going to win?

Nancy Becker: And what helped to turn the tide?

Hazel Gluck: As far as I know, I found out we were going to win when Christie got the call from Florida, saying to her that-- congratulating her on winning. That's when I knew and I think that's when you knew. It was a very, very tough campaign and the majority that the governor won by was small. And I don't think any of us picked our heads up for one second and thought about that night, that election night, but we really didn't know. We really did not know. There were definite turning points during the campaign. One was when a staffer, whose name I won't mention, took her into a gun shop and the press went berserk as if people don't have the right to bear arms. And there was another one I think when-- John will remember this. This probably happened during the transition when there was some kind of a discussion as to whether or not the minority vote had been bought. And Jesse Jackson and Al Sharpton came to Trenton, left their cars parked in the middle of the street, and the Trenton police department wasn't going to give them tickets because they were nervous because of who they were. I was not in the meeting when they were rabid about the whole situation. They went into a meeting with the governor-elect. They came out and they were totally turned around. But the funny part of that was John Sheridan and I were relegated to go to the room where all of the photographers, the national photographers were in that room and I can imagine what the paparazzi are like. These guys were animals. And John was on one side of

the lectern and I was on the other and we had our hands held out like this and we looked at each other and we said what are we doing here? Crazy.

Nancy Becker: Other comments in terms of what happened to turn the tide and how did you win?

John Sheridan: I'll go. It was a very tough primary race to start with. It was slugging it out day by day and I think the governor was clearly the favorite and most people thought she would win but there were some moments, some little things that sort of popped up at like nanny-gate at the beginning. Fortunately that one-- once in a while you get a break in a campaign and we got a good break on that one because Cary Edwards had a similar issue and quickly that issue seemed to go away. I thought the governor handled that very well.

Christine Todd Whitman: He tried to blame his wife. I didn't try to blame my husband.

John Sheridan: Right. The governor handled it very well, very straight forward. I think that was one of the qualities that the public found so enticing about her candidacy. She was straight forward. She was willing to admit a mistake and then move on very quickly. We had some-- as I say, that was just a back and forth, back and forth, back and forth is kind of the way I remember it and fortunately I got a pretty good victory in June. And coming out of that I recall a poll where you were saying we were behind in the polls, but I thought there was an initial poll, maybe not a good poll but a poll that showed you ahead right at the beginning, right after the primaries is kind of the way I recall it. No, maybe not.

Christine Todd Whitman: I don't remember.

John Sheridan: So I would say it's because Rollins put my plan in the drawer...

Christine Todd Whitman: Would that he put some other things in the drawer too.

John Sheridan: I shouldn't say my plan. There's a few other people here that were involved in that.

Nancy Becker: Does anybody else want to comment on the campaign? Judy or...

John Sheridan: Can I just get to my main point? I thought we went off the radar scope over the summer and I thought that was unfortunate. I mean I think what a lot of us were concerned about in doing the plan for the campaign was that Governor Florio and his team had buried Jim Courter in the first couple of months of that campaign and we were concerned the same thing was going to happen. You know, all kinds of issues would be drug out. So we were-- it wasn't that the governor was sitting around. She was getting out and about but I don't think the

campaign was very aggressive in going after Jim Florio who I think deserved to have people go after him because he had four pretty bad years in terms of how the public felt about him whether that was accurate or fair I don't know, but it was the way they felt about him. And I know there was some planning going on but I wasn't involved. I don't think any of us here at the table were involved about perhaps the right way to go was with the tax plan. And I could tell you I was one of the many that were concerned about that because we had seen what had happened to Ray Bateman back in '77 when he had a similar tax plan. And we were concerned that that would be a difficult road to throw in. That the press would be instantly against that. That's what we felt. When the governor told us all about it one day, I guess we were cramped from where the headquarters were. The governor told us and the only thing I felt good about coming out of there was that she believed in it. The governor believed in the plan. And I said, there's a big hurdle because I think that was one of the problems we had in '77. I think Ray kind of got talked into it and didn't really believe it. And the governor believed in it. And I think that was the turning point because at that point in time the polls were pretty bad and they were getting worse day by day. And then even after it was announced, it got a little worse for a while but then the bus tour and the selling of the plan all of that sort of came together and things kept getting a little better, a little better, a little better. And I remember I think it was Monday before election Dave Sackett had a little piece of paper that said we're going to win this race by one percent. And I think I still have that piece of paper some place. And the production was we're going to win by 25,640 and I think you won by 25,902.

Christine Todd Whitman: I think if there was a point and there wasn't-- I mean we didn't know until we were-- Peter, you remember, you were there in the bathroom.

Nancy Becker: Did you capture that?

Christine Todd Whitman: It was literally, we were told there were seven polling precincts in Newark where the poll workers had gone home and so we couldn't possibly get the results until the next morning. They hadn't bothered to go through them. There were more than seven, I guess and so we weren't going to know the next morning. So we were in the bathroom about to sign the papers to impound the ballot boxes when Florio called. I'll never forget what he said. He said, "We can't do it-- we've looked at the numbers and we can't do anything more." So I figured he knew what were in those seven or had an inkling. But before that and the one other thing that I would say that must have made a difference to people was you were right, the Florio campaign it was a tough campaign. I saw Paul Begala-- it was Paul Begala and James Carville who had run the ads. And all you knew about me from the ads was I drove drunk every night hanging out my window with an Uzi shooting up watermelons. And when I saw Paul afterwards one of the things he said to me is, "We don't know how you survived that because we didn't want people just not to vote for you, we wanted them to actively dislike you." And, again, the polls were really bad. We were getting hammered. And we put out that one negative ad, and

the negative ad it's a laughable negative. It said Jim Florio was probably the worst governor since Benjamin Franklin's son who was ridden out on a rail tarred and feathered during the revolution. And what was interesting about that is my positives went up after that. It was that the people of New Jersey didn't think I was tough enough to be governor because I had been taking all of the blows and not fighting back at all and that made a difference.

Hazel Gluck: I think the bus trips were phenomenal because people got to meet Christie and they knew that she was charming and they knew that she was bright. And they knew that she was personable. And they just kind of fell in love with her. So every place we went I think that the underlying-- you can't get to meet everybody in the state of New Jersey but I think those bus trips were absolutely important to the campaign.

Nancy Becker: Does anybody want to add just a little bit more on the campaign, if anybody has anything else to add? And then I want to go into transition. John.

John Sheridan: Others haven't talked.

James Weinstein: I was going to say exactly what John did, so I'll just leave it.

John Sheridan: So I remember one thing. We were all anxious about how-- it was right down to the final numbers that night. But I remember the infamous John Carbone running around stirring everybody up, putting some wrong numbers here and there just to make everybody crazy and basically try to convince us all that we were going to have a recount. And fortunately, Governor Florio saved the day I think he really did. He basically didn't want to go through that again. He really didn't want to go through that again and knew that the likely result was when you're 25,000 down if you can't make it up when you're 1,700 down, it's going to be real hard when you're 25,000 down.

Hazel Gluck: Nancy, I think that the thing that nobody has said but is very important, this was the first female who had the possibility of becoming the governor of the state of New Jersey. And if you don't think that that isn't a tough slog on top of everything else that you have to deal with it was really difficult for people to see a woman as the CEO of a state. And we had to get through that as well and the bus trips helped. But somehow, somehow, some miracle we made it. But being the first female is always very difficult.

Nancy Becker: Judy, if you would talk a little bit thought, about, nobody's talked about grass roots support from women. And Hazel's raised the issue, so will you talk a little bit about what was done in terms of building grass roots support particularly from women for the first woman governor of New Jersey.

Judith Shaw: Nancy, I think one of the things that made that job easy is that we didn't have to do as much building as we had to do with dealing with people who

came to us, who were drawn to the campaign because of the governor. They were familiar with her through the Bill Bradley race. I think one thing they were taken with was how clear she was about her policy statements. It appeared that she really believed them in a day and age where, you know, we hear many political people speak and you know that it's just a practical stance that they're taking. We did work with women's organizations. Here at the Eagleton Institute there had been this long standing non-organization, it had no structure at all. It was called the Bipartisan Coalition for Women's Appointments. And every time there was a gubernatorial race a number of us in this room would get together. Debbie Walsh, I'm sorry she's chosen to be with President of the United States today, and not with us, but her daughter is graduating from Barnard. But we would meet here often and we would talk about women who could bring support to the race. They could bring money. They could bring votes. They might be involved in some not-for-profit organization. They could bring visibility. They could invite the governor to events. I think frankly, we went back and forth often about should she run as the female candidate? I think you were uncomfortable with that. And we tried to talk about the qualities of this person. But no doubt I think it did make a difference. Some women were drawn to the campaign. I think some people thought let's try something different. They were becoming less enamored with politics. Nothing like it is today thank God, but it was pretty bad then too. So I may be wrong but I don't remember this overarching campaign to...

Hazel Gluck: We had-- you'll remember this. I think you forgot. We had Women for Whitman. We had a big deal up at that Hilton.

Judith Shaw: Right here in New Brunswick.

Hazel Gluck: And I remember getting a pat on the head from Rollins and your brother saying, yeah, if you want to do it go ahead. So I figured what the devil, we'll try. So we got a hold of-- we bussed people, women in. When the guys were there that night, they turned around and they said, oh my God, because the fact of the matter was she didn't want to run as the first female but the women knew that she would be the first female and they came out of the woodwork to come to this huge rally up at the Hilton.

Nancy Becker: All right, now I want to move on to the transition. So Hazel, John, and Judy you've talked a little bit about the transition. What was incredible to me, and I remember, transition, is you put together a huge transition team with numerous people in a broad variety of issue areas and points of view. Tell us how it all worked.

Hazel Gluck: I don't know. I was interviewing for cabinet officers.

Nancy Becker: How did it work? Jane and Judy who were involved in the day to day, and I guess, Jimmy too, in the day to day transition stuff?

Judith Shaw: I think we had kind of this checklist of things that we knew had to be done and we tried to find people who we thought would be good in kind of heading up each of those people they were really disparate skill sets that were needed. And then we put it together, people around us, first of all that you trust and you're comfortable with in many ways you're saying thank you to. When you have a race that's that close everyone thinks it was their vote that put you over the top. Everybody did. So from the beginning we were very considerate about the structure, the legislature, elected and appointed officials, the state committees, the fundraisers, the subject matter experts that we had met out and about during campaigns. And we just started to fill in the boxes. We moved very aggressively on selecting a cabinet because we knew that was a measure of how well is the governor doing. We wanted to demonstrate right away. In fact, we wanted every cabinet officer in place by the time of the inaugural. And I think we had all but one. I think Drew came, the insurance commissioner came after your swearing in. One thing and there's no time to think about this but we all know the skill set of people that work in campaigns is and should be radically different than the skill sets of people that govern. And to make that transition is very hard. We had a core of rabid Christine Todd Whitman believers of all ages and stages who didn't quite get it that when you govern, you now have to govern for the entire state. You have to learn how to compromise, not compete. The competition's over. She's won. Now, you have to find a way to reach consensus. But there's little time to do that. So we said to everybody in the campaign the first day, you're all in. Everybody will have a job. There's lots to be done. And in the course of that exercise, seeing how they worked in the governance position we could kind of weed people out. Lots of people came to the top who had had very quiet sleepy roles. And some people kind of went to the bottom. So that was an interesting exercise. I do want to note one thing, John and Hazel who had kind of the primary responsibility I just want to note the role of Joyce Himmelman in the back row here. This was long before the sophisticated computers of today. We got applications, résumés from so many people, how Joyce was able to separate out those that really looked legitimate from those that weren't. And then have to hear from the people who weren't selected was a miracle but that process started with Joyce. It worked its way up into John and Hazel and then other of us here who were brought in on different interviews based on the expertise.

Jane Kenny: So as I said earlier, I started going down three days a week from my other job, from my paying job.

Christine Todd Whitman: The thing you lived off of.

Jane Kenny: And as Judy mentioned it's very different to be on a campaign than to govern. And I had spent some time in the governor's office working for Tom Kean, seven years actually. And I actually transitioned Tom Kean out of the governor's office and helped the Florio people come in. So it's not very often that you have the opportunity to then transition those people out and transfer your person in. And I have to say had I been a gloating person it would have been unbearable. But it's interesting because they actually when I met with the Florio

people they actually said, you guys were right, we really didn't reach out enough to the public. And all of the kinds of lessons that I think we had started to learn a little bit in the Kean administration. And it was very clear to me coming down to the transition office and working with Christie Whitman and the team that was in place that this was different. These were people that wanted to know what people were thinking, how can we form coalitions? How can we hear all different sides of the story? How can we make sure that we're getting the expert opinion and then make a policy decision based on that and that to me was just really very seductive. I did have a nice private sector job with stock options and a corner office as my parents pointed out to me. But after working for a few days with Christie and the team I was really hooked. And my husband, I was saying to my husband, I remember it was November, it was right before Thanksgiving and I said I really just don't know what to do. And he said, "You just don't know what job you want in the Whitman administration." You're not trying to decide whether to go or not. So I think that very early on in the transition office, yes it was very chaotic because I think you have the campaign people and that kind of adrenaline is there still, and of course, there's extra adrenaline that you've won. But the business of governing has to begin. And we really did have to form some kind of a discipline on what were the important things to Christie Whitman? What were the policies that she really wanted to espouse? And what was she going to talk about when she became governor in her first inaugural? And there was real substance there. It was very clear where she was coming from and what she wanted to do and what she wanted to accomplish. So it really made, I think, our jobs in some way, as chaotic as it was, it made our jobs easier. It was easy to be her Chief of Policy and Planning because her policies were very clear, very direct and we've just got to get good people to help implement them. And I think that's what we saw in the transition office was a person who had ideas about government, how to run government, what leadership was all about and that's something I think we should talk about more because it's interesting I think as a woman what kind of leadership she was showing as a woman. And I can't help it, that's what we are, so that's what we got.

Hazel Gluck: Can I add just one thing?

Nancy Becker: Wait, I'm trying to give everybody a turn. Jim, do you want to add?

James Weinstein: Yeah, I mean one of the things, you talk about all of the people and you can speak after I'm finished, Judy.

Judith Shaw: I've always knelt at your knee, always.

James Weinstein: Was just managing the crowds. I remember John Ekarius who ended up working in the treasurer's office just literally spending days on end going through lists of people who had volunteered, who were supporters, who were contributors and trying to organize that in a way that made them feel as if they were contributing. And that they were really part of this new era that had been

voted in by the people of New Jersey. And it was an important function because-- and managing that part of it while the selection of the cabinet was taking place, while the selection of some of the key ideas that you wanted to present in your inaugural message and in your state of the budget message, all of those things was really important, in a sense to manage it, and frankly in another sense just to keep it out of your way without making people feel like they're being pushed aside. And that was quite challenging.

Nancy Becker: Hazel wanted to add something and Judy wanted to add something.

Hazel Gluck: No, I didn't want to add something. What it wanted to say was I wanted to go back after the primary to the campaign. One of the most important things I think that happened was Chuck Haytaian, was Speaker of the House and he became very, very dependable when it came to Christie Whitman. He joined the campaign. He was one of the few guys who did. He deserved a lot of credit because he helped us enormously when he did that. I think that was a big-- that was really a big, big turning point for us. The other two things I wanted to say, two other jobs, one we're talking about all of the wonderful characteristics of Christie and her sincerity and her dedication and her reach for the right thing to do, except she couldn't stand being enclosed in small spaces. So she kept trying to sneak out of the campaign office and actually it was the transition office. And so they put a cow bell on the back door so she couldn't-- and one day I'm standing there and she says "I've got to get out of here." I said, there's a cow bell. She said, "I'll tell you what, I'll open the door, you hold the cow bell and I'll go downstairs." So of course I did it and she went downstairs but I went downstairs after her. It was a lovely fall day and we went outside and I said oh the air, and she said <inaudible>. And all of a sudden we look up the road and here comes a state trooper who had caught us immediately. The other time when she was governor, and Judy would know this better than I, she also felt very enclosed she decided she'd go visit the Democrat office. And she went around the back with Judy, I believe, and went into the Democratic office. Diane Legriede was out there. She was deputy...

Christine Todd Whitman: I went out the window.

Hazel Gluck: Yeah, she went out the window. She went back there and everybody in the Democrat office went oh my God, the Governor is here. But she is one to doing devilish things. It's a big burden to carry in governance.

Nancy Becker: One more thing and then I want to go...

Judith Shaw: I just wanted to make one note of of what Jane said, this was the first time in New Jersey that a challenger had beaten an incumbent governor. So that front office never ever believed that he was going to lose, nor that they would be out of a job. And John Sheridan and I went in there the next morning, that was our job to go over and physically walk into the office which was very difficult to do.

The only person there who really got it was Rick Wright who at the time was the Governor's Chief of Staff. And he got it. He said come in, sit down, what do we have to do to deal with the transition, to be fair and equitable to people who had given good public service. But that was very difficult to do. I think you could take any degree in political science and they're not going to talk to you about how to handle that day.

Nancy Becker: Do you want to add one more thing and then I'm moving on...

John Sheridan: Moving on to?

Nancy Becker: Still the transition, I have a question.

John Sheridan: Okay. I'll keep quiet.

Nancy Becker: So all of you, you're talking about planning and staffing and going through résumés and managing this enormous transition committee and clearly having an incumbent governor who really didn't expect to lose. So here you're going forward, and Ed Rollins makes this statement which he made the week after the election and recanted later that month, what impact did that have on your transition effort?

John Sheridan: That's what I was going to talk about.

Nancy Becker: Okay, good. I read your mind.

John Sheridan: It was a complete distraction. I mean it was-- it became awful. An issue that you just had to deal with, the Governor had to deal with it. Her family had to deal with it. We all had to deal with it and it came to the forefront. It happened, if I recall, right about five days after the election so we had a little head start if I recall. Judy got appointed Chief of Staff and Peter got appointed Chief Counsel. And there were a couple of things that were in the works, but immediately a whole bunch of us were involved. We needed lawyers for this person and that person and this person and that person and including I see Debbie in the front row here. I think Debbie was assigned to represent the Governor because we had to have different counsel for different people.

Nancy Becker: John, Ruth has just asked, since many of us in this room know exactly what happened, for the record, would you just say what Rollins' statement basically said.

John Sheridan: Okay. So I believe he was in...

Christine Todd Whitman: Sperling breakfast in Washington. There was a Sperling breakfast in Washington which is all of the press.

John Sheridan: And it was a few days after the election as I said and Ed Rollins made a statement something to the effect that, I guess, they were pressing him, well, how did you pull this one off Ed? And I guess Ed was pumped up a little bit and started talking about how we had gotten to the black ministers and I don't know whether the word suppression was used by him or came up later, but there was sort of a sense that somehow the African-American vote had been suppressed.

Christine Todd Whitman: Five hundred thousand dollars he said we spent. Fortunately, we knew exactly where every penny-- we never had \$500,000 extra.

John Sheridan: That's exactly the way I kind of remember it. So one of the things right away I said this is B.S. because I knew what Peter had done in terms of the dollars. You couldn't get a penny out of the guy for anything. And so I knew there was no money out there floating around. And it just seemed so incredulous to me. But at any rate, it took it was that day or the next day we're on the phone with Ed Rollins' lawyer a couple of times and then Ed disappears. We can't find Ed. He went into hiding. So we had to smoke him out. And there was a statement that had been worked out with the lawyer and then at the last minute Ed was thinking maybe he didn't really want to say that. And we told his lawyer he's going to say it because it's the truth and ultimately he did fess up and put it out there basically saying he made this up out of whole cloth. That it was just something that he had...

Hazel Gluck: Braggadocio.

John Sheridan: Yeah, bragging about and decided it was going to be. But that didn't end it though because he was out there making statements. And the U.S. attorney's office got involved, and the AG's office got involved. And it was days and days and days. In the meantime, we're trying to find, can we get anybody to come into this cabinet with this going on? And it just-- I don't think it actually finally resolved until Mike Chertoff made a statement some time maybe six, seven days before the inauguration where he finally said it's over there's nothing.

Christine Todd Whitman: They closed the 800-number. The U.S. Department of Justice had an 800-number which ordinarily attracts every nutcase who just wants to make up anything. They never got a single call on it. We had five, I think, it was Peter, five different investigations going on, ELEC and the U.S. Justice Department and the State and it was kind of unpleasant.

Jane Kenny: That's an understatement.

John Sheridan: So it was a little bit of a distraction, not much. But in the meantime, business was trying to be done. We were trying to tee up a few people so you could have a cabinet.

Hazel Gluck: The clock was ticking. But we got it done.

Nancy Becker: Let's spend the last ten minutes we have talking about staffing. Were there any guiding principles the governor asked you to observe in choosing individuals to serve in the administration? Hi, John.

Hazel Gluck: Hi, John.

Nancy Becker: Sorry, you got caught up in traffic.

M1: He didn't get caught up in traffic, this address doesn't exist.
<overlapping conversation>

Nancy Becker: So please describe the process for choosing cabinet members, sub cabinet members and key appointees especially those subject to senate confirmation and senatorial courtesy who wants to start?

Jane Kenny: Can I just say overall the guidance was the best people and we didn't really-- I don't think Christie Whitman really had a lot of IOUs out there.

Hazel Gluck: None.

Jane Kenny: So she really did have the freedom to look around for the best people. But I think the other thing that's really important that I know another panel is going to talk about but I think when you come-- when you're not traditionally the person in this role, when it's the first woman governor, you do tend to know people that are very accomplished and they might not be men. They might be women. They might be minorities. I think a lot of times I've heard through my professional life, you know, we'd love to put a woman mayor, we'd love to put a minority but we just can't find them. And we found them. There were lots of people there that were really very skilled and experienced that were women, were minorities. And so we were able, I think, to cast a wider net because of that kind of thinking and that way of sort of looking at the world and really the sort of subcultures that we all had inhabited. We knew people that were very, very competent and I think it made a difference. I know other governors have appointed women and minorities. But I think that it was just a natural part of what we were looking for in terms of-- especially when some of the lesser appointments were made, not just the cabinet but the people that were on boards and commissions and all of that work that went into gathering people that was a much, much wider net and it really made a difference.

Judith Shaw: Nancy, one of the things that I would add too, Michael Gluck had come into the office and he organized a series of roundtables that we held in different subject matters. It would be education and environmental protection and some pretty far out ones too that nobody else, hot potatoes would want to touch. And the governor's direction in that was I want to hear opposing voices in those meetings. So I know we took some flak from our Republican friends. I think one of the first sessions was with the legislature and we invited the Republicans and the

Democrats. The Republicans were quite miffed that she had not just had a session with them. But that was the nature of every session. In education, we had different viewpoints. We did sessions on taking over schools in Newark and so forth. But one of the purposes, the sub rosa purpose of doing that was to kind of vet people who might be interesting in these different posts. And we developed a list of really, really good names of practitioners in those different fields who were brought in. and they were somewhat nontraditional. They hadn't been part of the...

Nancy Becker: Hazel and then John.

Hazel Gluck: John and I had the job of picking three in each field of potential cabinet officials and both John and I had served in a cabinet somewhere in the dim past. And it wasn't-- as I remember it it wasn't so much a question of whether you had had this enormous amount of governmental experience. It was a question of whether you would fit? And a question of whether you as Coleridge says common sense is what the world calls wisdom. Whether you had enough common sense, and whether you had the ability to lead as I remember it John. I mean you can correct me on this. But we also had to talk people like Harriet Derman into her job because she didn't think she could do it because she was a woman or some nonsense I don't know. And there were people like that. But as I recall, I mean it was an interesting experience for me meeting all of those people and listening to them and interacting with them until we finally thought we had the cream of the crop as far as the cabinet was concerned. John, do you want to...

John Sheridan: For some reason, I don't have a really good recollection of this but I remember one in particular and I'm not sure where he came from. But we interviewed Brian Clymer for Transportation Commissioner. And during that course of that he said-- Jimmy. So we interviewed him and he made it clear that he had enough of transportation. He had done that thing in Washington but he was telling us about his financial background and what he knew about that and he might be interested in the Treasurer's spot. And I remember that prior to that we had made an effort to get or at least to see if we could get Bob Grady interested and made some phone calls around, and had some other people make some phone calls. But Bob was on to another stage of his career. I mean all I remember doing was I think we passed along Brian to the Governor and they met and that came about.

Judith Shaw: And he recommended Wilson. He said, why don't you interview Wilson for...

Hazel Gluck: It was the first time that Christie was going to have the law changed about the Health Department. As a result of us doing the interviewing we met Len Fishman whom I had known before who was just a phenomenal person, a phenomenal human being, lawyer. And everybody that had been in the department of health had been a physician.

Christine Todd Whitman: The law called for it.

Hazel Gluck: The law required it, exactly right. And we went to Christie and I said you've got to meet this guy. She goes, "I'm not going to spend my blah, blah, blah, changing the law." She met with him and she came out, and she said, "Okay, I'm changing the law."

Nancy Becker: Jim, do you have a last word and then we're going to...

James Weinstein: I do. it's a very brief one and it's the one admonition that I recall the Governor being very explicit about. If I read about an appointment in the newspapers they're not being appointed.

Nancy Becker: I think on that note we're going to close. I thank you all for being on the panel. I know we've only touched the surface.

Panel Two: New Jersey's First Woman Governor: Making a Difference for Women

Moderator: Ruth B. Mandel

Panelists: Linda M. Anselmini

Harriet Derman

Deborah T. Poritz

Candace L. Straight

Ruth Mandel: Today, as you can tell from how tightly compressed this is, it's frustrating. It's exciting and frustrating at the same time. We only have an hour now to discuss a subject that has already been touched on during the first panel and that lends itself to a much longer conversation. And I certainly hope we expect that the Center on the American Governor will be able to do more with this topic in the years ahead, both through individual interviews and in larger programs. This afternoon's discussion will be necessarily broad, as a way to open consideration of this historic aspect of Christie Whitman's election to the office of Governor. This historic aspect being the fact that she is a female. I also want to mention right at the top, that she-- appreciated me identifying that. I also want to mention right at the top that you've heard a reference before to Debbie Walsh. Debbie Walsh is the Director of the Center for American Women and Politics, another unit here at the Eagleton Institute, about which we are very proud and there is a lot of crisscross in this particular archive between the interests and the resources of these two programs. So that whatever is available online in the Center on the American Governor, on the Christine Todd Whitman administration, will also be available on the Acronym for that one is CAWP, on the CAWP website, and Debbie, who has two wonderful daughters, one of them happened to choose to graduate today from Barnard, and so she's very sorry not to be here, as Judy mentioned before. Before we start this conversation, I'm going to present a few facts for the record. Winning office on November 3rd, 1993, sworn in on January 19th, 1994, Christine Todd

Whitman was the first, and to date, only woman elected governor of the state of New Jersey. She was also the first New Jersey governor who won by unseating an incumbent.

Governor Whitman was only the second Republican woman in the United States elected to head a state government. The first was Kay Orr, and she served as governor of Nebraska from 1987 to 1991. Governor Whitman was the 13th woman elected governor in the history of the United States. The first was Nellie Tayloe Ross, who was elected governor of Wyoming in 1925, to replace her deceased husband, and it wasn't until 1975 that a woman, the name will be familiar to many of you, Ella Grasso of Connecticut, was elected in her own right, not as a surrogate for her husband. So this is a very recent history. Whitman was the first Republican woman governor ever elected to a second term, a fact which Candy Straight carries around right at the top of her memory, and reminded us of. In the next hour, I'm going to be talking with four of the women who were active on behalf of candidate and governor Whitman, supporting her candidacy, helping her get elected, and serving in her administration.

To start the discussion, I'll ask them a few very broad questions about the legacy of the 50th governor of the state of New Jersey. In alphabetical order, and again, I'm mentioning this for the record, I know many of you in the room are quite familiar with your colleagues here. For the record, in alphabetical order, joining us, is Linda Anselmini, who was Commissioner of the New Jersey Department of Personnel under Governor Whitman, shared the Bipartisan Merit System Board, the Executive Commission on Ethical Standards, and the Governor's Employee Relations Policy Council. Harriet Derman, Commissioner of the Department of Community Affairs, Chief Counsel to the Governor, and finally, Chief of Staff to the Governor. Deborah Poritz, appointed New Jersey's first Attorney General by Governor Whitman, and first woman Chief Justice of the New Jersey Supreme Court from 1996 to 2006. And Candy Straight, who co-chaired Governor Whitman's Budget Advisory Committee, was appointed to the board of the New Jersey Sports and Exposition Authority, in 1994, and was Vice Chair from 1996 to January 2003, and as I think we've already made reference to, there are any number of women in addition to these four distinguished outstanding leaders, any number of other women in the room who played a very important role in the Whitman administration, and if time allows, we'll get some comments and questions. If not, it will be for another occasion. To address the title of this panel discussion, let's begin with a wide open general question. And I just want to get a conversation going, not necessarily one after another. Did Governor Whitman make a difference, as a woman, and for women? If so, how, if not, this is the time to tell us, for the historic record. If not, how, and can you identify any, what I'm calling gender benefits or challenges, apparent during the campaign, the transition and the first six months of the administration? And we're not going to-- for this discussion, we're not going to separate those three out, just when you're referring, when you're talking about some of these general issues, refer back to whether you're talking about, oh, well this was during the campaign or the transition and the first six months, because otherwise, we would

never get through some of these questions. So I'm going to turn to whoever would like to take a stab at that very wide open general question. Do I see a volunteer?
Candy.

Candace Straight: Okay. Well obviously Governor Whitman made a difference for women. And for being a woman, being the first woman elected governor of New Jersey, being one of the first women in the country, still today, elected as governor, and to go back with what Ruth said, here have only been, in the whole history of the country, I mean, Christie was elected in 1993, which is a while ago, if we think about that, okay? And I believe Ruth said she was the thirteenth woman elected? All right. There have only been 31, so we haven't made a lot of progress since then, and of those 31, only 20 were elected in their own right, as Governor Whitman was elected. My observation during the campaign and during the transition and her first six months, is that this was something totally different for New Jersey, therefore she had lots of challenges that she might not have had if she were a man. The press, I think today, continues not to do a good job covering women for elective office, so that's a challenge that everybody faces, if you happen to be female. And I think that Sarah Palin and Hillary Clinton would tell you the same thing. So it's certainly-- this was something different. What I really remember is how she energized women to realize that they could be part of the process, not just as voters, but to have an active participation in a campaign and in government. Women kept volunteering all the time. What can we do during the campaign? And I remember that same event that Hazel-- if somebody asked me, when I thought, my God, we might win this thing, it was that event. It was in New Brunswick, it was about a week out before the general, and I had a feeling that people just really came together, and they wanted to elect this woman. And that was the first time I thought we had a shot. Doesn't mean we were going to win, trust me, it doesn't mean we were going to win. But I thought we had a shot. After she got elected--

Ruth Mandel: Candy, there are noticeably always more women working in campaigns, right, men's campaigns, women's campaigns? So what was different?

Candace Straight: Well, this was that women wanted to write a check. And I think that was the difference. Women wanted to write a check and be a part, and I think-- and many of you know that I've helped a lot of candidates, both male and female. This was the largest group of women, in all of my political history, supporting another candidate, not just a woman's candidate-- no, woman who happened to be a candidate, just supporting a candidate. This was the largest group of women that I've ever seen put together. And Hazel and Judy and a lot of people take credit for that, but they wanted to participate, so I think that was a difference.

Ruth Mandel: And when you look at the overall funds raised for the campaign-- I'm not talking about dollar amounts, but in your-- and it is vast experience, helping candidates raise money, is the proportion of donors who were women much larger than in other campaigns?

Candace Straight: Yeah, two things I'll say. Obviously it's how many people donate, and how much they donate. I think the number of people donating, women, probably-- I'm not sure that we've ever seen that many since, okay? Now the amount, that's a different thing. A lot of women can't give 10,000 dollars. I mean, there's no secret, this will come out soon, there's an event for Mitt Romney in New Jersey in June. If you want, 50,000 dollars they'll take. Now not too many New Jerseyans can give 50,000 dollars, let alone women, so I don't want to comment on the amount that was given, although, I will say this, I think a lot of women stepped up and gave 1,000 dollars, and I think Kay will say the same thing. That's an unusually high amount. So it was the number and wanting to make an investment. And I really have not seen that in New Jersey since. Sure, a lot of women participate, and I think we did a good job for women for Chris Christie, but not as many. Now as far as after that, the observation that I will make, is that it's my belief that Christie felt that for every job that she was considering somebody, whether it was on the transition team, whether it was for her cabinet, that there was an equal number of qualified women as there were an equal number of qualified men. And just knew that in her heart. I believe that. I bet Judy and Hazel believe that, too. And I don't think every candidate, even though they may search for women, or ever elected official, even though they may search for women, and I give them credit for doing that, because they might not have the networks that-- over their life, the male candidates, that have been with women's networks, for lack of a better word. But I honestly believe that Christie believed that. I believe it's true that for every job there's as many qualified men as women. So that, I think made a difference.

Ruth Mandel: Was it a explicit directive to find them, or you all just assumed it?

Candace Straight: I don't know. I don't know. No, I believe Christie assumed that. And if Christie believed that, you were going to see a lot of good women and men put forward. And I think we saw that. And a little cute story that I will tell you is, Hazel Gluck called me during the transition, and said, what would you like to do? And so-- Hazel probably doesn't remember. And I said, "Well, you know, Hazel, I would like to help on something with respect to economics, and budget and program and stuff like that." And you know, I wasn't very specific, and so I think Hazel felt, Candy, just name something, don't give me blah-blah-blah, you know, and I didn't know you were supposed to make direct acts, you know, I wanted to be Chairman of Bloomfield, or something like that. But-- I'm just teasing. And so then I get a call from Hazel saying, well, you're going to be Budget Co-Chair with Andrew Chapman. And I said, "Well how did that happen?" And typical Hazel fashion, "A bunch of resumes went up, and yours came down." So there we go. Thank you, Hazel. Thank you, Christie.

Harriet Derman: Ruth, I'd like to comment on that line, Women for Whitman, because it looms large in my memory. I was an Assemblywoman and there was something in the air that evening, it was almost palpable, it was electrifying. We all knew, wait a minute, we are going to have a female governor, it could really

happen. It was extraordinarily exciting, and I think, correct me if I'm wrong, that Helen Reddy was-- they were playing Helen Reddy's song. "Hear Me Roar." And you asked us to be anecdotal, so this is a far out anecdote.

Ruth Mandel: So those people who are watching this 50 years hence, Helen Reddy, "I Am Woman, Hear Me Roar."

Harriet Derman: An Australian singer-- from an Australian singer. Anna Quindlen, who was a very well regarded columnist for the "New York Times," she's a novelist, also. She, that day, or just a few days before, she had had an op-ed piece in the "New York Times," where she was very critical of the governor. And the Democrats actually had the nerve to have young women handing that op-ed piece out to women as they parked their cars. I remember, being crazed out of my mind, because I think her husband is a Democratic operative, and she didn't reveal that in the piece. But that was a very, very exciting evening, and as far as the governor's interest in having women and people of color, it was a sense-- I felt the sense that she was not only trying to be inclusive, but she was proactively inclusive. Everyone had a shot. And although, Hazel, I don't think you had to talk me into it, because I was a woman, it was because I didn't want to leave the Legislature, I think, but I don't know.

<inaudible background conversation>

Harriet Derman: The legislature? No. And the remarks about Chuck Haytaian, are so true that you made. There came a time when I was an Assemblywoman, that Chuck said, "We're going to help Christie. We're getting onboard, and we are going to help Christie. She is going to be the next governor," and I think it made a big difference. The other part of your question was, as a woman, did it make a difference? I think that women have different skill sets as executives, and Christie brought different skills, priorities, thought process to the table. A lot of moderation, a lot of deliberation, not rushing in, not being argumentative or too aggressive, but I think at the end of the day, she got where she had to be, and her list of achievements is long and substantive, and the press, to Candy's point, still doesn't give her enough credit for that. I don't know why, and I don't think it's because she's a woman. I do not think-- I think the challenge of being a woman was in the campaign, although, goodness knows, she had proved herself during the Bill Bradley campaign. She should not have had to prove herself again, especially since she also had a tough primary with Cary Edwards. By the time she took on Florio, she had proven her stripes. But in any event, once she was governor, though, I think the issue of being a woman went away. I know I didn't feel it in my cabinet position that I felt I had to prove myself because I was a woman. So--

Ruth Mandel: I'm going to come back to that in a little while. I'm going to give other people a chance to comment on this first question, but I do want to come back to that, you, as a woman in the administration and reactions and so forth. Yes, Debbie.

Deborah Poritz: I would speak anecdotally. I had, unlike many of the people in this room, and the people on the Whitman campaign, I had not been politically involved. I had never before supported a candidate. I met the governor when I was, just for one year, at the end of Tom Kean's last-- the last year of his second administration, he had asked me to come over to be Chief Counsel and I was at the Division of Law, we couldn't be political there, and I hadn't been. But I got to know him, because we represented the governor, and I came over to do that for a year, knowing I would have to leave. But I met Governor Whitman then, and she was head of the Board of Public Utilities, we were in the Cabinet together, I remember that we went-- I think Hazel and Judy went, too, I don't remember who else, to a meeting in Santa Fe, for women executives in state government, and I remember feeling that there was some-- there was energy there, and liking the governor so much when I met her, and thinking that she had a clarity of thought and looking at issues, and getting to the really important stuff quickly, and knowing how to think about these things, and so when she decided to run for governor, this woman who had had very little to do with politics, the way other women had been caught in this. This is something important, this is something wonderful. But I had the added-- the additional fact of knowing her, and really wanting to see her be successful. And so I made my first campaign contribution then. And I remember, I was not political, so I said-- I sent a message to Campaign Headquarters, I know about insurance law and I was practicing then, in private practice. I know about environmental law. If you want position papers or-- and I was on one of those round tables at one point. And it seemed to me, to be a place that Governor Whitman created for good ideas about government, about how to do this in a way that I haven't seen for a long time, and it was very special at the time. I remember, there was a wonderful story that Hazel Gluck reminded me of, when the campaign was facing the-- well it was after the election, the governor elect was facing dealing with the investigation by the Department of the US Attorney, and the Attorney General's office, over the Rollins Statements. A lot of attorneys in New Jersey from major law firms came forward and said, we'll help, we'll represent the campaign, we'll-- and I remember getting a telephone call from Hazel Gluck, we were good friends. We also met in the Tom Kean days, and Hazel said to me, "Get your-- right down here fast." There wasn't a woman in the room, and I came down and true enough, at the transition headquarters, there was this large table and I walked in after everybody had been seated and I was the only woman in the room, and because of Hazel's telephone call, I got to represent both the governor and her husband. And I'll tell another story that I reminded John Whitman of earlier. He was being deposed by a US Attorney and by someone from the Attorney General's office, and I was representing him at the deposition, and I will never forget this. They kept asking over and over again, what was your role in the campaign, what was your title in the campaign, what did you do for the campaign, what was your role in the campaign? Because if they were ever able to find anything, which they were not, if they were able to find anything, then they could tie the husband in, too. And so they kept asking this question. And finally, I said, because I was trying to be as polite as I could be, I said, "Asked and answered," in other words, enough. And John turned to me, and he said, "Can I answer one more time?" And so the

attorney from the Attorney General's office said, "Okay," he was ready to play. "What was your role in the campaign?" And John said, "I was the wife." And it was such a paradigm for a woman running for governor, and I was thinking then, and I still, when I remember this and think about it, would a wife of a man running for governor have faced those kinds of questions? I don't know, but certainly there were so many different challenges and so many different ways in which gender became important and had to be dealt with, and it came up in odd ways, and in big ways and in out of the way, ways, but it was always there, I think, and probably still is, to some extent. I would add, finally, because I was in the judiciary, Governor Whitman didn't simply come in with the idea of having women in her cabinet or in prominent positions in government, because she believed that there were many women out there who were well qualified and could be competing with the men for those positions. The number of women judges that were appointed over the period of time that she was governor, that's gubernatorial appointment, increased, I just roughly, I don't have exact numbers for the exact period of time, but it was roughly from around 60 women, to around close to 100 women. It was remarkable when you think about it. It was clear that an effort was being made to find qualified women and not to stay within the narrow confines of the networks that had previously been created, that didn't include woman, and many of those women judges went on to become presiding judges and assignment judges and go to-- they went to the Appellate Division, because they were among the most talented in the judiciary.

Ruth Mandel: Thank you. One of the ways I'm going to go to you, Linda, but I want you to sit with this. You've all commented. You've all, in one way or another, made that comment, the last one that you made, and I'm interested, as a student of women in politics, for the record, I am interested in the extent to which that was directive from the governor, and I'm not saying it had to be, I'm just saying, extent to which, so do women out in the world who might be qualified, but they're sort of, I don't know how to come forward, they're unsure of themselves, but suddenly there's a woman elected, and they feel okay about coming forward, or there's special ways-- was there special encouragement, you know, this is still such a challenge, nationally and in all ways, when we talk about women and leadership and the number of candidates we don't-- we don't get enough women coming forward. And yet you've all commented that this happened in a big way in your areas. So I just want you to sit with that a little bit, and if there's something you can add later to it, please do. Linda.

Linda Anselmini: Well I think that the governor certainly wanted that. I mean, I think she was active in a lot of women's groups, both before she became governor and after she became governor. She was surrounded by advisors who were also active and supported women moving up in any way possible. And so I think that it was just kind of known that this was a desirable thing. And I think we all got the message. And I guess the thing that is interesting to me, because I guess I've kind of come to believe, after spending so much time in government, that as one administration leaves, it's almost like footprints on the beach. You know, the water

comes in, it's like you haven't been there so much. But with regard to all of these opportunities that the governor provided with regard to the breaking of the glass ceiling, starting with herself, and you know, the appointment of Debbie to the first-- be the first Chief Justice, and a lot of other firsts that occurred during her administration, by breaking those glass ceilings, it obviously is going to make it easier for those people coming along the second time. It's no longer going to be such a big deal as it was the first time, which will make it easier for those coming along. So there is that long term effect that will come about. And hopefully there will be another woman governor in New Jersey in the not too distant future.

Christine Todd Whitman: Ruth, one thing I would say is--

Ruth Mandel: Yes, Governor.

Christine Todd Whitman: One thing I would say is, I will say that if I ever got a list for an appointment that included just men, just white males, particularly, I would always send it back and say, "Give me a broader list." It didn't mean I wouldn't pick somebody from that first list, but I would ask for them to go back, take another look, find me women, find me people of color, so that we can at least-- I can at least have that kind of a broad base from which to choose.

Linda Anselmini: And I know that we had a process for the filling of appointed positions within the government, working with the governor's office, the chief of staff, where candidates were reviewed and those-- it was looked at to make sure that there were women and minorities on those candidates when they would come as recommendations from other cabinet offices or legislators, or wherever they were coming from.

Harriet Derman: I think it's also important to point out that during the campaign, NOW, the National Organization of Women, actually endorsed Governor Whitman, correct? I think that Myra Terry and--

Christine Todd Whitman: No, they just stayed out.

Harriet Derman: Oh, it was neutral? Okay, it was neutral. But that was something--

Christine Todd Whitman: The first time around, they endorsed Florio, didn't they, or they just stayed out.

Ruth Mandel: No the numbers were very partisan, they stayed partisan, even though there was a woman running.

Harriet Derman: They did not endorse Governor Florio. If anything, then I think they were just neutral. But Myra Terry was very involved, and had alienated a lot of her members who just could not understand. She was very involved. I remember

going with her to the inaugural ball, we hired a limousine, we went with our husbands, we were both so excited to be going to an event like that.

Ruth Mandel: And also-- oh, I'm sorry.

Harriet Derman: And the other thing about that Women for Whitman, and the governor's campaign, was that it was very inspirational for young girls, for female kids, really, just to see that a woman could be governor.

Ruth Mandel: Yeah, on the partisan dimension, just again, just for the record, in terms of the votes, the actual votes, Governor Whitman did not benefit from the gender gap. That is, if only women had been voting on election day, she would not have been elected, so there was that-- which is, the gender gap has been that way since it was, in quotes, discovered, in 1980.

Harriet Derman: I'm glad you said that, because I didn't remember that.

Ruth Mandel: That's correct. Things may have changed now, and who knows what it would be like, but in that first election, that is the way it fell out. John Whitman wants to make a comment. Governor, you've got to take off your Lavalier, just let him talk into it. Oh, okay, we've got it. No, it's okay, thank you. Okay.

John Whitman: Basically--

Christine Todd Whitman: No, it's okay, they do it.

John Whitman: Basically, what I have-- my thought on this subject is that you're all being very nice to society as a whole. I believe there is a very great gender bias that is tremendous and that basically, because you're women, you don't blame it. But if you were men, you would. And that, for instance, we actively decided, really, I think just about the time, just on election night, that I could not go and would not go to Trenton, ever. Because any time I showed up, somebody stuck a microphone in my face and said, well are you here to solve this problem or that problem or something along those lines. So basically we actively set up this position, so that I would not appear anywhere near Trenton.

Christine Todd Whitman: Except for speeches.

John Whitman: Except if she were giving-- If she was going to give a speech, I would get an order, but-- But I think, and--

Ruth Mandel: The assumption being, she couldn't solve the problems without you.

John Whitman: Well it would be nice if the newspapers and everybody else thought that would be the case. I also believe that this is still the case, by the way. I think the gender bias is so much stronger than-- all of you women, I don't mean it

as a condescending remark, are giving everybody a-- the shadow of a doubt, and I don't think they actually deserve it. So just tell you that from my point of view.

Ruth Mandel: Well that's a great-- Actually, that's a great help for transitioning actually, to coming in at the question in a different way, which is, that I did want to raise the question, and I'm sure we can get some examples, even from these Pollyannas, that we could get an answer to, so what were the challenges, what about reactions from various groups, various organizations, people in the legislature, the media you've mentioned. What were the challenges that had a gender bend to them?

Candace Straight: Let me say this. We have to remember, Christie was elected governor, which is the position of an executive. She was not elected to the legislature. Now my observation about the press is as follows. The male press and the female press both know very little about management, about finance at all. Now frequently female press members admit it. Okay, the male press members who know nothing about finance will never admit it. So they therefore-- They just-- I think they don't think women should-- but they're coming at it from a point of ignorance, because trust me, they're clueless as how to run a government, how to balance a budget and stuff like that. The press is clueless when it comes to that. So I think the model they've always seen has been, particularly as it relates to being an executive, as opposed to being a member of the legislature, is the male model, because if you look at who runs the corporations in America today, while they're making some changes, it's still predominantly men. So I think that's where they get it from, and we have to fight back at it, because-- and it's easy to fight back when you realize, if you're talking to these people, that they know a hell of a lot less than you do on any given subject. If you would just read about that subject for 15 minutes, because they certainly haven't. So now nobody in the press will give you the time of day. So what else did you want me to say?

Deborah Poritz: Yeah, let me play less of a Pollyanna. When I became Attorney General, and the governor made me the first woman Attorney General, I discovered for myself, first hand, exactly what John Whitman was talking about. I remember going to my first meeting of the state police brass. I was the only woman in the room. No one in New Jersey at that point-- there had been an all female class of troopers in an earlier administration, but they hadn't been there very long, and there were all kinds of issues relating to that class. There were very, very few women troopers. There were no women in the higher positions. The men sat around this huge horseshoe of a table in a large room, with their, you know, their brass and their gold and their everything else, and their blue uniforms. And I walked in, and I had the very distinct impression that they were going to just stare me down, that they were just sitting there and I thought to myself, this is not going to be easy. These people don't want me here. That was absolutely clear. I can't even imagine for myself how many times the governor encountered those-- I mean, because her opportunities were so much larger than mine. But I had the sense in that room, that they were never going to totally accept me, that it would take a long, long time for

me to be able to get even some basic policy changes, and that I would have to push at it and push at it, and push at it. And I still remember when the women troopers asked me if they could have an afternoon in which they could have a meeting. They wanted to invite women police officers from around the country, and they wanted to have a discussion about women police officers and how women fared in different ways, and the issues about promotion and so forth, and I remember they invited the first woman head, I think, of a state police force, she was from Massachusetts, a remarkable woman to speak, and they went to the colonel first, and they said to the colonel of the state police, you remember, Judy? Yes, they said to him, we'd like to do this. And he said, no way, I'm not giving you women an afternoon off. The men are working, you're not getting the afternoon. And one of them had the courage to ask the woman attorney general to decide-- to actually say to the colonel, no, they're going to have their afternoon, and I did. And actually, I think that was the beginning of some respect from the state police, because if you-- The attorney general has the power, the attorney general is the civilian that's in charge of the state police, and they had their day, and the world didn't fall apart, and the men troopers managed without them, and it was a really remarkable-- I went to all of it, and it was a remarkable afternoon. Woman Chief of Police from Pittsburgh spoke about studies that had been done. The men didn't want the women as partners because they said women weren't strong enough, and they didn't want backup from weak women. And there had been studies that women were so good at diffusing difficult situations, that men who partnered with women had far fewer injuries, and there were far fewer problems, and that-- it was a very high level discussion all day long, and I think those things happen when a woman governor appoints women cabinet officers who have to deal with these. It's almost like, you know, a rolling stone that picks up more and more and more, because each of those cabinet officers, each of the women that are appointed by those cabinet officers and then go out and you can dispel myths that way, and you can deal with these issues, but again, I'll go back to, I think John Whitman is absolutely right, and I'm not certain that I was ever, ever accepted the way a man might have been, by the state police brass. When the governor appointed me to be chief justice, I went into my first meeting of assignment judges. Those of you who are lawyers may know that back in 1996-- well the assignment judges are the head judges in all of the courthouses around the state. There was not a woman assignment judge, not a single woman. And I had the same feeling walking into that meeting. It was different, they were in suits. They weren't wearing their robes, they were in suits, they weren't in uniforms. But it was an all male preserve. And I think it takes a woman governor, it takes a woman cabinet officer, to start to break that down, and I don't think we've done a lot more than start, but at least there's a start.

Ruth Mandel: Did you observe people like some of those, other people, legislators, lobbyists, who had a problem with the governor in gender terms, or did-- in other words, for her walking into the room, once you've won that office, does that matter?

Deborah Poritz: I was never in a situation where I saw the governor in that context. But I was aware, I think that there were many, many men in the legislature who approached the governor differently from the way they had approached prior governors. I think that's hard to change, and I think that's difficult to deal with. I also think that Governor Whitman was straightforward and open about what she was doing, and I don't want this to sound too negative, but there are political ways of doing things that had been developed, and a lot of times, the governor cut through a lot of that-- Am I being very careful? Cut through a lot of that kind of stuff, and I think, rather than being understood as something really positive, which I think it was, it made it harder for the governor, that many people didn't want that kind of directness. They wanted the political norms of how you go about accomplishing something maintained.

Ruth Mandel: Hazel has been waiting to say something. Wait, you need a microphone. Hazel Gluck, you've been speaking from the choir there. Yes.

Hazel Gluck: Just want to say that once the governor got in office and the front office was set up, members of the legislature called it menopause alley. Does that give you some idea?

Ruth Mandel: That's what you were waiting to say?

Hazel Gluck: Or the estrogen palace. Yeah. I mean, that plays into this, I think, you know--

Harriet Derman: But you know, they all loved Christie. They wanted Christie to come to all their events and campaign for them, and--

Hazel Gluck: And they wanted seats at the Meadowlands, but so what?

Harriet Derman: I think there was some resentment of Governor Whitman that she wasn't one of them, not because she's a woman, but she hadn't come up through the legislature, so it's a little bit hard to differentiate. I think Florio, Governor Kean had all been in the legislature, so she was never regarded as one of the old boys. They had never really had a beer with her, you know, at Lorenzo, that kind of thing. And so I think that accounted for some of the separation and the failure to have a meeting of the minds. It was like, where did you come from? Wait a minute, we have to deal with somebody who doesn't know our ways, so there was a little bit of that. It's hard to differentiate whether that was being a woman, or not having been one of them.

Ruth Mandel: It is a fairly universal experience of women in politics, and most outsiders who are coming in to assist them with other people, who are not used to having them there, but it is certainly a common experience. I saw a leader of the legislature who has been referred to here a couple of times, raising his hands with energy. Chuck Haytaian.

Chuck Haytaian: Thank you, Ruth. I think it should be noted that the legislature, literally led the way for Christie Whitman to become governor, because in the class of '91, and Harriet was part of that, we had the largest republican female legislative class, and so it opened up the mind--

Ruth Mandel: In history, you mean?

Chuck Haytaian: Yeah, I believe so, yes.

Ruth Mandel: What was that, three women?

Chuck Haytaian: No, no, check the record, I think it was more like 14 or 15.

Ruth Mandel: And wait a minute, there's another woman over there, Barbara Wright

Ruth Mandel: I'm joking, but I remember being on a panel once with a congressman who said, this was 100 years ago, saying that he was in congress, he was so happy he was there these days, because he was there with a crowd of women, and I think there were, you know, nine or ten, 435 seats.

Chuck Haytaian: Yeah, but we didn't have many, but we had a night class, we opened up the minds of Republicans that they could vote for a woman, and she could become governor, and the reason I was as supportive as I was, was because Christie Whitman, I didn't look at her as a woman running for governor, I looked at her as a friend who was literally a neighbor almost, who I knew, and I knew her parents, and so people had to get to know her to vote for her, and that was the important thing. So it had not a whole lot to do with whether women--

Ruth Mandel: So do you disagree with what John Whitman said?

Chuck Haytaian: Yes.

Ruth Mandel: You guys settle that outside. Jane.

Jane Kenny: Yeah, I just want to add, because I worked with Governor Kean, and I staffed a lot of his meetings with legislators and other people that would come in, and when I would be with Governor Whitman, staffing meetings, it was-- the minute someone walked in the room, you already had three women in there. You had the governor, you had her chief of staff, and her chief of policy, and sometimes the secretary of state would be there, sometimes the AG would be there, but the ratio had flipped, and I can tell you unequivocally, that there was a very different way that Governor Whitman was treated, as a woman, than the way people treated Governor Kean. And I was with him first term, and before he became a, you know, the person he is today, So--

Ruth Mandel: Can you give a concrete example of that?

Jane Kenny: Yes, I think that people, and I'm not talking about Chuck, because Chuck was always very supportive, and he obviously had supported her in her campaign, and when he came into the room, you know, you knew that he was a friend. But, and I'm particularly talking about our own party with this. I think there was a lot of discomfort and dis-ease, within the governor-- in the Republican party, that the leader now was a female and not one of them, and it was much harder for them to do the kind of-- you know, whatever. I don't want to say anything that sounds underhanded, but make deals or whatever, make promises, I mean, Governor Whitman was coming as a straight shooter, a lot of clarity, and wanted to know what the issues were, and I do think, had a very different approach to gathering information. And I think it made a lot of the male leadership very uncomfortable.

Ruth Mandel: Was there an assumption? I'm just trying to dig into this a little bit. Was there an assumption that she wouldn't be available to make deals and so forth, and I'm not talking about illegal deals, I'm just talking about, you know, kind of the way things work.

Jane Kenny: Members of the legislature would come up to me and say, "I just can't really get close to her, like, what's she like?" Well I said, "She's a person, she's very easy to get to know, she's very personable." You know, "Well I don't really get her." You know, that kind of thing, and I think that was a different species, here we are. You know, now, all of a sudden, it's somebody very different in--

Candace Straight: I'd like to speak to Chuck's point if I may.

Chuck Haytaian: Before you do, Candy, I think we have to break the legislature into the two houses. But I think it's important when you talk about support for a female governor, you have to talk about the assembly, and the senate, and it's quite different. And I think where all those folks are talking, they're talking about the senate, to be quite honest, they're not talking about the assembly, because as a leader in the assembly, we didn't hear that, we never heard it, honestly. But in the senate, I'm not quite sure.

Candace Straight: I decided to check with the Center for--

Ruth Mandel: You can ask the Senate President when he comes.

Candace Straight: I wanted to check with the Center for American Women in Politics, to back up what Chuck said. IN 1998-- in 1989, there were-- and let's just stick with the assembly, the lower house. There were two Democrat women in the lower assembly, and six Republican women, that's 1989. By 1993, there were 12

Republican women, and there were two Democrat women, okay? Now some of those Republican women were then taken out of the assembly. I'm thinking of Ginny Haines, and I'm thinking of Harriet Derman, to go into the administration. But the Republicans in the house-- or assembly, we have never had 12 since then. We only have nine today, so that was a peak. I have to give Chuck a lot of credit for that, and I wanted to address that, because Chuck is 100 percent correct.

Ruth Mandel: I'm aware that we're running out of time. I'm taking slightly longer, because it took a long time for us to get started, and it ate into our time, but I am aware that we're out of the allotted time. I want to quickly give everyone a chance to add to this record for this opening discussion of gender. The story, the point about this issue that you would like to have on the record now. I gather that-- you know, I sent you all some questions in advance and one of them was, "Did you experience yourself as part of an important change or historic achievement?" I fear we don't have to ask that. That's been answered, pretty obvious, but in terms of challenges or illustrations or responses from outside groups, not just the legislature, are we missing some point that should be on the record, that we can explore later?

Harriet Derman: I want to mention that I think that Governor Whitman today, still doesn't get enough credit for what a good government she wanted. She wanted and practiced ideas of good government. When I went into DCA, I would say to her, knowing that she had commitments to people, you know, somebody has been a good leader of this agency. Maybe we should keep this person and she was willing to do that, at least for a while, for some people, much longer whiles, and we had a program at one of the agencies with which I was involved, HMFA. They had something called tax credits, and they're very, very lucrative. And I remember saying to the executive director, well how do you disburse them, who gets them? And she said, well I just get a call from the front office, and they tell me to whom they should go. They are very lucrative, millions of dollars we're talking about, so I worked with the executive director, and we came up with a plan to give points based on multi-family, urban, and I presented it to the governor, I mean, and she didn't think about it for a second. Yes, we're going to implement the plan, and I think the governor doesn't get enough credit for being, you know, running a very good clean antiseptic kind of government. And one other thing I want to say about this inclusiveness, and I think we just all had the message, because don't forget, we wore pins. I looked for it, but I couldn't find it, that said, "One Family, Many Faces," and I think that was the mantra for the government, so we all knew that if we were going to promote somebody, the governor would want to know if we had looked around and screened for women, for people of color.

Candace Straight: I want to get on the record, I agree with Harriet 100 percent, but I want to get on the record that we now live in a world where congress has a nine percent approval rating or something like that. Politicians are not really highly regarded in this country, and everybody gets excited when Chris Christie's approval rating goes into the high 50s. Well we have to remember that Governor Whitman's approval rating went into the mid 60s, so I think that is frequently overlooked, and

I think all of the good work that she did was recognized then, but somehow a lot of people have forgotten that, and I don't think it should be forgotten.

Ruth Mandel: And do you think that's gender related?

Candace Straight: No, I think it's-- I don't think it's gender related, I don't think-- I don't know that, I don't know that, but I don't think so.

Ruth Mandel: Okay, Linda?

Linda Anselmini: Well I guess I want to reiterate what Harriet said. In the beginning of the administration, the governor really did concentrate on trying to improve how the government was working, and took her own time, where we went to visit other governments. We went to Columbus, Ohio to see what was going on out there, we went to Indiana, the city of Indianapolis, we were looking for best practices around the country to institute in New Jersey. So there was a real effort, and the governor herself took the time to go and see what was going on, to look at bringing some of those practices here in New Jersey. But as I said, you can do all of these things, and put these things-- try and put these things into place, and then you know, at the end of an administration, another governor comes along and can undo that, and it's like, you know, you have to question why-- almost like, why bother, you know, in some cases. But there was a real effort to try and improve the government in New Jersey under Christie Whitman.

Ruth Mandel: Last word-- thank you. Last word, Debbie?

Deborah Poritz: Yeah, I want to go back to the theme and relate it back to women. I really do think that the governor made an enormous difference in opportunities for women. I was thinking, I talked to-- I said before that there was an increase in the number of women judges. I didn't mention that the New Jersey Supreme Court had three women appointed by Governor Whitman. And the first African American was appointed by Governor Whitman. I think she was both looking for and-- quality, but also looking for ways to reflect the diversity of the state in her appointments. We have the most diverse population of any state in the country, and that was part of the slogan, that was part of what she was trying to do to reflect that diversity, and I think that was a major, major accomplishment. You know, certainly some of these things are mixed and you can't say that this reaction or that was related to gender, but there were a lot of clear gender issues that she took on, and that I think changed the face of government, when she was governor.

Ruth Mandel: With that, we will wait for a return to this discussion. I can't wait, actually, but thank you all very much and thank all of you for getting so engaged with it.

Panel Three: State Finances:

Tax Cuts, Economic Master Plan and the FY 1995 Budget

Moderator: Peter J. McDonough, Jr.
Panelists: Brian Clymer
James A. DiEleuterio, Jr.
Caren S. Franzini
Peter Verniero

Peter McDonough: This is the third panel that we're going to be talking about the first budget and the tax cuts and the fiscal situation. On the panel today is Peter, Justice Verniero. Peter Verniero, Chief Verniero, General Verniero. The guy's got more titles than a used book store. Caren Franzini, who's the head of the EDA. Jimmy DiEleuterio, who started working at the State Treasury when he was eight, and has an historical knowledge of budgets that goes back to Governor Driscoll. And Brian Clymer, who is really the architect of the first few budgets, and I don't know if you saw his arm, but it was in a bandage, or in a sling, which is left over from when Governor Whitman said, "I said 30 percent Brian in two years." Let me set the stage just a little bit. On September 19th, 1993, New Jersey newspapers, it was a Sunday, had polling data out. The *Star Ledger Eagleton* poll had Governor Jim Florio up by 9 points, 47 to 38. The *Asbury Park Press* had Jim Florio's lead at 6 points. Beyond that though, the polls showed that jobs and the economy were the number one issue, and that Jim Florio's support was extremely soft. Two days later, on September 21st, candidate Christie Whitman announced that she would cut the state's income tax by 30 percent. The message was, and I quote, "New Jersey is open for business." It wasn't a tax cut message. It was a business message, it was a jobs message, it was an economic message. The reaction of the media and the political elite was predictable, and to quote Michael Aron-- part of this he got right. You can figure out which part-- "I am not always right about these things--

Audience member: That part.

Peter McDonough: "My feel for the public pulse is probably no better than yours. Maybe people are hungering for this new direction Christie Whitman wants to go in, but I think she lost the election today." The response of the political community was equally dubious, certainly among Democrats, but even among some of the members of her own party. That announcement, and perhaps the response from the media, from the opposition and from fellow Republicans, that it couldn't be done, more than anything set the tone, the direction and cemented the commitment to cutting the income tax and keeping a promise, a promise that, by the way, both of the last two previous governors up to that point, had both made and had both broken after they got through their transition period. That set the stage for the first budget.

The state was in terrible economic and fiscal shape. Taxes had been raised \$2.8 billion in the teeth of a recession. Employment had tumbled and unemployment

had sky rocketed. This is kind of a laugh line. It was at 6.8 percent. Other states were recovering but New Jersey was bucking its traditional role. New Jersey had a traditional role of being one of the first states out of national recessions, and instead of leading the nation, we were a laggard. New Jersey had a \$15 billion budget, fully 10 percent, or 1.5 billion, which was balanced by one shot revenues. State spending for decades had been running like a racehorse during the Florio years, the Florio term. Budget growth was at 6.3 percent on average per year. During the Kean two terms, budget growth was at 9.8 percent, on average, for those eight years. And during the Byrne two terms, spending increased 11.5 percent in each of those eight years. Now there are a lot of important things that went on. There was school funding, and a lot of things that drove the spending, but nevertheless, it had been increasing dramatically. Just as an aside, during the first Whitman term, the first four years, spending increased 1.3 percent. Overall, 1.5 percent in all eight years.

So we get to the first budget speech, which followed the inaugural address where the governor first said she would cut taxes. The budget speech was delivered in prime time, which was unusual, when most budget speeches were given at 2 o'clock in the afternoon. Governor said that government was expensive to run and slow to respond. She wanted to begin the process to making government smarter and faster. She said that high taxes were at the heart of the economic problems. She offered up a plan to cut taxes \$589 million and balance the budget. She eliminated the State Department of Higher Education, which I can say from my own experience, was a good thing to do. She suggested-- it was half a step, anyhow. She suggested a privatization commission to look at things like the Garden State health plan, medical services for prisoners. Proposed cutting the payroll by 600 positions, and the end result of the first budget was that we had a \$15.3 billion budget with a 450 million surplus.

At the heart of all this though, it wasn't just about budgets, it was about economic development. If you couldn't do a budget and put people to work, it wasn't worth doing. If you couldn't put some values in a budget, like creating jobs, creating a future, creating wealth for people, it was just a game of numbers. And so the budget was put together with that in mind, and I think nothing exemplifies it more than what the governor did during the inaugural address. I think I'd like to turn it over to Peter at this point, to talk about that address, and then how you and Brian put the first budgets together, and actually tried to present them, and Jimmy, some background on your historical knowledge, and Caren, how this all ties into economic development.

Peter Verniero: Thank you. Thank you, Pete, and thank you, Governor, for having me, and I assume, Governor, that you are waiving the attorney-client privilege this afternoon. Sorry, ever the lawyer. I have to check. Jerry Gray-- I was doing a little bit of research for today and I came across an article that Jerry Gray had written in the *New York Times*. It was published January 20th, two days after the inaugural. It was a piece about his impressions on the inaugural speech

and the tone of the new administration. It had some predictive aspects to it of what this new administration would be about. And he used four words to describe the Whitman administration, and particularly the inaugural speech: bold, ambitious, surprise and risky. And looking back, I would say those were pretty good words to describe the speech and the tone of the administration, and in fact, the entire Whitman administration. The proposals were bold and ambitious and Pete has indicated the 30 percent tax cut proposal. It was ridiculed by many during the campaign, but it was something that the governor was very convinced could be done and should be done to revitalize the economic growth and the economy of the state. And it was very much just one aspect of an overall economic growth program.

The administration was thoughtful in the sense that everything was reasoned and principled and so forth. Now of course, back in those days, to some extent, thoughtfulness was measured by the editions between *Star Ledger* newspapers, which back then was at least a day, because there was not a lot of internet. I don't think there were any internet postings of *Star Ledgers* or emails, so you sometimes had at least a day between editions of the paper. I also learned, as in any of these positions, you learn a lot about the person that you serve. One of the things I learned about Christie Whitman is that her *Star Ledger* newspaper is delivered at 6 a.m. at her home in Hunterton County. And I also learned I had to have it read completely by 6:15 a.m. in order to take the call about the *Star Ledger*. She really was very dynamic and very principled about her approach to governing, and her approach particularly to that first year budget. She was one to keep her promises in all respects. And as Pete alluded to, her promise about the 30 percent tax cut, it was not a political gimmick. It was a governing promise that she made. And when it came time to address the issue in the inaugural speech, she had a little surprise for New Jersey, and it was that she was going to ask the legislature to enact the first phase of the tax cut retroactively. So now think about that. It's January 18th, it's the inaugural address, and inaugural addresses, by and large, are thematic and sometimes you don't really get into any specifics at all. But she wanted to be very specific about the tax cut. And she said-- and I have her inaugural address-- she said, "Let's not keep economic growth waiting another minute. If President Clinton and his Congress can reach backward into time and raise your taxes retroactively, your governor and your legislature can cut them retroactively." Now keep in mind, ladies and gentlemen, up until that point in time, no income tax in New Jersey had ever been reduced, let alone reduced retroactively.

So this was quite a risky proposal. And putting it in an inaugural address is saying to the world, "This is my most important priority," or at least one of them." So this was something that she had to achieve in the legislature, otherwise she might have been embarrassed and really the whole tone of the administration might have been very different. And through her persistence and her leadership and our legislative partners, she got it done and she signed the retroactive tax cut into law on March 7th, 1994, less than two months before she enacted it. So it was quite an achievement and I think it well captures what Jerry Gray is saying in that article.

The other thing that I think really captures the essence of it is also in the inaugural address. She wanted to announce the creation of an economic master plan commission. Now many of you know, the typical way for a governor to announce a commission is to sign the executive order that creates it, and to announce it through a press release, or sometimes through a press conference. That was the old way. The governor wanted to sign the executive order, announce it and sign it, in the course of the inaugural address itself. She wanted to interrupt her speech and sign the executive order. Now what did that mean for me personally? Well, as chief counsel, I had to draft the executive order, but more intimidating for me was, I had to walk to the lectern in the middle of the inaugural address and hand her the document for her to sign. Now I don't know about all law schools, but at my law school, they didn't teach a course on any of this. I think the governor and her staff must have realized this, because the inaugural address had very specific instructions on how I was supposed to orchestrate this executive signing, I mean, right down to the minute and the gubernatorial pen, I had to hand the governor. And this was my favorite instruction, and this is right in the text of the speech itself: "Governor hands executive order to Verniero, who returns to his seat." They were taking no chances that I might linger up there.

Peter McDonough: Or possibly on your getting lost, but you asked me not to comment on that.

Peter Verniero: But the economic commission, again, was not for show. It was quite real. It was quite substantive, and it really was the precursor to prosperity in New Jersey, which itself has been around really ever since in different iterations. It goes by different names. But it really was, again, a very bold, and I think thoughtful way of providing an entirely new strategic approach for the economic approach in New Jersey.

Peter McDonough: Whitman listens to Barry White.

Peter Verniero: So I'm going to stop here because I know Brian and others will talk about the first Whitman budget. I have a few other things to say about that as well, but at this point, I'll turn it over to you.

Peter McDonough: Brian, could you talk about the first budget, putting it together and what you had to confront?

Brian Clymer: Yeah, and probably the one word I'd disagree with Peter a little bit, and that's probably because of my perspective as a number cruncher, was the risky part. There may have been some political risky parts to some of the things that we did, but I think the first budget, it became thematic for what we did throughout the whole four years. Most of it was really basic blocking and tackling, from our perspective. It was just kind of methodically looking at everything. We budgeted basically 365 days out of the year. We put together little taskforces, and Jimmy might run one, Pete ran one. Everybody had their opportunity to go in and look at

some aspect of what we were doing, but we worked with the departments. We didn't actually wait for things to be submitted. We sat down with them and went through their budget, and then we spent hour after hour after hour in the governor's chambers, again, going through the detail. The governor had the opportunity to look through, line by line, what was happening, so everything happened on a very methodical, very thought out way. I was never a believer in leaving potholes or something that somebody was going to stumble into in later years. So everything sort of stood on its own every year, and we really didn't leave anything that was going to come to be a problem down the road. I think one of the things that we ended up showing was that government really can lead by example and many of the themes that the governor set, we carried on throughout the whole term. We talked about staying within the rate of inflation and we did. We kept our budgets by and large actually at zero for the first couple of years and then we ratcheted it up a little bit. It ended up averaging out, as Peter said, at 1 point something. But as a result of that, I think we disabused some of the myths that existed in New Jersey and especially when it came to parts outside our budget, such as the schools and the municipalities, because the common themes held that the more you gave them, the less they were going to charge homeowners and taxpayers, when the fact of the matter was, the less we gave them, the more they tended to ratchet back and follow what we were doing.

So as we brought down government spending within the cost of living, they actually did the same thing. That was the first time in many, many years in New Jersey history that the municipalities and school districts had ratcheted their budgets down to a rate of spending that was lower than the cost of living. It really set that example, because in the past when they had been given double digit increases, they asked for double digit increases. It wasn't that that was going to sort of help out in some fashion. So that really kind of set the tone for that. And then we did things by a cut here and a cut there, and ultimately, when we got done all the tax cuts, I think it was in the neighborhood of \$4.4 billion that we returned to individuals and corporations. It was some 13 tax cuts, I think, at the time, during the time that I was there, but all of it done in a very thoughtful, very methodic way. We had our goals. We set out to follow that. We would monitor the departments. The governor would monitor what we were doing and we'd ultimately make decisions that we passed on through. The trick was getting it through the departments and getting through that process before you were outed in the public process. That was some of the fun part of it, because oftentimes, you came out with budget goals and things like that, the departments would somehow find a way to find information like that, and find its way into the press.

So we actually came up with the idea of asking the departments for a 10 percent cut, a 5 percent cut, a break even and a 5 percent increase, which actually gave us a couple of things. Number one, they didn't know where we were actually headed, but secondly, it also made them prioritize, because if you look at the difference between a 5 percent cut and a 5 percent increase, it actually gives you the opportunity to prioritize spending, or prioritize additional spending, and that gave

us some inklings as to what they really wanted to spend money on. Some of that was kind of eye opening as well.

Peter McDonough: Jimmy, you've been around for more budgets than anybody here. Was this process any different? Was the approach different?

James DiEleuterio: Well, I think it was different in a number of respects. Contrary to what you said, I only go back as far as Cahill, not Driscoll.

Peter McDonough: Cahill, Driscoll, _____.

James DiEleuterio: As you might imagine when you look through the appropriations handbook, I believe the number is something like 34,000 specific line items in the budget at the time that we were doing the budgets. Governor Whitman reviewed every single one of those line items in the course of many, many meetings. It was a process that I don't believe any other governor has become involved to that level of detail.

Governor Christie Whitman: They were smart.

James DiEleuterio: Yeah. So to that extent, it was different. It was also different from the perspective that you could go in and have discussions. Treasury obviously would have its own perspective on where spending should go and the departments would have their own perspective.

Peter McDonough: That, for example, might be general reports at the time, sitting down with Treasurer Clymer, discussing what kind of guns the state police should have or something like that?

Audience member: Troop cars.

Peter McDonough: Troop cars. You are the best. I used to look at the Attorney General at the time and go, "Man, she is unrelenting."

James DiEleuterio: Well, maybe when we're in private I'll tell you a story about a discussion that the chief and I had when she was Chief Justice, after an Abbot v. Burke decision.

Audience Member: No, we want this all on the record.

Peter McDonough: So these budgets got put together and then had to be sold, and they were sold again, very much with an economic message. Caren, how did EDA go about--? What, if anything, did you guys do differently at that point, and where did you try to break ground to try to make all these promises come true?

Caren Franzini: We spent all the money that Brian tried to save. I just want to say, Governor, I liked working with all these guys and the administration too, as well as the women. I also want to give, as a shout out to the Governor, because although I started in Governor Kean's second term, I was viewed by the administration as a Governor Florio person, as was the chairman of EDA, Tony Coscia. We had been an entity that had worked on economic development and the Governor made a decision which to this day continues to benefit EDA, that it's not going to be a political authority; that jobs are important, no matter what administration. And if there are professionals running there, because we had not had a history of having people that were just kind of in and out, that jobs were so critically important. And that decision at that point in time, to keep Tony Coscia, who was an avid Governor Florio advocate. You made a decision then to keep me, which was very important to me, and to keep Tony. I think that was just a clear indication that it's not politics as usual in Trenton. It's the power of your work. I think that was really critical, important, and I thank you for that leadership, because it wasn't what everyone in the front office necessarily might have wanted at the time either, but you clearly are the leader and made decisions. So I want to recognize that in this climate as well. There were, I think, three key things that were going on at that time. One is, we wish we had unemployment at 6.8 percent. And in this tight budget that Brian was leading, it was, how do you create incentives, or what do you do for the business community? And the key was to create an incentive package that was revenue neutral, or so we could convince first Brian and then you that it was revenue neutral. And Gil Medina was very much involved at that point in time, working with you to create this business employment incentive program that was transformational.

There's a quote, actually, to talk about Jersey City. A reporter wrote, "Governor Whitman's new program turned Jersey City overnight from a back office to a front office magnet." And through this incentive in Jersey City over the past, since it was created by you in your second year, there's been over \$2.7 billion of capital investment in Jersey City. If you look at the Jersey City waterfront today, it's because of this incentive program that the governor started because she was all about jobs. And what can we do to put New Jersey on the map? We can cut the budget, we need to cut income tax, but we need to bring jobs into New Jersey. So that to me was critical, jobs on that front, and also technology. People think it's so natural now, you talk about high tech. Eighteen years ago, it wasn't such-- people didn't talk about it as this thing you should be doing. Your focus to invest in technology and young companies-- which I know, Pete, in your current job is important, where you sit-- you made key decisions on this innovative program that allows young tech companies to sell their losses to big profit making companies in New Jersey. First time ever done in the country, and we've gotten so many states to steal that idea. But it was thinking out of the box of how do we get technology to grow? So I think those two things, on how do we get big business to come and create jobs, to how do we get those new start ups that no one was talking about at the time, was critical to help the budget, because the more income taxes we have from high wage earners, the better the budget was going to be.

Peter McDonough: Jimmy, you spent most of your career at the Division of Taxation. Everybody thinks of the first tax cuts as being income tax cuts, but they went beyond that. There's the CBT reduction that was critical to meeting Caren's mission, correct?

James DiEleuterio: Yes, and again, not to get too far down into the weeds, but it was corp taxes, based on several different factors of production or sales or whatever. We wanted to encourage folks to invest in plant and equipment in New Jersey, not just have retail outlets. So one of the tax cuts was to double weight the sales factor in the corp tax, which again, is in the weeds, but it encourages manufacturing operations to come to Jersey, and they did. To put it in perspective, later on during the McGreevy administration, there was actually a proposal that took back a lot of the cuts in the corp tax. Not too many people are aware of this, but Johnson & Johnson, over here in New Brunswick, figured out at the time that it was going to be cheaper for them to move out of New Jersey as a result of those cuts. The number, depending on who's doing the counting, the number of tax cuts enacted during the Whitman administration I think was 43. It went way beyond just cutting the income tax.

Peter Verniero: Pete, can I just add one point that Jim had made earlier, and that was that the governor went through this budget literally line by line. It was very impressive to me, as a relative outsider, and it was one of those moments where I wish the whole public could have seen that, because I think the public would be far less cynical if they really understood how this governor, and presumably other governors, approach the budget. But I know that this governor went through the budget line by line by line, and we were always asked for our explanation or our rationale, if we wanted to diminish a line item, because she was very aware of the stakeholders that were behind each line item. So when I said earlier that it was very principled and thoughtful, it meant that all of our recommendations to her at the staff level had to be principled and thoughtful. And she was very open minded to rationales, but the one rationale she was not very open to was, "Well, we've always done it this way before." That was really not a good reason to give her to make a decision.

The other point that really stuck with me in the whole budget process, and I know Judy and Jane can speak to this as well, is the Governor really emphasized over and over again that the budget was the single greatest policy document of her administration. And it's also a very technical legal document, where there are a lot of line item language that has the force of law and so forth. And as many of you know, the governor of New Jersey has enormous institutional authority to line item a budget, to certify the revenues and so forth. And she wanted to make sure that all of those tools were being preserved for her, but most important, at least in my mind was, everything had to have a reason behind the budget. I agree with you, Brian, the budgets weren't risky. They were, I think, quite reasonable, but at least insofar as the tax cuts are concerned, and other proposals she made, I think they

carried a certain amount of political risk and it took leadership to follow through on them.

Peter McDonough: Brian, you and Peter had that Saturday morning on the Monday before the budget duty of showing up at the State House and greeting the press corps, which was a traditional thing that had gone on, certainly through the Kean and the Byrne and the Florio years, I don't know if it's still done today, to brief the press corps. Now there couldn't be a more cynical audience to the budget, particularly because the governor had shaken up the status quo, and then you have to write a whole new different kind of story. What was it like rolling out the budget to the press, to the Cabinet who was finding out about it, and to the interest groups? You guys really had a strong, aggressive program to roll out the budget. How did you do that?

Brian Clymer: One of the things we tried to do was to tell our story. It had been always done the same way in the past. There was a way that the press was used to it, so they had their mechanism for looking at it and discerning whether it was a win or loss from their perspective. So one of the things we tried to do is just to change that a little bit, so that we were telling our story. So they had to look at it in a different fashion. They had to look at it in a way that we wanted to tell the story, not in the way that they expected the story to be told. So that made them look at it in a slightly different light. Not that that won us any friends, but as they looked at it, it allowed us to explain things in a logical fashion. We still had a lot of cynicism along with that, which was going to be natural with a Republican administration, but we always tried to be very honest about it and very open about what was going to happen, because ultimately, it was all going to come out anyway. So we tried to lay it out in a way that they would understand, in a very simplistic fashion, but again, in the way that we had developed the budget and in a way that we wanted to tell the story. We tried to do that every year. I think we changed the dynamics of it a little bit, in terms of how they had to look at it, because it was our story.

Peter McDonough: Peter, how did you like that experience?

Peter Verniero: It was a good experience, but it was a challenging one, from a lot of different perspectives. As Brian indicated, part of our job was to take very complex, dense material, by definition, and make it somewhat easy to understand, and still be honest about the presentation. I think we were all of those things. But it was not without a lot of practice and thought behind it and so forth. It's not something that you just went ahead and winged it at the lectern. Brian and I, with the Governor, of course, and others, spent many hours just really focusing not only on the budget, but how it would be presented. The other thing that really stands out in my mind is the timing presented a challenge, because we wanted to give advance notice to all the major stakeholders and especially the legislative leadership, but we also wanted to preserve the confidence of the budget, confidentiality and preserve against leaks. So what that really translated into, the day of the budget briefing and the day of the actual budget speech was a blizzard of

briefings and phone calls. Again, there were no emails back then, so it all had to be either in person or on the phone, where we had to make sure that every person who really needed to know and should be informed of the budget was informed. I think we got that mostly right. I'll be curious to see what they say on the legislative panel later on today, but we tried to keep everyone in the loop, which was sometimes a challenge.

Peter McDonough: I'll give a little personal story about the first budget and the leaking. Now for those of you who knew Joe Donohue, you knew that he had sources in every single department. And you didn't need to know a lot. All you needed to know was, in the Department of Environmental Protection, the governor's expected to some little tiny thing. And in the Department of Personnel, there's a possibility, some little tiny thing. SO you've got these 15 or 20 little tiny things, and you hang that around a bigger story that says, "Last year's \$15.2 billion budget is expected to grow only slightly under a budget expected to be proposed by Governor Whitman." That's how that story gets put together. But on that Sunday morning, Jimmy, Brian, me and I don't know, probably John Ekarius, all got hauled up to Peter Verniero's law firm, Herold and Haines, former law firm, to all get the what-for about the budget story that had leaked. And Carl Golden sat there and didn't say squat about how that really got put together. We all had to ride back from the land of country real estate closings, back to Trenton saying, "Who leaked this story? Who leaked this? Come on, who did it?" And it was just the normal put together. So the focus on secrecy was important, but the surprises were important as well, because in every single budget, there was that surprise moment where Donny and Chuck, sitting behind the Governor, would clap and applaud and say, "Oh, just the way we knew it was going to happen."

<inaudible comment>

Peter McDonough: I know you did.

Governor Whitman: And not always smiling.

Peter McDonough: Caren, did the attitude of these budgets carry over to the business community? Beyond the tax treatment, did they understand that these budgets and this approach to the finances of the state would help their businesses out in more than just a transactional basis, but in terms of a whole environmental thing? Did you witness that?

Caren Franzini: Definitely. It was what they wanted to hear, because the most important tax _____, especially the income tax cut, was critically important. And then having a budget that was sound and not keep going up. So whatever messaging everyone did, did a great job for the business community, and it was so much easier for us to go out and meet with them. And the other tie, in terms of to get groups in, by having the commission, which then led to Prosperity New Jersey, it was having the private sector informed and be part of the sell, because having

them be involved and being involved in meeting with the treasurer and being involved with giving their two cents into it, then you had your automatic sales force as well to go out there and tell the story. So having them understand the budget, what was being done, and being on the inside, so to speak, just because would be talked to in terms of a group, I think was critically important. It made our job easier when we went out to talk to them about the importance of staying in New Jersey. They saw that it was coming from the leadership, by the Governor, to get our own house in order, for the state, which gave them more confidence to stay here.

Brian Clymer: I think the other thing that's important is this: the Governor wanted to have a very inclusive administration, so we did a lot of external meetings. The business community was welcome to come in and talk to us. We had meeting after meeting after meeting. We had business advisory councils. We had a lot of consulting by the private sector that would come in and talk about what their issues were and what their problems were. So we had the opportunity to address a lot of those things. I think that word kind of got out. The business community in general notices when they're not being taxed and they're basically being left alone. That's the kind of environment they like. But when you're actually proactive, you get a lot of recognition and the word gets out a lot quicker. So groups that we had working with the accountants, working with business and industry, and the chamber, and just some of our general advisory groups, I think really went a long way toward getting the word out that we were open for business.

Caren Franzini: I have to give one end to the story, if I can. I talked about earlier, speaking of industry groups, the biotech industry really came in loud and clear to say, "You have to do something for our industry. We can't borrow money from the banks because we lose money forever. You have to do something from a tax perspective." They came with this idea, they always have losses, so let me sell our losses for cash. The Governor, we all talked about this initiative. Fine, it went to the legislature and it got passed. Well, I don't know if you remember, it was our first board meeting. We were going to institute this new program. But it said any life science company could take advantage of it. And there in our audience was J&J, Merck, all the big pharma companies were about to sell hundreds of millions of dollars in losses for cash to another subsidiary, which was going to cost the budget a lot of money. I got a call right before the meeting to say, "You need to hold that budget item." We like our big pharma, but we didn't mean for this program to be for them. We meant it for the small companies. So it was a lot of hard work to bring that industry group back in, saying, "It really wasn't meant for you guys. It was meant for the little guys." So we had to kill the program, went back to the legislature, redid the program to say it's only for people that have 250 or less employees, so for small business. So the only reason we had credibility with the large pharma was because of that open door, because they already felt that this administration was listening to them. It was really hard to tell them they weren't going to get this big tax incentive. We couldn't afford it. But it was making that rationalization: "We can't afford it. We still want you to be here, and this program

was really meant to help small business." So I do think it's sometimes good to have examples of things that you think were going to work, they almost work too well, and you had to go back and redo it, but there was credibility in the business community to go and make that change, and we saw pharma stay and thrive during the Whitman administration, because of that openness and that dialog and trust.

Peter McDonough: I remember one of the challenges, and it seemed absurd to me at the time that it would be harder to sell tax cuts than it would be to sell tax increases. Because when you had to do tax increases in the past, there was some urgency. There was some Supreme Court decision, or there was some other exigency that drove the need to increase taxes, and so Governor Whitman talked about cutting taxes. We put together an actual campaign plan. I wrote it up. Brian enforced it and Cabinet members were expected to go out on the road, to the Chambers of Commerce and the Rotary clubs and things like that. One of the big issues was trying to get the votes of two Republican senators from Mercer County. Now remember, the numbers were reasonably close, and you had Dick LaRossa and Pete Inverso, from really state employee-rich districts, and we had to sell them. Jimmy, they were your guys. Do you remember how we did that?

James DiEleuterio: I'm still selling them. You're absolutely right. They obviously had their turfs to protect, and tax cuts meant less revenue to give out in raises and things. It was very, very difficult. I can't say enough good things about Pete Inverso, in terms of his ability to grasp what the real issues are.

Brian Clymer: To dance.

James DiEleuterio: Yeah, and to dance. Peter was always perfectly willing to sit down and go through the numbers. Even if he ultimately didn't agree with you, he was still willing to sit down and go through them again, and eventually you could do a little horse trading, or you could convince him that the program was the right thing to do.

Peter McDonough: Enough about a boring accountant. What about Senator LaRossa?

James DiEleuterio: Dick was a little tougher to deal with.

Peter McDonough: Peter, we've often talked about the governor of New Jersey having this extraordinary power to determine what the revenues are going to be, and then line item various parts of the budget. What was that process like in your role as chief counsel?

Peter Verniero: Well, the first part of role of chief counsel is really understanding the enormous authority that the governor has, because it's very unusual. And again, it's not something that you learn in law school. There are cases explaining it and there's the constitutional text and there are statutes and so forth. But it was

pretty clear by the first budget that the governor really had-- I don't want to say the upper hand. Every governor in New Jersey has pretty much the last word on the budget, because the governor certifies the revenue and the governor can line item any additional spending that the legislature may put into his or her budget proposal. Now you can get overridden, but that process itself is very difficult, because it has to be line item by line item would have to be overridden in the legislature. And as someone said, it's 30,000 line items in the budget. So if you have a governor of the same party as in the legislature, and you use your authority smartly, you have an enormous say in what the final product will look like. Now that's both a virtue and a vice. It's a virtue because, as I said, it can be your significant policy document of your administration, but the downside is, you really own the budget in New Jersey if you're the governor. There are really no excuses, unless-- and there is an exception to every rule-- because of the legislative dynamic in the Florio administration, I think there was one Florio budget that was actually vetoed by the governor, and the entire budget was overridden. The veto was overridden and that became the legislature's budget.

Brian Clymer: That was the Chuck _____ budget of fiscal '91.

Peter Verniero: That's the exception to the rule. The rule basically is, the governor has enormous fiscal authority, but also enormous fiscal responsibility.

Peter McDonough: Brian, what was the biggest challenge in the first budget, if you can recount? A billion and a half dollars of the one-shots, I believe the first budget actually included 1.5 billion in the previous budget, and I think the governor's first budget had about 800. So you cut them in half. What were the other big challenges?

Brian Clymer: Yeah, I think we were down about 3 billion altogether, between the normal budget growth and the one-shots, we had about 3 billion to balance the first budget out. Probably the short time period, and we got a little bit of an extension to come through the budget, but we had two full things to go through. We had the transition team's book with a lot of suggestions for cuts and things that we wanted to pay close attention to, but you had to go through all those to make sure there weren't any landmines or things that were going to blow up on you, because again, there were people from the outside looking in. And then you had the career staff looking at their budgets and it's the first go round with you. They're not used to how you're doing it, and so you have to kind of ride hard on everything that's going on and pay a lot of attention to it. They weren't used to the fact that the governor looked at everything and we had constant meetings going on, the fact that we would literally traipse down to their offices, sit down at their tables and go through their budgets with them. And it was a time consuming process, but again, when you're going through something that's unfamiliar in a very short period of time. There's a lot of midnight pizza being eaten.

Peter McDonough: In fact, there's a glass room at OMB that's called the fishbowl. In the fishbowl, you go through this process of going through the minutiae of the budget and the process is called fishbowling, which doesn't involve throwing mackerel down an alley. Jimmy, has that always been the case? Is that the way OMB has always approached it? Was it any different?

James DiEleuterio: No, not a whole lot different. Again, from OMB's perspective, they needed budget analysts to really get down into the weeds, to deal with what does it mean to maximize federal reimbursement for Medicaid? From treasury, there's probably not more than a half a dozen people that could tell you what the gross receipts and franchise tax ever did. So you needed those folks to sit down in a room and bat ideas back and forth, and no, you can't do that because this will happen. So that's pretty much been the process.

Brian Clymer: I think they were a little unexpected at the level of detail we wanted to go into and were willing to go into to sort of ferret out programs that might be restructured or cut back and reexamined.

James DiEleuterio: If I could just add something. Don't forget, during the Florio administration, the New Jersey government had received several credit rating downgrades, so you had the public perception to deal with having credit rating downgrades to deal with. You had the one shot revenues that were up to 10 percent of the budget. Again, we're talking about \$15, 16 billion budgets, I think. Later on, during the McGreevy administration, they were 34 billion. We had the unfunded liabilities in the pension system, which like it or not, four and a quarter billion was a lot of money back then. Now we talk about trillions like it's pocket change. So there were a number of different public perceptions that had to be dealt with that I think we did successfully deal with. And at the same time, cut taxes and at the same time, implemented programs and preserved open space and open southwards to the prism, which doesn't sound too sexy, but it was quite an achievement.

Peter McDonough: Could be a dating opportunity.

Caren Franzini: The other thing I think with a budget, from an economic development perspective, is that there was a policy part of it. And I know Jane worked a lot of times to try to get her buy in first, to get the budget as well. On policy, the Urban Coordinating Council was deciding, how do we take limited resources and put it into urban areas? How do we invest in technology when there are limited resources? And we invested in venture funds to help technology companies. At the same time we were struggling, it was also the push of, with limited dollars, how do you make sure you're meeting the policy objectives of the budget and get things done, that's focused on some of the key policy areas? I think the person that didn't have to put together the budget, but had to try to influence it, and with other people, that was a great thing to be able to push a policy piece of it.

Peter McDonough: Peter, we're just about at a minute or so to go. Do you have any closing thoughts?

Peter Verniero: One closing comment. I may be getting ahead of this panel, because this is really the focus on the first year. You really can't evaluate the results of the Whitman administration by looking at one year. You really have to look at the entire life of the administration. I assume this will have more detail later on in this series. But I did come across some statistics that I thought I would close with. These were contained in the budget in brief of the governor's last budget that she submitted before she became EPA administrator. So it's a good synopsis of the Whitman years. New Jersey's per capita personal income increased from roughly 28,000 in 1994, to 35,000 in 1999, the second highest in the nation, an average increase of nearly 6 percent. During the life of the Whitman administration, over 439,000 jobs were created. The unemployment rate dropped to a decade low of 3.4 percent in June of 2000-- oh, how we would wish for that-- from an average 6.8 percent in 1994. And the last fact that I thought was noteworthy, gross state product had grown steadily to roughly 344 billion in 2000, from 256 billion in 1994, an average increase of 5 percent. So can you take full credit for that? No, the economy is much more complicated than that. But you can take a great deal of credit and I think it is really credit that this governor deserves, and I think that economic record speaks for itself.

Peter McDonough: Thank you. And with that, I think we'll let everybody take a break.

Panel Four: The Governor and the Legislature: Critical Issues and Relationships – What Worked? What Didn't?

Moderator: John J. Farmer, Jr.

*Panelists: Donald T. DiFrancesco
Joseph V. Doria, Jr.
Garabed "Chuck" Haytaian
Michael P. Torpey*

John Farmer: We are the cleanup panel today. Panel four, the governor and the legislature critical issues and relationships what worked and what didn't. I'm delighted to be the moderator or the referee of this discussion as it may turn out. We couldn't have a better panel to talk about the first year and the evolving relationship with the legislature you normally have. Don DiFrancesco immediately to my right was Senate president at the time, ultimately became acting governor and was in a critical leadership role in New Jersey for literally two decades. Joe Doria to his right was Assembly minority leader at the time, had been the speaker of the Assembly for a couple of years under the Florio administration and, again, was a

critical player throughout the Whitman administration. And one of the legislators with whom we worked most effectively on the other side of the aisle. Chuck Haytaian seated to Mr. Doria's right was the Speaker of the Assembly. Again, an outstanding public servant of New Jersey for the better part of two decades. And had been the speaker of the assembly the last two years of the Florio administration when the Republicans had gained a veto proof majority in both houses of the legislature. And to his right, Mike Torpey who was sort of the bridge between branches in the early years had been the Deputy Executive Director, I believe, of the Assembly Republican Office in the last couple of years of the Florio administration and had been instrumental in the work they did. And then came over and was really the chief liaison that we had in the Counsel's office to the legislature the first year of the Whitman administration.

This panel is entitled "Critical Issues and Relationships, What Worked and What Didn't?" I'm not going to have a lot to add to the substance of it because I joined the administration relatively early on and the position I had didn't really involve much dealing with the legislature. But I do have a vivid image of the what didn't work aspect that I want to share with you in kicking this off. So the legislature was a great mystery to me as I joined the administration from the U.S. attorney's office. And our contact to the legislature is limited to Mike and Senate liaison Rocco Iossa and Mark Musser who was the Assembly liaison, Janice Mintz and Peter Verniero. And I recall Rocco being sent off on a mission to lobbying in favor of some legislation that we wanted and he had to visit Senator Joe Bubba in Bubba's district office and they went out afterwards. And the next morning Rocco walked in with a completely stricken look on his face. And I said, Rocco, what happened and he said, "I showered with Joe Bubba." We'll put that in the what didn't work category. The things we would do for you governor. <group laughter>

Christine Todd Whitman: Above and beyond that.

Don DiFrancesco: That's a pretty tough <inaudible>.

Christine Todd Whitman: Yeah, that is. That is. An ugly one.

W1: <inaudible>.
<group laughter>

John Farmer: I'm relieved to hear that. But there was always much talk throughout Governor Whitman's term as governor of our relationship with the legislature and it obviously started in that first year. But I want to try to put it in a little bit of context in terms of what historical moment we had arrived at when the governor took office. And in my view, anyway, she took office at a really critical juncture in the history of the 1947 State Constitution. As everybody knows, the governor was made very powerful under the '47 constitution and early governors really didn't hesitate to exercise that power in sometimes very extreme ways really reaching their high watermark, in my opinion anyway, under Governor Byrne where

the income tax was adopted and where the Pinelands were preserved. And the pocket veto was used over 200 times which caused a backlash. And the backlash happened throughout the 1980s where the pocket veto was actually radically modified so that the bargaining power between the governor and the legislature was significantly changed. And the legislature I think made a concerted effort. And those of you who were there can speak to this to try to equalize the playing field a little bit throughout the 1980s so that legislative staff when Governor Byrne was governor, my wife Beth Gates was on the staff in those early days and she said the staff, at one point, for Senate was Pete McDonough, John Sheridan, herself and Victor McDonald against the entire executive branch so it was really not a level playing field early on.

Throughout the 1980s, though, the legislature had added staff so that by the time the early '90s rolled around it was not the equal of the governor's office but it was pretty close. And there was a policymaking capacity that existed in the legislature that hadn't existed under prior governors. And the two years leading up to Governor Whitman's taking office there had been a reaction against Governor Florio's administration and the Republicans had veto proof majorities in both houses of the legislature. They had actually passed the budget over the Governor's veto. So that when Governor Whitman came in as a woman, as an outsider, it was after two years really of republicans calling the shots and being the major policy drivers in Trenton. So in that context, I want to ask everybody on the panel, what was the adjustment like for you and your positions of leadership to an outsider, a woman, and also somebody who hadn't been involved in running the state the way that you guys had in the prior years. So I'll start with Mike, I guess, because you're the bridge so you were on both sides of this.

Mike Torpey: Well, I think you're correct John that the legislature felt as if it was a full partner and a co-equal branch and I think those last couple of years solidified that view of ourselves, for certain. As you noted, there's a historic override of the governor's veto of the state budget. It's never happened since, obviously. We felt, I say we in that context, I was working for Chuck as the deputy director of the staff, we felt as if we could govern from the legislature and did to a great extent. I have to say I think there was-- I think that sentiment obviously still existed when Governor Whitman was elected. But I also think overwhelmingly there was a sentiment in support-- from a Republican perspective in support of her new administration. It had been a battle, the previous four years with the Florio administration. It was a battle. And it was nasty. People talk about the political sentiments of today. But I can tell you in those four years and particularly those two from '91 to '93 it was about as nasty as it got. And it got personal with the administration on occasion. So I think there is some relief actually from the Republican perspective of a Republican governor and an opportunity to maybe change, have a more constructive relationship with the executive.

John Farmer: Chuck.

Chuck Haytaian: It wasn't too much of a change for me working with the Whitman administration. I felt I knew Christine and I came from a different perspective. I mean we're the highlanders and so we understand how government works, I think. And she was a former freeholder and I was a former freeholder. I knew her parents. I knew her family, not socially very well but I knew her. And friends of mine knew her well. And so it was easy to work with her because we had, in essence, laid a path. We cut a sales tax, the first time a tax was cut in New Jersey. And the results of that were favorable. I remember, Ray Lesniak getting on the Senate floor and saying, because of Chuck Haytaian cutting that sales tax, children are going to die in the streets. You know, it took me by surprise, I said, what the heck is going on with this guy. You know, I couldn't understand that all cutting a tax. And in fact, Steve Kalafer had said to me, when the sales tax was being cut, he was the person who really pushed me to do that. He said, "Cut it to five because it's going to increase business in New Jersey. It's going to increase revenues rather than decrease." So when Christine came in and I remember the meeting we had and Mike was there with Kudlow] and Steve Forbes and Christine we talked about cutting the income tax. And I liked the idea, I said, it'll work. And it did work. It worked very well. We did very well in the nineties.

So working-- and I worked easily with Joe. I mean when Joe was there as Speaker he and I used to meet for dinner, once a year at least. And he would say to me, what kind of staffing do you need and I'd tell him. At that time it was important that the party in power would cut the staffing of the minority party and I said, Joe don't do that, don't cut it. I think maybe he figured he made a mistake because we took control but he didn't cut our staffing or he did he may have taken one or two people. But when I became Speaker we had that same conversation. And I had some of my staff telling me cut his budget. And I said, no we can't do that because he didn't do it to me and we have to work with this new governor coming in. And so Joe was pretty good in the legislature. I had a good relationship with the Christine Whitman administration. I didn't have major problems. There were some problems we had but they weren't major at all.

John Farmer: Joe, what was like it?

Joe Doria: Yeah, I'll take it from a very different perspective because obviously, the two years right before Governor Whitman we had a democratic governor but we had a legislature that had a veto proof majority. And so as the minority and as the minority leader we were continuously pulled in two different directions. We had now as Chuck's pointed out, the speaker and I we had a great relationship and we were able to work together. But at the same time we had an obligation to the governor's office to be able to stand up on a number of issues and have to do with a number of things that maybe at sometimes weren't necessarily what we in the legislature felt we should be doing but we had to do it because we had to protect our governor. So it became from my point of view, much easier not that I wanted Governor Florio to lose. We worked very hard to help him win. But once Governor Whitman won it was easier from my point of view as the minority leader because now I had a clear path

of what I could and could not do. I didn't have the governor's office there leading the way in setting policy. Rather, we in the legislature and the minority, even though we were in significant minority could deal with some issues directly and we could work out arrangements with the majority, with the speaker, which we did on a number of issues to work cooperatively. Sometimes I got yelled at by a lot of people saying I was really a Republican.

Don DiFrancesco: I remember that.

Joe Doria: I remember it also. I won't say who but there was a number of people who felt that. And my point of view was look, our job is to do the best job for the people of the state of New Jersey and to work on a cooperative manner to be able to work together, not like is happening today unfortunately at all levels of government. There was not the same polarization. Once I did not have to worry about a governor in place of my party, I could now work with the Speaker on a cooperative basis and with the new Governor. We didn't have to agree on everything and we didn't. But at the same time there was an opportunity for the minority and myself as minority leader to work and get things done and to actually work for my constituents to be able to do things that we might not otherwise have had the opportunity to do. So in a way it was a freeing opportunity for myself and the minority which I think a lot of people would not realize. But yes, it worked to our benefit during that period of time.

John Farmer: Don, how as the transition for you from really sort of driving state politics from the Senate to...

Don DiFrancesco: Chuck was driving state politics. We just went along with him. Let's see, where do we start? Let me just make one correction here, Nancy, I don't know if you're responsible for this but after the Governor Whitman was elected we only lost three seats in the Senate. We went from 27 to 24.

Nancy Becker: I'm not responsible for whatever...

Don DiFrancesco: I'd figure you'd say that. It was probably five seats in the Assembly and three seats in the Senate, probably reversed. I just wanted to clarify that. I don't want Governor Whitman to think she lost-- and the three that we lost I mean, you know, it's just three less that we had to deal with, you know, which was probably a good thing but Bubba wasn't one of them.

John Farmer: Yeah, Bubba kept his seat. He was one of those 18 votes you always had for us.

Don DiFrancesco: Now, let me say something about Bubba. Now, Rocco Iossa developed a strong relationship with him. This is a true story because I went-- now I also was determined to also develop that relationship with Joe Bubba so we could get his vote once in a while because he hated me after the-- as you know, he was a

John Dorsey guy. So I had to golf with Rocco and Joe Bubba a number of times. I took him to Arizona on a conference. I mean one outing we went to I took him to-- it might have been the kickoff classic, John. So we take Bubba and it might have been-- I don't remember who else was with me but we golfed at _____. So we go into the locker room and you reminded me of this, we go into the locker room and there's a guy, this poor guy next to Joe, his locker, and Joe took off his toupee and put it in the locker because he was going to take a shower. And I looked at Tony Sartor and he looked at me and I said this poor guy next to me was like because, you know, the toupee looked like a dead rat or something. But I was determined-- I needed his vote. And I give credit to-- you know, Mike, when I was first elected, we were talking about when I was first elected in '75 with your dad, I think Joe Gonzalez and Carl Golden and his secretary the name was Eleanor were the only staff. And Carl, he worked for us and he wouldn't write a press release for me anyway. He'd always say no. So we didn't have any staff, but it was Alan Karcher and Chuck Hytaian, not Chuck, Chuck Hardwick really beefed up the staff to try to develop a better bite even though they were partisan.

There were a number of people that left OLS, Brian Rooster was one of them, for example, and Jim Harkness and other people who we tried to develop policy at times. I know it's not equal. But I just want to mention that because you mentioned it. The transition-- we did start as the Senate-- listen, let me explain something about this. I was in both the Assembly and Senate. And when you're elected to the Senate from the Assembly and you start walking down the hall to the Senate your head actually gets huge, bigger and bigger and bigger by the time you get to that Senate and that seat. So you have to understand there's a lot of big egos in the state Senate. The names change occasionally but the egos are still there. It's so different in the Assembly where Tom Kean was my minority leader and then Jim Hurley I basically did whatever they told me to do. But then when you get to the Senate, of my God, Joe Bubba, Hank McNamara, oh, you're going crazy. But we did stop, in anticipation of her victory, we stopped doing nominations I don't know seven or eight months ahead of time before the election so that we didn't want to deal with any more. I think DeCotis was the-- Bob DeCotis was the chief counsel and then he disappeared during the election. I don't know where he went but he disappeared. But we kind of stopped everything and this allowed the governor to make a number of appointments in January which she did do. I thought the transition was pretty smooth. And I don't know what was said earlier, but from my standpoint, I thought the first year was pretty smooth. She didn't have a lot of money to play with but I thought everything Governor Whitman asked to be done by the legislature was done. And I'm sure there was a lot of grumbling here and there, but there were a number of Republican senators that were big supporters of hers. John Dorsey was one of them, actually. I couldn't get him to stay. He buried himself over one issue but I thought it was pretty smooth.

John Farmer: But what effect did the fact that so much of the Governor's administration, so many of the key players were women? What effect did that have in the Senate?

Don DiFrancesco: I don't know, maybe other people felt differently. Harriet was one. Hazel I knew from the old days in the Assembly. Judy I knew. I don't think we saw that as a problem. I mean earlier somebody said it might have been a problem. I don't-- because Governor Whitman had served as a freeholder, had ran for the United States Senate, everybody knew her. I don't think it was much of a problem. And I thought probably the judiciary process-- now, I don't know what Bill Gormley was doing behind the scenes, maybe Mike does. From my standpoint I thought he made it pretty easy to put the cabinet in place, having been through several other governors where it was very difficult. And so I thought it was kind of a love-fest in the beginning. And Chuck I have to confess though going back to two years earlier that you and Bob Franks who state chairman. Bob was state chairman in the '91 election. I thought they ran a fantastic statewide campaign.

Joe Doria: No question.

Don DiFrancesco: I would have preferred and Chip and I used to have these conversations, but you made a commitment during the campaign to cut the sales tax.

Chuck Haytaian: Right.

Don DiFrancesco: And you stood by that commitment. I would have preferred to reduce the income tax because it was so high. It went from three-and-a-half to seven when Jim was governor, instead of three-and-a-half to four or four-and-a-half he raised it to seven. And I thought that was outrageous and that was something that we could have maybe reduced it a little. But in anyway, Governor Whitman did it anyway. So we were very happy about the income tax decrease albeit money was difficult at the time. We know that but things got better but I thought the transition in the first year and I know that's what you're talking about was pretty good.

John Farmer: What was your perspective...

Chuck Haytaian: I think John the difference between-- as I said there's two houses of the legislature and the difference is senatorial courtesy. That really is the big difference.

Don DiFrancesco: Yeah, it's huge.

Chuck Haytaian: That's the problem that they would have with the Governor because she would make an appointment. And how to get advice and consent, and sometimes some of these senators would say, no, I just don't want that person as we're having now with the Education Commissioner. So I think that was the main

stumbling block, if there was any that the senators would look upon senatorial courtesy as their domain, their little fiefdom.

Don DiFrancesco: But also in the Senate it favors the minority. The minority really relies upon senatorial courtesy. The majority has less of an impact that way but I thought Governor Whitman bent over backwards on appointments, I really do. I made she made it a lot easier than Chris Christie is making it, I can tell you that.

John Farmer: Mike, what's your perspective on the whole gender issue as the administration...

Mike Torpey: Yeah, I was listening earlier and I had obviously occasion to think about it a bit over time. And I have to say that when I first came into the administration and I heard this sentiment expressed from within the administration about obviously the need to promote women and minorities I think that obviously that was something that was easy to support. And at the same time, I started to get a sense that maybe there was a little bit of paranoia on the subject. But I have to say and my sense over time because I had the honor of serving with Governor Whitman from the first day until the very last day. And I'm one of the few people who had that honor. So I had maybe a longer arc on this, a longer view on this. So in the beginning I didn't really see the gender-- what I would describe as gender biased in terms of the dealings. And I definitely saw it the longer I was there I did see it. But it was a very individual thing. It wasn't institutional, I didn't think. I don't think it had to do with the houses, the difference between the houses per se. I think the larger difference is what was just described here about the relative powers of an Assembly member versus a senator. So I think that had more to do with any kind of difficulty that we ever faced. There was-- I was saying this to Don earlier, it was tougher to deal with the Senate than it was with the Assembly, period.

Don DiFrancesco: Yeah, it always is.

Mike Torpey: And always. And that has to do more with institutional issues than any gender bias issues that I saw, at least. But I'm not going to sit here and say who but I definitely saw it and thought that it was an impediment to a working relationship with certain people. I shouldn't say working relationship. There's a working relationship but it could've have been a better relationship but it was there. But, again, it wasn't an institutional thing. It wasn't a party driven thing. It was a real personal type of situation and, again, I wouldn't say who. I didn't see it with any of the folks sitting here, I'll say that. I will say too just as an aside in terms of Joe Doria called me when I became the liaison, the deputy chief of staff and he invited me out to dinner to sit down. And we went down to Diamond's one of the many long gone great restaurants in the Burg] and had a really nice dinner, just sitting there chatting. And, of course, I knew Joe as the minority leader and as the speaker previously but it was just for chance for us to sit down and talk and had a constructive relationship from there forward. So I mean we had previously but solidified that. Yeah, a lot of these things are very personal. The relationships are all

very personal not just amongst us but, I think, with respect to the Governor. The one observation I will make in addition is that, I think, again not so much-- I don't know that it was so much gender driven but I could definitely see-- there was an issue that the governor was not from Trenton.

John Farmer: Well, that was my next question. What about her status not just as a woman but as an outsider, someone who's not from the legislature per se.

Mike Torpey: Yeah, I think she clearly was and that was to her benefit. That's part of the reason she won. Yeah, so that was there for sure.

John Farmer: How did it manifest itself?

Mike Torpey: I think that occasionally, there was a sense that we in the administration just didn't get it all of the time, you would hear that. And I had occasion to have a lot of maybe strenuous interactions with my former friends and colleagues-- with my friends. They're still my friends but former colleagues I should say in the legislature on that subject. And I have to say I had a very easy transition. I enjoyed the difference, you know, and getting the two different perspectives. And I very quickly adopted the new executive perspective. And the truth is you just had to take a broader view of the state politically and from a policy standpoint. And that's where you really separate from the legislature. The legislature people are elected to serve their constituents within their districts who tend to be more parochial.

Joe Doria: Very parochial.

Mike Torpey: Very parochial sometimes, yeah, extremely, very local

Don DiFrancesco: Everyone is going to have arguments and misunderstandings. Nothing is going to be real peachy all of the time, 1000 percent of the time, but I thought it went very well the first year. That's what we're talking about, right, the first year?

John Farmer: We'll have another session later on the subsequent years, actually, we can get to when you were governor.

Don DiFrancesco: John, I have to say I was here for Jim Florio's-- what are we calling this Ruth?

Ruth Mandel: <inaudible>.

Don DiFrancesco: Okay. I was the only Republican. Nancy, are you still a Republican?

Nancy Becker: Yes, I am.

Don DiFrancesco: We were the only republicans here. I see Diane is here and Bob Smartt is spying on us over there. He I know from way back. So this is a good group. This is a really good group.

John Farmer: Joe, what was your perspective?

Joe Doria: I think Mike just brought it up. I think there was more of the tension as a result of the fact that the Governor and a lot of people in the administration were not of Trenton. And so there was that resentment that here comes these people coming in who really don't know what's going on and they're going to make these decisions and they're going to impact upon how we're supposed to do things. I think it was more of that than necessarily anti-women or a misogynist point of view. And I think that tension is always there and sometimes it's a little less, a little bit more but it was there with the Florio administration with democrats who resented...

Don DiFrancesco: It's there now.

Joe Doria: It's there now. There is always a tension between the executive branch and the legislative branch. Sometimes it's a positive tension, sometimes it becomes very negative. But it's part of the system that was set up by the Founding Fathers whether it be at the national level or at the state level that there was always that distrust of the executive. And our constitution pride of '47 really showed it because the governor had no power because they didn't trust the executive. They didn't trust-- it goes back to the king. So what you have is there is that tension and it's meant to be there. The question is how do you overcome it? So it's not so much because there was no women or because it's now Governor Whitman. It's no matter who the governor is there's a tension between the legislature and the governor just like there's always a tension between the Senate and the Assembly. And having actually sat in the Senate for a year, it's hard to understand why they are the way they are, but they do suddenly change when they walk across that hall.

Don DiFrancesco: You agree with me, right?

Joe Doria: No question. There is no question when they walk across that hall something happens. Sitting in the caucus I used to look at the people who I knew in the Assembly and I'm going what happened here?

Mike Torpey: John, on that point, an observation was made to me a long time ago by a long serving Senate staff member. Just look at the majority caucus rooms to see the difference. The Senate majority caucus room is a roundtable. And the Assembly majority caucus room is more of a classroom setting. You have the leadership up front, everyone else sits down.

Don DiFrancesco: That's because Kathy Crotty planned it that way. She planned the whole thing but not knowing that we were going to take control.

John Farmer: Chuck, what's your perspective?

Chuck Haytaian: Yeah, I think it was easier when Christine came in as governor for me because I remember when Donnie and I had the veto proof majority, my reaction, I should never have said this but I said, the governor he's irrelevant. Literally, he was irrelevant to me because we could override his veto. Now, taking all of the powers of the governor he wasn't but when it came to the legislature he was. When Christine came in that stopped because my caucus was not going to override her and they never did, at least, when I was there. I was just reading that you were over in _____ so I'll let Jack Collins, you can blame him. That wasn't me.

John Farmer: He's the pink elephant in the room.

Chuck Haytaian: And so it changed for me personally. And as I said, it was easier and it worked out well.

Don DiFrancesco: Well, Chuck ruled with an iron hand. I mean you were terrific at keeping control of your delegation and that's the whole key, especially in the Assembly.

Chuck Haytaian: Don Sico was the reason for that.

Don DiFrancesco: Well, I mean that's the key in the Assembly. You have to have control of the minority.

John Farmer: So turning from sort of the broad questions to the specific policy initiatives. Obviously, the central one we've heard about was the budget and the tax cut and the job growth emphasis. Mike, what were the biggest challenges and the critical relationships that you needed to cultivate to get that done?

Mike Torpey: Well, the biggest challenge right out of the gate was just getting organized. I still think back on that time and I was saying earlier that after the first six months of the administration, like the tension was so great that my hair hurt. I'd just touch my hair and my scalp hurt because it was constant. I know that I was one of dozens or a few hundred folks in the administration who probably felt that way. It was extremely intense. And getting organized around this endeavor of governing was really amazing. And some of the folks who were on earlier today really took the leadership roles in doing that. But we did, I think, a pretty effective job of creating a set of processes within the executive branch that we then employed in our relationship with the legislature. And we did a lot of work making sure that we linked up the liaison units and the executive agencies with the governor's office very directly. There was no communication that didn't pass

through the counsel's office before it got to the legislature. That, I think, occasionally caused some consternation with certain legislators but we needed to out of the gate establish some discipline in that communication process. I think that was pretty effective. And it certainly helped as we started to manage the agenda with the leadership, the Republican leadership in the Assembly and the Senate. And it certainly helped and you heard this talked about earlier, it certainly helped with the communication, the media communications. Without that, without that discipline, without those processes that we established it would have all fallen apart rather quickly. I think that was the biggest challenge was actually the internal organization and then deploying that into an operational mode.

Chuck Haytaian: Talking about tax cuts and finances and budgets I remember when I first got into the legislature it was 1981 I was elected. Tom Kean became governor in '82 and the budget at that time was \$6 billion as I remember it. When Tom Kean ended his term it was \$12 billion. And when Jim Florio came in it was going to \$16 billion when we said stop it's all over. When we cut the budget...

Don DiFrancesco: The sales tax...

Chuck Haytaian: Yeah, the sales tax was there, \$1.1 billion the number was. And then when Christine came in it stayed that way. I mean you had what was it 1.4 percent?

Christine Todd Whitman: Over the whole time.

Chuck Haytaian: Over her whole term there. So I think that was important in the transition from what we had even with Tom Kean. I mean \$6 billion at that time, that was a lot of money.

Don DiFrancesco: He doubled the budget.

Chuck Haytaian: Yeah, that's right, exactly. But you didn't see that in that Whitman years.

John Farmer: So what was the strategy from your point of view in dealing with this policy initiative of a 30 percent tax cut? And as a minority leader, what kind of discussions were there?

Joe Doria: Well, obviously the way we dealt with it was try to show what those cuts would-- how they would impact upon the various constituencies. So the question was, okay, we're going to cut the taxes by 30 percent, well, what does that mean to the budget of the various departments? What does that mean to the budget of Human Services or how will it impact DYFUS , how will it impact programs that exist in the Department of Health or in Education? So the attempt during the budget hearing was to show how this would have a negative impact on the various constituencies within the state and to get the support of those constituencies to

deal with the cuts that would be impacting upon them. Obviously, in the end, with the passage, we knew it was going to pass. We knew the budget was going to be what it was. But we knew also that this gave us an opportunity to show what kind of pain would result. So our strategy was during the budget hearings and also to go out to the public and to go out to the districts and show how the cuts would be made would impact negatively upon the various constituent groups.

Chuck Haytaian: You know Christine was-- I think it was very important in the transition that she took some of our good legislators and put them in the administration. I mean we lost Harriet or we lost that seat, we took Mike and we recovered from that fortunately because he worked very-- yeah, took Bob Shinn and went to DEP. Who else did you take? I think you had one more.

W1: Ginny Haines.

Chuck Haytaian: Yeah, you took Ginny Haines who went to the Lottery. So that part of the transition was helpful because now we were dealing with people that worked with us, that were our colleagues that we worked to get elected. So it worked. I don't know if you took any senators, did you?

Don DiFrancesco: I wish you had. I wish you would have. Joe Bubba, John Dorsey, you know, a couple of others I could name.
<overlapping conversation; group laughter>

Joe Doria: Actually, we were hoping she would take a few more out of our more competitive districts like Harriet's seat that helped us to pick up a few more seats.

John Farmer: So we're supposed to identify what worked and what didn't from the first year. So Mike, from your perspective, what didn't work? And then we'll go back to what did.

Mike Torpey: That's a good question because I'm going to have to think about that as I'm answering. I know there's always a lot of talk...

Don DiFrancesco: I think everything worked.

Mike Torpey: ... about the relationship and the tension, right. And I think it's been addressed, a lot of it's institutional. It will never go away and it shouldn't. There was only one initiative in the full seven years that we actually ever put any significant effort behind that did not pass and it was the gas tax.

Chuck Haytaian: Yeah, Joe and I remember that.

Joe Doria: I do remember that. I remember that well. I got beat up.

Mike Torpey: I remember that too, Joe. That's right. That was the only what I would consider significant initiative that we really were leaning forward on. We put a lot of resources behind that . It did not pass in seven years. So you can say whatever you want about relationships and tensions and whether there were gender bias issues among certain people. At the end of the day, it was actually a pretty effective seven years in terms of a relationship with the legislature. So asking what didn't work, the one thing I would say I know particularly going into the second term, I know one of the things we really tried to address was we did try to beef up our political operation a little bit more and our political awareness. I think at the beginning, maybe that wasn't all there and I think it was hard to have that right out of the gate anyway but that's one of the things that I think we had probably as the administration grew, I mean in terms of matured over time I think we became more astute politically.

John Farmer: Chuck, from your perspective.

Chuck Haytaian: I'll tell you, I'm getting older so my memory is not that great any more. But I don't remember anything that really didn't work. I can't recollect anything that didn't work. I can only recollect the good things that happened, mainly the reduction in the income tax, the holding the budget lines, doing the things that people thought were very favorable. And I thought at that time, the legislature, the favorability of legislature became greater too. I don't remember it going down. I think it went up as the governor's popularity went up and her favorability went up, so did the legislature which was a good thing.

John Farmer: Joe, other than your strategy to defeat the tax cut, what didn't work?

Joe Doria: I honestly think that the first year was a very successful year. I think that as with all governors, there's a little bit of a honeymoon. But I think given the dynamics of the legislature at that time and the governor coming in as the first woman governor and the times and I think you have to look at the times and what was happening at that time. I think that the first year in Governor Whitman's term was a very successful year. And that there was not really any issue that I remember that really created any type of major setback for the administration. I think as the years went on there were other issues that did not come up that were setbacks besides the gas tax, which was for all of us a major defeat. But I think it was a very successful first year because it was tied to the tax cut which nobody could beat in the end against-- everybody likes cutting taxes. Because the budget-- no, even though there were cuts and constituencies were hurt it wasn't that significant at that time. And the economy was beginning to pick up, nationally as well as in the state .

Chuck Haytaian: Yeah, it was doing better.

Joe Doria: Things were moving. So it isn't like today where things aren't moving as well whether nationally or in the state. So I think that the first year was a successful year. And I can't point out from my point of view in the minority that there was any issue that we were very successful in achieving our purpose during that first year. I think as the time went on we did succeed and much more focused on specific issues and specific districts, that's why we kept on picking up members.

John Farmer: Don, from your perspective.

Don DiFrancesco: Yeah, I think the first couple of years were very successful. And I don't say that because Governor Whitman is sitting here, but I think that there are a lot of other initiatives perhaps not big time policy initiatives, some of which are happening today or have happened with the Chris Christie administration that this governor would have done if the legislature had the energy to do them. And I can name a bunch of them, vouchers is one of them, caps on sick days. I'll never forget, you said that in one of your speeches. Now, it wasn't the first year because in the first year it takes you a few months to get organized, and the budget process and then you're through the first year. But down the road, as you know, there were a lot of other initiatives that she would have liked to have had passed but even Republicans get supported by the NJEA occasionally too. So I had to face a lot of that too.

John Farmer: Yeah, we actually drafted something that we called the property tax accountability act or whatever it was that had a lot of these things no double dipping and capping sick time.

Don DiFrancesco: I mean I think over the course of those seven years-- no one talks about it today. You'd think that nothing existed before the last couple of years, but 40-some odd taxes were probably cut over the course of her seven years, nobody talks about that. I'll give you one bill, though, we just mentioned the sick days. Right the state had a cap of \$15,000 for state employees. But that cap, Governor Whitman wanted to extend that cap statewide like they have all ready, right. And so I guess I was asked to find a sponsor for that bill. So we found a sponsor and it was introduced and sent to a committee to cap all sick days at \$15,000. And I've told this story a lot lately because of what's happening in the last couple of years. The police chief in my hometown called me. I went to high school with the guy, by the way, you want to come back as a police chief.

John Farmer: Or a county prosecutor.

Don DiFrancesco: And he said, "Don, if this bill passes, I'll have to quit." I said, why? He said, "I have 380 sick days." And I said, well who keeps track of your sick days? And he says, "I do." I said, you're a pretty healthy guy. But it was that kind of-- the atmosphere wasn't right for that, to buck all of these organizations at that time that exist the last couple of years. It certainly exists. But Governor Whitman would have had all of that passed back then had she had a legislature willing to--

and I'm talking about Republicans, mostly, willing to bite the bullet and pass some of these initiatives. The vouchers were one of the early ones. I think that was-- in that first year I think that would be the only thing I could think of that Governor Whitman put on the table and I couldn't find a sponsor.

Joe Doria: I sponsored it.

Don DiFrancesco: Even Joe in the Assembly. But when I went to the caucus-- now it was a pilot project. It wasn't statewide. When I went to the caucus, I said, I need a sponsor. And eventually Gerry Cardinale went like this because he knew I would have to-- so that was the only thing that I can think of the first year that Governor Whitman put on the table. But, once again, she was very accommodating. She didn't criticize us. She just passed it by. We went on to other issues which was the right thing to do because you can't get everything done. You have to take baby steps sometimes. And I thought her seven years was very successful.

John Farmer: From my own perspective I think if I can identify one thing I didn't think worked in the first year was I think we made some early mistakes with Judicial appointments and not understanding the bases that needed to be touched, not just the senatorial ones, but in some cases the county chairs.

Don DiFrancesco: You mean like prosecutors?

John Farmer: Yeah. And so I think so some of the "they don't get it" I think comes from those early days. But other than that I agree with the panel, I think it was a very smooth first year. So now, what worked other than everything? Mike, I guess, what are you the most proud of in the first year?

Mike Torpey: Well, I think what I'm most proud of is I assume what the governor is most proud of and that is getting the-- making good on her promises. I mean these were-- yeah, they were actually bold promises that were made and they were risky as we were talking about earlier, in my opinion. And she made them. She stayed committed to them. And we got them through and we got them through by working very hard and work with these gentlemen here and others. And I think that was it. And the reason that's critical is because you can't-- if we didn't get those things done who knows what would have happened after that. There's an expectation. You have to take advantage of this period, this honeymoon period. If you don't, you're done. I'll make the observation about having observed every governor, a few prior to Governor Whitman and all of them since that I thought, for example, recently the Corzine administration did not get anything really accomplished in their first two years. And then when they wanted to try to get something done it was already too late. And I think that you see these things, these dynamics that exist. And I think in the beginning of an administration you have to seize the moment and I think the governor seized it. And I'm very proud of the fact that we were able to accomplish those goals.

John Farmer: Chuck.

Chuck Haytaian: I think the good thing was the fact that her favorables were good. She was popular. She didn't have to backtrack. I mean Christine didn't have to backtrack on her proposals and that's important. You know, when we were, again, with Jim Florio he had-- although he had the veto proof majorities, we overrode him 17 times in the Assembly I think and in the Senate I think maybe 13. I'm not sure. They didn't do all of them. But he had to backtrack. We literally put the hammer on him. First of all, we didn't want to do it with Christine, nor could we because when you have a popular governor you're not going to in the legislature start fighting that. And so her proposals were good and it worked out.

John Farmer: Joe.

Joe Doria: I would have to agree with Chuck and Mike. I think that the success of the first year was living up to the commitments that were made during the campaign. One of the things, I think, the lesson to be learned here is remember what your promises are then try to live up to them because if you don't, then you're going to pay the price. And that, I think, will catch up to you. If you say things and then do the opposite, even if it's what people want or don't want, it's going to catch up with you at some point. So you have to be able to live up to the commitments you make during a campaign. And that, I think, is the lesson to be learned and it worked for Governor Whitman. And that first year, I think, was a very successful year. I think now as the years go on it gets more and more difficult to do things because it's just the atrophy that occurs. And also everybody becomes a little bit more concerned because you become more and more of a lame duck. So that first year is the opportunity to do the bold, the different things. And then to realize that as you go on it's not going to be as easy.

Don DiFrancesco: Well, I'm not going to point to any one thing. I thought the first year the governor really demonstrated a very effective leadership style that was kind of calm and collected but very effective on a state wide basis and more of maybe even a national basis I could say that, she kind of brought New Jersey back-- I have to say brought New Jersey back to the positive side. And I think that had a lot to do with her style, the way she went about her business. And I thought that the first year was very important that way for New Jersey.

Joe Doria: Just to add to that I think she presented herself in a positive way, a positive image and a positive image for the state. She did what Tom Kean did. Rather than presenting the negative image that New Jersey many times has there was a much more positive, a much more broader image of what New Jersey could do rather than the negativity that unfortunately existed, and existed in many administrations because people look at it and just say well that's New Jersey which I think is always a negative thing.

Don DiFrancesco: It's the slogan.

Chuck Haytaian: I think the worst thing was at inauguration time. I guess it was the first one when Barry Manilow decided <inaudible>, that was the worst. And you know what, it didn't matter.

John Farmer: There's a lesson learned. Don't invite Barry Manilow back. Time for a couple of questions. Anybody, throw it open for questions. Judy.

Judy Shaw: I just wanted to make one comment following on the comments-- I'm Judy Shaw. And I'm going to ask a question. Or just make a comment. So many people talked about the governor's demeanor and character. And one of the things that I like to say about her when she served was that she never got flattered and she never got flustered. It didn't go to her head. And when it hit the fan she never lost it. She was calm as could be. And I think that kind of steady hand on the rudder sent a message to a lot of people and that was very, very helpful with us in that first year.

John Farmer: Anybody else?

Carol Cronheim: Hi, I'm Carol Cronheim. And I just want to say that I agree with Judy. I think there was that calmness at the top and I think we all did a good job hiding it but there was chaos just slightly beneath the surface there, especially that first six months and then I think things really smoothed out after the budget and things calmed down. And I think it was the leadership at the top that started with the fact that I think Governor Whitman wanted to be governor not because she wanted to governor. She wanted to be governor because she wanted to do things for New Jersey and she ran the campaign that way. That's why we created all of those blueprints. Blueprints for the economy, they were blue, they had covers. Blueprints for the environment, even a blueprint for the arts which she humored me with which we released the weekend before the campaign so it wouldn't seem too elitist. And there were those of us in policy and planning which Jane so ably led and then Eileen McGinnis came along. And our job was to make sure that all of those promises someone either-- we may not have gotten all of them but we took a run at them. And then we didn't go back on them. Even the minor things, even the things we said we wouldn't do. Like we wouldn't, in my case, we couldn't cut the arts lower than the 10.5, the 50 percent it had been cut. We would maintain it. And when we finally had an opportunity we would raise the level and that's exactly what she did. And that wasn't the first year. That was right up and through a number of years before we could start inching it up. But with every single one of those policies we made an attempt. And there were those of us who had them in hand along with the Economic Master Plan. I think I have the very last copy, governor, because people used to come in and borrow my copy. I had a drawer full of them. And it was that persistence and the way that you had the whole administration work as a team even on the budget. I think since then there's usually a budget guy in Counsel and a budget person in Policy and Planning. But the way you ran Policy and Planning, every policy advisor was responsible for their division's budget. And we all sat in on

the fish bowls. And then we all sat in in the meetings with you and we were expected to know our budgets. And I think that sharing of information was very particular to your administration and I think it's what made it work so well.

Chuck Haytaian: John, I emphasize this a lot because I really believe her executive ability came, in my estimation, from the fact that she was at the county level as a Freeholder. That's really where it gels. I mean you put a budget and that becomes your policy statement at the county level. And so all of those things are important. Being Governor is right there. I mean it's top of the ladder. I always considered the best position I ever had was a Freeholder and I was speaker of the Assembly but that's what I believed.

John Farmer: Please, join me in thanking the panel.

Ruth Mandel: You don't close before you wrap and if you look at your program you'll see there's still one very important thing on the program and that is the Governor gets to come up at the end and to make a comment. What we didn't tell her in advance is that the responsibility of her closing comment is to disagree with the last panel on the program. Governor Whitman.

Christine Todd Whitman: Thank you, Ruth. And I've been sitting here thinking I don't know quite who anybody is talking about. Far too benign, far too nice, and wouldn't it have been wonderful if everything was that great. But I hope for the purposes of what you're doing with this effort to try to capsulize what governors have done and to present it in a way that would be useful for the future that everybody understands that while it's nice to have leadership it takes a team. Nobody does it on their own. The Legislature is part of that team. Your Cabinet is part of that team. Everybody-- it takes everybody to make it work. No one person. You can set a tone. You can make sure everybody looks at that blueprint and remembers that we actually made promises during the campaign. But at the end of the day everybody's got to buy into it. And everybody's got to be playing on that team. And if we were able to accomplish anything it was because of everybody and that includes the legislature.

We butted heads more than you would have thought from listening to this but that's the first year. The first year you do have a honeymoon, that's fine. We had our moments but you do. And that's the dynamic of governing and that's an important thing to have, frankly. You do need to have a creative tension. But it also means that you have to have a really good and competent team. And, again, I am proud of the people that have been here today and that have spoken and those who haven't spoken because there are a lot in the audience who were an integral part of anything that was able to get done and any new ground that we broke. And that's really the lesson for anybody is you've got to have the team and you've got to be able to work with all of it, not just the executive branch. It's the legislative branch and it's the people and it's the locals too as well, the mayors and the council people. So you've got to be able to reach out to all of them. With that, I say thank you very

much. I think you have a reception. I don't know if you'll have a certain wine at the reception but okay there's wine out there.

END OF COLLOQUIUM