

The Meadowlands and Jersey Sports Complex: Looking Back and Ahead
A roundtable discussion

Participants:

Ruth Mandel, Director, Eagleton Institute of Politics
Governor Brendan Byrne
Governor James Florio
Raymond Bateman, former President, NJ State Senate and Chair, NJ Sports and Exposition Authority
Gerald Breslin, former Chair, Hackensack Meadowlands Development Commission and
Member, NJ Sports and Exposition Authority
Ruthi Byrne, President of public relations firm and wife of Governor Byrne
James Dugan, former State Senator
Adrian Foley, attorney active in early financing for the NJ Sports and Exposition Authority
Gene George, former aide to Senator Frank X McDermott
Richard Ginman, former Planning Director, NJ Department of Community Affairs
David Kinsey, former Director, Division of Coastal Resources, NJ DEP
William J. Kohm, former Public Relations and Marketing Director,
Hackensack Meadowlands Commission
Greta Kiernan, former State Assemblywoman
Jack Kraft, former Associate Counsel to Governor William Cahill
Don Linky, Eagleton Institute; former Policy Director to Governor Byrne
Harold Martin, former Bergen County Freeholder and State Assemblyman
Frank X. McDermott, former State Senate Majority Leader
Ernest Reock, Professor Emeritus, Bloustein School, Rutgers University
Martin Robins, former Assistant Commissioner, NJ DOT
Dennis Robinson, President, NJ Sports and Exposition Authority
Alan Rosenthal, Professor, Eagleton Institute of Politics
Anthony Scardino, former State Senator and Executive Director,
Hackensack Meadowlands Development Commission
Eugene Schneider, former Director, County and Municipal Study Commission
Lewis Thurston, former VP, NJ Sports and Exposition Authority and
Chief of Staff to Governor Kean
John Weingart, Eagleton Institute, former Assistant Commissioner, NJ DEP

Ruth Mandel: Good afternoon, everyone. I'm Ruth Mandel Director here at the Eagleton Institute and it is my honor and pleasure to take just a moment to welcome you here and then to turn the program over to the person who has put it together. ...

The Rutgers Program on the Governor we began a few years ago to build step by step what we hope is going to-- it's already I think a treasure certainly for Eagleton and I hope for Rutgers and New Jersey and will ultimately be an enormously useful, interesting and unique national resource. The session today at least indirectly was made possible by a generous gift that was made by Governor Byrne three years ago to the Rutgers library and that involved a collection of some of his papers and memorabilia from his career in New Jersey politics and government, and to support the costs of processing, cataloguing, and preserving materials at the Rutgers library he and Ruthi decided to raise some funds. As you might expect knowing I think everyone in this room knows their persuasive powers. They were so successful that we here at Eagleton and the Rutgers library were able to initiate a much larger project that we now call as I said the Rutgers Program on the Governor.[NOTE: Since changed to The Center on the American Governor] Our ambitious goal is to make Rutgers the leading national academic center for research study and discussion for the office of governor in the 50 states starting with and emphasizing New Jersey's Chief Executive. There is and everyone is always surprised when I say this, when one of my colleagues says it, there is no other place in the country that has a program, no other university, no

other place in the country that has a program to study the role of the Chief Executive in the States. There was a program at one time at Duke University and the funding became an issue. But right now not only is what we're doing unique, but it's always for me a big shock to realize given if you think about not only the importance of governors but in their own states but also the history of governors who go to Washington from the State Houses. And nowhere anywhere do we look at the State Executive. And in fact just parenthetically but very important to some of us here, part of the problem is that there is also not a body, a group of graduate students who are doing scholarship about this and studying it so they can go on and teach courses and do the research and write the books and keep the subject alive and grow it and develop it. So we're trying to do our part here at Eagleton. The institute as I think everyone here is aware has a history that goes back over four decades of studying and advising state legislatures largely through the work of Alan Rosenthal, and Alan who is with us this afternoon is shifting his academic focus and Don and some other people are saying that he's "Going over to the dark side" to conduct research and write about the role of the governors so he is in the midst of writing a book on governors, adding to the study of governors and to Eagleton's portfolio and its mission of work on state politics and government. One of our initial goals is to develop an archive highlighting the career of New Jersey's recent governors. Governor Byrne's initial donation of papers, supplemented now by dozens of ... of videotaped interviews of people who were connected to his administration. That gave us a very strong beginning. Last year we were delighted that Governor Kean agreed to support a project focusing on his administration and we've now since last winter begun interviewing and collecting material for the Kean section of this Program on the Governor, the Kean archive. This past summer there was a kickoff event, and reunion ... that initiated a project highlighting the issues and decisions that Governor Florio faced while was in office, and most recently Governor Whitman has also agreed to work with us to develop a similar program. So we are in the early stages of the large program, the large center, but moving very steadily in the work with some of our recent, very important state executives. Ultimately, I hope some of you will be helpful and support us, but with lots of support Rutgers will become the primary national resource for examining how governors run for office, evaluate policy options and how they handle their day-to-day responsibilities. The person who has been central to every aspect of the Rutgers Program on the Governor here at the Eagleton Institute is Don Linky, whom all of you know not only from his days in the Byrne administration but because for many years he has been some of us think he's Wally Edge but if he's not Wally Edge he has been the encyclopedic all central source of information about New Jersey politics and the history of government in our state. So it's now my pleasure to turn the program over to him and he will guide us through the discussion.

Don Linky: Thanks, Ruth. As Ruth suggested our format today is probably very little format. There are really no canned speeches other than what Ruth and I are going to say at the beginning and we hope that you'll talk up when you think you have something relevant to say or irrelevant to say and that we keep this as loose as possible. I've given you a very thin agenda as to what we might cover. I propose that we'll at least start talking chronologically about the history of the Meadowlands from a public policy standpoint, probably beginning with the Meyner administration but some people may have ideas that even go back earlier than that. And then proceed through the history to current day. We'll have a short break, and then

talk a little bit about what's happening today. As many of you have seen I think in the papers over the last couple of weeks, this is a really timely event because of the issues that are coming up in terms of the Sports Complex, the fiscal viability of Xanadu, of the Izod Arena, of affordable housing, of transportation, many of those issues are on the laps of Dennis Robinson and Tony Scardino and others who are in this room today who are going to make those decisions. And some of those of you who used to make these decisions may have your two cents to share with them today as to how they should be looking at the future of the Meadowlands and the Sports Complex.

When we first discussed this program with Governor Byrne and Ruthi Byrne the Governor I think was quite forceful in saying he didn't want the program to be simply an exercise in nostalgia. That he did want it to look at what's happening today and where relevant, how some of the decisions that were made 30 and 40 years ago have effected where we are now. I mean what were the successes? What were the failures? What could have been done different over the years that might have made some shift in course in the way New Jersey has developed and the way the legislature and the governor could look at these problems today. So I hope that where relevant you'll talk about some of the decisions that may be questioned today that were made in the early days or how we could have shifted course a little bit to go a different track. We don't have I think any real super goals about influencing current policy. We know that there are people in charge who will make those decisions, but I thought it was helpful to have an interchange between some of the people who were in there early on with those who are currently in decision-making roles.

A few logistical issues and sort of rules of the game. We did not invite the press to this event after some discussion and debate, but this program will be as Ruth suggested publicly available on the Internet both in a video form and in a transcript, so I hope that you realize that when you're talking today it will eventually be publicly accessible and you're waiving all your rights to publication, reprints and everything else. Another logistical thing is that since we are taping it, I hope when you speak you do lean into the microphones and speak directly into the microphone, and it may also be helpful if you could even though you have your table tent in front of you, identify yourself so that the transcriber will know who's speaking when the transcript is prepared.

This is the 40th anniversary of the Meadowlands Initiative, and there are other events and programs that have been going on. The Meadowlands Commission is sponsoring its own series of events. I think Governor Florio participated in one panel discussion earlier this year. The Commission's also digitizing its archive and documents with Fairleigh Dickenson University ... And the Meadowlands Commission has also put up an interesting video and oral archives of its own dealing with some of the environmental issues, more hands-on issues in terms of the land-use management and housing and environment that it has dealt with over the years of some of those people who were involved. And I urge you to look at the Meadowlands Commission website if you're interested in some of that history. I'd like to now go around the room quickly and have you introduce yourselves. I think most of you know each other but it will be

helpful again for the electronic archive to have this for the record, and to identify I think what any special role you might have had with the Meadowlands or the Sports Complex in the past or currently, and also if it's relevant what you're up to now. Governor Florio?

Governor Florio: Jim Florio. I among other things teach at Rutgers at the Bloustein School. And I guess free association with the topic, first thing comes to my mind is the Sports Authority as a financing vehicle for the Atlantic City Convention Hall and for Rutgers University Stadium. That was the initiative that we were involved with and both have been very successful.

Martin Robins: Martin Robins from the Voorhees Transportation Center at Rutgers. And I've had a long career in transportation and been very interested in the transportation in the Meadowlands and one project that was very important in the '80s and '90s in my career was the development of what is now known as the Secaucus Junction which also was a precipitating cause of something that I helped formulate which is the access to the region's Core Project which is the new mass transit tunnel into New York. So the Meadowlands has been very, very central to our work over the years.

Dennis Robinson: Dennis Robinson, I'm the current President CEO of the New Jersey Sports Authority. I've been involved through two different stints with the Authority over an 11-year period. I had the actual honor of being the Project Executive in charge of both the Rutgers project and the Atlantic City project where not only did we finance the governor but we were also in charge of the construction and development and the operation of the convention center. So obviously it's great for me to be here with all the legends and the names and the history of this really what I consider to be one of the great success stories in New Jersey history.

Anthony Scardino: I'm Tony Scardino, former Mayer of Lyndhurst, New Jersey. Spent most of my life in Lyndhurst and Lyndhurst is part of the Meadowlands district and as a kid I remember traveling the pipeline out to the Hackensack River to crab, and in those days you could literally crab and eat them. When I was a kid, of course many, many years ago, Gene as you can well imagine. And then over the years of course I saw the transformation of some of this beautiful pristine wetlands being covered and buried by garbage. And not knowing that one day I would be involved in a transition again of trying to convert that garbage into something useful like parks and landfills closed properly. I also served as State Senator for seven years. Left at the end of my seventh year because Brendan Byrne decided that I might be better off as the Executive Director of the Meadowlands Commission. And I held that position for nearly half of the 40 years that we are now going to be celebrating. I was there for 18 years. And right now I have the pleasure of serving with Ray and with Dennis as a member of the Sports Authority.

Lewis Thurston: I'm Lew Thurston. I grew up in Northern Bergen County. We thought anything south of Route Four was South Jersey. I got involved with the Meadowlands early on when my then boss Ray

Bateman included me sometimes in some meetings drafting the legislation. So that was an early start. Later I spend nine years as basically the Chief Administrative Officer of the Sports Authority and enjoyed that very much. Right now I'm retired doing a little teaching at the Bloustein School and that's it.

Raymond Bateman: I'm Ray Bateman. I was Senate President when the first legislation was approved. I've had a relationship for all of those years with the Sports Authority one way or another. I was Chairman of the Authority for seven or eight years. I've been a member of the Authority for 15 years. .. Back then, I along with the Bergen County Legislators - Fairleigh Dickenson being the principal sponsor of the Senate Bill, and Dick DeCourt being the principal sponsor of the Assembly bill - were deeply involved in what was a very difficult moment when Governor Cahill proposed the project getting it through the public and understood by everyone but the environmentalists. It's been a great ride. It's a wonderful, as Dennis alluded to, it's been a wonderful aspect of New Jersey life over these years.

Brendan Byrne: My name is Brendan Byrne. I was Secretary to the Governor, Governor Meyner in 1950s when he first mentioned the Meadowlands in one of his annual messages. That message actually was drafted by a guy named of Rob Copeland who deserves some recognition and credit, because he did see potential of the Meadowlands. I went on to become the guy who originally rejected the Giant's contract with New Jersey and never got invited to a Giants game.

Ruthi Byrne: I'm Ruthi Byrne and I'm here in my official capacity as Brendan's wife. We are delighted that this project is in the very capable hands of Ruth Mandel and Don Linky. And I am currently as I have been for 30 years in the marketing and PR business.

Adrian Foley: My name is Adrian Foley. Many of you know me as "Bud". I didn't think my heritage was an issue but since Lew Thurston has bragged about his New Jersey connections I might as well confess I was born on a farm in North Dakota. My connection with the Meadowlands began when Ray Bateman accosted me at 21 in New York and said "Governor Cahill wants you to run the finance of the Authority." So I've had the experience I've served under- three terms under both Governor Cahill and Governor Byrne. I was directly involved in borrowing \$50,000,000 from the banks, one and one half million from the legislature, spending it and then have a bond issue go down. So I have spent all these years in between trying to redeem my reputation.

Gerry Breslin: My name is Gerry Breslin. I was born and raised in Rutherford and I was active in high school at the high school level in a lot of sports. And when Brendan Byrne asked me to 1974 to become a Meadowlands Commissioner and serve on the Sports Authority it was a dream come true for a young boy. And I envisioned at that time that maybe some colleges and high schools would play athletic contests at the facilities that were going to be built... Unbeknownst to me. I was going to meet some young, energetic, bright, capable people at the Meadowlands commission that I think Cliff Goldman

recruited by the name of George Casino, Chet Mattson, and Rich Roberts who it was a lot of fun working with ... developing and implementing the master plan. That was a great experience, memorable for myself, and my wife and my children. They have fine memories. Thank you.

John Weingart: I'm John Weingart. I work here at Eagleton. I was in the Department of Environmental Protection for many years and had some interactions with the Meadowlands Commission. I now chair the Highlands Council which I have chaired since it began five years ago which is a commission with a statute based in part on the Meadowlands Commission statute, but is not nearly as good.

Jack Kraft: Hi, my name is Jack Kraft. I'm an attorney. I was Associate Counsel to Governor Cahill and participated in the drafting of the Sports Authority legislation. I also created the original bylaws of the Authority and worked with the formation of the Authority at the beginning. My experience before coming to the Governor's office was as a bond attorney in New York, and that experience stood me in good stead in connection with the provisions in the Sports Authority legislation dealing with the issuance of bonds and the promises that governmental agencies make to bond holders in order to be able to sell the bonds at reasonable interest rates. Bud mentioned the \$50,000,000 loan. That loan was made after I left the Governor's office and had started a law practice in New Jersey. And I represented the five banks that agreed to make this interim loan when no other funds were available to the Authority. And they did get paid back, Bud. <laughs>

Adrian Foley: <inaudible>

Jack Kraft: Right. It was a great experience, it was a fun experience. One of the people involved that hasn't been mentioned yet but I'm sure will be as we go through is Joe McCrane who was the State Treasurer. And one of the highlights of my working in Trenton was when Joe McCrane picked me up in a helicopter in _____ New Jersey and we proceeded over to Monmouth Park in Oceanport and spoke with Sonny Werblin. Our role was to explain to Sonny Werblin how the Sports Authority would work and encourage him to accept the appointment to be the Chairman of the Sports Authority. He did. He was great. All of the original and continuing members of the Sports Authority were terrific people which contributed greatly to the success of the Sports Authority in its formative years, and I'm sure that that continues. And now I continue to practice law, representing governmental units that borrow money by issuing bonds. Thank you.

David Kinsey: I'm David Kinsey. I spent the summer of 1968 as a college student working with and learning from Cliff Goldman in the summer before the legislation passed. In the Byrne years I worked in DEP in coastal management matters which involved a lot of working with the Meadowlands Commission and more recently I'm a planner specializing in affordable housing now. I help the New Jersey Association and the Fair Share Housing Center in their Mount Laurel litigation against the Sports

Authority and the Meadowlands Commission and was intrigued to see our court system decide that the Meadowlands-- excuse me that the Sports Authority and its enabling legislation trumps the constitutional Mount Laurel doctrine.

Frank X. McDermott: I'm Frank X. McDermott. I was Majority Leader in the State Senate in the year 1968 and I introduced Senate Joint Resolution number 15 which set up a special nine-member commission to study the effect and the ability of the State of New Jersey to sponsor such an event as a sports arena. One of my appointees, Al DeRogatis who is a former football player became a real sparkplug of the Sports Arena and to my knowledge helped to get the financial leaders in the State of New Jersey together to purchase the bonds that eventually created the sports arena. And all I can say today I have four tickets every season to the Giants game.

Gene George: I'm Gene George and I was an aide to Senator McDermott during this time when he was also Senate President. Later on I went over to Community Affairs as an Assistant Commissioner to Ed Hume [ph?] and later on as a Deputy Commissioner to Pat Kramer. We had aboard during Kramer's administration a man who hasn't been mentioned yet. I'm sure he will be, and very close to Rutgers and that was _____ whose grandfather started New Jersey College for Women. Well Rick [ph?] was an old football player and we sat one day in the Governor's office where he was complaining of the fact that he couldn't get _____ to talk to him. So Rick said "Well let me call him." And we said "How do you know him?" The first and only time he ever heard the expression, he said "Well one of the _____ grandfathers was a butter boy in my grandfather's speakeasy." Well he said "Are you kidding?" And he said "No." He took the phone and then he said to me "You're driving me to New York tonight." I drove him to New York _____. I sat in the car. He came out he said "_____ will call the Governor." I'm still involved with Pat Kramer and still involved with Frank McDermott. We go out for dinner at least once a month. Kramer and I have been in the land development business for the last 30 years. We built Fort Carteret in New Jersey.

William J. Kohm: My name is Bill Kohm. I've had the pleasure of being involved as a Public Relations and Marketing Director of the Sports Complex for some 30 years. That's under the terms of Governor Cahill, Governor Byrne, Governor Florio, Governor Whitman, Governor everybody. And I guess the one thing I can contribute is because of that service I could identify all the ghosts in the room. And there are a lot of them. I know we're not supposed to discuss nostalgia but we're talking about personalities who were bigger than many of the personalities on the stage today, and who were not-- who understood what bipartisanship was and respect, and were not poisoned with some of the meanness that there is in politics today. I'm also a great fan of Brendan Byrne, and I tell Brendan Byrne stories almost as good as Brendan Byrne does. But I appreciate being included. It was a wonderful experience for anyone who played any role at all in the development of this sports complex. It did more to create if there is such a thing as a state self-esteem. .. Remember, with all of the talk about financing not one New York bank or bought on Sports Authority bond. Not one. The only bank not in New Jersey that bought a bond was the

Bank of Tokyo. And that in itself was a great accomplishment for the State of New Jersey. I'm delighted to be here and see so many familiar faces. And I'm sure we'll spot some ghosts and we'll talk about them as we go.

Alan Rosenthal: Hi I'm Alan Rosenthal. And I got hired by Don Herzberg at the Eagleton Institute of Politics in 1966 and since that time I have been an observer of New Jersey politics.

Ernest Reock: I'm Ernie Reock. Back in the '60s I was director of the Rutgers University Bureau of Government Research. And starting early in 1966 we began work on a research project based on a grant from the Department of Community Affairs to develop an intergovernmental mechanism for developing the Hackensack Meadowlands. We were partway through that project when everything broke loose in terms of actual drafting legislation so that half-done research fed into the development of the legislation. I think it came out a lot different than we put it in if that was the case.

Eugene Schneider: I'm Gene Schneider. And my connection with the Meadowlands goes back to Governor Meyner's term when he requested then Commissioner Sal Bontempo of the Department of Conservation and Economic Development that preceded the Department of Environmental Protection to look into what can be done with Meadowlands areas in 33 municipalities in New Jersey. The mayors got together. There was a meeting as there always is, and they decided that the Hackensack communities, the 14 were the contiguous communities and they were going to be the focus of the state activities. He requested the then Chief of the Bureau of Planning in the department to be the staff to provide the staff for the groundwork that was necessary. And it took 11 years from the day that that initial meeting took place, to the point where the bill was enacted. During that time I and the staff of the bureau later the division along with Dick Ginman who is here as well, did the drudge work: coloring maps with pencils before digital mapping was invented, and going out there in the reeds which were seven feet tall and looking to see whether there was a stream in there or not, and the garbage dumps and all of the other things. And it really was a fulfillment of everything that we started out with, all the dreams we started out with to see that bill enacted. With the participation of so many people, Sal and Bud [Chavooshian] and others, and the U.S. Corps of Engineers that looked into it, and the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey and many others. So I think this kind of a session by definition calls for some nostalgia and I'm glad to be here to share it.

Richard Ginman: Dick Ginman, as Gene said I was the one of the young staffers that he drafted to go through this process, and at the time before the legislation created the commission there was this group called the MRDA, the Meadowlands Regional Development Agency. And I want to tell all those who hail from that area that was one of the memorable impressions on a young staffer to go to these evening meetings that were held in some of the most interesting watering holes. And the eating and drinking that went on was absolutely legion. I still remember them fondly. I've never experienced anything quite like

that, but it was fun, and I eventually went on to be the Director of Division of State and Regional Planning, and am now retired. I'm locally trying to buy up as much farmland in our town as we can. Hopefully the new bond issue will pass. Good luck.

Harold Martin: Sorry for the delay. My name is Harold Martin. I'm a resident of Cresskill in Bergen County and have been since 1959 which I think sets somewhat of a record for home ownership if nothing else. It's a pleasure to be here. I'm a graduate of Rutgers. Graduated in 1940 with a Bachelor of Arts in Political Science and a minor in Economics, and took my master's after my service in the army in 1947. It's a pleasure to be here to see so many of my good friends that I haven't seen in many, many years and those who I have seen in recent years. My background just to give you a little inkling, I was born in West, New York, a town some of you may be familiar with. The corner of Bergenline Avenue and what is now 60th Street. When I was born there in 1918 that was 16th Street, a very, very busy thoroughfare. And my first association or contact if you will with the Meadowlands was a child when my parents drove up from West, New York up to visit some distant relatives in Englewood. So we traveled up Tunley [ph?] Avenue which is as you all know the eastern border of the Meadowlands. And even though I was a minor child, I can still remember holding my nose as we drove up Tunley Avenue. And when I asked my parents why the odor they said "Well there's a pig farmer in the area." And as it turned out some years later in the '30s I guess it was when I was a resident of New York I remember reading about I think his name was Henry Krajewski. Is that right?

Man 3: Yeah, that's right.

Harold Martin: I'm glad that my memory is still good. At any rate Henry Krajewski, as I'm sure you all know, ran for President of the United States. I mean that's quite an achievement for a pig farmer. But unfortunately or I guess fortunately he didn't make it and we had somebody by the name of Roosevelt. At any rate, my more recent contacts with the Meadowlands I guess date to about 1965 when I took my seat as a Freeholder of Bergen County. And thanks to Gerry Breslin and Tony Scardino and his wonderful family who really helped me immensely because it was the votes that came from South Bergen that really elected me since as many of you know Bergen County was heavily Republican in those days. And thanks to Gerry and Tony and a good many other people I was fortunate to become the first Democrat to sit on that board since Woodrow Wilson was the governor of New Jersey. And my first act as a public official was to deal with what we were told, I say "we were told" because I had two colleagues, Democrats who also were elected. And I'm not making this a partisan thing by no means. It's just a matter of fact. We were confronted by our six Republican colleagues with what they called an "exigency". Now those of you who are lawyers or who know the meaning of words can tell me what the difference between emergency and an exigency is. We were told by our colleagues that we would have to vote, have to vote for an appropriation I guess in these days it's nothing but in those days \$250,000 had to be paid to buy a dredge. I asked my colleagues why do we need a dredge and what's so critical about it. They said "Well, we have to buy edict of the Health Department cover the trash and the garbage that's being dumped in

the Meadowlands.” And as many of you know the Meadowlands come up to Teaneck and I think it was in Teaneck that we had to cover that garbage. And so confronted with those facts, and I had no time to research it, I cast a vote affirmatively and we bought the dredge. I can tell you other stories but I don't want to monopolize your time. I'll introduce my good friend colleague, Greta Kiernan whom I was happy to run with and represent the 39th Assembly District, the most heavily Republican district in New Jersey. Greta?

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Greta Kiernan: I'm Greta Kiernan, former member of the Assembly as Harold Martin has just mentioned. And I also served as a staff person both to Harold Martin and to Al Burstein and Mattie Feldman when they represented parts of Bergen County, and I had a great education in politics in those days. I grew up being afraid of the Meadowlands. My grandmother, Margaret Scanlon,... lived in Richfield Park. And when I was a kid, we spent a lot of time at grandma's house. And we had one mantra about what we were doing when we were there. If we were going to the park, we were to stay out of the Meadowlands, it was full of snakes. And I was terrified of going anywhere near the edge of a basketball court or anything else that was on the edge of the Meadowland for fear some large terrible anaconda would come and eat me up. I didn't know what it was, but it did teach me to keep out of the Meadowlands. But I haven't done that ever since. You know, I've been there to a lot of things at the Meadowlands. I'm a student of government, a student of politics, and a collector of New Jersey government history. And I'm honored to be here and share this with you all, who had a much more major role in the Meadowlands than I did, and whose work and friendship I respect greatly.

Clifford Goldman: Hello. My name is Cliff Goldman. Let's see. I came to New Jersey in the Fall of 1966 on a parlay gamble. Number one, that Paul Ylvisaker would be named commissioner of the new Community Affairs Department, and number two, that if he were, somehow I would be able to work near him. And that parlay worked out. In 1967, we were reviewing all the different divisions that went into that department, and the Planning Division was one of them. The Planning Division had two major projects at the time, a state plan and the Meadowlands work that Gene and Dick have described. And Ylvisaker was very impressed with the technical work, which Gene mentioned is a huge volume of studies of the ecology. They didn't call it ecology then, but the soils, the economy, the transportation, just boxes full of these blue books. But he was not impressed with these endless meetings with the mayor. I guess he didn't know about the good food and drink. And his decision was on the Meadowlands, we're either going to do it, or we're going to forget about it, which was a very good lesson for a young person like me. And so the bill was drafted. It was introduced in 1967 by Senator Al Kiefer, a Democrat from Bergen County.

Man 1: Republican.

Clifford Goldman: No, Democrat, Democrat.

Man 1: Oh, I'm sorry, correct. I was thinking Chapel.

Clifford Goldman: Now, and here's another story with a little lesson that I gleaned. When the bill was introduced by Senator Kiefer, Senator Dickinson, who was the Republican to run against him, issued a very nasty press release attacking the bill. So we had a meeting in Ylvisaker's office. And he had very smart people there. What should we do? We should respond, we should attack back, we should let Kiefer attack back. And this discussion went on for about a half an hour. And then my friend, Jack Gleason, who was working there and who had experience in politics, said, "I bet you Dickinson doesn't even know about that press release, that some staff person put it out. He's not a bad guy. Don't attack anything, go have lunch with him." Which Ylvisaker did. And so instead of having an antagonism, they had a friendship, and Dickinson became the sponsor of the Meadowlands bill after he beat Kiefer. Jack Gleason was the kind of guy who didn't say much, and only said something when he knew what he was talking about. And Ylvisaker was the kind of guy who recognized when someone was speaking when he knew something. So that little episode could have changed the course of this whole history we're talking about. In 40-odd years that I've been watching New Jersey politics, and I've been involved in some very difficult legislation, especially the Byrne tax reform and school finance program, which was a heroic thing. The passage of the Meadowlands Act was the most miraculous piece of politics in the history of New Jersey that I know. It would be as if you were playing golf and you got a hole in one in the last nine holes. And Richard Hughes was unbelievably skillful in getting that passed. Okay. So then I became the first executive director of the Meadowlands Commission. Governor Cahill was elected in the year I became the first executive director. I had no assumption about my tenure there. Governor Cahill, his office called in January of 1970 and said, "The Governor would like a briefing on the Meadowlands." I said, "Whenever he wants, I'll come down there." And they said, "No, he wants to come to your office in Community Affairs and bring the whole cabinet." Which he did. So he was also a hero in this enterprise, because instead of thwarting it, he supported it from day one. He backed us up in everything we did. And we were fighting with major land developers and garbage dumpers. And they tried to get past us through him and they couldn't. I then became one of the few people in the quest to get the sports authority. Joe McCrain called me, said if I ever told anyone what I was doing, I'd be fired. I went to New York with him and Tom Hitzelberger (deputy to Joe McCrane who chaired the HMDC). And we met with Willington Mara in Sonny Werblin's office. And my job was to convince him to come to this mess of a place, which apparently I did. And so I was involved in that during the Cahill Administration. Then I left, I was involved in Governor Byrne's rejection of the Giants contract during his transition. I was involved in the financing afterward, in the renegotiation on the Giant's contract. I was involved in 1978 when we refunded all the bonds with state-guaranteed bonds with a voter referendum. The savings of that paid for the arena, which we then built. And I like to tell this story. This was a very complicated undertaking, and it did require a referendum and legislation and a lot of things. And I proposed this to Governor Byrne in a two-paragraph memo. And I got back the next morning, "Okay, BTB." That's how things were done. And that's why things were done. Anyway, I've continued in various capacities to be involved in the Sports Authority since.

Don Linky: Senator Dugan.

James Dugan: Thank you. I'm Jim Dugan, for eight years, I was in the State Legislature and I served as the Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee and as Democratic State Chairman. And after listening to the round of comments, it refreshed, or rather confirmed my thoughts that I've held for many years that they were great years to have served in high public office, as most of us did. And some of things that were mentioned earlier by Governor Byrne and by Cliff about the renegotiation of the Giant contract that the governor rejected, I can remember participating meaningfully when that issue was resolved to Governor Byrne's satisfaction. And in addition to that, when Ray Bateman spoke, I can think of how pleasant, compared to today's practice of politics, that bipartisanship was practiced and enjoyed by many of us, so much so that Ray and I sponsored the Senate resolution that pledged the state's-- the Morrow [ph?] pledge of the state's credit to the support of the construction bonds that were used in the building of the first Giants Stadium. And now on the eve of the raising of the razing of that stadium, I look back and glad I've morphed into anonymity. And also glad that I participated in a great run, in the great run that the state had during the years that we served.

Don Linky: A few of you mentioned some of the people who've passed on. And I think before we really start the discussion, we should recognize the valuable contributions of, I guess as Bill Kohm referred to them, the ghosts, but the people who really were responsible for many of the achievements of the Meadowlands and the Sports Complex, including the former governors, but all those who served them. I'd like to start, as I said, loosely chronologically and go back to Governor Meyner's time as Gene and Dick Ginman mentioned. When Governor Byrne first mentioned to me that he recalled when he was executive secretary to Governor Meyner that Governor Meyner had talked about the Meadowlands, that sort of surprised me. My sort of vague idea of Governor Meyner was as a very conservative governor, a guy who was not pushing the state government into new ventures, was a very conservative fiscal governor. And when he suggested that Governor Meyner really had first raised this on the public agenda, I was surprised. Then when I researched it a little bit, I found he did talk about it in his January 1958 annual message, talked about what he had seen had happened in the Netherlands in reclaiming submerged property, and thought the Dutch engineers might have some ideas to play in the Meadowlands. And then he didn't simply leave it at that. He convened a conference, brought mayors down to Trenton, and there was discussion. And I'd like to sort of leave it there and ask Gene and maybe Dick and whomever else can contribute. First of all, was this inconsistent with sort of Governor Meyner's overall concept as a very conservative laid-back governor?

Eugene Schneider: There was an issue that had surfaced at the time, and that was riparian rights, which clouded the question of who has the right to proceed with development if the state owned the land flowed at high tide. And one of the anecdotes that came out of it is that when Bud Chavooshian, then director, or the chief of the bureau, went to meet with Governor Meyner, what he saw first is the governor took off his watch, put it on the table, and he says, "You've got five minutes to explain to me what riparian rights is all

about." And we thought, when Bud came back, he says, "We've got a problem." Which continued to bedevil us throughout the time that we worked. But we proceeded on the assumption that the initiative will be state prodding of local action. That this was not going to be a state initiative in itself, that we would let the mayors of the 14 communities basically get together and develop some mechanism for doing regional planning. And what Ernie referred to was a part of the Housing Act that allowed for that regional undertaking. And the staff of his bureau really was asked to come up with an operational plan that would enable us to proceed on the assumption that the state would back local action. A regional plan written for the local level. Dick later on made the observation that it was the obverse of the Pinelands, which was a state initiative trying to enroll support, enlist support from local level. That, the 11 years I referred to, was spent mostly in trying to resolve differences and issues among communities, between communities and counties, between Republicans and Democrats, and every other kind of adversarial relationship that you can come up with. That was an incremental process that involved hundreds of meetings, literally, at the technical level, at the political level, in those watering places and also on the second floor of firehouses. And gradually what began to emerge is that as Joe Healy, an assemblyman from Hudson County, said, "Every time we get together to discuss it, we're either going into an election or coming off an election. If we go into an election, it's dangerous to talk about it. If we're coming out of it, there's no incentive because we have two years to debate it." It took 11 years as I said, before a bill emerged. And not enough can be said about the initiative Governor Hughes, at the time, and commissioner Ylvisaker, but they said basically enough is enough with the talk, now we've got to take over and begin to act.

John Weingart: Gene, do you know where the sort of idea originated? Was it Sal Bontempo, was it the governor himself?

Gene Schneider: No. There were five communities in Bergen County, Rutherford, East Rutherford, Carlstadt, North Arlington and Lyndhurst, that got together and created the Meadowlands Regional Planning Board, MRPB. And they were the ones who basically decided to look for the money to bring the Dutch engineers and look at it. The Dutch engineers concluded that you cannot deal with hydrological and hydrographic problems on the basis of these five communities because the Hackensack Meadowlands basically straddled the river. And at that point, a debate began, what do we do to bring in Hudson County, the other side of the Hackensack River, into play? And the meeting I referred to was basically to define a workable area known as the Hackensack Meadows. And up to the point where the Bill has already been enacted and was challenged in court, that the issue of defining the Meadows was still on the table. Because the communities in the Meadowlands then argued why do you exclude the Overpeck Creek north of Hackensack Meadows? Why limit it? In other words, we are working with an artificial area. The judge made a decision that it was a viable work that was done by the division defining the Meadows.

John Weingart: Cliff Goldman?

Clifford Goldman: I just wanted to say that the public attention to the Meadowlands goes back into the 19th century, and there were commissions appointed at the state level. I forget the exact dates, but in the 1880s and 1890s, and pretty much every five or ten years from then on. So this has been a public issue for 100 years. And then on the question of--

Anthony Scardino: There was a regional plan that came out too, as I recall, in the late 1920s.

Clifford Goldman: Right. It just kept happening until the territory was such a hell hole, and it was--

Anthony Scardino: I mean the Regional Plan Association out of New York--

Clifford Goldman: Right.

Anthony Scardino: --came up with a plan.

Clifford Goldman: Then on the issue of the boundaries, this became very important as a legal matter not to have special local legislation. I mean, we had I'd say seven votes in the 50-member Republican assembly caucus for a year. So we didn't have much of a shot at getting this bill passed. But then it was passed but they amended the boundaries by a little bit. So and so knew somebody on this border. And Hughes vetoed the bill. And I was assigned the task of writing the veto message, which I did, and drove it up to Morven at midnight. And when he delivered the veto message the next day, mine was thrown out and he had handwritten on yellow pad the veto message. And he vetoed it and made them come back to pass it without these amendments.

John Weingart: One of the press articles that we have in the slide presentation across the hall also mentions, I don't know how they got this, that Governor Hughes stayed up until 4:15 in the morning writing his veto message.

Clifford Goldman: That's because of my failure.

<laughter>

John Weingart: Cliff didn't mention when he introduced himself that after he left as executive director, he also wrote his dissertation at Princeton on the Hackensack Meadowlands, "The Politics of Regional Planning and Government in the Metropolis." It's 447 pages. We digitized it, it will be up on the website

eventually, but we're at about page six right now. Let's talk a little bit more about Governor Hughes, unless there's anyone who'd like to add anything more about Governor Meyner's role?

Gene Schneider: Not Meyner, but there's a little anecdote about getting the bill passed. There was the assumption at all times that the Corps of Engineers would play a role in this process. And you talked about hydrology and the need to protect the land and so forth. Well the Corps insisted that we have a plan that was implementable. And our response was to come up with legislation that showed how the commission could in fact implement this plan. Of course, the legislature, being careful, wanted the Corps' support that that in fact would suffice. And I remember Cliff and Paul sent me up to the Corps of Engineers' office to gather this letter. And they argued about this, the civilians at the Corps said, "No, we can't support any-- we can't associate ourselves with any of this stuff. It gets into politics, and we don't want to be labeled as such. We can't say specifically that the Hackensack Meadowlands legislation is in fact what we need." And the colonel at the time, they had revolving military leaders, Colonel Duke finally said, he threw up his hands, and he says, "Look," he says, "if this is going to get it off the dime, I'm going to sign it." And that's how it got done. Of course, Cliff and Paul at the other end of the conference call were making very persuasive arguments as well. And I have to give-- he's one of the ghosts we're talking about, I don't even know if Colonel Duke is still alive, and here's a guy that took a leap of faith and he didn't have to, but he did.

Clifford Goldman: Can I amplify on that? So Frank Panuzio [ph?] was the Corps leader in New York. And he came down to Hughes' office with the reluctant legislative people and he made this very great case that if they passed this bill, we would get this \$300 million project. And if they didn't pass the bill, we would not. And that was the basis for getting the last votes that we needed. Now, when we created the commission, Ylvisaker had a network of people all over the world of experts. And he had as a planner a guy named Dan Coleman from California, who was called the Mud Man in the newspapers, because he did development work in wetlands. And he had worked for the Vatican and he'd worked in Australia. And his method was, leave it alone and develop around it. So when he came to New Jersey and looked over this territory, he said to me, "This Corps plan is stupid." I mean, the Corps plan was, we're going to build a tide gate to block off the Hackensack River, and then we're going to fill up this 20,000 acres with sand. And because we'll build the tide gate, we only have to use eight feet of sand instead of twelve feet of sand. And the cost benefit analysis is the saving of four feet of sand over 20,000 acres. So we said-- by then it was just sort of at the beginning of the environmental movement. And Coleman was way ahead of us on all that. And he said, "You know, you've got to keep these wetlands as much as you can. So we don't want tide gates, we don't want to fill them." So we went to New York and told the Corps of Engineers, "We're off this. Forget about it, thanks for your help." So in a few months, we reversed the whole point of why this legislation was passed.

John Weingart: Let's talk a little bit about the legislative side. The legislators who were still around at that time, particularly the role of Fairleigh Dickinson, I think, with the legislation.

Frank X. McDermott: Well although I started the Study Commission, Fairleigh Dickinson was the fellow who carried the ball. Fairleigh Dickinson was a highly regarded member of the Senate and it was just natural for the governor to talk to him about this. And Fairleigh Dickinson moved the bill in the Senate and it passed, I think unanimously, right? There was no dissenting votes.

Man 3: I can't remember, Frank, to tell you the truth.

Frank X. McDermott: Yeah. And that made a big difference. The reason that Fairleigh got it, it was because of territorial connections. Fairleigh Dickinson was from Bergen County, he was part of the Bergen County Senate Delegation, so it was a natural thing for him to be a sponsor, the principal sponsor, of that legislation. And he carried the day.

Man 3: Wasn't Frank Guarini on the Democratic--

Man 4: Well, Guarini was his co-sponsor all the way.

Frank X. McDermott: Yeah. Well what happened at that time, talking about bipartisanship, we always asked the Democrats to come on to bills that were very necessary to the state. The rule had always been is that whoever the majority party was, their representative got the first spot. Then in something where you wanted bipartisanship, the Democratic leader got the second spot. And then they got intermingled. So in major legislation where bipartisanship was the rule, it was always spread between the Republicans and the Democrats. Today, I don't think that's the rule.

John Weingart: Senator Bateman.

Raymond Bateman: It sure isn't. Dick Dickinson was a one-term legislator. He was probably the most shy, bashful member of the State Senate and he passed with Frank Guarini the most significant piece of regional legislation before or since. It was an incredible accomplishment for a guy who couldn't say his own name. Seriously.

John Weingart: Cliff Goldman.

Cliff Goldman: Dickinson was a person who had had personal family tragedies just before this or during this period. And he was a very sweet man, a very nice man. His name was very important. Of course, the University and Becton, Dickinson, and all of that. And he revered Paul Ylvisaker and Governor Hughes.

And he was intimidated by them and how they worked. And there was one session where Dickinson said, "What do I do? How can I help? What should I be doing?" And Hughes said to him, "Take your checkbook and put it in your pocket." And Dickinson said just from that one conversation he decided never to run for governor. But I should say how this thing passed. Because truly we had-- nobody was for it. And it was only because Dickinson was on it that the assembly Republicans kept bringing it up and saying, "Why are we doing this? We only have five votes out of fifty." But that was because of Dickinson's presence in this and Herb Brenoldi [ph?] and other people. And here's what happened. The riparian issue that Gene mentioned, who owns the land statewide? The state won a court case saying the state owned land that was flowed by the mean high tide. And this affected hundreds of thousands of acres up and down the coast of the Delaware River. So the Republicans wanted to have a referendum that would undo this court case and give the ownership of this riparian land back to the title holders. And I think Senator Herring was the sponsor of this. And in order to get that passed, they needed Dickinson and his few votes. And the deal was made that they would support his Meadowlands bill and his people would support their referendum. And that's how this thing sprung out of the ashes into life. Now, as soon as that happened, Hughes, who was not party to this arrangement, attacked the arrangement and called for the repeal of the referendum. And he called it the billion dollar robbery of the schoolchildren. And he had I think Bill Brennan and people like that in his office running this campaign. And one of the senators, I think Senator Beadleston, said "I wasn't elected here to eat crow." But he did. And they mounted this campaign and got that thing repealed. This was really a fantastic set of circumstances.

John Weingart: Gene Schneider.

Eugene Schneider: Another obstacle was the role of the waste management interests in the Meadows. I recall sitting in Governor Hughes' reception area. He was recovering from a cataract operation and the issue came up, we're not going to be able to go with the Hudson people if we don't give assurances to the garbage interests that they would be able to continue dumping in the Meadows. At that point, the governor asked his assistant, I think it was Larry Builder [ph?], I'm not sure, to call the political leader of Hudson County, who was reached at Hialeah Race Track in Florida. And the answer was, "Whatever Billy Musto wants is okay with me." And the call went to Bill Musto, and he said, "Give them assurances for dumping until the dumps are filled, and I'll go along with the bill." And I think the Hudson County votes came based on that assurance.

John Weingart: I wanted to backtrack quickly. Before the bill gets passed, Cliff or anyone else, in drafting the bill, did you have any models? Did you look at anything else to copy and paste?

Cliff Goldman: Well, I think the work that Gene and Bud Chavooshian and Ernie all contributed to this bill. But mainly, it was Sui Generis. Among the other provisions of it were the tax sharing. We had a formula for sharing the taxes among the 14 towns, because some of them would wind up just being open

space and marshland and others would have development. And we didn't want to be bound to make sure every town had some development and all that. So we had a tax sharing formula, which Bill Kingsley and Sid Glazer from the tax division, and that was my original part of this, working with them to prepare the tax formula. Now since then, that kind of tax sharing went into the Twin Cities in Minneapolis and there was some county in Florida that did it. I think ours was the model for it, and I think it wasn't that you needed a model. It was pretty clear what you wanted to do. You wanted the state to take control of this area and do whatever was best for the area and not have too much interference with constant meetings. We did have a mayor's committee in the bill as an advisory thing, so we could keep them posted. Out of all these meetings and so forth, we only had one mayor who supported the bill, that was Bill McDowell, who became a commissioner and then succeeded me as executive director. Although the people in that area really wanted the bill. We went around to these neighborhoods, and the women were complaining about rats coming up into North Arlington and Lyndhurst. And people really-- we didn't do polling in those days, but basically it was a popular thing to do to end this misery up there. Mayor Healy of Carney kept quiet and didn't oppose it because we got him a llama for his zoo. That was one of my projects.

Woman 1: You can't make that up.

Cliff Goldman: No. It was not easy.

John Weingart: Okay. Let's move on.

Anthony Scardino: If I may.

John Weingart: Yeah. Senator Scardino.

Anthony Scardino: I can't top that. But who came up with the definition of what the Meadowlands Commission would be charged with, protecting the delicate balance of nature and develop the area economically and to manage the solid waste? Those three precepts that were part and parcel of bill, because I think that was rather unique. I mean because that was really sort of the foundation or the base for whatever you developed after that, because you knew what your charge was.

Clifford Goldman: One of the people that we haven't mentioned who was very important in all this is Bea Tylutki who was assistant counsel to Governor Hughes and then became counsel to the Meadowlands Commission. But she was the legal person developing this language. I think the environmental part of that came from Dickinson. I think so.

Anthony Scardino: It was really far reaching at the time.

Clifford Goldman: And this was 1968, so it was before Earth Day, and it was before environmental focus, at least in the politics of New Jersey. But there were people, and we paid attention to that. We had a young guy from Lehigh University named McNamara, he was an ecologist. And his father was the head of Fish and Game in New Jersey. And he came out and he and I went by helicopter, boats, all in one day in February. And we had these high waders and we walked. I fell into a muskrat hole up to here. He pulled me out. He knew how to do stuff. He had anisette in some thermos bottle to keep us warm. But that was really very interesting. Then he went back to Lehigh and he drew environmental maps of the 20,000 acres based on that one day, plus whatever material he was given from Gene's work. And it was really accurate. Afterward, we had more important studies and so forth, but he identified, you know, what was what. And I said, "How do you do that?" And he said, "Well, you go to a doctor and he looks at one thing and he says, 'You have diabetes.' You just know your subject." So that was really a little ahead of its time. But I think it was Dickinson.

John Weingart: Now the legislation gets signed into law. Let's talk about the sort of getting organized and the issues that you confronted when the staff was being recruited and the commission was getting organized.

Brendan Byrne: I'd be curious. We've been talking about the Meadowlands. There are two separate issues. The Meadowlands and Giants. What I'd be curious to know is, what would have happened if the Giants deal just fell flat? What would have happened to the Meadowlands?

John Weingart: Okay. Cliff, why don't you just give a minute of the organization of the commission?

Cliff Goldman: Well, I have to answer his question first. He's the boss.

Woman 1: Still.

Cliff Goldman: I think the question should go the other way around. If it weren't for the Meadowlands Commission, I believe there would not have been a Sports Complex. I'm not saying it definitely would not have been, but I was involved in the early days of the Sports Complex. And for example, when we met with Wellington Mara and Mike Burke from the Yankees, who was originally part of this, they had to be convinced that if they went to the Meadowlands that that misery that was around it would stop and would be controlled. And we were able to convince them of that, although we weren't convinced ourselves. We were involved in making that site available. There was an illegal dump on that site that was burning. We fought against it and stopped it at considerable risk to ourselves personally. There was a company that

built a building there without a permit. We sued them and they had to tear down the building. Another company built a building on that site without a permit, and we were going to sue them too. But a tornado came down Route 3 and wiped out their building for us.

Man 5: <Inaudible>

Clifford Goldman: Yeah. And in a variety of other ways. And I picked the site as the Meadowlands Commission person and saved them from a major mistake on the site that their architects had picked which would not have worked, would not have been able to do it.

Brendan Byrne: Clifford, my question, suppose I had said to the Giants, "We don't want you. We don't want that." What would have happened to the development of the Meadowlands?

Clifford Goldman: It would have been a little bit different, but still fine, because the main accomplishment I think of the Meadowlands was the preservation, the ending of the dumping, the preservation of the wetlands. There was tremendous development on the Secaucus side of the river in Hartz Mountain. Huge amount of ratables, a hospital, apartment buildings. The original Meadowlands master plan called for some regional facility on that site. And before the sports thing came up, we were trying to get the new college, Ramapo, which we thought would have been better in the Lyndhurst, East Rutherford area, than up there where it is, which we didn't get. But we would have had something there. Of course the Sports Authority was a great contributor to the prestige of a Meadowlands location.

John Weingart: Some of the early press coverage of the master plan and the legislation suggests a mega city. Was that overplayed, or was that the idea generally at the time?

Clifford Goldman: Well, that was during the legislative period, and it was not supposed to get out. But it was not the intention at the time. That was Ronnie Sullivan.

Man 6: John, getting back to Brendan's question, I think that it was key that the Giants and the stadium was built. At that time, everybody going back to the Dutch had tried to build things n the Meadowland. It all sank into the meadow mat. You have to understand, there's an igneous formation of rock which starts up in the highlands, goes all the way down to the Newark Airport. And the depth of the meadow mat was, up to that time, had never been conquered, and everybody tried it. So when the Sports Authority put this massive structure down, it still was highly debatable. And if anybody else wouldn't have had the money to even try it. We had to bring in thousands of yards of filth from the Ambrose Lighthouse through another engineering miracle, and develop a new form of engineering, spread footings because all the first pilings

we did went right through to the bottom. So I suggest that without the Giants and with the initiative that allowed them to spend \$319 million, I think the Meadowlands could very well have died aborning.

Don Linky: Mr. Breslin?

Michael Breslin: Yeah, I would disagree with Cliff. I think without the Sports Complex, without Giants Stadium, the economic development which subsequently took place would not have been as intense. It think with Giants Stadium and the Sports Complex, that area, the Meadowlands became a destination. Like this example, the office building in the Sheraton Hotel across the street, without that, I don't think they would have been built. And I don't think the intensity of the development on the Hartz Mountain property, on the eastern part of the district, would have taken place. There would have been some development, but not as dense.

Clifford Goldman: Okay, I'll grant you that.

Michael Breslin: Thank you.

John Weingart: Bill Kohm?

Clifford Goldman: With those two guys arguing against me, I can't win.

Brendan Byrne: Incidentally, the Giants Stadium was not an issue in the 1973 gubernatorial campaign. Nobody was for it. Nobody.

Man 7: Charlie was against it.

Brendan Byrne: Charlie was against it.

John Weingart: Bill Kohm?

William Kohm: I just wanted to pick up on two things that Cliff aid and expand a little bit. One is, you couldn't ignore the Meadowlands. The Meadowlands, as he says, is 20,000 acres. That's larger than the island of Manhattan.

End of Disc 1 Part 2: The Meadowlands and Jersey Sports Complex: Looking Back and Ahead
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William Kohm: This started off with the Yankees. The first discussions that anybody had with bringing a team to New Jersey was with the ownership of the New York Yankees, they wanted to come. And they weren't going to build it on the dump. They wanted to build it in the Teaneck/Englewood area which is all part of the-- still part of the Meadowlands. And that was the initial discussions. Now, as far as the major city and all of the nonsense Brendan is absolutely right, Charlie was against it. Brendan was against it. Nobody was for this project I've got to tell you. I mean Bud and I-- well, I'll come back and tell you a story about Chicago but we were selling bonds with two renderings. We had a rendering of what a stadium would look like and rendering of what racetrack would look like and we had a whole in the ground. And we owed the DiNello Brothers [ph?] \$400,000. I used to have to go into Guido's Restaurant to find out if either one of them was having lunch because we were embarrassed to go into the restaurant. We had no money. The money was gone. So there's a lot-- I described what we faced in those days as a mountain of skepticism. A mountain of skepticism. Nobody believed that it could happen.

Donald Linky: I searched the archive of the old Eagleton polls and couldn't find any at that time period. But were there polls or anecdotally what was public opinion beyond the insider political opinion? Was it against?

William Kohm: We couldn't afford to take polls in those days. You could not-- we did not have any-- you've got to understand there was a point in time when the Sports Authority was flat broke. Flat broke. They had spent all of their money.

Donald Linky: It was even worse than-- we have memos of slides...

Bud Foley: Wait a minute, let's keep it straight. It was flat broke because 50 million of it had been used as a down payment for all of the land we had to condemn. We weren't running anything as far as operational. Operational was held in a decrepit restaurant until they took that away from us. And then we had it in my law office, so we didn't have any operational money at all.

Cliff Goldman: Well, you have to remember that in this year in 1973, election year this had flopped temporarily when the financing didn't work. And it was an embarrassment, I suppose, and it created very difficult circumstances because the state owed \$50 million to somebody and had no prospects on how to get it. The underwriters who were chosen had failed. They were thrown out. And then it came to Governor Byrne that he had to put the state behind this attempt to sell the bonds. This was not a very popular thing at the time because of that real history.

Brendan Byrne: I had made a calculation of how many touchdowns the Giants scored in 1972 and divided it by the projected cost of the stadium and it was hundreds of thousands of dollars per person.

Cliff Goldman: And also you wouldn't have had the U2 thing if Governor Byrne hadn't renegotiated that lease because the lease gave the entire thing to the Giants, whatever was going to go on in that stadium. And the new lease that we renegotiated gave the entire control of the stadium to the Sports Authority with the Giants having a lease for their season. But even then we would have conflicts with them if we wanted to have a soccer game or something or a concert during the preseason they could say no. But that renegotiation produced terrific benefits for the state.

Raymond Bateman: To pick on Tom McLight [ph?], the fact is the Governor of New York and his brother David were killing every attempt we made to sell bonds. I mean my friends who were bond salesmen in New Jersey wouldn't get involved because of the Rockefellers and they threw up Sunny Side Cards [ph?]. It became kind of an us against them perspective from public people. And we had the same kind of difficulty when trying to pass the legislation initially. There was no great interest in professional football in 19...

Brendan Byrne: Seventy-three.

Raymond Bateman: Seventy-one. This was '70 when we passed the legislation. And, you know, to pass legislation in those days you had two hurdles. One was the public hurdle when you voted in public. The other was a caucus. The Senate caucus literally turned down this project initially and Cahill-- I'll never forget Cahill said, "You've got to bring Joe McCrane into the caucus to talk about it." And nobody up to that moment had come into the Senate caucus except senators to talk about anything. And so we agreed. Joe came in and pretty well killed the project as he was talking. And the guy who saved the project in the Senate caucus was Senator Frank "Hap" Farley from Atlantic County who got me four votes when they were needed to get the bill out of the caucus and he didn't even vote for it on the floor of the Senate but he got the votes in the caucus.

William Kohm: The bond issue would never have happened unless Brendan Byrne supported putting the full faith and credit of the state behind those bonds. It would never have happened.

Brendan Byrne: That's why I had you all come here.

William Kohm: That's true. But that's the God's honest-- you've got to understand that there's only one daily newspaper in the state of New Jersey that supported this project. Think about it...

Brendan Byrne: No, no, "The Ledger" supported it.

William Kohm: Only "The Ledger", one. Every other paper-- now imagine if we were sitting here playing something brand new and I had to tell you guys, "Well, I want to tell you that 'The Record' is against it. 'The Asbury Park Press' is against it. 'The Camden Courier' is against it. The two Trent papers are against it. Everybody is against it. The New York television stations are going to kill you. The governor of New York is going to break it." And we say, "Okay, let's go ahead and try to pass this and get it done."

Brendan Byrne: Millicent Fenwick was against it?

William Kohm: Millicent Fenwick was against it.

Brendan Byrne: My assembly woman.

William Kohm: It's hard to recreate the atmosphere in which these decisions were made. I mean Brendan sits there and smiles but his-- that was an unpopular decision. The guy has made a lot of unpopular decisions. He voted-- he gave us the income tax. He saved the Pinelands. He made the Meadowlands by putting the full faith and trust of the state behind those bonds. It wouldn't have happened. But they were tough times. These were difficult times to do these things. And that's why when I say I identify ghosts we had men and women who were large figures on the stage. You've got to realize Sonny Werblin who we finally will mention was ideally created for that role. He was involved in professional football. He was one of the top racing stables in the United States. He had racehorses in the Derby and what not. And he was in show business. He had contact-- Don tell us...

Brendan Byrne: But he was not Cahill's first choice.

William Kohm: No he wasn't. And Charlie Serrano was really the first chairman of the Sports Authority. Everybody forgets Charlie Serrano.

Bud Foley: Yes, he was.

William Kohm: He was the first chairman. But I'll tell you one quick non-Brendan story because it describes Sonny's unique contribution in his own ways. Bud Foley, myself and Sonny got on a play that I had to buy because the Sports Authority had no money. And we flew to Chicago to appear before a group that was set up. You say it was at the Chicago Athletic Club?

Bud Foley: Illinois Athletic Club, but we had all of the bankers in Chicago.

William Kohm: So we had all of the bankers, all of the top bankers. Now, Sonny had a lot of talent but one of them wasn't-- he was not a great spellbinder. And here I am and I've got the two renderings and Sonny's making a speech about how we're going to do this and at the end of the speech we got very polite applause. Suddenly an elderly gentleman in the back of the room, white-haired gentleman came forward to the front. And he said, "Gentleman, I've known Sonny Werblin for 25 years. If he tells me that he can build a racetrack and a football stadium and make money in a swamp in New Jersey I believe him." They all broke down they were all cheering. I turned to Bud, I said, "Who the heck is that?" He said, "That's George Halas the owner of the Chicago Bears." And that's how he sold bonds in Chicago.

Donald Linky: We promised you a short break-- Bud Foley.

Bud Foley: Don't confuse two oppositions. The opposition we talk about now is after the first bond issue failed. The opposition took to the whole Meadowlands Complex started from the beginning. The League of Women Voters were against it. I debated Steve Wiley three nights on television. It was-- this was the very first time so it wasn't even popular from the beginning. Of course, then when the bond issue which we put out at \$262 million failed, failed strictly because of Rockefeller's interference. We had a due diligence meeting, I'll never forget it, March 16 over in New York. All of Wall Street was crying for the bonds. "Oh, you've got to give me some." They're tucking at my lapels. And they realized the feasibility study was there. And in three days, Rockefeller passed a bill in New York passed both houses and signed by the governor on a Saturday which effectively killed our feasibility. Our feasibility for competition was based upon the existing laws the take that New York was getting. They reduced that. They passed a bill of free admission to all tracks in New York for a year. Everything they did was in this bill passed overnight and so our feasibility people came to us and they said "We can't support as we did support your bond issue." So naturally we <inaudible>. So what my point is though that the opposition to this goes way back. It goes way back before the formation. And then, of course, it really heightened when we did the first issue. But what is absolutely sure, if I could, the way I see this from-- in retrospect, Joe McCrane had this vision. Bill Cahill who really wanted baseball and not football had the nerve to go through with it. After it had worked-- after it had failed and now he's out of office, Brendan's-- many of his advisors because I knew-- I was the only democrat on the original commission by the way. They were all republican. But Brendan asked for I don't know whether I should use his name but a survey, a real survey of the feasibility et cetera, Jimmy Sazali [ph?] to head a team that did the work on this. They looked at everything for three months and then a lot of his people were of course saying to him, "Stay away from it. It's all ready failed. It's not going to fail again. And it's going to be attributable to the republicans. Why should you pick this up?" He had the nerve and the courage to pick it up. So I make them all heroes and I make one other hero the one that Bill mentioned. And that is the magic name of Sonny. Howard Cosell was a very important newspaper and television figure at that time. Howard was dedicated to the defeat of anything in the Meadowlands. He railed against the Giants, et cetera. But I

remember because Howard became a friend of mine, I used him on a television program. But Howard used his last line in his real diatribe against it. He said, "After all I've said Sonny who rhymes with money will probably make it go."

Donald Linky: On that note, let's take a five minute break. I wanted to explore a few points that were discussed out in the hall. First, Joe McCrane has usually been given much of the credit for the Cahill administration's development of the Sports Complex legislation. And I wanted to ask those of you just what his role was and how did McCrane come up with the idea and what was the genesis of the initial focus on attracting a Sports complex.

Brendan Byrne: Joe McCrane wanted to have his own team. He wanted to buy the Philadelphia team. He had an association with Earl Blake who was the football coach at West Point and Joe McCrane was at West Point. He couldn't swing that deal. And this was in the general realm of his interest in football.

Donald Linky: Jerry Breslin.

Jerry Breslin: To add to that. A year or two prior-- there was a fellow from Camden, I can't remember this name, now, he's a property owner. Maybe Tony will remember his name.

Tony Scardino: Gene Maury [ph?].

Jerry Breslin: Gene Maury. He tried to put a race track in the Meadowlands-- in Secaucus and he was Joe McCrane's father-in-law or related.

Tony Scardino: Brother-in-law.

Jerry Breslin: And therefore, I guess, the only way they were going to get-- anybody was going to get a racetrack because then Hudson County, Jim Dugan probably remembers this specifically they put it on a public referendum in Hudson County would you approve of a racetrack in Hudson County and it was defeated heavily. But I think that's where McCrane got-- the geographic area why he was interested in the Meadowlands for a stadium and he also played football for West Point for Earl Blake.

Donald Linky: Cliff Goldman.

Cliff Goldman: There was a racetrack proposed in the cross [ph?] at Meadowlands and I had to go testify and, of course, we said look the commission was just created. We're opposed to this which was the state's position. The state attorney general who was conducting this public hearing asked the proponents of this racetrack in each case, do you know anyone who's in the mafia. And each one said one person I know. Anyway, that went down. Then they-- I'm not sure whether it was after or before they went to Secaucus.

Jerry Breslin: This was after, Cliff.

Cliff Goldman: It was after and they couldn't go back to Bergen County for five years so they went to Secaucus. And according to the newspapers the weekend before the public referendum people from one of the New York racetracks sent bus loads of African-American guys into Secaucus knocking door to door. I'm going to be working at this racetrack and can I have a room and that contributed to the failure.

Jerry Breslin: That's exactly right. And that was despite the support of the Hudson County leader of the time who was in favor of the racetrack.

William Kohm: That was a two-part referendum. That was a two-part referendum. It carried in Hudson County but it failed in Secaucus and they had to carry them in both places. In Secaucus they got killed.

Cliff Goldman: Now, it was really quite a brilliant plan that McCrane or whoever-- I think Tom Hitzelberger was his assistant or deputy. And it was very sophisticated. If you looked at the racetrack it was a gold mine. And, I guess, the question was why should we let some private people have this. Let's get it for the state and use the money to support the stadium and that was the basis for the legislation.

William Kohm: Tom Hitzelberger is one of the unsung heroes of this whole project. Tom Hitzelberger is, I believe, is the guy who came up with the idea of marrying a racetrack to the financing of the stadium. And he doesn't get the credit over the years that he deserves. But I think he was the guy that actually married the two. And just as an aside, Cliff, I knew about that application in Bergen County. And the finances of that proposal with the Pappas Brothers [ph?]. Anybody who's been to Greece it's so Pappas and they're both bishops of the Greek church. And one of the Pappas brothers came down to testify at that hearing. And he was asked by a young deputy attorney general, "How much money do you have?" Because this man was going to finance this whole project. And he said to him, "Young man don't ever ask someone how much they have. Ask them how much they owe." He said, "My brother and I owe Chase Manhattan \$50 million. We owe Boston. We owe..." I mean but-- and they turned it down but it was the-- I'll never forget that. He said, "Don't ever ask anyone how much they have, ask them how much they owe."

Raymond Bateman: Don, Joe McCrane and his patron saint Joe Cahill were politicians but they were both jocks. They were former athletes. It was quite natural to fall into something like this <inaudible>.

Donald Linky: Let's explore more the renegotiation of the Giants contracts after the November 1973 election. Governor Byrne, you said that it wasn't an issue during the campaign. But talk, I guess, about your first approaches, I guess, by the Cahill Administration, after your governor elect.

Brendan Byrne: About?

Donald Linky: About helping to salvage that financing of the stadium project.

Brendan Byrne: There was some issue. I forget what it was. I was governor-elect and Cahill had it on the board. And he called him and he said he wanted me to support it. And I said, "Not now." And so Cahill said, "Well, I'm going to withdraw it. I'm going to kill the whole issue." I said, "You can do that if you want, governor, but I wouldn't if I were you." So he called me about an hour later and he said he had changed his mind. But he had an Irish temper and he might well have.

Donald Linky: And how about the meetings in New York with Wellington Mara and the other...

Brendan Byrne: There was only one meeting.

Donald Linky: One meeting.

Brendan Byrne: One meeting on Friday afternoon-- Friday. It was a Friday morning. It was carried through lunch. Sonny Werblin had lunch with the Maras. And I had lunch with Lou Kaden and I think Dick Leone, a couple of-- you were there weren't you?

Cliff Goldman: I think so.

Brendan Byrne: No, I mean Jim Dugan was there.

Jim Dugan: Yeah.

Brendan Byrne: And that meeting wound up about 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon when we had outlined our proposal, what we wanted different on the contract. And they said they would let us know the next day which was Saturday. I got a call the next day about 11 o'clock in the morning from Phil Canon [ph?] who was somehow...

Jerry Breslin: His son-in-law. No, no, Jack Mara's son-in-law.

Brendan Byrne: He said they would buy into our recommendation.

Donald Linky: Did they accept all of the terms? Or were there some that they rejected?

Brendan Byrne: There was no second discussion. It was either they bought what we gave them or it was over.

Donald Linky: Was there any discussion about changing the name?

Brendan Byrne: About what?

Donald Linky: Changing the name from New York?

Brendan Byrne: No.

Cliff Goldman: The major changes were to give the control of the stadium to the Sports Authority instead of to the Giants with respect to booking it for other uses which enabled us later to get the Cosmos and the Jets and all of these other concerts and everything else. Plus, I think, there was like a 50-cent or \$1 ticket surcharge on top of the rent that went to the Sports Authority. I mean the governor negotiated a much better arrangement.

Donald Linky: Jerry Breslin.

Jerry Breslin: The major element was Mara natural turf. Football was only played on natural turf. I wasn't a part of these negotiations but I just know the history. And with the artificial turf we were able to one Labor Day weekend I don't know whether it was-- I think it was '77 or '78 we had Cosmos play Argentina on Friday night. Sold out. Saturday Night

NOTE: RECORDING DIFFICULTIES DURING THIS PART OF THE PROGRAM RESULT IN SEVERAL GAPS IN THIS TRANSCRIPT

I think Penn State played Nebraska, and Sunday, The Giants played somebody, three sell outs on a Labor Day weekend but for—because we had our artificial turf, if we had natural turf that wouldn't have been able to take place.

Brendan Byrne: Leon Hess would have never come over, with the original contract

Donald Linky: You mentioned Leon Hess. Let's talk about David Wilentz and his interest in the stadium and also protecting his interest in Monmouth Park racetrack.

William Kohm: I think one of the lawyers should comment on this but we had 14 lawsuits, 14 lawsuits where filed against the Sports Authority before we ever did anything. One of the lawsuits was by Monmouth Park, but I think Monmouth Park was the main suit, but we had 14 lawsuits that had to be decided. And there's another ghost that's not in the room that deserves a lot of credit a guy by the name of Morris Pashman.

Jerry Breslin: You got it.

William Kohm: Was the superior court judge who wrote the opinion on the constitutionality of the borrowing and upheld that we didn't violate the credit clause of the constitution. And the environmentalists didn't have a leg to stand on. The environmentalists in those days believe me were not-- didn't have the power or the strength that they have today. Monmouth Park and the New York Racing interest played the most...

Brendan Byrne: And don't forget Monmouth Park was not Monmouth Park. Monmouth Park was David T. Wilentz.

Donald Linky: And how much did General Wilentz lobby you?

Jerry Breslin: Well, I can tell you a little bit of history. This is a story about how politics makes strange bedfellows. I was a county chairman in the Spring of 1973 and I endorsed Brendan Byrne in the Democratic primary. And then he got elected in the general election. And then the issue came up about whether the Sports complex was going to be built or not. And I worked for my uncle John Breslin at the

time and he called me down to his office and he said, "David Wilentz is on the phone." So he said, "Jerry." I used to call him Uncle David. So I said I'm going to have my son Robert speak to you. And Robert Wilentz spoke to me and said, "We want you to, because of my Uncle's name Breslin, in the Bergen County court system to file a lawsuit on behalf of Monmouth Park to stop the construction of the Meadowlands Racetrack. And I said "I can't do that." And he said to me "Well, you can name your own amount, we'll give you any retainer you want." "I can't do that. My uncle John, I'll never forget, is sitting in the chair, he's like going.. <laughter> He said "Why?" I said "Look I endorsed Brendan Byrne, I don't know what his position is, whether he wants the race track or not. If he wants it, I don't want to go against him." So the conversation ended. I'll never forget my uncle, who was a very pragmatic guy, he said "Boy, you are very idealistic." But then later as we all know, Brendan appointed Robert Wilentz as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, one of the best in the whole country, so..

Man: .. and a class act..

Jim Dugan: Personalities that we're discussing are really interesting. Brendan mentioned the one meeting in New York with Wellington Mara and Brendan and his folks and it lasted all day long and we had these side meetings and so on. But it came to the end of the day and I was the only legislator there that could speak officially about what was going to happen. And Brendan turned to me and he said "Jim, what do you think the Senate will do?" And I said "Well, Mr. Mara the perception is that this contract that is in place now is nothing more than a vehicle that allows the state to build this stadium to have you play your Giant game in it on Sunday, then the citizens of the state can pay to have it cleaned out after the game is over." I said, "That's all that they think is beneficial to the state." And Wellington Mara his briefcase <claps> gave it one of these, got up and walked to the door, as if that was it, and when he got to the door, his son-in-law, who was his attorney, turned around and looked at Brendan and said "Mr. Mara doesn't feel well, that's why he has to leave." He said, "But he'll call you in the morning." And the next morning he called Brendan and he blinked. And the other gentleman that was mentioned, the General Wilentz- General Wilentz. Anybody that knew him in those days called him general. I can remember at an inaugural ball or something like that for Brendan that issue was tops in terms of the concern of the Wilentz family. And the general was passionate about the issue. And I can remember sitting at a table and he knew me and was the about to be the democratic state chairman or maybe I was and he vaulted, literally vaulted the table and he said, "Jimmy, you're not going to let that happen are you?" I said, "I'm just a face in the crowd, general," I said, "It's up to Brendan." And I said, "There are a lot of people that think it should go." But he was a worthy advisory and it was fun witnessing that kind of history with the people with the determination of Brendan and people that could make compelling arguments such as these other people that we mentioned. But in any event as I said, before, it was a great run.

Jerry Breslin: But Donald, what ghost we haven't mentioned is a fellow by the name of Al Linkletter. He was an engineer and an executive with Prudential Insurance Company. I think Bud and Cliff know more

about this but, I think, they agreed to buy a lot of the bonds. They asked if Brendan would appoint this fellow Linkletter to the authority. He had managed like 19 projects before this with Pru had an equity interest such as the Prudential Center in Boston and et cetera, et cetera. And it was not only a lot of skepticism financially about whether this thing was going to fly but whether it was going to not sink into the Meadowlands, the construction was going to be faulty defective. But Linkletter was-- took charge of the construction of the racetrack and the stadium and both finished on time and at budget and Cliff and Adrian could tell you the guy was a nice gentleman, quiet guy and he contributed a lot to the physical buildings actually being built and not falling apart.

Donald Linky: We probably should, at least, pause and recognize the role of the New Jersey banks and Prudential in coming together. It's a role probably that was unique to its time because there aren't any New Jersey banks left to join on a New Jersey focused project any more like that. But it was interesting that they all came together. And, I guess, it was the five Bob's at the time in Newark that could be put around the table to save something like that.

Dennis Robinson: I think, Cliff, didn't Bob Ferdund [ph?] have a significant role in all of this?

Cliff Goldman: Bob Ferdund was a bond counsel for Mudge Rose. And he's still a bond counsel, but he's too me the most brilliant lawyer I've ever worked with. And he's the equivalent of Al Linkletter on the legal side making everything work and a brilliant guy. And he stayed with the Sports Authority for a number of years afterwards shepherding other changes through. He's one of the ones who deserves credit for this.

Brendan Byrne: The background, by the way, of the Linkletter thing was when it came down to selling the last \$50 million worth of bonds we had almost nobody to turn to except to Prudential. And McNaughton was head of the Prudential at that time. He called me and he said, "We'll give you the \$50 million but we want to appoint one member of the Sports Authority." And I said, "I'm not going to let you do that." I said, "I appoint the members of the Sports Authority. I'd be happy to consider any name you give me." And he gave me Linkletter and he couldn't have given me a better name.

Donald Linky: I just wanted to step out of my moderator role for a minute. The summer after my second year in law school I worked for the summer for Kelly, Dry and Warren which was the Giants law firm in Manhattan and worked with Jack Cancannon to the son-in-law to Wellington Mara. And most of the summer we had probably I don't know about 15 summer lawyers working. We were doing research on how New Jersey could screw the Giants after they moved over in terms of passing fees and taxes and so forth. Yeah, Bill Kohm.

William Kohm: This might be a good time. We start singling out individuals like Linkletter. I'd just like to make two quick comments. One, whoever was responsible for putting into the legislation that the attorney general and the state treasurer would be members of the Authority that's genius.

Donald Linky: That's ex-officio.

William Kohm: Whoever did that that's genius because the fact that Cliff and John Degnan sat on the Authority was a tremendous strength for the Authority. You didn't have to deal with going back to the AG's office or the treasurer's office. They participated. They contributed. And they were, to me, examples of the quality appointees that all of the governors made to this Authority starting with Brendan. We had terrific people on that Authority forever. They were quality people. They weren't Democratic people. They weren't Republican people. They were concerned with the operation and they all made contributions. And, I think, that that's important because the personnel at the Sports Complex at all levels was terrific. I spent nights walking the floors of the racetrack with Sonny to make sure there was no chewing gum on the floors. He did that to make sure that the ash trays were emptied. He oversaw the fact that there had to be a color of peach in the ladies restrooms because that's a flattering color for women. We had to come in in the summer time one time, Bud, you maybe remember this with our overcoats so that we could sit in the test seats in the stadium before we could pick whether it was a 21-inch seat or a 22-inch seat to see how comfortable you were sitting in the stadium. There was that kind of attention to detail. And the employees were excited to come to work. The only other place I've ever seen this at Disney. Disney has that kind of employee. You have to be excited to come to work. I confess I still get goose bumps.

Cliff Goldman: I'd like to add a little to that. It was really a great honor and educational benefit to me to work with Sonny Werblin to see how he ran something. And along the lines that Bill was talking about, here's one story. We were in the Authority body when the Giants were playing early, maybe the first game. I don't know. And out on to the sidelines came some guy and a woman in a bikini. So Sonny went ballistic and called security and "Get those people out of there and bring them up here." So somebody knocks on the door and it's LeRoy Neiman, the artist. And Sonny said-- he used some curse words. "What are you doing?" And LeRoy Neiman said, "Look, hey, Sonny I'm an artist I'm doing a picture." And Sonny said, "I remember when you were designing schmatas on 23rd Street."

Jerry Breslin: Well, when you talk about chewing gum you couldn't find it because we refused at Sonny's behest to sell shelled peanuts or chewing gum.

Dennis Robinson: Yeah, I think, Bill, you guys make a good point about the board. I've been through a number of chairmen including Jon Hanson and Carlos Bergen [ph?] and maybe even Peter Levine [former chair of the Sports and Exposition Authority]. And so I've seen a lot of different boards under

different governors but there is a link to all of them and that is they always made a decision for what was the right thing to do. What was in the best interest of the Authority, what was in the best interest of the public to run it as a business not as a political entity. Now, obviously, over time things happen but it was always this is a business we're going to run it like a business. The legislation was created to run it like a business so it could be as flexible as we can. And they also allowed the organization to hire industry professionals, people who knew how to run a racing business, or knew how to run a stadium with 80,000 people in it. Knew how to interface with professional sports franchises, those types of things and it exists until this day. And, I think, largely that's probably the greatest strength, historically, of the Authority was the fact that it was allowed to run as a business and not as a political entity. And the people that were allowed to be hired and are still hired there and still to this day deliver, last night being a perfect example, tremendous events. We did a week ago Friday night we had a professional soccer game. Saturday we had a college football. Sunday we had a Jets game and on Wednesday we had U2 all in a matter of days. But it takes people and dedication and organization to pull that off and it's been the history and I think that's the strength of it.

Donald Linky: I also wanted to mention that on a lower lever the staff involvement, the governor's office and the departments and the commission and the Authority that we found in going through the state archives and other papers indicates how much interest there was and there still is in getting to the right result. In the building of the stadium and the arena there are memos initially from Oren Kramer in the treasurer's office to Cliff and to Dick Leone sometimes blowing the whistle that the Authority was spending more money than the bonds had authorized. John Degnan was sort of monitoring the transportation issues with Alan Sagner and Marty Robins. And the, I think, involvement and, I think, enthusiasm at the time for getting the thing right is evident in the historical record that we found. I wanted to turn now to Tony Scardino to sort of summarize 20 years in two minutes in terms of the major sort of issues and accomplishments under this tenure.

Tony Scardino: With the Meadowlands Commission. I always say that I got there after what I call the first 10 years, the years of dreaming with the folks that were there under Cliff's tenure. And I had the luxury of implementing a good deal of those dreams. And I took seriously the charge that we have to develop the area economically in a sound fashion and also to protect the delicate balance of nature. And to make sure that the garbage that was being dumped in the district at some point in time would cease and desist. And when I took over we had some 13,000 tons of garbage coming in a day and it was a considerable task to deal with over 2,500 acres of this precious wetlands of this area was dedicated to solid waste at the time. And, I think, in my tenure what I was most excited about having achieved not obviously by myself but with a tremendous staff Chet Mattsen and George Casino and Rich Roberts among others and a tremendous staff supporting them trying to fulfill this dream that Ele Asacher [ph?] and others had put in place. That was my luxury. That was my thrill was to be able to see, for example, all of you, I think, know where the environment center and our office buildings sit in Lyndhurst. And I'll never forget that when I took over in 1981 in January of '81 Chet Mattson came to my office and we were in East Rutherford in the Sisselman Building at the time in East Rutherford and he lays out these plans to

me. And he said, "Look, we're going to build this building," and we went through a selection of sites. We went to Secaucus. We went all over the 14 communities in the district. And we settled on this area in Lyndhurst and I said, "Well, that's great for me. I live in Lyndhurst, right. I can get out of bed-- roll out of bed into my office, that's wonderful." And I said, "But where is this location?" I knew the location. If you recall earlier in my opening comments I said that as a kid I used to ride the pipeline and go down and crab. Well, it was literally almost that same path that I used to take as a kid that led to the site where they wanted to put this building. Now, the building was going to be placed on the base of an impoundment, a body of water that may be 12 inches to 18 inches deep at most. And it was so bad, so polluted because it sat on the foothills of an active landfill called the Kingsland Landfill where mostly Bergen County garbage was being dumped at the time. So this impoundment was so bad it was bubbling with toxins. You could see it. I mean nothing could live in this thing. If you fell into you'd have to be afraid that you'd die of a poisoning. And I said, "This is where you're going to put a building?" I said, "Yes," and this is-- I'm learning now. Don't forget I'm new at all of this. And these were my teachers so to speak. And I'm saying, "Well, what does this mean?" So this is where the mandate that the commission was formed to do really came to me. And he said, "Well, what we want to do is we want to prove that what the legislature asked us to do, what we were defined to achieve would happen by literally changing this area from one of degradation, decay, into something useful, manageable and active environmentally. And I said, "Well,"-- and it was sort of like a born-again kind of situation for me. And it was a wonderful, wonderful dream. I said, wow is that-- I mean talk about being idealistic. Okay. Short part of-- the shortened substance of the story is that we broke ground in July of 1981. And Tom Kean came down to cut the ribbon. And he drove along Valley Brook Avenue. It's about a mile-and-a-half stretch from say Route Three over a washboard road. And he came down and he said to me, it was the hottest day of the year, it was in July. And he said, "Tony, are you guys really going to build a building here." And I said, "Yes, governor and in 18 months you're going to be here to cut the ribbon for the new building." He said, "Great." Now, he went back on the washboard road and as some of you will remember he ended up in the hospital the next day with a bad back. And he sometimes attributes that trip to his bad back. The point is that 18 months later he cut the ribbon. The staff at the Meadowlands Commission literally turned that impoundment into a thriving body of water where I sitting in my office in this building that we built looked out the window and could see carp, fish, carp spawning in the spring time after maybe of five or six years of our paying attention to this impoundment. And the landfill behind us was converted into a park at least the section nearest to the building. And I said to the staff Katie Weidel, that's a name from the past a former assemblyman's daughter, Katie Weidell. I said, "Katie, what are we going to do with this? How are you going to convert this garbage dump?" He said, "Here's what we're going to do,"-- now talk about dreams becoming reality and becoming and all of you that were involved in this thing made it happen when you think about. He said, "What we're going to do is we're going to clean it up. Make sure that there's a liner put into it so that none of the stuff leeches out of it destroys what we plant there." He said, "And then we're going to plant certain types of vegetation that will attract certain species of birds and insects and butterfly. Two years later, I'm sitting in this spot, it's a little up and right next to our buildings fantastic view of the Manhattan skyline and I'm sitting there. It's quiet. The only thing you can hear is an occasional plane flying overhead and maybe some traffic on the turnpike in the distance. And all of a sudden I see these wonderful birds and I see these magnificently beautiful butterflies that weren't

there before. That was the transformation. I tell that story because when people say, well you've got a nutty idea here, you guys didn't have a nutty idea because it worked and I'm a witness to that. I've seen it work. And the boys and girls, the men and women that are still down there are still working at it trying to do the same thing, hopefully to the same extent that we were doing it at the time that I was there. It was absolutely magnificent. One other thing that I'm proud of having worked with my staff on was the development of the environment center which the Sports Authority contributes to. The Sports Authority literally made our environment center happen but the concept behind the environment center was to say look let's not just have something we call an environment center and have people come down and things related to the environment. What we're going to do it we want to make sure that we teach young people, children coming in by the thousands every year and we hired teachers to take them through the programs that related to our mandates. And we had literally in our museum and I'm to this day sorry they ever got rid of it and I don't remember if any of you remember seeing it but we built a garbage dump in the museum that people-- and Bill for the life of me I can't understand what they ever got rid of it. We had people come from Japan, Thailand, various other parts of the world because they heard of the Meadowlands Commission and its mandate and what it was doing. And I can say to this that Brendan asked a question earlier about whether or not the Meadowlands Commission would have survived without the Sports Complex and I say absolutely. There was no question about it because first of all it was created before the Sports Complex was even a speck in anybody's eye. And there was a definite need for the kinds of things that I described that need to get done there. So in a nutshell I give you my spiel on the Meadowlands.

Donald Linky: Twenty years.

Brendan Byrne: Are we going to do a where are we now?

Donald Linky: Yes, right now, actually. Let's fast forward to where we are now. Unfortunately, I see Ray Bateman leaving. I'm sure he'd have opinions on this.

Raymond Bateman: Yeah, but I have Dennis here and that's better than me.

Donald Linky: Okay.

Cliff Goldman: Before you do that, can I just say something about Chet Mattson because he's not here and Chet Mattson was really the soul of this Meadowlands development for many years past me into Bill McDowell, into Tony. Chet Mattson was a graduate student at MIT who came down like David for a summer internship and never went back. When we started the Meadowlands Commission he was the chief environmental guy. He lived on a houseboat in the Hackensack River and went to all of the bars

and was a local. He had a beard. He was a local guy. And he made friends with all of the muskrat trappers and the duck hunters and the bridge-- the guys who worked the railroad bridges and the night watchman...

Bud Foley: Cliff, I'm sorry to interrupt but we have to leave. But Chet Mattson was the fellow who went down to the United States Senate and faced down the Army Corps of Engineers when they wanted to take over the whole project and would only give him 120. I endorse everything you say about him.

Cliff Goldman: Good, thanks, Bud. And this gave us an ability-- we knew everything that was going on in that 20,000 acres because all of the people that he was friends with would tell us. And there are hundreds of stories. I'll give you one example. Somebody loosed a cloud of toxic fumes from something that was so bad that they had to-- the Coast Guard came in and shut down the river and they evacuated Secaucus and nobody could figure out where this was coming from. But one of Chet's people told him somewhere in the back of some little building, some guy was running a toxic waste disposal company which meant people would drive their trucks to this trailer and put the hoses of toxic liquid into the trailer grate which went right into the stream and this was the thing that-- but there are hundreds of things like that that one-by-one we were able to get rid of and clean up because of Chet. Anyway, I just wanted to mention that.

Donald Linky: I also wanted to mention that Pat Sheehan who couldn't come today but served both as chairman and executive director of the Commission called me and said that she wanted to stress her, I think, appreciation for how valuable the staff of Chet and George were during her tenure at the commission. Harold.

Harold Martin: Yeah, Don. Just a couple of words. I want to add to what Tony said. We drove down the turnpike to get here and I've driven that turnpike hundreds of times. I've never seen the waters so clean. I couldn't believe my eyes. There's really progress being made.

Donald Linky: Governor, do you want to start us off as to where we are now at least in your eyes?

Brendan Byrne: I don't know where we are now.

Donald Linky: Well, you've been a critic of Xanadu.

Brendan Byrne: I think Xanadu is just an ugly mess. And I think what we had when we all left was pretty nice. Maybe I've got a distorted view or maybe it's proprietary but when I left I thought it was pretty nice.

Donald Linky: Anyone else want to comment?

Jerry Breslin: As Dennis's personal attorney I'm going to advise him that he doesn't have to say anything.

Donald Linky: Gene Schneider.

W1: Turn the tape off.

[laughter – tape left on]

Gene Schneider: <inaudible> discussion in the past tense and maybe a little bit in the present, but are there any unrealized dreams in the Meadows with respect to specific areas, Marty?

Martin Robins: Yeah, I've been thinking about that...

Donald Linky: Martin Robins.

Martin Robins: Martin Robins. I've been thinking about one for the entire session. The Secaucus Junction site, I think, is an unrealized opportunity. It could develop into a marvelous commercial center of New Jersey with exceptional rail access from all points of northern and central New Jersey. And but for a number of factors that always seem to relate to timing it has never come to fruition. The building-- the physical railroad station is in place which is a pretty remarkable accomplishment by itself and Jerry Breslin and I were talking about a discussion that we must have had in I don't know somewhere in the 1980s about this-- maybe the '70s, about this very subject. And it took a lot to get a lot of the transportation people to see the value of Secaucus junction and it's ultimate value, I think, can be phenomenal. But one of the things that concerned me was that the 15X interchange was delayed for an ungodly amount of time and we missed a number of commercial cycles that where development could have occurred because 15X wasn't in place. And now, obviously, this is a very, very difficult time for a major costly development. But New Jersey transit has secured a lot of the rights, now. And so it is under some degree of public control. And, I think, that the leadership of the state of New Jersey should make it

a priority that the air rights at Secaucus is something that should be pursued and should be build instead of just leaving it to happenstance whether or not it happens. I think it's really a strategic site for New Jersey.

Donald Linky: Gene Schneider.

Gene Schneider: Well, this is an opportune time given, quote, "stimulus money" and other infrastructure interest to go after the possibility of building now.

Martin Robins: Well, the irony is that much of the infrastructure is actually there because when they built the Secaucus Junction they laid out the infrastructure so that building could occur on top of it. The problem was is that they've never been able to-- it's a very large project. And they've never been able to keep a developer in place in the economic cycles to actually start the construction or for that infrastructure.

Jerry Breslin: Don, I second what Marty is saying. And if the price of gasoline or oil keeps increasing and then a mass transportation becomes more and more popular and our national economy does make a recovery there is an opportunity for tremendous private development there. And I'm talking a million to two million square feet of commercial space and air rights over the site of the Lautenberg Secaucus transfer station. And I think that's in the future in response to Brendan's question I think that's the potential for the greatest growth in the Meadowlands in the future.

Donald Linky: David Kinsey.

David Kinsey: The Secaucus Junction is also an excellent location for some residential development as part of a true mixed use high density village.

Jerry Breslin: I second that.

David Kinsey: This is a world class location. I mean one-stop from the middle of Manhattan. Two stops from the international airport that has been undervalued. And the challenge now is for the Meadowlands Commission which exercises the land use control and Secaucus which talks back and forth with the Meadowlands Commission on land use issues to really step up to the plate and work with New Jersey transit and really make it happen at really appropriately high densities and intensities of commercial development. Current plans do not do that.

Donald Linky: Let me pursue that a little bit more.

Tony Scardino: Is it current plans or local opposition?

David Kinsey: Well, current plans in effect and then the local opposition which helps constrain that. The commission is in a planning process to think through what happens at that village.

Tony Scardino: Yeah, but see, what my pet peeve is that over the years we've moved-- you see the reason that the Meadowlands Commission was created was so that the men and women that make the policy there and the staff to carry it out would do so on an as objective a basis as possible, obviously, having the necessary public hearings and due diligence that's necessary in any case. But in the final analysis making the final decision that they feel in their hearts and minds based on the research and everything else that goes into it that this is the right way to go. That stopped years ago. Because now the policy is, now for the longest time it's been if the town doesn't want it, they're not going to do it. You tell me how to overcome that. It takes away...

Cliff Goldman: I'll tell you how.

Jerry Breslin: I'll tell you too. That's the big philosophical difference in the Meadowlands Commission of 20 or 30 years ago and today. As a commissioner of the Hackensack Meadowlands Commission my position was look at the enabling legislation that our legislature enacted. Look at our master plan and I should do what I think is right as a commissioner to make their master plan breathe, live. Local opposition is irrelevant.

Tony Scardino: No, it's relevant...

Jerry Breslin: No, it's not relevant.

Tony Scardino: I wouldn't say it's irrelevant.

Jerry Breslin: I do.

Tony Scardino: Yeah, because there may be...

Jerry Breslin: I don't want it misunderstood it's irrelevant.

Donald Linky: Bill Kohm.

William Kohm: If we can learn something from the past my understanding in the years I've been in politics and government in New Jersey is we have the strongest governor in the country. And everything that we've talked about was inspired, pushed, organized and directed out of that office. And unless you have a governor, I don't care who it is, who thinks big and who lays out a course of action nothing is going to happen. We have a team going to Brooklyn that's going to be owned by the richest man in Rutgers.

Donald Linky: In Russia, not Rutgers.

William Kohm: In Russia that's going to be called the Nyats, the NBA Nyats they're going to be called. We let that happen. We let an arena be built in Newark...

Jerry Breslin: That should have never happened.

William Kohm: We had an arena built in Newark. There was nothing wrong with the bloody arena that we had. I thought the architect of our arena, the Byrne arena, did a brilliant job. I don't have any problem with that arena. I'd take my grandchildren to that arena in a minute. Nothing wrong with that arena. What the hell do we need an arena in Newark? It never should have happened because Sharp James [ph?] wanted to have a Newark arena? Ridiculous.

Jerry Breslin: That's because...

William Kohm: We need-- you need to build-- you talk about transportation, you talk about housing, you talk about-- you need a plan and a plan has to originate with a strong governor. If we have a strong governor whoever he is, whichever party he is, these things will happen. If we don't we can be sitting here 40 years later and we'll be looking at ruins. Ruins. We can learn something else, we got the Jets out of New York because, and I like Mayor Koch, they had the dirtiest restrooms in America. People didn't want to go to the johns at Shea Stadium because they were filthy. And you had a landlord, the person who owned it, who owned the team, wanted to get them out. You had Wellington Mara who was treated like a poor relation. The Giants were treated like a semipro team from Queens, that's the truth. That's why he was so susceptible. Brendan is a great negotiator but Mr. Mara was dying to get out of New York. Dying to get out of New York. Now, if we-- so what I'm saying is we learn from the past. If we take care

of what we have now and make it as good as we can make it because the arena and the stadium year-after-year were voted by the people who use them as the best arena and stadium in the country. And if we have a governor who will pool _____ together and hook it. Tom Hitzelberger, as I say, was a genius. He found a way to take something of value, the license to conduct racing and he used it as a funding mechanism to build an arena.

Dennis Robinson: Bill, let me comment on it. You know it's interesting you say that it's all of this rhetoric with the arena situation but the fact of the matter is Giants stadium year in and year out is the number one rated highest grossing facility in the world. And last year Izod Center, Brendan Byrne arena was the number four highest grossing facility in the country. And the year before that was the third highest grossing arena in the country. So if anybody thinks that that arena isn't producing the kind of events, the kind of economic activity and so forth people are sadly mistaken. And people are using the adage old to insinuate that it isn't productive. Well, in fact, it's just the opposite. It is extremely productive. In fact, we book substantially more events than other arenas in the neighborhood.

Cliff Goldman: If it was the Brendan Byrne Arena it would be number one.

Dennis Robinson: That might be true actually.

Jerry Breslin: It always number one and two.

William Kohm: Nobody is being critical of what you're doing now but what I'm saying is do you agree we never should have had a competing arena built in Newark?

Dennis Robinson: Well, I don't think there's any question about that. I mean there had been proposals all over...

Tony Scardino: We should have had Brendan Byrne negotiate the Giants...

Dennis Robinson: But there have been proposals over the years, in fact, to build new arenas. In fact, when I was there the first time I proposed a new arena in a joint venture with both franchises and it was turned down. So it isn't like the vision isn't there. We had the vision in the mid '90s to bring the rail when we first developed the first master plan back under my development area in 1994 which we won a state award for in master planning to bring the rail terminal back to the Meadowlands-- rail link to the Meadowlands. And, of course, last night we did over 21,000 on the rail which is good and bad because we had some issues with wait time. But nonetheless obviously there's a demand for it. So we're not

short of vision. The issue in New Jersey, in my opinion is, is people would rather do something new rather than reinvest in the successful and continue to reinvest in those assets that have been so productive over time, the reinvestment theory rather than well, we're going to do something new because it's the flavor of the month. In my vision of the future obviously with the new rail link with the new stadium that's privately financed, 100 percent filing, privately financed which the Sports Authority will have a large operating roll in the new stadium. And certainly there's a future for the Izod Center. And despite what you think about Xanadu as far as the-- I'll take the look of Xanadu and chalk it up to the beauty is in the eye of the beholder but it's going to be a spectacular facility that's going to create thousands and thousands of jobs. It's just got caught up in this whole financial industry freeze at this point. But there's a huge future for the Sports Authority and for the Sports Complex but there has to be the political will like there was when you gentlemen were part of the creation of the Meadowlands Commission, part of the creation of the Sports Authority and the Sports Complex. It needs the same political will, the same vision to get things done that it did back when you gentlemen were a part of this.

Jerry Breslin: Yeah, Dennis, we agree with everything you said. And what we were talking about the dense mixed use development at the Secaucus transfer station is only going to add to the use of people going to Xanadu, the arena, the racetrack.

Dennis Robinson: There's no question.

Donald Linky: Harold Martin.

Harold Martin: Yeah, Don, I agree with what's been said by the previous speakers. But in order to start moving forward on new developments, new ideas we're going to need a lot of money. My question is since all budgets state, county, local, school budgets are up against a rock and a hard place, where's the money going to come from? How are we going to restore our credit rating? And I haven't heard any of that addressed. I don't know whether anyone would like to comment on that.

Jerry Breslin: That's for another day Harold. We need a new master plan for the state of New Jersey to get rid of 562 municipalities of whatever we have.

Cliff Goldman: Before Bud Foley left I wanted to tell this one story to lighten up the mood here. About the only time in eight years that I was slightly reprimanded by Governor Byrne and that is when Bud Foley was leaving the Sports Authority the commissioners put up an issue to vote to give him a gold watch. And I said, "No, I'm not for that." Because I was going to be leaving at the end of 1981 myself. And they tabled it. Then the next day I got a call from the governor which was very rare to go down and see him

and he said, "Cliff, why are you being such a about the gold watch." And I said, "Because I don't want to set a precedent." Okay, that was it. But there was no gold watch.

Jerry Breslin: That's right I didn't get a gold watch because you opposed to me.

Cliff Goldman: Maybe it was you and not Bud Foley.

William Kohm: To answer Harold's question. It takes imagination to raise money. It takes imagination to raise money. And it takes-- I think Joe Katz and I were-- governor-- helped pass every bond issue that passed in the state of New Jersey in the last 30 years. We were retained to pass bond issues. And we used to put people together. We would have joint statements by the Chamber of Commerce and the AFL-CIO and we would have the League of Women Voters and we would have the Jewish this and we would have the Presbyterian that. We created a cohesion. We created alliances of people that wanted to have things happen and were willing to pay for it. Now, I don't have any dog in this fight Harold, but you can't have a casino gambling in Atlantic City and you're going to have slot machines at a racetrack. If you're going to gamble and you're going to raise money by gambling stop fooling around and raise money by gambling. I don't think it's a good thing to do, but that doesn't mean a lot of states aren't doing it. So you have to tie it to something. There has to-- I read Don's letter and it said what's the future going to be like? What are we-- well, what do we want the future to be like? What do we want to see down there? What do we want to have happen? That's the key question. Somebody-- and the only guy that can do that is the governor of the state of New Jersey. He's the only guy with the muscle and the ability so we maybe they will have to do-- whoever gets elected we'll get Brendan to give him a transfusion.

Donald Linky: John Weingart.

John Weingart: Don, let me just say, in terms of governmental leadership and strength, I wonder if senatorial courtesy was less of a factor then because the governor's office these days feels that making appointments to a land-use board they need the-- I mean the Senate won't vote on it without the approval of the local senators. The local senators won't sign off on it if some of their mayors are strongly objecting to something there. And to get a project through the Meadowlands that one or two towns in the Meadowlands don't want I think these days it would be hard to get commissioners appointed to do that. I don't know if that was less a problem in 1969/1979 or governor's were more adept?

Donald Linky: Yes, Harold Martin.

Harold Martin: Just a brief response. I'm sure Bill's point is well-taken. I don't think anybody would quarrel with that. But my concern is that with the unemployment being so high I don't know many of you

watch the papers to see what's happening with foreclosures. But if you look at the "Bergen Record" on Wednesdays you'll see two weeks ago, I guess, it was I counted 87 foreclosure sales. Yesterday I counted 30. What I'm saying is that I think that there comes a point where you've got to-- I appreciate your idealism. I share that with you but you've got to at some point be practical and figure out how you're going to raise the money. I don't have to tell you Governor Byrne had a heck of a time with the legislature as any governor has because the legislature wants to spend more money and this is not just New Jersey it's the nature of the beast. Every legislature wants more things for his district or her district. And some of those things wind up in the budget. Unfortunately, a lot of them wind up and some of them are not warranted. But at some point you've got to balance that with the resources and the ability of people to pay their bills. I mean when you see the numbers of foreclosures it's pretty scary. And I don't think we've seen the end of this-- I don't want to be a doomsayer but there are a lot of people hurting.

Donald Linky: Well, let me take off from there...

Jerry Breslin: I think Harold, what Marty Robins thought and Bill Kohm followed up with is we're talking about private investment not public. Not public. Attracting the private sector to put money into New Jersey.

Harold Martin: But we don't want the private sector take over...

Jerry Breslin: Take over what?

Harold Martin: Take over the development. You're saying...

Jerry Breslin: No, I'm saying I want the private sector to invest, build buildings.

Harold Martin: Can I just make...

Cliff Goldman: At the earliest, when we were created in the spring of 1969 Hartz Mountain bought all of that land in Secaucus maybe a couple of months before that. And what was going on in the development of the Meadowlands in those days was these concrete block one-story storage buildings. And in our first meeting in the spring of 1969 we put a line around any developed area and said no one can develop anything outside this line for two years until we get control. Hartz Mountain went crazy. And in the end we changed all of the zoning of their property from that kind of building to office buildings, housing, whatever. And that's what they had to do. Now, years later when I was gone from the Meadowlands Commission I saw a column in the "Star Ledger" where Gene Heller from Hartz Mountain says, "You

know, we were stupid and it took these guys at the Meadowlands Commission to straighten us out and force us to do what was in our interest.” So now, you have billions of dollars of ratable development and thousands of jobs contributing to the state, to the local governments by reason of good planning. That’s what we have to do.

Donald Linky: But to take off a bit from Harold’s point the Meadowlands and the Sports Complex were conceived in a period of greater optimism than we’re facing right now. And are we now entering a period where with the strain on both public and private financial markets that we’re just going to have to lower our expectations that the Meadowlands is never really going to reach maybe this concept of the ‘60s of a mega city or a grand new complex of entertainment and shopping and so forth, it’s never going to happen.

William Kohm: I don’t agree with that.

David Kinsey: Absolutely not.

Cliff Goldman: I don’t either.

Jerry Breslin: I don’t either.

William Kohm: First of all, if you’re going to do planning you’ve got to assume that things are going to get better. You’re planning for tomorrow. What about-- I don’t know how Brendan feels about it, what about a constitutional convention in the state of New Jersey. If I were running for governor I’d be a for a constitutional convention and I would have land use and I would have taxation and I would have all kinds of things, legislative reform I’d have them all on the agenda. Let’s have a constitutional conventional. Now, just as a historical note, Harold, we researched this, the Roman Coliseum was build...

Harold Martin: I wasn’t around back then.

William Kohm: Was built by a tax on beer and brothels.

Jerry Breslin: It was probably built over local opposition too. Just before the fall of the Roman Empire.

William Kohm: But you got to plan for what do you want at the Meadowlands? Do you want a multi-- do you want a small city in the Meadowlands? Do you want a mix of commercial properties? Do you want

to start talking about transportation that's tied into places of employment so that people don't commute and use their cars? I mean I remember going down to Maryland 100 years ago and being told this is the future. This is tomorrow. Tomorrow never came. If you're going to plan, you have to plan now because things aren't always going to be bad, Harold. I mean they keep printing money in Washington sooner or later they'll stop.

Donald Linky: Dave Kinsey, you've disagreed also why?

David Kinsey: I think it comes down to political leadership. We have Governor Byrne here who has demonstrated leadership in the power of the appointment to these commissions and particularly to the Meadowlands Commission and Sports Authority. Tony Scardino made the point that there's been a shift in the Meadowlands away from regional decision-making to really letting the locals help decide. And that's the shift that needs to change for the Meadowlands Commission to really achieve the vision that was established 40 years ago. The Secaucus Junction is the classic example. The most recent land use build there just to the west of the turnpike is a surface parking lot. It will be there for seven years maximum. But still, it's a surface parking lot. That's a place that cries out for high density mixed use residential and commercial development. It can happen. Our history has shown that it takes political leadership from the government.

Donald Linky: Lew Thurston.

Lewis Thurston: It's important to talk about new projects and being creative, but I think the first step, the first thing that needs to be addressed is what we have right now. And if you look at the Sports Complex you've got-- I'm going to identify four areas, four issues that have to be addressed right now. The first is you've got Xanadu. The second is you've got a new Giants stadium. The third is the arena and the competition with the arena in Newark. And fourth is the racing industry. The concentration first should be to make those things succeed and resolve the issue of the two arenas. You want Giants stadium to be a great success. You want Xanadu because you can't really go back and scrap it now, I guess, you want it to be successful. How do you go about doing that? And sadly, in the gubernatorial campaign, of course, we don't hear the candidates talking about these kinds of things. But that's what needs to be done first and then you start to look at the other imaginative things that are possible.

Donald Linky: We've gone over a little bit of the time we said we'd finish. Unless there's someone who has something that they certainly want to say before we close I'd like to thank you for coming today. We also encourage you to send us any memos, photographs, other memorabilia that we could add to our electronic archive. And if any of you are interested in the broader goals of the Rutgers program on the governor please contact me, we can discuss it.

We'd appreciate your support both in terms of sharing your memories, also sharing checkbooks if that's relevant. And we hope that you'll attend future programs that we're going to be sponsoring throughout the coming year.

Thank you.

END OF PROGRAM