

***Forum on the Education Initiatives, Programs and  
Legacy of the Kean Administration***

(November 19, 2012)

*Transcript edited by Nancy Becker and David Andersen*

**John Weingart:** Well, good morning, everybody. Welcome to this forum on the Education Initiatives, Programs and Accomplishments of the Administration of Governor Thomas Kean. I'm John Weingart. I'm the Associate Director here at the Eagleton Institute of Politics, and I'm part of the team of people here who are building a Center on the American Governor, which is the only academically-based institution in the country focusing on the Office of the Governor. While we concentrate on New Jersey, our scope is national. The cornerstone of the center is a website, which is [Governors.Rutgers.edu](http://Governors.Rutgers.edu). And in the section on the Governors of the 50 States, you can already find an inventory of Governor's gubernatorial archives in every state; a bibliography of major books and major articles about Governors throughout the nation's history, and across the country. In the beginnings of the original research that we are seeking to encourage and promote, there are short political biographies of the 17 Governors who became President of the United States; and listings and analysis of the Governors who have been nominated for President and Vice-President. This spring, we awarded our first research grants under the umbrella topic of the American Governor, Politics, Policy, Power and Leadership. We gave these grants to faculty at eleven colleges and universities across the country, and we deliberately sought and selected proposals from junior faculty with the goal of not only sponsoring useful research, useful individual research projects, but also of helping to stimulate much more academic focus on this very important office. Next weekend, we're bringing these researchers together, the faculty members for a workshop here. We hope we'll begin to help them to learn from each other and to nurture a network that we hope will interest and motivate more research on the Office of Governor and on individual Governors, comparisons across the states and comparisons across time. Our major focus, though, is on Governors of New Jersey, and in particular, our current work is on creating major archives on the administrations of Governor's Brendan Byrne, Thomas Kean, Jim Florio and Christie Whitman. Nancy Becker is going to introduce the program tell us more about where we're up to and what we've been doing with the Kean archive, in particular. But I want to mention one thing that we're very excited and happy that we just reached an agreement with the *Star Ledger* to have the entire inventory of the Kean-Byrne dialogue added to our website. And this is, as most of you know, an extraordinary set of conversations between Governors Brendan Byrne and Tom Kean that began in 1995 and has continued right up to this morning, where there is a column of the two of them discussing this month's major

storm, and this month's major election. The creation of the Center is a team effort, but the person most responsible for the Kean Archive, and the soul of this effort is Nancy Becker. It's our continuing honor that Nancy has made work at the Eagleton Institute a key part of her career, of this next chapter of her career. And it's Nancy who's put together today's program, and will get us started.

**Nancy Becker:** Thanks, John. Today's round table discussion is the fifth event organized by the Center on the American Governor at Eagleton. And it's to recall and review the issues and events during the Kean Administration. The Kean portion of the Center Study and Analysis has three components. And for those of you joining us for the first time, I'd like to describe each component and give you a status report on each. We have done archival research, and we have material that we've collected from the State archives in Trenton and other sources, which is identified and posted on our website. We have photographed documents, pictures and other memorabilia from Governor Kean's personal office which is in the process of being posted on our website. We've also established a link with the new Kean Collection at the Drew University Library, which we're very excited about. And so that scholars and journalists have access to Governor Kean's personal papers, briefing books and schedules, which are housed at Drew, in addition to the information that we've assembled at Eagleton. And to that end, today, we have posted a comprehensive list of speeches on education that the Governor gave during his years as Governor, which are in the Drew Library, and are accessible to scholars. We hope to work with Drew to digitize them, and post them on the web so it'll be even easier to access them. We also have videotaped oral histories of cabinet members and individuals close to the Governor during his years as Governor. We have completed 26 interviews with former cabinet members and colleagues of the Governor, in addition to four interviews with the Governor himself. And these oral histories are posted on the web with their transcripts. We expect to complete these interviews within the next year. The few we have left are hard to pin down. But we hope to complete them. We also have a series of colloquia that we've done, and today's program is, as I've said, is the fifth event that we've convened. The others have included a kick-off event, a round table seminar on the politics of inclusion and urban economic development, a conversation with two Governors, Mario Cuomo and Tom Kean, and a forum on the Governor's commitment to the arts. And all of these are posted on the web with transcripts as well. And we are planning to convene a colloquium on Governor Kean's role on the environment, and we will be planning that within the next few months. Today's program has been scheduled as a round table discussion, because all of you are experts, and have been invited because of your experience, and commitment to education reform during the Kean administration and beyond. We encourage you to participate. We will not take time to introduce everyone individually. Biographies of all participants are included in your packets. Before I introduce the program, though, I would like to review some

housekeeping details. Please turn off your cell phones. I have to do mine also, and other devices. This session is being videotaped for the Kean Archive, and will be up on our website in a few weeks. We need everyone to use his or her microphone, which feeds directly into the audio recording system. If you're not speaking into your mike you may not be heard on camera. And lastly, for those of you who are at Eagleton for the first time, there are two restrooms on this floor, and one up on the second floor. We have not scheduled breaks, so just feel free to get up. There's coffee outside, if you need to.

**Ruth Mandel:** There are two on the second floor.

**Nancy Becker:** There are two on-- oh, sorry. I didn't know if you wanted me to tell everybody that. Good to know. Improving the quality of public education was among Governor Kean's highest priorities. And in this area he can clearly point to some of his most significant accomplishments. As most of you know, Tom Kean taught at the Saint Marks School after graduating from Princeton. And then was a graduate student at Columbia's Teachers College prior to serving in the legislature as Chairman of the Education Committee. Clearly, there has been a continuing theme of commitment to education in his life. Tom Kean understood education policy and politics, in addition to what it took to be an excellent teacher. Leading our discussion on Governor Kean's legacy on education are two outstanding individuals, whose vision and commitment contributed significantly to accomplishments of the Kean Administration. Saul Cooperman, Commissioner of Education for Governor Kean's entire two terms, had been a Superintendent in several school districts prior to his appointment. He was not political, and had not met Governor Kean prior to being nominated as Commissioner. However, he did share the Governor's point of view that the schools were providers of a service, and kids and their parents were consumers. Governor Kean and Commissioner Cooperman forged a partnership committed to excellence in education which was very unusual in New Jersey history. Saul, I'm not going to give much of your biography, it's in here, so I'm going to turn this over to you-- and this afternoon, when we do higher education, I'll introduce Marla Ucelli-Kashyap. Saul.

**Saul Cooperman:** I'd like to thank Ruth and Nancy for hosting this. And while you were talking, Nancy, I was just thinking of John Updike. That came into my mind, because when he wrote the rabbit books, and the last rabbit book was "Rabbit at Rest." And I remember he was saying about Rabbit Angstrom, that the mark that he left on the world was as an old man when he got up to urinate in the middle of the night, he would pivot from the bed. And when he'd pivot from the bed, his thumb, he used that so he knew where he was to get into the bathroom. And his thumbprint was the only mark that Rabbit Angstrom left on the world. <laughter>

Well, as Yogi Berra said, "You could look it up." Anyway, Governor Kean has left a big mark, and not only in education. And you know, just for housekeeping, there are five members of the Department of Education here. And I will call on each one of them to briefly introduce the particular area under discussion. And by brief-- and I told them, I said, "Here I am, the micromanager," told them, "Take three minutes." And I'm going to be real tough, because we've got a lot of stuff to go over. But there are four areas. They're very complex. They were very difficult. A lot of loyal opposition. And so there were, I think, more than three minutes, worth about seven minutes. And they are the Alternate Route; the Educational Bankruptcy or Takeover; the Financing, which became a court case; and our urban programs that we try to tailor to individual kids. But the first thing, before we start to talk about the programs, is I was a Superintendent as Nancy said. And I received information from the State Department for many years. And I was concerned, because I would receive a memo one week, and then it would be changed the next week, and then changed again. And then sometimes Person A would send me things on a subject, and then Person B. So I was concerned as to the functioning of the State Department of Education. And when I went down and spent a day, I'd been nominated, but not appointed, and not cleared by the Senate. And all of my concerns were further emphasized. They were driven home. And I know what I wanted to do, but I didn't know how to do it. I wanted to make the State Department nimble, fast, not reactive. A department that would initiate, and hopefully I could meet with the Governor, and we could form a partnership, and we could do important things. And when I was coming up on the plane, United, and I got a drink, they gave me this little napkin, and it said, "Planes change; values don't." And I thought, "Hey, that's pretty good." Because I was interested in a clear mission, not something that you put on the wall, and say, "Oh, that's really nice." Or values that again, would be on the wall, but no one would pay attention to. I wanted values that, not only I believed in, but everyone that reported to me believed in. And we could drive this down into the organization, and it would be a driving force. I wanted to do this, but I didn't know how. So I went to a friend of mine who I really respected, Morey Tannenbaum of AT&T. He was the Vice President at the time. And I said, "Morey, who is your best guy in strategic planning?" And he said, "Bob Maher," right away. And I said, "Okay. Can I have him," <laughs; <laughter>, "because I want to organize the department. Not the way it's usually done. You change this function, you put it over here. You give this guy, or this gal, extra responsibilities or so forth. I want to make it, as I said, nimble, initiating and coordinative." And he said, "Maher will do that." So without any further adieu, how did you do it, Bob?

**Robert Maher:** Just before I start, I want to assure all of you that I'm not interpersonally incompetent. The issue is that-- guess how many minutes I have? Three. So I'm going to rely somewhat extensively on my notes. A four-phase

process was used to design the Department of Education's organization structure in 1982. I can't believe it's been 30 years since we worked, Jeff and Bob. Phase 1 was the project scoping. I met with the Commissioner -- actually Saul, you were still in Madison at the time, I believe-- and we discussed the challenges and issue confronting the Department, and what aspects of the current situation were most troubling. We reviewed the organizational framework or model we would use in the remaining phases. We used a very particular way of looking at organizations and understanding organizations when we worked with them, to develop strategy, or to develop organization design. Phase 2 was an organization analysis. The analysis was performed by three people from Rutgers' Graduate School of Engineering-- I'm sorry, Graduate School of Education-- and four people from AT&T. The methodology we used was primarily individual and group interviews. We prepared a report and presented it to the Commissioner and to the State Board of Education, and the major findings were things that Saul said in his opening remarks were concerning him. The mission of the Department appeared to be unclear. The shared values were weak, and internal interfaces were often not coordinated, so that information that was supposed to flow between units did not flow. And if it did flow, it was not in a timely fashion. Phase 3 was the strategy development. The work was performed by the Commissioner, his senior management team, and the president and vice president of the State Board of Education. They worked for a week-- and Saul, I don't know about you-- but I was a little surprised that the President and Vice President of the Board could devote that amount of time to work with us. They analyzed the Department's external environment, identifying challenges and opportunities. They reviewed the resources of the Department, identifying strengths and weaknesses, and they looked at the organization's history - prior events that still had a significant impact on how the organization functioned. They created a mission statement. And they developed a set of shared values, what I referred to in many cases as the organization's Ten Commandments. One of them, for example, if I recall correctly, Saul, was, "Planning is what we do first." Okay. Phase 4 was the organization design. It was essential to design a structure that could achieve the Department's mission. The design was created, was built by members of the senior management team. They developed specific design criteria, prepared and analyzed alternatives for grouping the work into units, and decided how the interfaces between units would be coordinated. The structure they designed helped the Department rapidly identify needed programs and adapt to changing conditions. Numerous initiatives were designed, implemented and evaluated. For example, the Academy for the Advancement of Teaching and Management; Partners in Learning, the High School Proficiency Test, and the High School Proficiency Test Institutes; Core Course Proficiencies; Alternate Route; Governor's Teacher Recognition Program; and many, many others that I won't mention. Some of them will be brought up today. I'll conclude my remarks by sharing with you a statement made by Dave Nadler and Mike Tushman in their book, "Competing by Design," "In this volatile environment, where instability is the norm, we're convinced that the last

remaining source of truly sustainable competitive advantage lies in the unique ways in which each organization's structures its work, and motivates its people to achieve clearly articulated strategic objectives." I believe the Department of Education's achievements during Governor Kean's administration reinforce the validity of this statement. Did I make it?

**Saul Cooperman:** I really wasn't timing you, Bob. This is the first time I've had a watch on in probably five years. <laughter> I've got to get used to looking at it.

**Governor Tom Kean:** Saul, I'm going to ruin your schedule.

**Saul Cooperman:** Sure.

**Governor Tom Kean:** For one sec. Just to back it up a little bit, to the selection of Saul Cooperman. We had a very different method of selecting cabinet members and leaders than I think any Governor prior or since. We had a selection process, which brought an outside firm, a search firm, to really find the brightest and the best under a committee which was headed by Nick Brady, who later became Secretary of the Treasury. And they only had one direction from me, "Find the very best." And they had a second direction, "Don't ask them if they're Republicans or Democrats, because that's not the point." And so Saul was picked out of that kind of a selection process, simply to find the very, very best. And the conclusion was by the Committee, and recommended to me, and which I agreed with, that Saul was the very, very best. And after finding Saul, we had a little problem, because Mr. Burke, who was the Commissioner, didn't want to get out. <laughter> And I remember calling him and saying, "You know, we disagree on almost everything. There's no point your serving in this cabinet." And I think we had to buy him out before he finally left. Yeah. But the second part of the process was it was difficult to get Saul in, and get the other guy out. But eventually it was done. But I think just to start off the process, I didn't know him; and I didn't know the fellow who was my State Treasurer, never met him before. Didn't meet my Commerce Secretary, or my <inaudible>. No, I hadn't met any of them before. So he was selected by that kind of a process. And I don't know if any Governor before or since has used that process. And I thought it started out, Saul was picked because he was the brightest and the best, and still is.

**Saul Cooperman:** Thank you. One of the things that happened was, as the Governor said, I didn't know him. And in fact, during the Senate Confirmation, John Lynch, after about two hours of questioning, turned to me and he said, "Okay, Cooperman, I can say one good thing about you." And I thought, "Boy, that's nice."

And I said, "What is it, Senator." And he said, "You didn't give a nickel to Tom Kean." <laughter> But I'd just like to talk about people for a minute, before we get into the particular projects, initiatives and all that stuff. To me-- and it's easy to say that people fit into nice little boxes, but there are leaders who, you know, they listen to the polls, and they see where the band is going, and then they run ahead and become the drum majorette. And they really don't have any ideas of their own, nor are they willing to risk. I think real leadership is to decide on what should be done, to really decide what's the right thing to do. And once you know what the right thing to do, no matter how risk-laden, to then build your constituency. And Governor Kean took a chance on me. He really did. And took some high risks. And you'll hear about those high risks during the course of this day, because we did not play it safe. And I had to have a team-- I had the structure that Bob Maher gave. And but then, a structure or a game plan, a vision or a program or strategy is nothing without people. And I recruited for one thing in mind: I didn't care whether they were Democrats or Republicans, but one thing, some of Governor Kean's people cared. Because there was a guy named Rick Mills. Rick Mills isn't here. And Rick Mills had Marla's slot. There were three people that were the watchdogs of education, Chris Daggett, Marla Ucelli, and Rick Mills. And Rick was an assistant under Fred Burke. And I wanted to find out who really the best people were. And if they were in the Department, retain them; and if not, you know, ask them to leave. And Rick was stopped by the Governor's office. Not by the Governor, the Governor's office. And they said, "He's a Democrat!" And I went up to Rick and I said, "I'm having a tough time retaining you, and I'm willing to go to the mat, but are you a Democrat?" And I can remember, and he said, "I'm not!" He said, "I'm a Republican Councilman in Rocky Hill." <laughter> This little tiny spit of a place, we both lived in the same place. And I said, "Can you prove it, Rick?" <laughter> And he said, "Yeah." And I said, "Okay." So I took the stuff, and I sent it over-- where's Edie, oh, here-- Edie wasn't in the position then. I think it was Lew Thurston? Yeah. Lew? And I sent it to Lew. And I said, "The guy's a Republican." And he was, "I don't think so!" <laughter> But finally we retained Rick. And Rick not only has served the Governor well, but he became Commissioner of Vermont, and the Chancellor of New York. So he was almost nailed for being a Democrat. But, thank god, he was not. I recruited for one thing in mind. <laughter> Crazy, huh? I wanted what I called practical idealist. And whether the name was Klagholz, or Nadel, or Swissler, or Osowski, or Kaplan, who are here, and some other names, I wanted these practical idealists. I wanted people who were not academics. Nothing against brains. And I wanted smart people, but I also wanted people who had practical experiences. Knew how schools worked, and could stand up before teachers and principals and board members, and have credibility. And they also had to be tough-minded and practical. Not only heads in the clouds, but feet on the ground. And so I would like to ask, first, Leo to talk about the Alternate Route. But first, since we are at Rutgers, I'd like to just tell a very brief, brief story. I was down here for a residency, probably about three miles away, Seminary Place, in the Department of

Education. And my lead professor was a guy by the name of Steinhauer, I really liked him. And he said, "Saul, I'm putting your name in for Phi Delta Kappa in an honorary society." And at that time, to get into Phi Delta Kappa, you had to write an original paper, or you could comment on someone's dissertation, to see if it was applicable to the current times. I wrote an original paper. I had done some research on the number of people, and the quality of people coming into teaching. And I found that their SAT scores and their class rank was very low. Many of them, tens of thousands, hit emergency certification. And I didn't think that children were best served. And so I said, "Gee, why couldn't we open the doors to liberal arts graduates, from any liberal arts school, as long as they had an academic major, and could know the pedagogy?" And my political smarts were zero on a scale of one to ten, they were zero. Because I didn't realize that I was talking to education professors! They were the ones who would decide whether I got into Phi Delta Kappa or not. And Dr. Steinhauer told me the day after, he said, "You know, there were 19 people that were proposed for Phi Delta Kappa, and 18 got in. And I'm talking to the one that didn't." But I dusted that off, from 1968, and I went to Governor Kean, and I talked to him about this. And when I say talking about risks, he said, "Yes. Do it." Well, to do it, I had to find a person who could do it. And I looked in the State Department, and there was no one there. They just didn't understand and/or didn't want to do it. And I was told there was a guy by the name of Klagholz in the Department of Higher Education. And one of the best things I did in eight years was convince Leo Klagholz to come into the Department of Education, because he had to fight right, left, in front of him, behind him on this one. We had professors coming in from all over the United States to try and sink this one. And Leo just didn't get discouraged. Leo?

**Leo Klagholz:** And I got into Phi Delta Kappa. <laughter> I was already in it, and it was nothing that could be done about it. <laughter> The Alternate Route was one of many Kean Administration initiatives that were aimed at attracting quality people into teaching, and then supporting them once they were in there. The Alternate Route was under that first heading of attracting people in. And the program was proposed in 1983, in part, to address concerns, some of which Saul alluded to, with the established system. That system, I would describe it this way, it drew new teachers from a relatively narrow pool of young people who enrolled in teacher education programs at colleges within the states-- within New Jersey. There were exceptions to that, but that was the main approach. And then it tried to achieve quality through certification course requirements at the undergraduate level. There were several concerns. One was that that was a limited candidate pool of very small supply, and so the employment market was very uncompetitive, which is one aspect of quality. Second concern, the mandated courses, some of them were very solid, but many of them did not effectively assure teacher capability. And in fact, there were so many certification course requirements, that one effect was that they

displaced and weakened the academic component of teacher's undergraduate education. Further, as the public school system had grown over the decades, that traditional route couldn't keep pace with the demand for sheer numbers of new teachers. And college programs were forced, in order to try to keep up, to compromise admissions standards and retention standards. Even so, there were perpetual teacher shortages. It just-- the system wasn't designed to keep pace. And the system responded to that through State policy either by eliminating or dropping or suspending its own requirements, declaring emergencies, and then letting districts hire people who didn't meet the requirements. At the same time, top graduates of the nation's colleges-- who didn't study education as undergraduates, were being routinely turned away from positions that hadn't been dubbed emergencies. The first step the Kean Administration took was to reform the traditional route. And that was an essential step, instituting stronger admissions and retention standards, and replacing the traditional curriculum with one that emphasized a strong academic education, first and foremost, and also supervised practical teaching experiences, supplemented by the core of training course work that was most solid. The second step was to eliminate the emergency approach in all its variations, and replace it with an Alternate Route that was, by design, intended to parallel the traditional route. In that, it sought to recruit candidates who had the same kind of strong academic background that was now being put into the traditional route, and it sought to provide them with supervised teaching experiences, supplemented by course work, only in conjunction with employment, rather than a college placing them in the school as part of the undergraduate program. The big difference with the Alternate Route in New Jersey, the biggest difference of all was that since the two routes were by design parallel, districts were permitted to use both freely as a way of achieving quality. That was different from the historic approach, nationally, not just in New Jersey, of relying on the traditional route all the time unless there's an emergency, and then you can use it to fill a slot. You know, it was intended to replace that. It was supplemented by a number of other initiatives. The Governor's state-funded minimum teacher salary helped to attract people through both routes. An aggressive teacher recruitment program was established by Saul in the Department to find people nationally, who were interested in teaching in New Jersey, and had outstanding academic backgrounds. Recognition programs were set up for the best candidates in both routes. A mentoring and support program, was initiated, and that's evolved over the years, and become better as a result. I'll just conclude with these comments, because one of the things we're discussing is the relevance to current needs. During that first year of the Alternate Route, 121 teachers were hired through the program in New Jersey. Thirty years later, the program is not only still in place, it's thriving, and district's use it routinely to staff classrooms and to find quality. Also, virtually every state in the country has an Alternate Route program at this time, as does the United Kingdom. There's a National Center for Alternative Certification in Washington DC. And all this began in New Jersey. That Center reports that Alternative Certification

has matured-- its maturity is mainly a recent phenomenon. More than half of the programs were established since 1995. In '97/'98, according to the Center, 6,000 new teachers were hired nationally through Alternate Route teachers. And that figure has grown steadily, until the peak year of 2007/'08, in which 62,000 teachers nationally were hired through Alternate Route programs. Since then, with the economic turn-down, it's hovered around 60,000, slightly less than that peak year. Essentially, and especially since the Alternate Route is a voluntary program, districts are not required to hire people through it. They can go the traditional route exclusively, if they prefer to do that. And so its success is, I think, impressive in light of that, especially. And it's safe to say that schools throughout the country continue to find the idea to be highly relevant to their needs.

**Governor Tom Kean:** The reason why I found it so attractive when Saul came and talked to me about it was that I'd always wanted to be a teacher, but I was talked into going on Wall Street after the army, and I was on Wall Street. And I got a call from an independent school. It was at St. Mark's, I'd gone there myself years before, and said, "You always said you wanted to teach history." I said, "Yeah." They said that, "the Head of the History Department dropped dead yesterday, would you be willing to come next week?" So I went in and resigned from the Wall Street firm. And the guy said, "I've lost people to Paine Webber, and Merrill Lynch, but never to some damn school." <laughter> I packed my bag and headed out. But I taught there two-and-a-half years. And I looked at the faculty there. And there was a brilliant music teacher, one of the most popular people, and he was a composer, and came later to teaching, but was terrific. There was a fellow there who had taught at a community college, and then come onto the faculty. There were a number of other people who had been parts of other professions, which should have enhanced what they were doing, but then came to teach at the school and became wonderful teachers. They didn't necessarily have the normal preparation that we thought of in those days as essential for teachers, and yet it was a great school with brilliant teachers who came, in a sense, through the Alternate Route. And so I went to Teacher's College after that at Columbia. And learned the pedagogical skills, and well, I learned a lot of them in the classroom. But had learned my pedagogical skills at Teacher's College, so I didn't have anything against that route, but I did feel that we had to attract people from other professions who were already experts in the area, into the teaching profession to enhance it, to enhance schools. So that was why we had the conversation. It just resonated with me there were good people out there who had come in through an Alternate Route.

**Saul Cooperman:** It also resonated with a young lady who was at the Governor's alma mater, an undergraduate at Princeton. And about four years ago I got a lovely note from her. And she said that, "It was the Alternate Route that got me to write

my senior thesis at Princeton." And right now she heads one of the largest organizations of teachers in the United States. You all know her name. It's Wendy Kopp, and it's "Teach for America." And so what Leo did, what the Governor did with the Alternate Route, spawned someone like a young lady, Wendy Kopp, who has puts tens of thousands of good people into urban schools. Open it up if anyone else wants to comment --

**Joseph Doria:** Well, I should comment, because myself and, at that time someone named John Rocco, we were on the Education Committee; I was the Vice Chair, John was the Senior Minority Member at that time. And both of us had questions about the Alternate Route, if you remember, Leo remembers. <laughter> We created a few problems at that time on the Alternate Route. And the issue was we felt that there needed to be some background, some experience in teaching and getting some of the pedagogical points that you need to have to teach. And at first it wasn't clear how the program was going to work. I think there were a lot of questions about whether or not you would be taking some courses or some background in teaching techniques, methodology, you know, some child psychology, just getting to understand some of the uniqueness that was necessary to be a teacher. And I remember, you know, we were supportive of-- in fact, I sponsored minimum teacher salary, and the recognition program-- because there were things that we all agreed on. But the issue here was how were we going to get these young people who we all agreed were talented, but at the same time, they needed to get some kind of background and teaching skills. And I think-- we went back and forth. I remember being hit very hard by Bob Braun one Sunday in an article, because at that time Bob Braun was very supportive, if you remember of the Alternate Teacher's Route. And him coming after myself and John Rocco, basically saying, well, we were both working for colleges, so we were just shilling for the colleges. Which was, no, it was good to say. <laughter> But I remember going out in the-- I knew ahead of time, and I remember myself and my wife drove to Journal Square to get an early copy of the *Star-Ledger* to see what Bob Braun was saying about us. And you know, it was back and forth. And we went back and forth. But it was a good discussion, and I think we had some very positive meetings, and it took a while, and eventually, I think, we all got together, Leo, right?

**Leo Klagholz:** I was going to say if you didn't say it, that I think the program was much better as a result of that interaction, and it's continued to evolve over the years, and I think for the better.

**Governor Tom Kean:** But no question-- this is, again, the background-- one of the things that was helpful for the administration, and didn't feel it was helpful at the time, we had a Democratic legislature. My whole eight years was a Democratic

Senate. And so the programs I suggested, not only had to go through the normal filters of public opinion and all of that, had to go through a legislature controlled by the other party. I didn't like it at the time what they did, but by putting it through that filter, most of the programs got improved in the end. And it was a time when I think people were more constructive. Now, you know, the other party, well, they really just oppose everything, it seems to me, no matter who's in power. But in those days, you know, we worked together, and we worked together very, very well. And the bottom line for both of us, I think, was to get the best And that ended in a best result really. And it's a shame we've gotten away from that today.

**Joe Doria:** It worked very well, Governor. And myself and John Rocco, then, in the end supported it after we had a number of discussions with going back and forth.

**Governor Tom Kean:** But it was an interesting time, because for the first time, really, for me, to have the opportunity to have that kind of interaction with the Department and the Governor's Office.

**Saul Cooperman:** One of the things that we tried to do because we knew it would be a problem was the pedagogy. And I've got to admit this, I did have some fun going around the state, because in the beginning, people were opposed. And I would take from Trenton State, from Rider, from Jersey City, from Kean, and I would take the education courses which were required. And Leo, you'll remember some of these. One was required at one of the schools in elementary was "Puppetry." And we found out that the professor who was teaching it liked puppets. So that became required. One was called, "Your Teaching Self."

**Leo Klagholz:** Excuse me, Excuse me, "Discovering Your--" this was the '60s, Saul-- it was "Discovering Your Teaching Self." <laughter>

**Saul Cooperman:** Alright, Klagholz, I stand corrected. <laughter> "Discovering Your Teaching Self." But it was no consensus on the pedagogy. And for someone like myself who loves great teachers, I was saying, "There's got to be some sort of consistency as to what is the pedagogy which undergirds our profession. And so what we did was we asked Ernie Boyer, who was then an ex-Secretary of Education, and head of Carnegie, and we asked people like Emily Feistritzer, Barak Rosenshine. These are big names in the '80s, and they're almost bullet-proof. And I can remember going in and we had the first meeting at ETS, and I said, "Your charge," when all these people came to me, I said, "Your charge is one sentence, "Tell me what is essential for beginning teachers to know."" That was it. And Rosenshine got up, and he said to me, "If we work on this, and we come up with a product, is this

all for politics? And you'll put it on the shelf and do what you want to do anyway." This is what he said to me. And I said, "The only thing we will change is grammatical stuff, if you mess up on that. Otherwise it's going to be public! It's going to be public." And that was it. And that's what we used, and that's what we talked to Joe about, and John Rocco and so forth. And now there is consistency in the pedagogy and no one can teach, "Discovering Your Teaching Self," or "Puppetry," or anything else. It's got to be consistent. Okay, we'll move on.

**Governor Tom Kean:** Edith wants to say something.

**Edith Fulton:** I have to comment on this segment, because I guess I was the loyal opposition at the time. I am an Alternate Route person. I came in in the '60s, not on an emergency certificate, Leo and I just had a discussion about that. I went to Newark State before it became Kean University. I had ten credits in addition to my bachelor's degree, and I qualified for a provisional certificate. And ended up subbing, and then falling in love with the profession, and starting-- was hired as an Alternate Route candidate in Lakehurst, not Lakewood as it says in here. And I think it's interesting that you talked about "Puppetry," because I remember, Leo, you said something about teaching us to make potholders. That was one of the analogies we heard about some of the courses. Now the courses I took at Newark State, methodology courses in each subject, I've come to realize over the years that a course in teaching a good lesson is really what you need, and not in every discipline. Because teaching a good lesson can carry over. But the Alternate Route became, I think, I mean, I had to go on to take the rest of my 30 credits to get my standard certificate. And that was in the '60s, so I know there were people on emergency certificates, but I was not. So when this program came out, it appeared to us, as it, I guess, appeared to Joe Doria and several other people, that maybe there wasn't enough substance for people coming in who had never set foot in the classroom. And I think that was solved by the negotiations that went on. And ultimately we did support it. And I think it's wonderful, because no one at the time I graduated from high school and went to college told me that maybe I could be a doctor or a lawyer. You know, it was a teacher, a secretary, whatever. Our views were not that open. And of course, teaching, for me, has been a wonderful career. But I just had to comment a little bit. I'd like to comment later on some other portions of the Governor's term in office, which I think are very, very critical to the education profession.

**Governor Tom Kean:** Again, we had a very civil relationship, and a good relationship.

**Edith Fulton:** Absolutely.

**Governor Tom Kean:** With the NJEA, all the way through my term. We didn't agree on everything. We had disagreements.

**Edith Fulton:** No, but we talked, it was an open history.

**Governor Tom Kean:** But we always talked and we always listened to each other, and--

**Edith Fulton:** I can't tell you how many times I was in your office, Saul, talking about problems.

**Governor Tom Kean:** Mine, too.

**Edith Fulton:** Yes, yours, too.

**Governor Tom Kean:** Harold wants the floor.

**Harold Eickhoff:** I'd like to add maybe a footnote to the broad discussion here from the macro to the micro. I became aware of the Alternate Route issue shortly after I became President of the Trenton State College in 1980. And through happenstance, I met Rick Mills in Saul Cooperman's office. We had a friendly conversation. When he moved over to Governor Kean's office, I guess I wasn't surprised when he called me to lobby me to endorse the Alternate Route. Now I didn't relish that thought. I knew it was the right thing to do, but I still remember well the Sunday morning when Rick Mills came over from Rocky Hill, and we sat around the kitchen table, and he gave me all the pros and cons. And when he left, he had my endorsement of the Alternate Route, which immediately went public, and I was in the soup with the faculty at the College-- or the School of Education at Trenton State College. The result of that was my first vote of "No Confidence." <laughter> So Governor Kean, I want to thank you for that-- for adding that to my badges of distinction. And just maybe one last comment. I can still remember myself standing before the teachers, before the faculty, and explaining why I did it. Telling them the sky was not falling, that they would-- and insisting that they were so good that they would continue to attract great students to the school. And they were saying they didn't believe me, or something like that. Anyway, that's the footnote I would add to this.

**Saul Cooperman:** I was so surprised when Harold endorsed the Alternate Route, because I thought we would have supporters just on-- I was naïve enough to believe just the sheer logic and sense of it, and the scope and depth of the problem. But I was surprised that sometimes what I thought, and what others thought, was not quite the same. And when Harold came out and supported it, I said, "Oh, my god, that is so wonderful." Bob, did you want to say--

**Robert Swissler:** Oh, yes. I love results. I think, I'm one of the persons on the practical, non-academic side that Saul was talking about, that he retained in the Department. But I just want to point out how important it was what Bob Maher started in terms of the reorganization of the Department. It is my judgment that this never would have happened if it had been entertained in any previous structure of the Department. And I'll give you a quick example why, as far as legislation goes, and this was-- there was a lot of intimate interaction with the legislature on this issue. I was the legislative person for the Department. And I mean, "I," "me," "the Lone Ranger." And that was for quite a few number of years. And in the department if you ask someone, like Leo's predecessors, "Look, we got this important issue down there, would you come meet with Assemblyman Doria and Rocco? There's that little, "It's your job, Swissler. You're the legislative person." Because you didn't have the communication flow in the department that the reorganization brought about. So I think I can probably repeat this for a whole bunch of these initiatives that are coming up, but that just shows you how important that first step was. If it didn't take place, I think a lot of this would not have taken place. And going from one person, I was able to hire people like Dennis Crowley, and Jeanne Oswald, and Judy Savage, and they have been successful in many, many ways in their professional life. And there they were on one team that allowed us to develop the relationship with Joe and with John Rocco, and the committees and the legislature in general. That as a "Lone Ranger," you just can't get that done. So I just wanted to correct that.

**Saul Cooperman:** We even started groups where the fight was. And that was very, very important. The second thing was once you had teachers in, you had to develop them. And I do a lot of reading in the private sector. And I read about Welch and what he did in Croton-on-Hudson, and how he brought people in and developed and developed and developed. And successful companies do that. And I wanted to make sure that we did the same thing for teachers. And Sybil Nadel was a Director of Curriculum in Madison. And she ran a program there that attracted, not only teachers from Madison, but from adjacent districts. Chatham, Chatham Township, and Morristown, Hanover, Florham Park. They came to Madison to participate in our development program. And Sybil is a New Yorker. And to get her to come down to Trenton was to pull her further away from her roots. And she came. And I said, "Sybil, I want to do for the teachers of New Jersey what we did for the teachers of

Madison and surrounding districts. And will you come?" And she said she would. And you will hear in about 30 seconds, a nice soft voice. And Sybil is a nice, soft person. However in that-- and I've told her this before, and she's probably saying, "Oh, god! Why are you saying this?"-- but in that velvet glove, there is really an iron fist. And anyone who decides to do battle with Sybil Nadel will know that she is a very strong-willed person. If she were not strong-willed, we would not have had the Academy become what it was. So Sybil, will you just open up the discussion by taking us through the Academy.

**Sybil Nadel:** Well, thank you. Well, I had the honor of being the Director of the Academy for the Advancement of Teaching and Management during the years 1984 to 1990. The Academy recognized that teaching is a profession, and as such, needs opportunities for teachers and principals to continue their ongoing professional development. The birth of the Academy was not easy. The New Jersey Education Association saw it as a step by the State Education Department to divert teachers and monies away from their instruction and remedial classes. And college professors of education claimed that classes they taught could not be substantiated by a State Department activity. But the Academy was eagerly welcomed by many of the professionals in New Jersey Districts, and for many of these reasons. 1) program offerings stressed those that were based on the best research translated into practice. 2) teachers attended voluntarily, often headed by the principal. 3) course offerings were spaced to permit teachers to practice the new material in the classroom. 4) tuition was paid by the district to emphasize the importance of the programs. And, 5) teachers and administrators practiced with one another. This stimulated them to network with other schools that had participated in the same programs. The beginning program, "Instructional Theory into Practice," commonly called ITIP-- I'm sure some of you remember that-- was offered for a team of four teachers and their principals from 50 schools. It was filled almost immediately. In the beginning, the Academy instructors visited each school to observe how the team members were applying the skills they had learned in the Academy. Even the principal would teach a class, so that she would recognize better the experience of her teachers. Then, as more programs were offered during the years, such as "Classroom Management," "Cooperative Learning," "Coaching Strategies," "The Supervision of Instruction," it became evident that someone within the District was needed to coordinate and observe the practices of new information. Thus, the position of a Staff Development Leader was born. The District had to make a budgetary commitment for a professional to work within the District to assure that new practices were being applied and that the quality was maintained. The Academy also supported the Staff Development Leaders by helping them to network with each other, by giving special courses for their continued development, and often inviting outside professionals as guests to contribute their expertise. During the six years of its existence, the Academy had the opportunity to learn from its

participants so that it could confirm and improve the content of its courses. Most important, it demonstrated that opportunities for professional growth were desired and supported by New Jersey educators.

**Saul Cooperman:** We'll open it up for discussion.

**Sybil Nadel:** I just wanted to tell one little thing that was not in my-- about two years after Saul and I were no longer in the Department, I met a principal from one of the schools. And he said, "Oh, I remember you," he said, "You are the Director of the Academy for the Advancement of Teaching and Management." And he said, "That was wonderful!" And with that he took off his hat and bowed to me. <laughter>

**Saul Cooperman:** Joe mentioned Bob Braun, and I said to Braun repeatedly, "You're always looking for stories. You're always coming up and saying, "What's new? What's new?"" And I said, "The Academy's new! Go write about the Academy!" And he looked at me and he said, "I'm not going to ever write about the Academy." And I said, "Why?" And he said, "There's no controversy. Everyone loves it!" It was oversubscribed. And the thing that-- and Edith will comment on it-- I think why the NJEA opposed it is we weren't giving credits to teachers. We said if the teachers wanted to come down and learn, and put theory into practice, not just academics for academics sake, but theory into practice. You can use it in the classroom to help kids learn better, we're the place. And teachers came. But they didn't get credits to advance on the salary guide. We thought about that one, whether we should do it, or whether we shouldn't do it. And we decided not to do it. And we thought that maybe teachers would not come because of that; but, boy did they come! And it was one of my deep regrets. And I know you've got your five minutes on the stage and that's it, but when the next administration did away with the Academy, in my opinion, that was really stupid. Because the teachers benefited and the kids benefited. And to destroy a thing like that didn't make much sense. Anyone want to comment? Okay, we'll go on to the next thing. Again, we recruited teachers, we developed teachers, and then we had a very large grant program where we challenged teachers. Leo?

**Leo Klagholz:** The idea was to recognize teachers who had developed and implemented classroom practices, and this is a key part that had been shown through practice and research to be effective in enhancing student learning. And then to make those practices available throughout the system to other teachers as well. And the mechanism was the Governor's Teacher Grant Program, which provided each year, awards, approximately 30 awards of up to 15,000 dollars each

for a two year period, one or two year period, to teachers for this purpose. And it was effective in a lot of ways, in my opinion, one was that teachers competed for these grants, and to do that, they had to create practices that they would propose. It was a teacher recognition program, a morale builder, and truly a lot of good practices got disseminated through the system as a result of that. Developed and disseminated. So I think a very positive program.

**Saul Cooperman:** One of the other things I would add to that is, we had independent evaluation of the teachers that won these grants, and if the evaluation showed that they did what they said they were going to do, we spun off replication grants. And so, if Leo, for example, got a grant, and it worked, we would then have Leo go around the state and talk to other teachers on his replication grant. So we would have teachers doing really neat stuff that worked, and then enlarging their scope, so we thought that was a pretty productive program. The next thing that we did was very, very controversial. I went to the Governor and said, "Look, we're recruiting teachers, we've got the academy, the alternate route, we've got grant programs, and we've got to pay them more. We've got to pay teachers more. Then I had data that in South Jersey, if a head of household with the spouse staying at home, and two kids, could receive food stamps. There were teachers making \$11,000, \$11-5, \$12, \$12-5. I knew full well, and so did the Governor, that if you raised the minimum from say, \$11,000 or \$12,000, to \$18-5, then other teachers would want increases. It would be dominos, and the Governor recognized this in a nanosecond, which was, of course what I wanted, to pay teachers more. That was one of the ways you get in good teachers. In fact, my daughter, who had been a teacher for about five years before I became Commissioner, came up to me one time at a dinner, at a family dinner, and said, "Hey, Dad, I see about this \$18-5 thing," and she said, "I've been teaching for five years, I'm making \$19,000. What are you going to do for me?" And I said, "Well that's up to your board, Suzanne." Passed her off. I can remember a debate one time, there was the Governor, there was Cary Edwards, Gary Stein, and Chris Daggett, three very bright people, and they gave counter arguments to my arguments. If we took a vote right then, it would have been three to one against. And I found out then that if you had one vote, and it was the important vote, three votes didn't count. I had Thomas Kean. And so he said yes, and Cary and Gary and Chris, on that one, at least, didn't count. They, as I said very bright, bright guys and all good people. And so we started out on this quest to raise teacher salaries. And of course we gave this one to Bob Swissler, to carry the ball, and again, we gave him lots of hot potatoes. Bob?

**Bob Swissler:** Thank you, Saul, this was a huge initiative for the Governor and Commissioner. It began two years before it was realized. It took two years to work its way through the legislature, raising funds is required to go through the legislature, come out of the legislature. The purpose-- of course, of the initiative, is

under the umbrella of attracting more candidates and raising the quality of candidates into the teaching professions. So we started with the starting teacher's salary. In 1984-85, which was the year of record before this went into effect, the average teacher's salary was \$14,963 dollars, that's average salary, average starting salary, \$14,963, and as Saul pointed out, in South Jersey, it was \$10 and \$11,000 and up in Central and North Jersey, of course it was above that average. The current tool for getting more teachers in, was pretty much limited to the emergency certificate that Leo had mentioned in areas of need. So we needed other incentives to attract people into this. The state established the minimum teacher's salary at \$18-5. This is what the provisions of the law are, for all school districts in the state. And that included, county special services districts, county vocational districts, educational service commissions, as well as, of course, the local school districts. The state was going to fund the school district the difference between their current entry teacher's salary and \$18-5. So if your current entry salary was \$14,963, the district would receive the difference between those two elements. And the funding would take place for three consecutive years, the state would fund that difference for three consecutive years, and then the system, as Saul described it, was on its own. There was much discussion about this issue. Almost everyone was in favor of it, so how you can have all this discussions, and two years worth of process to go through for something everybody-- well almost everybody agreed to. But here's the issues that they brought up, two or three, I guess, of the big issues. One was, the state was superseding local authority, overstepping the authority of the local board or school district. And that's a huge issue, and in fact, it's one you can't argue against, because that's just what you're doing, you're stepping in and setting a minimum that has historically been the responsibility of the local district. So that was one issue, and the second issue-- a second issue was that there would be, almost for sure, a ripple impact on the rest of the salary guide, that, you know, if-- Saul described his daughter. She was making whatever, \$19,000, all of a sudden, an entering teacher is making \$18-5, it doesn't take much of a view to say that, wait a minute, that's not quite right. So they were the two big things. The third thing was the cost of the program, it was an expensive program, and the legislature, of course, had a concern about the cost. But I think the state's response to those comments, from both the Governor and the Commissioner, was that, as far as infringing on the local authority, that's true, we're guilty, that's what we're doing. However, that the need was so severe, the issue was such a dramatic issue, that it was one of those times when the state must take a step, and they did. And that was the general feeling. Many people objected to it, obviously the school board's people didn't like that idea at all. If you start there, what comes next, and all of that kind of argumentation. But that was something that was well understood, but it was felt that the need was so severe. That there would be a ripple effect, as Saul described to the Governor, there certainly would be, likely, and that, I think we all felt, in the education business, that that would be a good thing. That was a positive, that was not a negative, because that's what we needed, higher salaries to

compete with other professional competition for graduates coming out of college as well as retaining the teachers that you have in the systems. So that was the kind of debate that took place. It took about two years and finally was enacted in 1985. That was-- 1985 was the first year that the state funded the difference between the \$18-5 and the existing starting salary. There was a person, interestingly, at the Eagleton Institute here, a Dr. Craig Richards, I don't know if he's still around or not, but he conducted--

**M1:** Columbia, actually. Columbia Teacher's College.

**Bob Swissler:** Is he really? Okay, he had conducted a study the fifth year out, of the impact of raising the salary to \$18-5, and he looked at kind of raw data, were there more applicants who try to enter the system. And he found-- I just read his summary, I did not read his report, but he found the answer to that was definitely yes, that there was, like, one and a half to two times the number of applicants during those three years, and presumably on. And he concluded, I think it's safe to say, when you get more applicants, you have a better chance of improved quality. So I think that his conclusion was extremely supportive of the initiative. Thank you.

**Governor Tom Kean:** First of all, as Saul described the original debate in the Governor's office, was the way we did policy. We liked to have disagreements until I made the decision, and then we didn't have any more. But we liked it.

**Richard Kaplan:** You always won.

**Governor Tom Kean:** Yeah, I tended to win the argument, but I wanted to hear the opposition, and wanted the opposition to be vocal and I'd take in all of that, that's how we did policy. And second, on this particular initiative, my concern was quality. I mean, I just didn't see how bright kids at the state colleges were going to go into a profession that started you off at \$12 or \$13,000 dollars, I just didn't see it happening, and it wasn't happening. And so my hope was, and I think it happened, was that when you raise the salary to a decent level, that teaching would attract some of the best who wanted to be teachers, not just the people who couldn't get any other job in some cases, but it was an important initiative.

**Edith Fulton:** It was, and I think it was the beginning of a really big climb to a very decent living for educators, and to this day, I mean, now we have some districts starting at \$40,000, a couple at \$50,000 and people say, oh my gosh, but when you look at what other people are making in professional jobs, it's not out of the

question. I had to put up, though, with all those people that said, you know, I've been teaching six years, and now somebody is going to make, you know, practically what I'm making, and when I went around the state, I was president of the NJEA, so I was in every county, practically in every local, and when they brought up that argument, I said, "Well, listen, I started at \$4,750, and I am delighted that young people can start in this profession at \$18-5. And it was a ripple effect, because the other salaries did grow, and somehow we were able to afford it. I think, as Governor, you were very fortunate, it was a good economic time, you could afford to do that. Probably wouldn't happen in today's economy, but we thank you from the bottom of our hearts.

**Joe Doria:** I had the privilege of being the sponsor of that bill, and working with Bob, and let me say, Bob did an excellent job. The interesting thing was, there were always undercurrents or ripples, and Bob will tell you, Edith and the organization basically supported it, but at the same time, there was opposition, because there was concern, again, as Edith pointed out, that teachers who had been working for five, six years, were only making \$18,000, \$18-5. And they said, well why should we only be making that, and new people will come in, and I kept on saying, look, if it goes to \$18-5, everybody's up-- the average of one boat is going to raise everybody up, everyone will come up eventually, and the salaries will come up. But there was a great deal of angst, a great deal of angst and it took a while, and that impacted on the legislators who were concerned about voting for this. The cost was there. Now the three years at the beginning was great, but the School Board Association at that time, gave us a hard time, saying, well that's the first three years, but everything else is going to start going up. They saw the ripple effect, and so they really opposed it at the beginning, very vehemently, right, Bob?

**Bob Swissler:** Yeah.

**Joe Doria:** And Bob now worked very diligently, and the Governor, together with the Commissioner, and we took a while, two years. It did take two years, because it was a case of trying to convince everyone that this was going to be beneficial. But it was not as easy as you would think. You would think, when you said, okay, we're going to raise everybody to \$18-5, and we're going to-- the state is going to give you money for three years, that it would pass immediately. But it took a while for my colleagues to really grasp the idea and then move forward with it, and it was only in an election year, in '85, that we were able-- the election year was coming up, that we were able to get the bill passed, so it wouldn't be impacting in the election year, because everybody said well this will help us. So-- but it was not an easy task, surprisingly, not as easy as anybody would think, and Bob had to deal

with it during that time, and I think we succeeded, but it was a case of a lot of undercurrents which you don't expect.

**Joe Doria:** Yes, in the end, yes.

**Governor Tom Kean:** Both unions staked that out as something they were--

**Joe Doria:** In opposition to some of their members.

**Governor Tom Kean:** Yeah, but prime positions and legislatures didn't-- the legislature wouldn't go into that election with that sitting on the table.

**Edith Fulton:** Well I'll be six feet tall before you do that again.

<Laughter>

**Saul Cooperman:** The mayors called me. I should make that point. The mayors called me and said that we were meddling in their affairs, and because the negotiations would take place between the teachers union, and the board of education, but the result of those negotiations would be the tax rate, because schools were usually the major part, almost invariably, of someone's tax levy. So the mayor would say to me, I'm paraphrasing, I'm not in the negotiations. You guys raise it to \$18-5, it ripples, everyone gets more. Everyone's got their hand out. The teachers are negotiating for more, middle of the guide, top of the guide, and we get stuck with the tax levy, and then the people who don't have kids in the school are angry at us, and that's what you're doing. And I had to say yes, the greater good, but nonetheless it was not easy. You know, and Bob says, everyone was for it, yeah, they were-- everyone would mouth it, we want to pay teachers more, but then when you came to the street fighting, not so. Anyone else? Rich?

**Richard Kaplan:** Commissioner always had a convocation, an annual meeting wherein this period of time of debate, when you were-- used to go to the Middlesex County Vocational School in East Brunswick for the meetings in the central part of the state. And during the Q and A, the Superintendent got up, see if you remember this one, and said, "Commissioner, I'm the superintendent of a small South Jersey district, I'm also the afternoon kindergarten teacher, and I don't make \$18-5, and I'm a superintendent. So it was a ripple effect for everybody.

**Saul Cooperman:** I don't remember that.

**Richard Kaplan:** Until recently.

**Saul Cooperman:** Okay, selective forgetting. Well, to almost bring this teacher section to a close, with this comprehensive program. And one of the things was to recognize teachers, to say, we value you, and in not just words, we're going to do something unusual and we're going to invite you to Jadwin Gym in Princeton and we're going to have white table cloths, and we're going to have a nice hot meal, and we're going to have some really key speakers, Governor Kean, Bill Bennett, who was a Commissioner at that time, Greg Anrig, head of ETS, Ernie Boyer, of Carnegie, and then we were going to also spin off from the teacher recognition program to invite 100 of those teachers to spend three days with people from the department intensively working with them on issues that they said they wanted to discuss. And we thought this would be a slam dunk, this was going to be really easy. Who would be against recognizing teachers? Well, nothing is easy, and so I'd - let's see, who is going to talk about that? Jeffrey Osowski. And let me just mention Jeff for a second. He's going to come in at the end, we're going to have about 20 minutes for anyone to say anything they want that wasn't on the agenda and Jeff was our guy in special education and he worked with me in Madison. Actually, our paths kept crisscrossing. I was a high school principal in Belvidere, after I left Belvidere, Jeff came there. I had the good sense to invite him to Madison and then bring him down to the State Department where he did a bang up job for us. He says he was a good basketball player for Penn. I have my doubts about that, but you know, other than that, he was a hell of a special ed person. Jeffrey?

**Jeffrey Osowski:** We're going to play horse outside, if there's a basketball out there, later. I remember vividly when Saul asked Rich and me to join him and come down to Trenton, to the Department of Education. Rich and I, if you can remember this, showed up in front of the building on July 2nd, 1982, at 8:05 a.m. in brand new suits, which Saul required that we buy, shiny shoes and we were in front of the building, high fiving each other and smiling, slapping each other on the back, and then at some point, said to each other, now what? Now what do we do. And we realized that we had to get our antenna up and start to listen to the messages that were being sent out there from a lot of places, but particularly from the Governor's office, from Governor Kean, and so we, you know, watched him speak, read articles about him in the paper, gathered as much information as we could, and a lot of messages were coming down. One, clearly was that education is priority number one. That was something nobody debated. But beyond that, it was that we have to improve learning and you improve learning by improving teaching and you can't improve teaching unless you value and respect teachers. That's the path you have

to take. If teachers do not feel valued and respected, you can't improve instruction in the classroom, no matter what you do around that. So we established then, as Saul just mentioned, the Governor's Teacher Recognition Program, and the purpose of it was to improve teaching and learning by identifying high quality teaching, recognizing it and rewarding it. And we then said to schools, this was a school based program, go out and establish a local panel to select teachers who would be recognized in the Governor's Teacher Recognition Program. We had one teacher from each school. The criteria included, use of effective instructional techniques, extraordinary contributions to the quality of learning in the district, knowledge, commitment, creativity and other criteria. And in 1986-87, remember these numbers, 1,600 teachers were selected from over 400 districts to receive the Governor's Annual Award for Outstanding Teaching. Now why wasn't it in all the school districts at the time? And I think Saul alluded to-- One of the resistances to it was that some felt that all teachers are excellent and you can't really pick just some of those teachers. It would be difficult to do, if not unfair, to pick an outstanding teacher from a school building, when really all should be recognized as outstanding. And it was a sort of herd mentality at the time that was a little disconcerting, because we were saying, look, let's have the local panel identify who is really good, and let's bring them down and recognize them and reward them. So it wasn't all, in the beginning, and it gradually grew over time. Those 1,600 teachers came to the convocation at Princeton University and those who were there will remember it as an environment in which there was an incredible amount of excitement and enthusiasm, a very warm and good feeling about being selected as an outstanding teacher, and an intellectually charged environment because, as I sat at tables listening to teachers talk to each other, they were swapping stories about what they were doing in their classrooms. They weren't just there to be recognized, they weren't talking about the weather or sports, they were talking about what they were doing in their classroom. So just getting those people into one place, sitting them at tables with each other, and listening to what they were saying, was exciting from my perspective, because I was learning as they were talking about what was working in their classrooms. As Saul mentioned, we had inspirational speakers, and an important part of this program was that each teacher was provided with-- I should say, each school district was provided with 1,000 dollars per teacher to be used for an educational purpose in the school district, to be designated by those selected teachers, and that was an important piece of the puzzle. That said, and not only do we want to recognize you for your contributions, but we want to give you something so that you can disseminate or improve or increase those contributions. The spinoff was that there was a Commissioner's symposium for outstanding teachers and there were 100 teachers selected who spent three days in an even more charged environment, with national and state experts to identify, share, replicate and disseminate the practices that made them outstanding teachers. Also very exciting, exciting time. So we had set out with the Governor's direction, and with Saul's ideas to improve instruction by identifying, recognizing and rewarding

outstanding teachers and it was a really important part of this whole fabric of the improvement of teaching and learning in schools in New Jersey.

**Saul Cooperman:** I think an interesting story to tell about this one. Three days, or two days before we were going to have our first teacher recognition program, I got a call from one Marcoantonio Lacatena. Marcoantonio Lacatena was the head of, I think, the AFT? And he told me, "You're not going to hold your recognition program at Princeton." And I said, "Well, yes we are." And he said, "No you're not." And I said, "Why am I not going to hold it?" And he said, "Because we represent the food handlers and they are not going to do this, so you're not going to have any food. You're going to come down and you're going to have these teachers and no food." And I didn't know what to say, so I hung up. And I hung up, and I got three guys in, Jake Piatt, Sandy McCarroll, and Rich DiPatri. Rich and Sandy really wanted to be here, but they had family obligations prior to Thanksgiving. Anyway, I said, "What are we going to do?" And we looked at all the options. And I came up with an option. My son, we lived in Rocky Hill, which bordered on Princeton, always liked to go down with his friends after a basketball game-- like a kid would, who was captain of his basketball team, and they would go down to a place called Hoagie Haven, and they'd have hoagies. And I said, Jake, go down to Hoagie Haven and see whether they can make over 1,000 hoagies. You know, some people say, you can't make this up? He came back and he said, "They can do it." You've got to give them 24 hours, because it's going to be a big production. So I called Marcoantonio, and I said, "Marcoantonio, here's what I'm going to do. We're going to have lovely plates and white table cloths and we're going to serve the teachers hoagies, and I'm going to get up there and I'm going to say, the reason that we have hoagies and not a hot meal is that you would not let the food handlers work." And he said, "You wouldn't say that, would you?" And I said, "I'm going to say it, you can count on it." And he hung up. And he called back a couple of hours later and he said, "I talked it over with them, they'll work." And so we didn't go through with Hoagie Haven and we had our first thing. But I've always wondered, Edith, was the NJEA behind that?

**Edith Fulton:** No.

<Laughter>

**Edith Fulton:** Marcoantonio Lacatena? No, no, no.

**Saul Cooperman:** No, Dennis was the head, but you guys didn't want the teacher recognition, because it would recognize some teachers, not all teachers.

**Edith Fulton:** Well that's how a lot of the members thought and in my particular school, being with a very small faculty, they really didn't like the idea of picking out one person, because what they felt, in some of the districts, that it was like teacher's pet, it was somebody that the superintendent recognized, not necessarily the staff themselves, and in my school, we all felt we were great teachers, and my school did not participate in that program for a number of years, much later.

**Saul Cooperman:** But you guys didn't call Marcoantonio and tell him about that?

**Edith Fulton:** To my knowledge, I never really had a personal conversation with him.

<Laughter>

**Edith Fulton:** About that or anything else.

**Saul Cooperman:** I wondered why he did that. I wonder why he did that.

**Governor Tom Kean:** So, let me say something about the program. There were two pieces of the money. And this was an improvement that you guys had made in the legislature when I originally suggested it, we'd recognize great teachers, and they would also get some money to put in their pocket. The legislature, in their wisdom said, no, no, no, let's have less to put in their pocket, something, but less, and let them have some part of the program designated. Wherever they want to designate to improve the school. It's up to the teacher to improve the school. I got more great letters on that program than anything else I did as Governor, and I wish I'd kept them all. I'm hopeful that they're in the state archives, but teachers really aren't recognized. And I remember one teacher came up to me and said, "You know, I teach English, and you know, they always recognize the basketball coach." He said, "Nobody has ever recognized what I do. And now there's an article in the local paper, saying this teacher has been recognized, all of that, I got to come down to Princeton and meet with you and everybody else, and he said, it's the highlight of my career, and I'm going back a better teacher." And I got thousands of those letters. I mean, I don't know, teachers, I guess, are articulate, they write. But I'd say three quarters of teachers who came to that thing wrote at one point or another, and said, you know, they liked it. Pretty close to that. And so that was for me, to set an example, I think it's very hard to pick who's the best, you know, it's very hard, but at least somebody was recognized for being a great teacher and recognized by the community for being a great teacher. And the second part of it

that I liked very much was that these teachers were so extraordinary in what they chose to use the other small part of the money for. I visited some of those projects. I remember one up in Bergen County, where the school had looked out on, basically a dump. It was a polluted little tiny stream, a gutter almost, and people would put the trash there and everything else. The teacher looked at it from her classroom. She won the award, she got this money, second grade teacher. And she said, we're going to clean this up, that's what we're going to dedicate the money to. And so she got her whole class out there on weekends, to start cleaning this up. And she invited the parents, and so the parents came, and then the parents invited some of their friends, and they came, and then the mayor and the council thought, well this is something pretty good, they came. And pretty soon you had the whole community cleaning up this area. And they not only cleaned up all the trash and disposal stuff, and the pollution, then they decided it was going to be a nature area outside the window. So now they're all cleaned up, they labeled all the trees as to what they were, and had environmental classes out there, and so I came to look at what this teacher had done with this very small amount of money. And she said, you know, it's great, it's all done, I congratulated her. She said, "Only one question I have," she said, "I've still got half the money left."

<Laughter>

**Governor Tom Kean:** "What do you think I ought to do with that?" But that was an example, it would be a good example. But these teachers, you know, one thing I learned was, teachers are extraordinarily creative, and they know better than the administration does, what's needed for their students and their classroom and around, and what you can use small amounts of money for, so I-- one of the things I regret the most, frankly, is that particularly these days, when teachers are not getting the enhancement and the recognition and the tributes they should now, it's bad, and I think anything we can do, programs like that, or other programs, really recognize great teachers for what they do for the world is very, very important, and I just-- that program was one example of that, and I think it worked, and I'm sorry that one isn't still there.

**Edith Fulton:** One of the national reports in the last 15 years, that was looking at why young people are leaving the profession after three or four or five years, it wasn't salary and it wasn't necessarily working conditions, it was being valued, being appreciated, and they didn't feel it. That was a great step that we did.

**Governor Tom Kean:** Anything you do with your life, particularly something where you're not going to get paid as much as some of the other things, you do it because

you value what you're doing, you think other people ought to value it, too, and if other people don't value it, then you're right, I think you're losing good people out of the profession, and you can't afford it, can't afford it.

**Saul Cooperman:** I didn't get as many letters as the Governor got.

**Governor Tom Kean:** It's called The Governor's Program, it wasn't called--

<Laughter>

**Saul Cooperman:** Touche, touche. Anyway, the letters that I got were thanking me for a little thing, and this is when the Governor was talking, I just thought about this. For the 100 teachers that were in the symposium which came off the big teacher recognition, I would get them little plaques, and this was something I was doing personally, it wasn't government money. And it just said on the plaque, "May you teach today as never before," and I would give it to the teachers. And I still have, in my work room at home, a plaque that a teacher sent to me, and it just said simply, "May you commission today as never before." So you know, these little things, but the teachers, after a couple of years used to come down in limos, the boards would provide limos and the guys were dressed in suits, the women, whether it was pant suits or lovely dresses, it was-- you had to be there to see it, and it was just a good feeling. Anyway, the next thing we did, still on teachers, was evaluating teachers. I found, as I went around to school district after school district, that what I thought and what was, was a disparity. I thought that in most school districts, there were programs to evaluate teachers, and to reward those that were good, and praise them, and to help teachers who weren't good, and if they didn't shape up-- the kids were our client, not anyone else, and therefore, teachers should be asked to leave or, you know, you would have to go through this, at that time, enormous tenure procedure, and mostly you could counsel out people, you know. But anyway, I found that there were some districts that didn't evaluate teachers, or in some cases, they had form evaluations and they would phony it, and so I'd get evaluation A one year, evaluation B the second year, and then it would circle back, I'd get evaluation A the third year. It was really rotten. So it would be almost like a restaurant- a restaurant that didn't watch the chef, didn't watch the cooking. Seventy-five percent of the current expense budgets, more or less, are teacher salaries and benefits. How can you not evaluate what's going on in the classroom? So we started a program to bring, again, research into practice, and this was back in the '80s, and as I read in the paper today, they're still talking about that, and they're implementing an evaluation program for teachers and a one or two year phase in. And you know, this really did happen in the '80s. Sybil

**Sybil Nadel:** Our most popular course for the principals and for supervisors was the supervision of instruction. And the important thing that evaluators needed to learn was that the criteria by which they were measuring the teachers was valid to that which the program had. And we had groups and groups of principals and supervisors of instruction come to us. So where I think we helped was that evaluation shouldn't just be off the cuff, but should have a meaning to what was being learned in the program, or for the schools. The other thing is that as we taught these new programs, and as teachers came willingly in with the principal to them, I mentioned before, we saw that we needed somebody in the district who could make sure that something that was being taught was being used and that could help. And so the staff development leader that turned out to be an enormous program for districts, came to be someone in the district that could look at what had been taught and how it was being used, and if it needed more help, could they let the academy know so that we could work with them. So although the academy did not impose a certain way of evaluating these teachers, what it could do was suggest that there were relevant criteria that had to meet the programs of the district, and that this would be a way that would be more acceptable and not only that, more meaningful. Teachers also had courses in coaching, and many of the teachers needed models to practice, how do you speak to teachers in a way that doesn't demean them or make them think that you know everything and they don't know something. So is there a way of coaching and including the participant, that could make education better. I also just wanted to mention, in terms of what the Governor was saying about the teachers, I found it-- I guess I was naïve, but at the academy, since the teachers who came with the principal was voluntary, they were interested, what surprised me initially, was that we had good learners from every age, so that I could have teachers who had been teaching a long time, who loved the new learning as much as young teachers who had just come into the profession. So it was just always exciting, because it was a chance to contribute to people's growth, and people who had come voluntarily because they wanted to get better in what they did.

**Saul Cooperman:** I'd just like to comment on one thing, to make sure, one, we get it on the record, and everyone gets it, and I hope I'm not insulting intelligence on the staff development leader. We had the academy. Let's assume the Governor is the academy. So teachers come down to the academy and they learn stuff. Then they go back to their district. Well we thought, gee, that's great, when they come down four at a time, five at a time, six at a time, and they go back, but how can we institutionalize that learning and how can we pollinate, right across the state? So what we tried to do, assume that everyone else here are districts, and the Governor is the academy, and I'm a staff development leader in Ed's district. What it meant

was, I would come down to the academy and I would learn things, kind of a hub on a bike, and then there are lots of spokes going out. The spokes would be the staff development leader. So I'm a staff development leader, I've learned at the academy, I go back to the district and I now talk to teachers in the district, and I talk to the staff development leader in Joe's district, in Edith's, in Frank's, and so on, so you have, if you have, let's say 600 districts in the state at that time, we'd have 600 staff development leaders, all linked to the academy and their district, and the other staff development leaders. So we could take good research, not crap, good research and bring it right to the teachers and right to the kids, and that's what we were doing just with evaluation, but trying to do it with others. And again, there's got to be a better way, not that it was made in Kean, but that it goes on to another administration, and when Governor Florio came in, and his Commissioner, as he had every right to do, boom, it ended. The academy ended, staff development leader ended, the whole stuff ended, and you know, eight years of work of developing this stuff, so you know, too bad, but maybe there's got to be a better way. The next thing was seniority regulations. This was a very quiet little battle. It didn't make the press and whatnot, but we thought we should take it on. Now because again, we wanted the best teachers in front of the kids, and Bob, you're on again to explain the seniority.

**Bob Swissler:** This is very simple, and simple in structure and simple in concept. And I think it's best presented to you with example, rather than some long narrative. Let me first say, I'm assuming you all understand what the significance of seniority is, and just to repeat it, it is that the teacher-- in a school districts, the teacher with the greater number of years experience in a particular certificated subject bumps, in the event of a reduction of force this is, bumps a teacher with lesser number of years in that same certificated subject. That's the whole principle of seniority. Let me first give you an example of the original regulations that were being addressed by this initiative. In the original regulations, a teacher, and I prepared a sample. A teacher certified in math, and certified in science, so this is a teacher who has, in fact, two certificates, multiple certificates. This teacher was hired by the district to teach math and in fact, taught for 20 years, taught math in the district for 20 years. Taught science, his other certificate, for zero years-- never taught it. This teacher would attain 20 years seniority in math that he did teach, and 20 years seniority in science, that he did not teach at all. Meanwhile, there's a science teacher in the same district, teaches science, certificated for science, and teaches science for 15 years was hired by the district to teach science and did so for 15 years. Now we have reduction in force, and of course that's caused by any number of things, but the district is reducing the number of teachers that it has. In that event, the teacher with the 20 years of experience teaching in math, and a certificate in math, as well as 20 years-- as well as zero years certification in science, would bump the 15 year teacher out of a job, so to speak, and that's the

person that would be laid off, assuming nothing else takes place in the way of bumping, but that's the person who would go. Now, I think, facially, you can see in the example what we feel the issue was, that you're replacing a person in your district that you did not hire to teach science, that person is replacing-- and never did teach science, that person is replacing a teacher who did teach science for 15 years, and was still teaching there up to the time of reduction of force. So that's the issue we wanted to address. The new regulations that we proposed, changed these-- and here's my example, do it by example. The same teacher with 20 years of-- the math teacher with 20 years teaching on that math certificate, and zero years teaching on the science certificate, reduction in force, that 15 year teacher with 15 years teaching on the science certificate would not be bumped, that you only-- you must actually teach the subject for which you're receiving the seniority rights. That's the principle involved, that you actually teach, so that if that math teacher, back to that same person with the double certificate had taught 17 years of math, they would accrue 17 years of seniority, and if that same teacher with the certificate in science as well as math, ended up teaching three years of science, he would have 17 years of seniority in math, three years of seniority in science, and would not have been able to bump in either circumstance, the 15 year teacher with 15 years in science. That's it-- I hope that examples are clear enough, but that's the case that's described. These were regulations, by the way, of the State Board of Education, and the board did adopt those changes, and the impact of those changes are good for the teacher, I think, and good for the district, because-- and good for the students, if it was objective, because you have, in the event of bumping, you have the person with the most seniority not-- retaining that position, and the person who has never taught the subject, obviously not hired to teach the subject, is not able to bump someone that was hired to teach it and did so for 15 years. That's it.

**Saul Cooperman:** Got a note from Nancy that we have an hour and five minutes to go, and we're not quite halfway there. And you know, a lot went on in those eight years, as you know, so I'm going to have to exert the prerogative of the chair and gloss over some things and emphasize others, so I'm going to move right along. And on monitoring, I'm just going to make a couple of comments on that, Rich, and then ask you to take the HSPT. Monitoring was something that was required by law, and we thought it was rather haphazard. Sometimes it was done, sometimes it wasn't done, the districts really didn't take this seriously, and so we put together an inspectorate, looked at the T&E law, tried to figure out what the essential things were, held meetings all over the state to discuss this, and finally came out with an inspection. We said we'd do this every five years, and we would inspect the districts. We did that, we had a level one and level two, basically what we said was, if you had deficiencies, whether they're in curriculum, finance, whatever it is, personnel, we'll help you if you want help. That was pretty much it for monitoring.

But it became very, very important later on, when we decided that two levels of monitoring were not enough. The next thing, which I'm going to ask Rich Kaplan to discuss is the HSPT. The law said you had to have a test in basic skills, and the test that was given by a prior administration was called the MBS test, The M in the BS, was very--

<Laughter>

**Saul Cooperman:** You got that, Leo, huh? The M was minimum, Minimum Basic Skills, and they were minimum. And to get people's attention, I used to go around the state and talk about the tyranny of the minimums, and I really believe that we were really dumbing down the curriculum to the kids and especially in our urban districts. We were patting them on the head, saying you passed, but what did they pass? They passed just very, very low level. So we instituted a-- something called the HSPT, the High School Proficiency Test. Rich Kaplan was a special ed teacher, and most people might not have thought of Rich Kaplan as a special ed teacher. He also was the head of a special ed consortium that some of us started in Union and Somerset and Morris County. And Rich was only there a year or two, and I asked him to come down to the state department and thank goodness he did. So Rich, would you just walk us through the HSPT?

**Richard Kaplan:** Sure. Actually, from its early beginning, on the first day that Saul became Commissioner, when then acting Commissioner, then deputy, Gus Rue, brought Saul purchase orders much like they do in the local districts, and Saul went through these purchase orders and came across one for the MBS test, and he threw it on the floor, and Gus said, "Why did you throw that one on the floor?" And he said, "Well I'm not going to do the MBS test anymore, and that's where the tyranny of minimums came from. So the point being that it-- it wasn't tough enough, there wasn't rigor, there was no growth expectation, and so we spent time with a number of people in assessment to try to come up with what we felt was a fair way to evaluate high school proficiency test. We also put in the GEPA which was for the eighth graders, that's the early warning test and so that people would be ready for the high school proficiency test. And then we went about designing it through the Bureau of Treasury and outsourcing the test and reviewing it, and a lot of folks weighed in on it. And initially the fear was that we were going to have all these failures throughout the state, and in reality, not that it was a high mark, but it certainly brought us closer and closer to a higher mark. We had 68 percent passed during the first administration, and so from there, we took all of the other theories into practice, and worked on curriculum development and building of standards that could be utilized by school districts, in order to focus on truly important issues and instruction. And so that level of accountability was pretty much unheard of prior to

the Kean-Cooperman administration in those early years, and much like other initiatives, there was some outcry by all parts of the communities, not only the educational community, but folks fearful that our kids wouldn't do as well as they do do, and could do even more. And so we raised the bar, a phrase that got used more and more and to this day, we're still raising the bar. And so-- I can talk about that, but I won't.

So now I'll move on to Level Three Monitoring. Dr. Cooperman had an interesting way. Every Monday morning at eight o'clock, he would call the senior staff, some of the senior staff in to the office, and first it would be benign, you know, what are you doing this week? Here's what I'm doing this week. And occasionally he'd throw out a gem. And one day he said, "So -- we have Level One and Level Two, what happens-- what comes after two?" And of course, I said, "And everybody knows, three comes after two, Sir." And so off we went to design-- okay, smart guy, what is Level Three? So we put together a number of drafts and a number of ways to really get down to the causative factors of deficiency in school districts. And while in some papers it appears as an urban initiative, just a waltz down memory lane, the first place I went to was in Salem County, a little place called Maurice River, which they call, Morris River, right? Morris River. Then Penns Grove, not urban districts at all, and then to Camden, Union City, Hoboken, Jersey City, Patterson, and then later with another administration, Newark. And so the whole design was that monitoring began pretty much in Governor Byrne's administration in '78, with the passing of T&E, and issues that Commissioner Cooperman wanted to look at, well what did it really say we should be doing, and how did the department, over time, deal with that? And one of the things he found back at the test was that writing was never included, even though it was included in the legislature, and to do that, we met with a number of former legislators, and current legislators at the time, and judges that the Commissioner hooked in to talk to us about what was their intent and how did we want to go about it. And that had overriding issues dealing with causative factors of deficiency and what districts really looked at or didn't look at and how they analyzed or didn't analyze a variety of things. We came down on five major areas that, to this day, I think are as valid as they were then, governance, how does the board govern, management, how does the supervision of the district operate, what is the curriculum of instruction in the district, what are the finances of the district, and also the facilities of the district, what shape the facilities are in. And oftentimes that's an area that we forget about, but in many of these communities the kinds of schools we put youngsters in, tell the community and certainly the youngsters and the staff what we really think of them, and so those are the things we looked at. We spent a number of years wandering in the desert, waiting for the legislature, Joe and others, to help us out, to come to some conclusion, and as we moved through the communities, we felt that this was not intended for an urban takeover, but it was really dealing with, as the Governor said

a number of times, educational bankruptcy, and that this wasn't a question of home rule, it was a question of no rule.

I think the Governor and Commissioner have always been principled about what we do and what we think about our kids and that they will inherit the next generation. I think that will forever be, in my mind, their legacy as well, the caring for the student. And going through the reviews, we had a team of about seven people that worked with me that were experts in particular areas, and the first thing we always did was we looked at what did the county office say about the district, and was the county office accurate in portraying the condition of the school system? That was our internal check of what the exchequers were looking at, and based on that, we made decisions based on the presenting behaviors of the school system in those five areas, and in the case of Camden, we felt that the leadership there, which was new, did require a recommendation for CCI, which was the second level-- the second level provided additional support to our staff, in that we had an outside management firm, Cresap, McCormick and Paget, from Washington, D.C., came in and did an organizational overview, pretty much the same as Bob Maher did for us internally, but tied it into some of the fact finding that our people had in fact discovered. And then, based on the district's willingness and ability to perform, we then took a right turn and said, okay, you would have an opportunity to have a corrective action, and we would have to be sure that you would tell us what you would do, and we would tell you when it needed to be done, and we'd have an ownership in that process.

Lots of time, folks say, okay, develop a plan, and the department was always great for, and districts were great for producing plans, but implementation was nonexistent. And so only 50 percent of the work was developed in the plan. Most of the work is implementing it to see if it works, and many districts don't do that. And so from that, if we thought they were unable or unwilling to accomplish that, we then moved to that external group that came in, and we would continue our review. And it wasn't until we got to Jersey City and weren't sure about Penns Grove, and Camden, and Union City, Hoboken, Jersey City, did we realize this was the place that was incapable, incompetent, unwilling, unable, just to name a few things that were wrong. I will share something-- I've only had two private conversations with the Governor. One was at three in the morning, which he probably doesn't remember. I'll tell him later, and the other one was when we were about to move forward in the no-show jobs review investigation, and I was at the firm's offices in Millburn, and I was in front of all these auditors and our own staff, and we're going through the process for this check verification, and secretary comes in and says, "The Governor is on the phone, he wants to speak to a Mr. Kaplan. Now when Jeffrey said we did high fives in the parking lot, Jeff is like, six-four, I'm five-seven and a half on a good day, so they were low fives, really. I went into this office

going, oh boy, this is the Governor, he wants to talk to me. And here's the one question he had for me. "Is this really necessary, and are you going to really find anything?" Do you remember that? And I said, "I believe so." And that was it. And that's an amazing thing for a Governor to trust and understand, because he really was, you know, it came out of nowhere. And we did find folks, unfortunately, who were no shows.

**Saul Cooperman:** Can I pick it up from there?

**Richard Kaplan:** Sure.

**Saul Cooperman:** Just let me just, in time. I wanted to just let you get in my mind a little bit, and my relation with the Governor and my relation with Kap on this. The first four years, and we're going to get to what we tried to do in the urban areas-- the first four years were all programs, as you will see, of trying to help, trying to do things which we thought were good for kids, and at the end of the fourth year, beginning of fifth, I don't-- it's fuzzy now, but I started to think about every kid should have the opportunity for thorough and efficient education, and they weren't getting it. And slowly but surely, as I toured around, I saw that algebra one in Camden, was not algebra one in Cherry Hill, and that started something we called the Core Course Proficiencies, to get people from all over the state and say, what is algebra one? What is essential to know about algebra one? You don't dumb it down in Camden and tell the kids they have algebra one, it's on their transcript, and they really don't. So what are the core course proficiencies that are algebra one? And once you have them, that's the minimum, which you've got to have in Camden, and you've got to have that in Cherry Hill. So it was things like, when we started the core course proficiencies, it started into my mind that, you know, maybe we've got to go beyond this level one, level two business, and I can remember the exact day. Some things are fuzzy, because it's a lot of years, but I can remember this. I was reading Fortune Magazine in my back yard, and it was on a Chapter 11 bankruptcy, and I said, huh, a Chapter 11 bankruptcy. We're doing monitoring and we keep finding that people can't get the curriculum straight, they have got patronage and nepotism out the window, they don't care it's in your face, the bidding is rigged into dummy corporations, we knew all this stuff, we were trying to put a stop to it. But we didn't do anything about monitoring in general. And so I went to the Governor one time, and I said-- I had met with my staff first, I had an outline I had prepared, and I think he got a kick out of it. I used to come in with flip charts all the time. I had things written on flip charts, because I really couldn't remember all the stuff I wanted to say. So I wrote it down on flip charts. But I had this idea for a hostile takeover, and I thought, oh my, I'm going to really be in it for this one, and he's going to grill me, and whether it was Marla or Rick, at that time would jump on me,

and he got up and he came across, and he said, "Let's do it." And he said he was going to talk about it in the State of the State. And I said, "I'm not totally prepared." And he basically said, get prepared. And I went back and I started to talk to Kaplan, and if you remember, "Dragnet," at the time, there was a Jack Webb, and Jack Webb's operative line was, "I just want the facts, Ma'am, all I want is the facts." Well I said to Kap, "Kap, all I want is the facts, because if we do something like this, we've got to have the facts." So as he went through Keansburg and wherever, we were doing our monitoring, monitoring, monitoring. Things sometimes were bad, but not terribly bad. And we got to Jersey City, couldn't believe it. he came in with boxes, he actually had boxes, and boxes were on their self insurance plan, on the hiring of people. Tony Cucci was the mayor, remember this, Kaplan, when they arrested you.

**Richard Kaplan:** We remember that.

**Saul Cooperman:** What happened was, Tony Cucci was the mayor, and a guy by the name of Arsenio Silvestri, was the business administrator, and Diane Silvestri, who was Arsenio's wife, had a no show job. She had a no show job. She had a desk, and there was dust on the desk, and she never came in, but she got raises. We could prove all this, so they took Kaplan and they threw him-- did they put you in a regular jail, or not, Kaplan?

**Richard Kaplan:** No, it was a complete-- I wasn't even there at the time. Since we're on the record here, you like to tell-- I told him, don't go into that Senate story. I had been in, in the morning, I had gone into her office with my investigator with me, the secretary opened the door, and in it was an empty room with hairspray and a "People Magazine," and that was it. I drove back to Trenton, and I got a call from my assistant who was on site, said the Police Director was there, to sign a complaint against me for breaking and entering.

**Saul Cooperman:** Oh, that's what.

**Richard Kaplan:** Yeah.

**Saul Cooperman:** That's when you called me at night.

**Richard Kaplan:** I still have the-- and then Cary-- just the facts, and then Cary Edwards put me through the ringer to determine whether or not I should get special counsel. That's how it went.

**Saul Cooperman:** Anyway.

**Richard Kaplan:** It wasn't happening to him, it was happening to me.

**Saul Cooperman:** I thought it would be good. I remember there was a Chicago Seven at the time, so when they were going to apprehend Kaplan, I said-- he said, "Now you've got to get-- you've got to talk to Cary to get me counsel," and I said, "No, Kaplan, you're going to be the Jersey City One." I said, "We're going to get great publicity on you. But he didn't go to jail. Anyway, getting serious about this stuff, there were boxes that I read about this, which I really couldn't believe. For example, not only that no-show job, but what was the name of the guy that was the director of personnel?"

**Richard Kaplan:** Lou Lanzillo.

**Saul Cooperman:** Lanzillo, and one time someone told me that Cucci was on television and he was talking about you, Cooperman, and I said, "What did he say?" and he said, well Cooperman is full of manure, in saying that Lanzillo is not qualified. And Lanzillo, once taught physical education, he was in charge of patronage, so he said, "You can tell Cooperman that Lanzillo was a phys ed teacher and he can jump really high. So he jumped high into this position." And Cucci was making a joke, see, a joke. And I didn't think it was too funny at the time. Anyway, so we put together a team, and I wish they were here. Jaynee Lavecchia couldn't come because the Supreme Court wouldn't allow her to come, and Al Ramey for reasons of his own. I e-mailed Al, so he could tell this story. So I'll make it very, very brief. I can remember, first day when we went in to argue the case against Jersey City, and we had Jaynee and Al, and they were both very young at the time, to argue. And in came five guys with briefcases and from the firm of Shea Gould. But Jersey City was a mess. I say this, they were a mess, but nonetheless, they had good lawyers, and I thought, could they possibly win with all the evidence we had? And I remember the show, "Chicago," and remember in "Chicago" if you saw it, there's a song which the lawyer sings in there, and the woman says, "How can you get me off, I put the gun to his head and I shot him, I really did shoot him." He said, "We'll do the old razzle-dazzle." And he sings a song called, "Razzle-Dazzle." And I wondered, could Shea Gould razzle-dazzle us? Well they couldn't, and the judge said in that, for a school district to be taken over by a state, there has to be overwhelming evidence of corruption, ineptitude and so forth, and he said, basically the state has proven this. So we took over Jersey City. And I'll make this very short, because of time. We had one year, and in one year, we had an independent evaluation, the finance, the curriculum, the corruption was all ended. The kids still

weren't learning, the kids weren't learning, and I had a plan, and the only reason I wanted to stay on till the end of my contract, which overlapped the Governor by two years, is, Jake Piatt and I were going to each spend one day in Jersey City the next year, and that year was going to be to evaluate the principals, and, in blunt language, get rid of those who couldn't cut it, and bring in principals who could, and then the second year was going to be intensive training of teachers, intensive evaluation of teachers, and rewarding the teachers who did well, and getting rid of the teachers who could not, and that's what we were going to do in two years. And we thought we had a chance of turning it around academically. Did not work out, and if you read about it, it was correct, you know, that I-- I'll just tell the story very, very quickly. When I resigned after a dust up with Governor Florio, a guy by the name of Ray Chambers called me and he said, "I read in the paper that you resigned and you didn't take a buyout and you don't have a job. Is that true?" And I said, "Yes." And he said, "I have never heard of anyone so stupid in all my life."

<Laughter>

**Saul Cooperman:** Kaplan and others advised me against doing what I did, but anyway, I did what I did, and Chambers then said, "Well I'd like to meet you for lunch, anyway," and then things went off on that path. Anyway, so we did the takeover, we did the educational bankruptcy, and Kaplan was an absolute key player in that, as were Jayneee Lavecchia and Al Ramey. If it wasn't for Kaplan and Lavecchia and Ramey, it never would have come to pass. And I think it should be used very, very selectively, but if someone is not cutting it for the kids, and you've got overwhelming evidence, then the state has a responsibility. The United States Constitution doesn't speak of education, it's under the reserve powers of the state. The State Constitution says, thorough and education, so that's the link for the state to do something. Whether the state should or not, I think depends on the Governor of the particular state. So I'll stop right there and open it up.

**Governor Tom Kean:** Joe, it was a torturously slow path.

**Joe Doria:** It was a torturous legislative path. I have to say, I spent more time meeting during that period. Joe Palaia was the chair of the Assembly Education Committee. We were the minority, I was the minority member of that committee. Mildred Barry Garvin was on that committee also. Now we spent a great deal of time going over that legislation and making changes and trying to craft it so that it would be something that could pass. I made a commitment that I would support it, which was difficult, because Jersey City was in my district, it was the biggest part of my district. But I agreed that something had to be done.

**Governor Tom Kean:** It took real courage.

**Joe Doria:** Oh, thank you. It was something that had to be done. Artie Silvestri's wife, you didn't mention, was also the mayor's stepdaughter, so we didn't mention that. Okay, so that was all tied to the situation, and I knew them all. I knew Artie very well. Louis Lanzillo I knew very well, but the problem was, Jersey City was not getting better, and the children were not learning. And Mildred Barry Garvin understood that also, because she knew Newark and Irvington, she represented them all, East Orange. And so we sat, and let me just say, Rich Kaplan, together with Jaynee Lavecchia, Michael Cole, we sat and we met continuously with Joe Palaia, and we worked some of the parts of the legislation, because the important thing was getting it passed, and we also felt, and I think the Governor, at that time, felt that having some bipartisan support was important. So it was another example of where we could work together, and we did. This time we were in the minority, rather than the majority, but the necessity of doing this was obvious, and the necessity of how it could be done was very important. And I agree with the Commissioner and with the Governor, that this, I think, was a very important step, and I-- the problem was, and I never knew about that second part, Commissioner, about you going in and with Jake Pyatt, who, by the way, was a very good man, to actually go into the district, because the problem became, how then, the development and the movement to change the district during that takeover would occur, and I think that that was the thing that we didn't spend enough time on, thinking of how you take the districts out, and what do you need to do? We spent a lot of time on the other parts, but it was a very interesting vote, when it passed the Assembly. It was a very difficult vote, but there was a lot of people who were arguing. I remember the mayor of Jersey City threatening me. I've been threatened by the mayor of Jersey City many times-- different mayors.

<Laughter>

**Joe Doria:** Different mayors, to be honest, and you know, but I thought at that time, it was the right thing and it was the right thing. And we've moved a long way since then, but the thing that was important, was that there were people like Rich Kaplan and Jaynee and Michael Cole, Ed McGlynn, the people who were around in your administration at different points, Governor, who were willing to sit down with the legislators, whether they were majority or minority to get things done, and that really-- this really was the proof of the pudding.

**Governor Tom Kean:** Now the role Joe played so often, in a bipartisan sense of doing things that were right for the kids, was played in the Senate often by Matty Feldman.

**Joe Doria:** Matty Feldman, absolutely.

**Governor Tom Kean:** Matty Feldman, obviously passed away, he's not here, but nobody should talk about that period without recognizing Matty's contribution. He was really a remarkable legislator from Bergen County. Let me say something I haven't said before. I made a big mistake, probably the worst mistake I made as Governor. I don't know if I ever told you this, Saul, I don't think so. It was on this issue.

**Saul Cooperman:** <inaudible>

**Governor Tom Kean:** The-- I think I did tell you, but the-- but I said at the time, I talked to someone, you know, we're being sued on a thorough and efficient clause. It's in the courts, and we'll probably lose. If that's true, that the court is going to oppose thorough and efficient, why can't I just do it under the Governor's executive power, and a thorough and efficient clause in the constitution? And I remember Mike Cole said, you can't do that, it would go into the courts, you'll be stuck there for a while, and then you'll probably lose it, and better to go the legislative route. And so I said, "Let's look at it again." And so he called Cary Edwards, the Lieutenant General. Cary came back to me and said, you cannot do it, you can't just do it. You've overreached with-- you can't overreach on this one, you know, because you're not going to win it. And so we went the legislative route, which took a couple of years, I guess, and then got sued in addition, so it took another year in courts, I guess. It took three years, we went three years before we were able to do it. I had lunch, after they retired from the Supreme Court, and somehow this just came up, and I said, you know, I was inclined to just do it? You know what they said? We would have welcomed it. We could have done that. Not only that, we wouldn't have had any constraints at all. There wouldn't have been any legislative constraints, good or bad, on our ability to go into that district, and we would have-- you would have had three years to work on it.

**Saul Cooperman:** Yeah.

**Governor Tom Kean:** I mean, that's probably-- it's listening to lawyers, but it's probably the biggest mistake I made as Governor. Not just go ahead and do that.

**Edith Fulton:** I'm sorry, I just wondered if, would an Executive Order of that proportion died at the end of your Governorship, or would it have been able to carry over to other Governors?

**Governor Tom Kean:** It would depend on the next Governor. Yeah, a Governor, an Executive Order is, is the law, but a Governor can change an Executive Order that his predecessor did. So it would have been up to Governor Florio after he had been elected, he could have looked at it, but then he would have had three years to judge it, he would have had three years to look at it, are the kids better, is it working or not working, and if it had been working, I think a Governor in conscience, would have had a hard time overturning it. If it hadn't been working, that's a whole different matter, but it would have given us freedom and it would have given us a lot of time, and we could have set-- if we had been able to do it, we could have set a national example for what you can really do to move in and improve kids' education. You can help the teachers and the schools that really want to do that.

**Leo Klagholz:** You know, honestly, I think we would have put the Supreme Court in a difficult position at the very least, because on Abbott, at every turn, they said education is a state responsibility. When the state has said, we put money in but it's not used as well as it could be, they said, that's your responsibility. What about the board and the superintendent? Oh, you delegate to them. So really it's a question of how long do you delegate when you see these kinds of problems, to what extent? It becomes a whole different discussion. I can see why you would think that.

**Governor Tom Kean:** Yeah, I was-- anyway.

**Saul Cooperman:** I thought there was another reason, too, and it was more visceral with me, was that the Governor's from the suburbs, he's white. I'm from the suburbs, I'm white. A Republican administration, at that time, I was independent, you know, on the thing, and so I thought, and it was things of plantation politics all the time, you know, the state coming in to the urban district, you don't know anything, all you want to do is take over minorities. You know, this is stuff that people may not want to talk about, but it was there. So I argue that the more difficult route, I mean, you know, it was tiresome, for example, Edith, I understood what the NJEA did, it took us six months to overcome this. We lost the first vote. We lost the first vote, because we wanted not only to be able to remove the superintendent-- we wanted the key pressure points to be able to be removed, the superintendent, the board, the director of personnel and the business person. We wanted to be able to remove them for nonperformance. And you know, that was

pretty darn autocratic, but we lost the vote because we wanted to take tenure away from the principals. That was getting too close to the teachers, and so the NJEA bucked us on that. We lost the vote, so we had to allow tenure for principals, which made it more difficult for us. So I just thought we'd win the battle and lose the war if we just went in, and so to go the more torturous route. Now, was I right? Maybe not. Maybe what the Governor says would have been the right, because we would have had three more years. Incidentally, I talked to Steve Perskie, he was the guy that I talked to about the plan. I gave it to Perskie and then when I left, I gave it-- who was the Commissioner after me?

**Joe Doria:** Ellis, unfortunately.

**Saul Cooperman:** Ellis-- I gave it-- I gave the plan to Ellis, and I told him, and I said, no one wants the next Commissioner around, so I said, here's the plan, this is what we're going to do to turn around the academics in Jersey City. I gave him the plan and of course nothing happened.

**Edith Fulton:** What year was that?

**Saul Cooperman:** Pardon?

**Edith Fulton:** What year was that?

**Saul Cooperman:** Ninety.

**Governor Tom Kean:** Yeah, that's when it was over, but when I first proposed it, it was '86, I believe. Yeah, so if we had done it in '86, and by the way, Saul...

**Edith Fulton:** I was already gone.

**Governor Tom Kean:** I just carried Jersey City by a reasonably good majority.

**Joe Doria:** Well you went four out of six of the assembly people in Hudson County.

**Governor Tom Kean:** Yeah.

**Joe Doria:** The only district you didn't win was mine.

<Laughter>

**Joe Doria:** No, you won the district, but we-- and we tried to catch up with you

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**Governor Tom Kean:** And the other thing was that I carried 60 percent of the African American vote. And the people who were for this kind of reform were the African American community, and the people I heard from in favor of taking it over were African American parents in Jersey City. They were the support for it. It was the old establishment that was opposed to it. So I think we would have had-- you know, and nobody ever accused me of being a plantation type. I carried 60 percent of the black vote. So I mean, I think we could have pulled it off, and I think we would have had support of the African American community.

**Edith Fulton:** Plus, I think you were the only Governor to fully fund the funding for that, for your second term. You even got the NJEA endorsement that year.

**Governor Tom Kean:** Yeah.

**Saul Cooperman:** Okay, anyway, very quickly, the report card, I'll just take a moment on that. You know, Bob, just to move ahead of time. You know, Mayor Koch used to always say, "How am I doing? How am I doing?" And we thought that the parents should know how their schools were doing, and so we were the first in the country to have a report card on the health of their school, to the parents of the school. And we formed a report card and got it out every year. Sorry to be so brief on that, but we do want to get to our urban stuff. And the last thing in-- under the area of districts, is the Governor's School, and this was the Governor's baby, it was highly successful. Governor?

**Governor Tom Kean:** Yeah, this wasn't my program, it was stolen. Governors are-- I hope it's still going on. Governors are good friends with each other, and if there's a good program in one state and you hear about it, you call the Governor, he tells you about it, and if it's applicable to New Jersey, you bring it over. Governor School is something that came out of North Carolina. I got it from Jim Hunt. Jim is still a close friend of mine, and Jim gave me all the background, how it was done and so on, so we made a few changes, to hopefully improve it, but the idea was getting the brightest kids in a particular area together for a month in the

summertime, and letting them be with other bright, bright kids, with college faculty, and in the case of sciences and so on, college equipment. And it worked very well in North Carolina. It worked even better in New Jersey. In fact, I'm delighted, before we left office, we had the Association of Governors' Schools meet here, and the guy from North Carolina came and said, you know, "You do better than we do." And I said, "Yeah, I know." But anyway, it was-- it's electric, if any of you ever went to a Governor's School. I got to know the one on the sciences best, because it was at Drew, and stayed at Drew when I was President. And these were kids who were thought of often to be sort of freaks, frankly, in their own schools, because they were so bright, they were so different, and they were sort of off by themselves a bit. And here, all of a sudden, these very bright kids, but somewhat isolated, get together, and all of a sudden they find out, here are kids just like me, who are just every bit as bright, and not only that, we're working with equipment here that we've never seen in high school. We're working with a college faculty who really understand - what happens is electrical. We've had, by the way, we had a Nobel Prize winner, met at the Governor's School at Drew this year, who credits that experience with starting off to the Nobel Prize. And we had it in the arts, and we had it in Monmouth for political science and governance and we had it for the environment down at Stockton and anyway, we had a bunch of these things, and I think there are only about two left. I think they've succumbed to budget cuts and so on, but most of them are supported, I think, by private fundraising now, but they're extraordinary, educationally. They're doing something-- we worry a lot about the lower end. This was something really geared to the top end, to the very brightest students, to enhance their education, make them go even farther and faster, and it worked -- I used to visit every one of them. It was a joy to do. Used to end up and speak to-- it worked, and I remember at Monmouth, it was in government, so they were most interested, ended up with cake and cookies, you know, the dormitories at 10 or 11 at night, talking to the kids and it was fun.

**Governor Tom Kean:** It was a great deal of fun, and the guy who's now-- who is the political guru now who is at Rider, public television \_\_\_\_\_

**Governor Tom Kean:** Yeah, yeah, he tells me Governor's School got him going, that he got so excited about the Governor's School in Monmouth County, he went into the field. And now he's supposedly, I guess, the state's leading political-- anyway, that was the Governor's School, so it was a good thing, and somewhat fun as well, and very cheap, it didn't cost very much.

**Saul Cooperman:** All right, talking about cheap, leads us into Richie Kaplan talked about the takeover, we got into that. Another big court decision was on funding,

and that was a real biggie, and Bob, will you take us through that, and then we'll move right on into the urban area of the agenda.

**Bob Swissler:** Sure, Saul. The funding issue and the legal-- the court cases surrounding it, have gone on for four decades. It started with the Robinson Cahill petition, filed in 1970, the enactment of the T&E law, in 1975, the dismissal of the T&E law by the Supreme Court in the late '70s, and that brings us into the '80s, and the '80s was the Kean-- or at least eight years of the '80s were the Kean administration, and what came out of the ashes, so to speak, of the '70s, was an Abbott-Burke, Robinson-Cahill became Abbott-Burke, filed in 1981. It took seven years for that case to meander its way through the various creations of the legal process. The administrative hearings, Superior Court, Supreme Court, back to Appeals Court, back to Superior Court, so after seven years, a final decision was rendered in the-- It's not a decision, a final recommendation was rendered in the Administrative Law Courts, Judge Steven Lapel, in the Administrative Law Courts found for the petitioners, that the T&E law was unconstitutional, and it provided-- and on grounds it provided both insufficient funds for the Abbott districts and unequal tax impact, property tax impact. Judge Lapel's decision is not a decision, it's referred to constantly in the press and everything-- it's a recommendation. The ALJ is the hearing process for the administrative officer, who happens to be the Commissioner of Education. So he conducts-- he does all the fact finding and conducts the hearings, makes the recommendations to the Commissioner. And that brings us into the '80s, which in 1989, the Commissioner rendered his decision, after studying for over a year, Judge Lapel's decision. The Commissioner's decision, which is a decision, it is a stopping point unless appealed, was very interesting, in that the Commissioner dismissed the ALJ's conclusions, he did not agree with the findings of the ALJ on behalf of the petitioners. The Commissioner adds some, I think, interesting comments to make in his-- if I can read off a couple of them. He found that the State Constitution does not require equal expenditures per pupil but rather a competent level of educational programs, as prescribed by the State Board and Commissioner of Education and by statute, educational statutes. The Commissioner further stated that he proposed that-- he found that, without reform of the educational programs, the amount of money is not the issue, the issue is the educational programming, and that's what should be addressed by the court. The Commissioner further stated that state procedures are in place to address educational programs in local districts, and he referred to all that's been talked about here, the monitoring, the various levels of monitoring, the school takeover law, and at that time it was the enactment of the school takeover law had been in place, and then the corrective action plans that were put together by the department. He cited aggressive actions the state had taken to assist school districts in identifying and rectifying school and district problems. The reporting, the school monitoring, the process level one and two, and the takeover and all those

things I just said. The Commissioner stated that the DOE monitoring of Abbott districts had found specific incidents of leadership failure, mismanagement, patronage, misuse of school funds, etcetera, in some of the Abbott districts. The conclusions the Commissioner came to, the Commissioner's decision of 1989 was in sharp contrast to any preceding decision at any level of the legal process regarding this Abbott Burke issue. It was the first time the decision in this legal process of Abbott Park, challenged the belief that spending more money equals a better education, and that was sort of the heart of the Commissioner's decision. The Commissioner's decision of 1989 was understandably appealed to the Supreme Court by the Education Law Center in 1990, and then at the close of 1990, or in the mid-1990, I guess it was, the Governor's term and the Commissioner's term in office had come to closure. So the history through those two decades were, through various mechanisms, to direct more money to the Abbott districts, and they did, and decision after decision, directed more money into the Abbott School Districts and the educational programs didn't observably improve. The Commissioner's decision, as I say, was in stark contrast to that process, and said, basically, wait a minute, we should be doing something about the educational programs and not just pumping more money, so to speak, into the system.

**Saul Cooperman:** One thing I would add is that you know, when I used to get up and people would ask me questions about this, I'd say, for God's sakes, yes, if the roof leaks, you've got to provide money for the roof. If you're losing teachers, because they're not well paid, we've got to pay the teachers. If the kids don't have science books, they've got to have science books. Those are things they've got to have. But I remember one time there was a superintendent in Jersey City, as it happened, this before I was Commissioner, I was superintendent. I was riding in a car with a guy named Mike Ross, and Mike Ross was a superintendent, and he was really down in the dumps, and he was saying to me, he was saying, "I've got all the money I need. I don't need any more money." He said, "If I could just get the politics out of it, if I could get the envelopes going around, got to contribute to the mayor if I stop putting in incompetent people, and so on," and everything that I saw during the late '80s, when my eyes were fully opened, was ineptness, just wasteful of money, skimming off money, dummy corporations that the board would send bids out to. It had nothing to do with kids, it was like Willy Sutton said, you rob banks because that's where the money is. Well, you rob schools because that's where the money is, too. And from my point of view, not sustained by the supreme court, so there's certainly another side to this, was that where money is the answer, provide money. But where money isn't the answer, and it's leadership, and it's just bordering on crimes, then those are different types of problems, and you've got to solve those problems.

**Governor Tom Kean:** So I think this is a great tragedy, I really do, and let me tell you why. I've never met money properly spent for education, I was for, and the more good money you can get to educate kids, the better I like it. But the court never tied the money to any kind of reform until the very last decision. They started-- they did it at the very last court decision, said, all right, we'll tie money to reforming the schools and changing the schools. But before that, it was simply just Princeton, whatever they're spending, or Short Hills, -- and so it was just raising money, and raising the bar, and the suburbs kept on-- the tax base raised in urban areas, spending went up so high, that we became the number one in the country for pupil expenditures, because of what we're spending under Abbott in the urban areas, we got to the point where, what is it now, \$26,000 per child in Asbury Park or someplace, or more? And you look at the test scores and the evaluations, they went down. They went down in Newark, the same period the spending was going up, the results went down, which is Saul's point. If you'd been able to use that money, -- money is so wonderful when you can use it properly to educate kids, you can do so much with it, but it's got to follow the research, it's got to follow education reform, it's got to follow what's best for the kids. And if we had ever spent this amount of money, really following the research, because after I left the Governor, I went to Carnegie Corporation, we were doing a lot of the research. If that had followed the research, we would now be, without question, the leader of the country in education. We would, without question be the state that people look to when you find out what to do about kids in urban areas having trouble learning. We would be the leader nationally, so I think, these are very good people, a lot of them were close friends of mine, but I think there was a tragic decision by the court, because it misused a lot of money that could have been spent in ways, my own view, could really have made a difference, not only here in the state, but by example, nationally.

**Saul Cooperman:** Okay, we'll move into the urban area. We have about 20 minutes, and I'm going to really focus on one or two areas and briefly touch on the others. In the urban areas, it was somewhat hard to get a clear focus and I think that Bill Bennett and Ernie Boyer, at that time, gave me, personally a focus. You couldn't meet two different people, Bill Bennett, a blustery in your face type of guy, Ernie Boyer, quiet scholarly and so forth, and one a Republican, one a Democrat, and yet when it came to urban districts, when you read their stuff, it was pretty darn close. Bennett wrote a book, "Urban Schools, What Works," and Ernie wrote a book called, "The Imperiled Generation," and they came down, when you look at both of them, and you read this stuff, they said, there are certain things you've got to do. You've got to establish order. If there's chaos, if we were all yelling at once, no one could hear what the other one is saying. So the first thing is, there must be some sort of order. The second is, you've got to raise academic standards, not lower them, raise them. The third, you've got to supervise what you've done,

accountability, to see what the progress is, just like a doctor would do for us on blood pressure and blood tests and so forth. And then you've got to tailor the strategies. Just what the Governor was saying before, take the research, tailor the strategies to a particular problem, you've got to match them up. And finally, teach all children English, and the final thing is work with the parents, which everyone says that, this is very, very hard to do. I mean, I worked ten years on mentoring programs in Newark, and working with parents, it's easy to come off the tongue, but very difficult to do in reality. So we followed that in the department. And most of what you read in the papers was all about takeover and was all about funding, and those were important, but establish order, raise academic standards, supervise progress, tailor the strategy, teach kids English, work with parents and then we threw in an extra one that they didn't mention, adult literacy. So if we could, I'd ask Leo and Jeff to maybe summarize in a minute-- I know this is hard, establishing order and raising the academic standards, because I want to get to the whole area of tailoring the strategies, that's where we really put our emphasis, with so many programs which we think were tailored to the kids in urban districts. Leo?

**Leo Klagholz:** I have three times more material than--

<Laughter>

**Leo Klagholz:** No, seriously, on the order issue, the idea that, in order for students to achieve higher standards, course proficiencies, they need an orderly school environment that's conducive to learning. And discussions also of the effect that disruption can have on that, when a few students are disruptive, how that affects their own learning and the education of their peers. And quickly, three things, one, an initiative to assist districts in writing codes of conduct, and instituting them in their schools, making them a reality, day-to-day reality in the schools. The other side of that coin was helping them also to develop expectations for student behavior that it would not just be rules and sanctions for negative behavior, but what is the desired positive behavior, to motivate students to strive toward an ideal. And then the third one is, what about the disruptive students? Where it's necessary to remove a disruptive student from the mainstream environment, what kinds of programs would be effective to help them achieve a fair and efficient education? Grants were used to create six pilots, districts alternative schools in six pilot districts for disruptive students. And there was evidence that it reduced the dropout rate - the idea being to return them, ultimately, to the mainstream education program.

**Saul Cooperman:** Thank you.

**Leo Klagholz:** You're welcome.

**Saul Cooperman:** Other things. I asked him to do it in a minute because we were under time pressure and all that, but those were three things, and with the disruptive students, if anyone wants to look at this, we kept kids in school, the HSPT scores went up, and ultimately they graduated. Jeff, raising academic standards?

**Jeffrey Osowski:** Well we did three-- we did a lot of things to raise standards, but there were three main ones. We increased the high school graduation-- the rigor of the high school graduation exit test from the MBS to HSPT. We, as you heard earlier, we established course proficiencies to make sure Algebra I was the same in every school district, and the third thing we did was to increase credit requirements from 92 to 110, setting the minimum at 110, with an additional year of science, math and history. In those latter two-- the latter two cases, the credit requirements and the course proficiencies, the urbans were setting much lower standards than were other school districts in the state. So it was really important to raise the bar as high as possible, and that was done across the state, but it had a particular impact in the urban school districts, where they were-- generally, and it's an overstatement, but generally aiming at the lower levels of requirements and one of the arguments made at the time against raising the standards, was that it would be unfair to students in urban school districts to raise the bar, because they wouldn't be able to reach the bar, and therefore wouldn't be able to achieve the high school diploma. Our counter argument was the exact opposite, that it would be unfair not to raise the bar, because we were graduating students in urban school districts, and in other districts, but particularly urban, who were not ready to go on to higher education, or go on to employment, so it was in their interest for us to raise the bar, and then to provide the assistance and guidance and support and funding to enable them to reach that bar.

**Saul Cooperman:** Just a 30 second story here. When we mentioned that argument. I was visited by four senators during my first month as Commissioner . They told me that if I wanted to scrap the MBS and go for this new test, that I would be responsible for dramatically increased dropouts in the state, and I never mentioned this to you, Governor, but the senators also told me that I seem like a nice young man, but if I pursued this, they would guarantee me there would be no second term in my future. So that was Trenton hardball, welcome to Trenton. The third thing of supervising progress, Sybil, I'm just going to say that we tried our best to supervise the progress in a variety of ways. We've discussed some of them. I do want to get to Jeff and tailor the strategies, because, Jeff, take ten minutes on that one. That's the heart of what we're trying to do in urban areas.

**Jeffrey Osowski:** So we raised the bar and we said everybody's got to come up to that bar, and that was only the beginning, because the next step is to provide educators in urban schools, with the knowledge and tools that would enable them to teach their students in a manner that will get them to those higher standards. We-- this is one where there was a comprehensive array of interwoven initiatives, numerous initiatives, aimed at improving teaching and learning in urban school districts, and I'm going to start with just some of the major themes of those and hit on as many of the programs as I can in the allotted time. Improved instruction goes without saying, improved academic achievement goes without saying as a major theme, improved student attendance, decreased dropout rates, decreased disruptive behavior, improved district and school leadership, integration and coordination of programs, so that you didn't have these little dishes spinning around here that were in no way related to each other, that you had to have some way to make sure that things were integrated, and really important at the end. This goes back to the effective schools research that Saul mentioned earlier, is that we wanted to make sure that only research based, proven successful programs were being implemented, and Governor Kean mentioned that earlier, that if we would have invested all of our dollars only in programs that have been proven to get results, we'd be far ahead today compared to where we are now in terms of success in urban school districts. So those are some of the major themes, and now I'll hit on some of the projects and initiatives that relate to those themes. The one that, I don't know, call it most important, because they're all important, but the one that really got a lot of attention was the establishment of high school proficiency test institutes, and the idea here was that through our regional curriculum service units, of which there were three, beginning in the summer of 1985, we provided in depth seminars for educators four days in length with follow up in the school districts on specific instructional strategies that would lead to attainment, instructional strategies that would lead to attainment of the skills, as measured by the new, more rigorous high school proficiency test. And for high school teachers, the training, the seminars were aimed at specifically how to teach those skills, and for elementary school teachers, it was instruction to ensure that their students were achieving what we had set as the benchmark skills that were the progression that leads toward achievement and attainment of the high school proficiency test skills. So that was a really important component, where we, in a very intensive way, for teams of educators, provided seminars on how to improve instruction to attain the new higher level skills. We also established high school proficiency test summer assistance programs, and with significant funding by the State, beginning in 1986, involved 31 districts, all urban, in programs that provided morning remedial instruction for 9,000 students and jobs in the afternoon, And the idea here was not just to improve the academic skills, leading to the HSPT, but also to make the connection that improved achievement is connected in a meaningful way, to the world of work. So the jobs in the afternoon and the instruction in the morning, just made sense in terms of that theme of integration and coordination. The results

were very promising, particularly in the area of mathematics. A related program is the City Summer Session Programs, and a number of these programs were ones that were, as Saul alluded to earlier, were part of our natural progression, but late in the administration. So some of them got off the ground and were very successful, and some were an indication of where we were, late in the Kean administration, where we were headed with the programs and this City Summer Session was one of those examples where 1,000 students in grades five through eight, were provided thematically based language enrichment experiences through things like field trips and research and collaboration with adults and with each other, to address the issue of what's lost over the summer. Because we had ample evidence that, particularly in urban districts, that two month summer period of time, there was a great decrease in knowledge and content lost that had to be made up when the fall came around. It happens with all students, but in the urban areas it was particularly acute. So the City Summer Session Program was our effort in that direction. We had a program called the City Schools of Excellence. This was school based, and I just want to add as an aside, I think one of the things that we came to realize was that, in urban education, if you aim your efforts through the district offices only, that you will achieve limited success, that in some way, you've got to get down to that school building level to the leaders and the educators at that school building level, if you're going to make meaningful change.

For me, one of the "aha's" was that, you know, when we did the school takeover, it really was a takeover of an entire school district and trying to change it in its entirety when maybe one of our efforts might have been more successful, had we looked to taking over school buildings. But it's difficult to do in a school district that has 50 or 80 or 100 school buildings. The City Schools of Excellence, was aimed at the school building level, and there were 50 schools selected. We had them implementing programs with a three year commitment, beginning in 1988, and what they were doing was implementing the proven strategies that were identified through effective schools research, and what grew out of the effective schools research. And the intent here was to implement proven practices, and not things that felt good, seemed good, or were hunches. And there was an awful lot of that happening in those days, before the research on effective schools and other similar researches were bringing to us examples of what really worked at the school building level, and in the classroom, so no more hunches, we wanted to do only what worked. We implemented-- I don't know how far, Saul, you want me to go into this, because there are many other programs, but let me skip ahead to the dropout programs, and there were a few of these.

The one that I think got the most attention and perhaps was deemed as the most successful was the New Jersey Youth Corps Program, and we established nine dropout centers in cities, providing full time education and full time training for

young people ages 16 to 21. This was a very successful program, identified as one of the best of its kind in the United States. And we served 1,500 kids, or young people annually, young adults annually, and when it was compared to the more traditional adult education programs, we found-- these were some of the results. Three times more of the participants got their GED or high school diploma, as compared to adult education traditional programs, five times more were placed in jobs, four times more attained basic skills training than-- as compared to the adult-- the traditional adult education programs, so this is a really successful high profile program, and it was used as a model for others. We also established the residential dropout program. This, too, was late in the administration, and it went beyond the traditional drop out center program, because we recognized that some families were so dysfunctional that it didn't matter what you would do just during the day, so the intention here was, and again, it was our plan moving forward, was to establish pilot residential dropout centers for 100 young adults, and this was a pretty bold program that I don't think ever fully blossomed, because it was so late in the administration, but when you think about it, it was a way to integrate the schools with families that had never been tried before. And to, in some way, provide the circle of support that was necessary in some communities to prevent dropouts and keep young people in school, and have them go on to success in life. How do you want me to go here? I know we're short for time. Were there any particular ones you wanted to get to?

**Saul Cooperman:** There's some pressure on, but you know, most people can eat in a half hour, I think, and we started 15 minutes late. I don't want to kill higher ed, but maybe they can start at five minutes after one, and we can eat at--

<Laughter>

**Saul Cooperman:** If we go to 12:30, that's just ten minutes more. I just want to add one thing to Jeff, I would like to get all of the things that were in the Kean administration. I'll just mention one more in this area. One of our shared values which Bob helped us through was, we research, we plan, we act, just like that, and Jeff was talking about research, research, research, so if anyone came to me with a hot idea, I'd say, did God speak to you, or do you have anything here that it's been tried, it's been researched, you've got some proof here. So we research, then we plan, we argue together, and we used to have real arguments. Kaplan remembers, at meetings, because people don't like to talk against their colleagues, they're always very nice. I would designate one person, we'd call them the bulldog, and the bulldog's job was to be opposite whatever anyone was saying, so they could say something which everyone else was thinking but didn't want to hurt the colleague. So we research, we plan and then act, and one of the things was called, 10,000

mentors, 10,000 jobs. There was a guy from Mutual Benefit Life at that time, Bob, something or other, I can't remember his name.

**Governor Tom Kean:** Bob Van Fossan.

**Saul Cooperman:** Bob Van Fossan, yeah. One time I was at an evening thing, just pleasure, I thought, with my wife, and Van Fossan comes up to me and he says, "Cooperman, these urban kids can't read. They come to the Mutual Benefit Life, and we have to teach them to read." And I thought, oh geez, here we go again. And he was correct, of course, but he was berating me like, you know, like crazy. So anyway, we started, and then we ran at Van Fossan with this, because it was called, 10,000 jobs. Ten thousand graduates, ten thousand jobs, and what we did, was we said, if the kid passed the HSPT, and had attendance of at least 90 percent, and went through a course of ours, which was five days, which was acclamation, getting acclimated to a corporation, we'd give them a card, and we'd say, this kid is qualified to do work in your place, Van Fossan. We're standing behind this kid. And in the first year, we had 560 kids who were placed. And not all of them, but almost all of them were retained by the corporation. So this was just another thing, and these things, all the things that Jeff mentioned, the 10,000 graduates, 10,000 jobs, and others that worked, were all under the radar and didn't get a heck of a lot of publicity. And if anyone wants to know about them, we'd be glad to tell you. the last two things would be, teach children English, work with parents, and then adult literacy. So Sybil, can you do the teach with English in one minute? Talk fast.

**Sybil Nadel:** I don't feel qualified for that, except to say that when we had requests from teachers for certain programs, we did the same thing, we searched who were the best people, what was the research, and would people come to us because of need. I can't really say more than that, because I didn't teach it.

**Saul Cooperman:** Okay, I can say more than that.

**Sybil Nadel:** Okay.

**Saul Cooperman:** One of the problems we had was with Spanish folk and Japanese. And Spanish delegations came in to me, and said I was taking away their heritage because what we said was that kids, if they were in a bilingual transitional program, they should transition to English within three years, and it was up to the school to help them speak English within three years. We had evidence the kids were going through our school systems, eight, nine, ten, twelve years, speaking

Spanish, history in Spanish, biology in Spanish, everything in Spanish, and the Latino community fought this, because we were taking away their heritage. Naturally I argued that, to make it in America, you have to speak English and therefore, bilingual is good, but you've got to learn English. Yet the Japanese parents came to visit me, and were annoyed that their kids were in a transitional bilingual. Why weren't they being forced to learn English right away? And they were very nice, and they said, well you know, not that your schools aren't good, but on Saturday, we have mathematics institutions and academies, because when we go back to Japan, our kids have to compete with the Japanese kids there, and your schools just aren't as rigorous as the schools in Japan. So they wanted the kids to learn English right away. I don't know whether-- I can't remember whether it was that pressure on me, or just, I thought it was good, but we were one of the first two states to participate in Bennett's immersion program, where we took a couple of hundred kids and put them into English right away, the way all immigrants used to do, maybe when our parents or grandparents, or great grandparents came over, and taught them English right away. So yeah, that was really big and people had different views on--

**Governor Tom Kean:** The Spanish community came to see me.

**Saul Cooperman:** Oh really?

**Governor Tom Kean:** The leaders, yes. Checked into you.

<Laughter>

**Governor Tom Kean:** And they said, basically, and the obvious arguments, why can't we learn many of these subjects just as well in our own language? We can learn them just as well, and I said, because their kids would not get good jobs after that, because most of the good jobs in this country require your kids to know English. So what we're saying is, we want you to keep your own heritage, but we also want you to be able to get good jobs for your kids, and when they left, three out of four of those leaders came back and said, okay. And the opposition from that-- from those groups evaporated after that meeting.

**Saul Cooperman:** Thank you. Thank you, Governor, appreciate it. Work with parents, Leo?

**Leo Klagholz:** The Partners in Learning initiative had three phases. The first was a multimedia campaign to provide information to-- in English and Spanish to parents in urban districts and throughout the state on how they can be productively involved in their children's education, in concert with their children's school. The

second phase identified 14 schools that already had effective school parent partnership programs and descriptions of those were created and sent to all districts throughout the state. And then in the third phase, grants were provided to 30 schools, 22 of them urban schools, to develop new effective parent school partnerships. Again, the idea being to get parents productively involved in the education of their children, in concert with the school as a partnership.

**Saul Cooperman:** Thanks, Leo. The last thing was adult literacy; Debbie Kean was cochairman of this with me. We found that there were several hundred thousand people who were functionally illiterate in this state, and so the Department of Education worked with IBM, Mutual Benefit Life, Howard Savings Bank, AT&T, New Jersey Bell, Caesar's and the Sands Hotel. And we took on the job of working with these functionally illiterate people. I worked for a year with one guy who could hardly read. He came in for one hour a week. I always thought about this, was this a false do-good thing, I was being paid to be a Commissioner, should I have done it? Well I did it anyway, so I was working with this one man for a year. But just to show you what could be done, after the year, he got up to about fourth grade, and that was as much as I could get him up to was fourth grade, but he got a job, working in the back of a restaurant, and he could read the vegetables, you know, lettuce, radish, whatnot, know where to put them, and to sort them and so forth. We actually won a national award, and Debbie and I got plaques for this work in adult literacy. So we just mentioned most of the programs, there's some we didn't mention. I want Jeff to have a minute or two and talk about special ed. We didn't talk about principal certification, we wanted to change principal certification, bring people in who did not go through a teacher route, NJEA did not agree with us on this. We also had some choice programs-- vehemently. We had a Choice Program that the Governor was really interested in, and we did this with dropouts around the state. Not time enough to talk about that. And Jeff, special ed?

**Jeffrey Osowski:** Just very briefly, in the prior administration, the Commissioner on the other side of the aisle, who developed-- they developed a plan for modifying special education in the state of New Jersey that moved us away from a medical model, naming the medical type of disability, and toward an educational model. It did many other things also, and we implemented pilot projects through the Kean years, that were very successful in getting more kids included in regular classroom instruction, who had disabilities, in identifying their educational needs, as opposed to just medical needs, and tailoring programs to them. And it was interesting that I stayed on for the next few administrations, in fact, and it started with Al Burstein on this side, on the Democrat side, and when it got to the Democrat administration in the next administration, I hit a brick wall. Fortunately we prevailed and were able to implement all the major provisions, but it was difficult moving-- more difficult moving from this administration to this one, than-- I'm sorry, from the Byrne to

Kean administration, than it was beyond the Kean administration, even though Al Burstein was behind it and was advocating for it all along. But it was a difficult road, and we got most of the things that were designed by the Burstein Commission in place.

**Saul Cooperman:** Governor, can you wrap it up?

**Governor Tom Kean:** The only program I'll mention very briefly, which Marla will remember, was just helpful to me personally-- if it made a difference to anybody else. A thing called, Talks with Teachers. I would get panels of teachers and just meet with them for two or three hours, and just talk. And I'd want to know what was going on in their school, what did they think about some of these initiatives we're talking about, was it practical, wasn't practical, and just talking to individual teachers who were doing the work in their schools. I learned a lot, I really learned a lot, and it was very, very helpful. The other-- all I'll say is, you know, I'm pretty proud of the people in this room, and others, because we became the national model. We were the only state who was mentioned, for instance, in at least two, if not three presidential addresses. They talked about education, they talked about New Jersey and what was going on here. We had a secret visit, I think I can talk about it now. And Saul may remember this, from leaders in the Conservative government in Great Britain. They had heard in Great Britain about what we were doing in New Jersey, and they sent the top educating team from that administration here, and quietly, in that hotel in Trenton, talked to me, probably you. We were-- the British never wanted it getting out that they were taking anything from Americans. So we had to be very quiet about it, but they came here to New Jersey, because they said, we understand you are doing the groundbreaking work here, more than any other state. And there wasn't a report, I think, done by any influential group on what was going on in education in the country in those years, that didn't start with New Jersey, because we were doing so many groundbreaking things. And I remember that now, I was pretty proud of it. And I felt very bad since, because frankly, it hasn't happened since. When the president addresses, he doesn't talk about New Jersey. You know, we don't read, when we read about what's going on, really groundbreaking, we don't read enough about New Jersey and we should. We should be the model. We should be the state. Education should be more important than anything else, it's the future. And I'm proud of what we did, and I think some of the things we talked about this morning, are things that we could still do to improve what's going on in the schools and to help with the education of children, and finally, obviously, it was a very collaborative effort. I mentioned legislators, Joe, and Matty Feldman and a number of others, Al Burstein was certainly one of them. I mentioned Edith, others in the unions, because they were very cooperative and what was best for kids. Agree, disagree, but they were

always willing to talk. Everybody was-- everybody pitched in. Everybody was helpful, and without that collaborative effort, it never would have happened.

**<INTERMISSION AND PANEL LINEUP CHANGE>**

**Ruth Mandel:** We're very proud of this program that we have been developing now for the last several years and especially of the forums like this one when we get an opportunity to hear about the achievements of the individual Governors and beyond-- especially when the achievements happen to be Governor Tom Kean's. I've had the privilege now of sitting in on several forums. The last one was on the arts, and at that time I left that session, and I thought, "Well, if he's done all that, that's it. He couldn't have done anything else." And today, listening to the session this morning--it was actually sitting here-- it was actually the subject itself because it was on education, and I am thrilled. I actually was thinking, "My arm aches because I was patting myself on the back so much about how we actually have done this." We've built this program and videoed these sessions, and we have permanently on the record what is being shared as we get together on these various subjects. And the one this morning on education-- I want to just say one last thing about that and among many that I could, but watching Saul Cooperman lead that session was also-- as I've just told him-- a great privilege. I think it was an amazing example of the coming together of style and content. I was sitting and thinking, "I'm watching a great educator," in the way that you ran that. There were moments when you were going to explain something, and I watched you pick the perfect illustration, and weave it with the background information and just, I hope you go back to the classroom. <coughs> Tickle. The person who actually put together the education program is the woman who's been working with us on developing the Governor Tom Kean's section of The Center on the American Governor, and that's Nancy Becker. And I'm going to turn it over to her now, and look forward, especially, to the afternoon session because, for me, higher education-- it deserves more than the couple of hours it's going to get, but I do remember in the years that the Governor served-- and I served on a couple of search committees in the years after that, and there was no one in the state who's name was ever mentioned in the same category as Tom Kean when it came to who cares about higher education. Who cares about us? He really does. We've got a Governor who cares about higher education. Who should be the president of the university? It should be Governor Kean, and, believe me, there were many discussions like that, and I have no idea what the background was on-- why that didn't come to be, but he was and continues to be in the state of New Jersey an inspiring leader-- a political leader who values education at all levels including

higher education. So, Nancy, if you will get us going for the afternoon. Sorry about my voice.

**Nancy Becker:** I will, and I'm going to be very brief for those of you who weren't with us this morning when we began, please turn off your cellphones and speak directly into the mic because the audio will be picked up directly on the videotape. So that's just a housekeeping issue. I'm going to introduce our afternoon moderator, Marla Ucelli-Kashyap. She served as Governor Kean's special assistant for education from 1986 to '88. She was a senior adviser on state policy issues in elementary, secondary, and higher education as well as on national education activities, and Marla is going to sort of set the stage before we talk about higher education and what was going on at the national level. I just want to say one thing though. Rick Mills, who was Marla's predecessor, was mentioned several times this morning, is unable to join us today. He sends his greetings and regrets to Governor Kean and his former colleagues. Two other people who also couldn't be here because of scheduling conflicts are Chris Daggett and Gary Stein. So without further ado, Marla, it's yours.

**Marla Ucelli-Kashyap:** Good afternoon, everybody. We're going to have a tough act to follow in terms of the content and the richness of the morning discussion and to do it in half the time, but I know we can do that.

**Marla Ucelli-Kashyap:** I'm going to make a little bit of a segue.

**Marla Ucelli-Kashyap:** That's the way things happen-- yeah. From that morning session into our afternoon session-- because I actually only had the privilege of being in the Kean administration for the last couple of years, and I think as I heard you talk, Nancy, I think there's a mistake in my own bio because I really was only there the very last two years. So, frankly-- the hard work had mostly been done by the time I got there, which was pretty cool, and in addition to the Governor, of course, that hard work had been done by Saul-- by my predecessor, Rick Mills. But I didn't want to leave behind the K-12 conversation without taking a minute to say how important that national impact was that you mentioned at the end of that session, Governor Kean. And you really saw in the final two years that I was part of the administration-- that increasing national impact. Earlier on, the Governor had chaired The Education Commission of the States which is the premier organization of legislators as well as Governors connected to education issues. He had chaired The National Governor's Association. At that time, the collaboration among Governors was really strong and really bipartisan. The Governor had gone on to serve on the Carnegie Taskforce on Teaching as a Profession. It produced a report

called "A Nation Prepared: Teachers for the 21st Century" back when the 21st century seemed distant, and that report actually still shapes education policy today and teaching policy today. And I know my own organization, the AFT, is going to be releasing a report in a couple weeks that harkens back to that important work. The Governor also served on something called The National Board for Professional Teaching Standards, which was one of the most important efforts nationally and remains so-- to truly professionalize K-12 teaching. And one little thing toward the end, which I almost forgot, is that you convened a taskforce for NGA on international education. This was after you had been chair of The National Governors Association because you recognized those many years ago that it wasn't just we need to learn another language, but it was about students being exposed to culture, to economics, to understanding the world, and the globalized world that we've come to know, but that didn't seem quite the same some twenty years ago. So I think it's really important to think back to that and to note that a lot of the issues that we were talking about this morning were early recognitions of things that have become important for the country. And we were earlier here in New Jersey in doing those things thanks to the Governor's leadership whether it's the status and support for teaching as a profession, the notion of focusing on knowledge and skills-- not the process of getting into teaching, worrying about what happens to the lowest performing schools or those that are being left behind by leaders and systems who are failing them, and, frankly, collaboration that's based on ideas instead of ideology. And so we were ahead in all of those things. I think we've lost ground on one or two-- maybe that last one.

So let's start our conversation on higher education initiatives, and though they were certainly fewer in number, I think, quite significant. And we're going to focus on four of them. I'll introduce-- I think all of them together might be a better way to do it for the purposes of this conversation. And to say that we want to have a free flowing conversation. Now, that's not to be confused with a free-for-all. Everyone will have to maintain control, but I think we can have a free flowing and really productive conversation given that we have represented in the room Rutgers, the state colleges, the private colleges and universities-- I should say state colleges and universities, the Board of Higher Education at the time, the legislature, the union-- we're not missing anything for having a really good conversation.

So let's focus on a couple of major signature issues if we could, and one of those being State College Autonomy. I believe the legislation was 1986. What we-- a lot of the stories in the paper were about the sort of Big Brother aspects of the Department of Treasury and saying that a college president couldn't go out of the state to recruit. That wasn't an approved expense or the notion that it cost \$25.00 for every transaction that went through Treasury, but it really was not only about the sort of economics and bureaucracy. It was about, in a sense, giving colleges the

opportunity to control their mission and focus as well as their tuition and fees-- what their specialty was and what their focus would be. So it was an incredibly important-- not just about control, but really about developing institutions to be their own institutions.

A second major initiative idea that is related to that one as well is the Challenge Grants Program, and the challenge grants, again, focused on that notion that there is a potential area of excellence, but you need to define what that might be and compete for it, and then figure out how to do it. And so a number of folks in this room have experience with those, and they were not just about public institutions, but ended up being about our private colleges and universities as well and really important for that sector.

The Jobs, Education, and Competitiveness Bond Act of 1988 was-- at the time-- it was late in the administration. It was the largest issuance of General Obligation Bonds in the state's history. I remember distinctly as we tried to have events to prepare for the passage, and it passed very nicely. Thank you. We were trying to come up with the Governor's speechwriters with nice ways to abbreviate that and catchy slogans and really Jobs, Education, and Competitiveness Bond Act does not lend itself to any of those things, but it passed anyway. So that, again, was really important in terms of its focus not only on academic facilities-- library facilities, but also advanced science and technology facilities and the opportunity to build those.

And the last one that I'll mention is the establishment of the New Jersey Commission on Science and Technology in 1985, which as we all know, shut its doors just a couple years ago, and I-- it certainly seems like there are prominent people in the state who are suggesting that wasn't a very good idea, and maybe there's a way to turn that around, but, in my mind, that really formalized the link between economic growth and education for the state and the support for both research and entrepreneurship together. So those are four significant issues and initiatives that have shaped the state-- the state's higher education climate and, to some degree, the state's business climate these many years, and there are also some initiatives and some efforts that have been challenged and changed since then. So I hope that we can have a really rich conversation not only on the what of those things, but on the why, the how, how they came into being, and really what the impact has been. And, hopefully, that kind of conversation will lead us to some sense of direction for the future as well from that terrific legacy. So I'm hoping that someone who is directly affected by the state college autonomy is willing to kick off that conversation from the perspective of the why, the how, and the impact.

**George Pruitt:** Well, that's either me or Harold.

**Marla Ucelli-Kashyap:** So why don't we start with you, George, and then go to Harold? How's that?

**George Pruitt:** Brevity is a challenge. I'll really try.

**Marla Ucelli-Kashyap:** I can help if it comes to that.

**George Pruitt:** I've always been afraid of you, Marla. I think it's important to put it in the context of the state-- the autonomy initiative because a lot of the attention was given to the governance aspects of it and that really-- that was a means to an end. The objective of state college autonomy was not to achieve state college autonomy. The objective was to improve the quality of particularly the last state colleges. Unfortunately, this state has had a history of low expectations for public higher education. The only institutions that escaped that were Rutgers because Rutgers had a history of a private institution, and we were a hundred years behind the rest of the country. Rutgers became a public institution a hundred years after the Land Grant was signed by Lincoln, and so the expectations of the rest of public higher education was one of very low expectations. And that was generally acknowledged, and so I believe it was the Board of Higher Education that appointed the Commission on the Future of State Colleges, and it was chaired by Tony Cicatielo and Bill Maxwell. And even in that report, it reflected the low expectations of the state because it said that to improve the quality of these institutions and bring them up-- to give them the opportunity to serve the people as they should, there are certain changes that had to take place, and that the state would never do the right thing. It basically said what needed to happen was that these institutions needed to be given the same governance flexibility as Rutgers. They needed to be competent, independent, distinguished trustees to attract talented leadership to attract talented scholars, and do the things that colleges and universities had to do, but that the state would not do that because of our rich traditions and culture. And so if we create a thing called the University of New Jersey, the state might give the authority to another bureaucracy instead of giving it directly to the institutions.

And when that core report was issued and the discussions then soon following that-- and I can't-- it's a big loss not having Rick Mills here, but as Harold and some of the rest-- and Bill Maxwell and Seymour Hyman and a bunch of other presidents-- Vera Farris, too. We began to particularly beat up on Bill, who chaired the thing, about why create this burdensome bureaucracy and why not just do what the report called for. And it was, essentially, Rick echoing the Governor who said, "If what's

needed is this structure, then why-- " and I remember. I think you-- I remember this quote from you, and I don't remember what room-- what the meeting was, but you said, "If that's what needs to be done," you said, "then why don't we do that?" That's what your first response was. The people that put that commission together looked around and said, "Well, we didn't know we could do that." And it was Rick who was-- kept challenging us to--that the objective was not the mechanics of how to run a school. The objective that the states aspired to was to have nationally distinctive, high quality colleges and universities, and there was a unanimous consensus that the only way that was going to be achieved was to change the governance structure over these colleges and universities.

So we met to try to figure out how to do that, and I remember there was a--and I'm going kind of be quiet now, and turn it over to Harold, but there was a meeting in Bill Maxwell's conference room with Joe Doria and Harold Eickoff, and I know I was in there. And I don't remember who else was in there. And we sat around the table and took The Commission on the Future of State Colleges' report--took all the nonsense about The State University of New Jersey out of it and started looking at it element by element. What should the governance structures of colleges and state colleges and universities look like? And that eventually became-- and turned into The State College Autonomy Bill. Joe Doria did a lot of drafting of that bill. We also did a lot of work with - the member of your staff, a young woman named Jean Bogle, who was in the counsel's office-- who helped to shape that, and then it began the challenge of working with Joe, who was chairing the education committee at the time, the state college presidents had to try to tactically figure out how to get the bill passed. And I'll stop now because I talk too much. I'm going to defer to Harold, but I do want to tell-- or I am going to tell one story before this over about how Joe Doria ended up voting against his own bill, but that's--

**W2:** Unless Joe tells us first, right?

**Joe Doria:** Well, we'll let George tell it.

**Donald Edwards:** He was for it until he was against it.

**George Pruitt:** No, he was always--

**Joe Doria:** I was always for it.

**George Pruitt:** He was always for it, but it is the nature of the politics with this state. With these guys, strange things happen, and I've got the bill in a frame on my wall, and you signed it on my birthday, July 9, 1986. And the thing that I don't like about it is that your name is not on that bill, and it should be.

**Joe Doria:** You can rectify that.

**Marla Ucelli-Kashyap:** Harold?

**Harold Eickoff:** George has done his usual job of getting the context of trying to \_\_\_\_\_ something more to the \_\_\_\_\_ in which I'll do so briefly.

**Marla Ucelli-Kashyap:** Harold, will you move the mic closer to your face because I-- thank you.

**W4:** No, don't do that.

**Harold Eickoff:** Is it working now?

**W5:** No, I don't think that mic is--

**Marla Ucelli-Kashyap:** It is working.

**Harold Eickoff:** Aha, it's-- I knew you moved me over here for a reason.  
<overlapping conversation>

**Harold Eickoff:** All right. Okay, so what stands out to me in this process of gaining autonomy is, first and foremost, the leadership of the Governor who, through it all, was there to make plain that he had expectations and high expectations and was ready to support those high expectations, but there's that message that it had to really come from the institutions. And all of that was just a theme that was there all the time. "It's up to you people-- the leadership of the institutions to come up with the ideas," and when we finally did get to the point of what should be the structure-- if you would-- there was a spirited dispute and amongst the presidents, and it broke down as George suggested that he-- George and I as well as Nick Weiss from Kean were on one side and Bill Maxwell-- and I mentioned his name, and I want to just take a minute to honor him because Bill was one of those people that-- who

was just like a bulldog. When I arrived in New Jersey in 1980, he was already on the ramparts about freeing the colleges to develop their missions without all of this burdensome and stifling bureaucracy. But in any case, Bill and Seymour Hyman from Patterson, were on the other side of the issue. They wanted a state system, and as I remember it, Chris was-- Chris Daggett was there and pushing hard for a system. He was enamored by the North Carolina system, and I was constantly there-- as I remember it-- holding up another example of a state college system that was utterly stifling, and that was the University of California state college and university system. But without going down that road any further to suggest that what is always there was let's do it right. And we need all the ideas and the debate that we can get our hands on, and that was the message that kept coming out from the Governor's office. And so I remember that meeting also in Bill Maxwell's office, and I get specific about Joe's role there. We were wondering, "If we don't go down the path of the system, what do we do?" And then we began to brainstorm, and then Joe said, as I remember it, "Sounds like the model you could use right out of what's already in existence-- " a way to coordinate the state college's efforts because everybody agreed that we weren't ready to go off in the weeds all by ourselves. Joe said, "Let's use the School Board's Association." Do I have that title right?

**M7:** That's right-- the School Board's Association.

**Harold Eickoff:** School Board's Association is the model, and I remember saying, "What's that?" And you went to Bill's bookshelf and pulled down the appropriate statutes, and gave us the details of that. And so it was through this process that was always there or always operated within an environment that was open for ideas for the best way to get the job done. And the job that was to be done was to have the institutions freed-- giving them freedom to act-- to develop their missions and to come up with something that would be distinct.

**Joe Doria:** Let me say I remember that meeting also very well and the discussion that took place, and I was supportive of the concept of autonomy. And thought the idea-- I was not as supportive of Bill's idea-- Bill Maxwell of the university, but I thought that autonomy was a good idea, and I suggested the school board model of creating the governing association. Eventually, that was my bill, and I was always supportive, but what happened was we got caught in a political crossfire. This is a case where the leadership had more control than usual, and the leadership basically created a party position on the autonomy bill-- not on the governing bill because it was mine, but on the autonomy bill, and so we ended up having a party position. So I couldn't vote, and, actually, this was-- this actually was good in one way because by doing this on this issue, I eventually was freed to do the school

takeover because I said, "Wait a minute. You can't do it all the time. We can't have a party position all the time." I said, "Alan Karcher," and I was the Minority Leader at that time, as you remember, he went from Speaker to Minority Leader. And I said, "You've got to give us some movement," and Mildred, at that time, argued. So we were successful on the takeover, but on this one, he was vehemently-- and it was more a thing with the unions who were opposed. And that's where it became the issue it became. So this is where sometimes party positions and politics do enter into it unfortunately, but, fortunately, the bill did pass, and the governing association was created, and it worked well because what Bill saw and what all-- George and Harold saw in the present was the need develop the schools further-- not to just to be teachers' colleges, which they were, but to become comprehensive colleges. And the autonomy bill allowed them to do that. They were moving in that direction already, but it gave them greater ability to become comprehensive colleges no longer just to be doing teaching. So it was the right step. Unfortunately, as I say, politics sometimes enters into these things, but it worked out well in the end, and I think the governing association-- Michael-- no, Darryl here can talk about it. Michael can, too. It has worked out to be very successful.

**George Pruitt:** There were three bills. There was a package of three bills. The first bill was to create--

**Marla Ucelli-Kashyap:** Microphone, please.

**George Pruitt:** I'm sorry.

**Marla Ucelli-Kashyap:** Oh, no.

**George Pruitt:** The governing board association-- and that was not controversial, so that one passed. And then we were able to create the governing board association and recruit Darryl. The thing that the opponents misjudged was that by creating that association, it created the vehicle to work, but the other two bills, which would be important bills, we had important legislative support-- I want to mention-- particularly from Matty Feldman. You mentioned him earlier.

**George Pruitt:** He was very-- and the other one was John Lynch and the unions made John mad. And he had a big fight with the. But the creation of the governing board association-- if we hadn't been able to-- if the stars aligned correctly-- if we hadn't had the governing board association, we would have had a hard time getting that bill passed.

**Thomas Kean:** Well, so much for my point of view at the time, but some of the college presidents who didn't think it was-- who had a different vision of how it was going, they didn't recognize there were two presidents, who just by proximity, had much better access to the Governor. One was Harold, who I'd come into my outer office and see all the time, and we'd chat, and the other was George because they were right there. And so that was-- because I heard their point of view, and the other was that those two and so many others impressed me so much, frankly, with their ability. And if you're going to make autonomy, you have to have-- you had to have real confidence in the people who are going to do it. And, yeah, you looked at somebody like George or Harold, then you had no question whatsoever that if they got autonomy, it was going to-- they were going to make their institutions a much better place. And that vision-- I mean, that vision for both-- you look at both institutions today, and others in the system as well and recognize what they've done. I mean, what George's institution is one of the most-- it's the model for the country as to the way you've developed it. Harold, your institution's now rated almost number one or number two in the country.

**Harold Eickoff:** It's always number one.

**Thomas Kean:** I mean, so the vision both of you-- your vision and so many other visions of college presidents of that time had-- public and private-- was implemented. But it was, frankly, the ability of the college presidents and my confidence in that ability to really take the autonomy and run with it-- of their own vision and implement that vision, and the vision wasn't quite right. We didn't give them the grant that year. We said, "Go back and revise it a bit, and come back another year," but once the vision was right, and the leadership was right, I had full confidence that the system was going to prosper.

**Marla Ucelli-Kashyap:** And just before we go to Darryl, I know you were trying to get something in there. I think it's really important to remember that at that time, New Jersey's support for its state colleges and universities was the bottom of the barrel practically in the country, and so there had to be some way of being able to address that to some degree at the same time as addressing the direct-- the institutional needs around governance and control and all those good things. Darryl, and then Frank.

**Darryl Greer:** Just a quick comment or two to tie together what others have said. And I'm sure Governor Kean doesn't remember this, but I was recruited as George said. The first autonomy set of laws, the Governor vetoed. That's right because it was half a hog at best, and I was just being recruited. And I didn't know Rick Mills

from Adam, and it was-- the Governor was in Washington. I was, at the time, in D.C. heading national relations for the college board. And George, and Harold, and Vera Farris, and others. I was just lucky enough to be recruited to what to what has turned into a job for life it seems. And even-- so I asked Rick if the Governor was at The National Governor's Association meeting, and I said, "I'd like to meet Governor Kean," and colleagues in D.C. said, "You're crazy to go to New Jersey." And I was young and better looking and skinnier at 36. And remember, Rick said, "The only time you can see the Governor is in the hallway between meetings," and so I met him, and I was convinced then that I was coming home to New Jersey because of-- we just had a minute or two-- because of his belief in improving-- it wasn't just about autonomy-- improving higher education for the citizens of the state of New Jersey. One day I got with the Governor's staff on the floor during the fight for the passage of the bill in '86, and, of course, Jack Ewing, who we haven't mentioned, was there with Mattie all the time. The Governor was always gracious and he was a great coach. And he would pull often-- and Marla you did this after Rick. The Governor really wanted to meet with the college presidents and trustees, and he would give us pep talks. And say, "This is your fight. You have to get in there. You-- I believe in you. Believe in yourselves." And those last votes-- and George I think you'll remember this-- he always gave credit to the presidents and the boards of trustees, but really those last few votes to get that law passed-- if Tom Kean had not-- had the depths of belief and the integrity that he had to use the capital of the Governor to say, "We really need to do this," it wouldn't have happened. But the last thing I'll say is one thing that-- after the law passed, and we met with him, and Cary Edwards was moving over to the AG's office, and the Governor made it very clear. "You won. We feel good, but now you have to lead." And he said, "Take responsibility. You have to take responsibility." And one thing the association did was we took that seriously, and so I just happened to be-- with Mike's help-- there's some reports that on the implementation of state college autonomy-- that I don't believe anyone else. I don't think the department ever really played a significant role in helping it happen. And it was this memorandum of understanding between the chancellors of institutions to implement on time-- over three years. So we didn't get it automatically, Joe. It took three years, and so the association began in 1987 every year-- to document, "Is it working? Did we get it?" And the last report written on that was the final report on the implementation of autonomy in 1991, which surveyed all the presidents and trustees, and actually came up with a number of recommendations that carried us forward. One last thing, and I'm sure the Governor wouldn't mind if we sell a few more of-- but this is a letter that I kept in the Governor's book, "The Politics of Inclusion", and it's dated December 21, 1989. So the Governor's about ready to take a vacation after two terms of leadership, and I know that Marla-- this is the Governor's signature, but I really know who stuck this book in front of him. And there's one thing that I have to say. The Governor is-- he didn't quite complete this agenda. He wrote an inscription to me. It says, "To Darryl: Keep those colleges in line." I failed.

**Joe Doria:** Very good.

**Marla Ucelli-Kashyap:** That's great. Thank you. Frank?

**Francis Mertz:** As a non-state college person, I guess, what was hitting me so much though is that as we look at this, we always have to look at it in context. That autonomy was not nearly a result of-- let's say—a piece of legislation as much as it was the culmination of a number of steps that were taken going back. One could even say that you were the pre-Governor education leader if we go back in the roles that you played in the legislature that set part of it because what hit me was the statewide plan in 1981, which had that important section that was devoted to not merely autonomy, but accountability. And that was the acceptance on the part of the institutions-- state-- as well as the rest of us. To continue with autonomy, we had to always be accountable, and I think this was-- it was part of a "pre-challenge" challenge for us to take what has been given, and then find a way to nurture that and to give it back to the rest of the system. And I think that has been done at that period of time.

**Marla:** Don, and then Mike.

**Donald Edwards:** Can I add something from a Rutgers' perspective? We weren't directly involved in the autonomy bill. Although, I think the level of Rutgers' autonomy, which was always a little shaky, may have been a model, but, George, what you said about expectations reminds me of something that I think had a profound impact on Rutgers' relationship with the state. You may think the state has always had high expectations for Rutgers, but if I look back to the 1970s, I don't think that was the case. And despite my continuing fond feelings for Brendan Byrne, I think Brendan and Dick Leone and others in administration essentially felt that New Jersey had a first-class university, and it was called Princeton. And that the role of Rutgers was to provide wide access at a low cost, and that was really the expectation. I remember a moment-- today, you will remember, Governor, but maybe not for this reason. It was December 11, 1981, and Linda will remember this. In fact, that may be the picture you have. The board of Governors gave Ed Bloustein a party to note his tenth anniversary as president of Rutgers at that house after a board meeting. Well, I'd been trailing after him-- the Governor throughout the campaign and working on the staff to develop relationships. And somehow or other, the Governor accepted an invitation to come to that party, and when he came in-- the reason he'll remember the day, it was the day his election was finally certified, December 11. He actually was the Governor-elect, but I remember, Governor, you came in, and you told the crowd that you had just come back from a trip to Wisconsin, and you said being in Wisconsin reminded you that you can't have

a great state without a great state university. And what that did for expectation-- for our mission statement, which the board had been lingering over and so forth, really will always, for me, be the beginning of what happened at the end of what everyone here looks back on-- rightly-- as a golden age for the university and for higher education.

**Marla Ucelli-Kashyap:** I've got Mike, and then I'm going to come back to George.

**Michael Klein:** Let me just try to point out Darryl and then Frank's points together. I can't say-- the governing board is now called The Association of State Colleges and Universities has kept the institutions in line, but we have taken the accountability challenge from the Governor to heart. And I'm fiddling around with my cellphone trying to find this report from The National Center for Higher Education Management Systems came out with a report in 2005 that's been revised a couple of times. Our set of nine institutions is one of the most productive in the country. Governor, I know you know that already, but in terms of-- they measured productivity a couple of ways. The one I can remember is appropriations and degrees created at a ratio to state appropriations, and we pump out more graduates than anybody-- top five in the country. So the proof is there that with our boards of trustees-- and we can get into a discussion about the importance of institutional governance and the appointments coming from the Governor onto our boards of trustees, but that's what drives the quality of these institutions and their commitment to this-- commitment to their mission and their service to the state, but it's there 25 years later.

**George Pruitt:** The point briefly I want to make about expectations and why the Governor's personal commitment is so important is that you're right. I mean, the history of-- this state has a fairly poor excuse supporting public higher education at all levels, but at least for Rutgers-- when Ed and I would go out and talk about world-class university, people understood that, and thought, "That's a good idea." The problem with the state colleges and universities is that they have always-- and to this day-- struggled with a kind of a preconception-- a fortunate conception that they need to stay in their place. And that when they behave in a way to get uppity and out of their place instead of being supported, that's a bad thing. When we were going for the challenge grant we were asked to talk about whether aspirational institutions were the institutions that we were trying to be like, and the Governor kept saying that he wanted the public institutions in New Jersey to be amongst the best in the country, but he was-- but that was not the culture. That's not the culture of the Board of Higher Education. I mean, this autonomy stuff-- we were part of the delicate challenge of getting this through because we conspired with Rick to isolate the Chancellor because the Chancellor was not fair on this stuff because of

control-- some control issues. And Ted's a good friend, and I have great affection for Ted. And, Ted, to his credit, did believe in higher academic standards, but there was a sort of Rodney Dangerfield issue about the state colleges. So when we were asked who did we want to be like-- and I remember this meeting we had-- Harold Eickhoff said, "Who do you want your institution to look like?" He said, "William and Mary," and people didn't salute him. They laughed at him because you were a New Jersey state college. What we got from the bureaucracy-- from the political culture-- was, "These people are out of their mind, and that's not their role. That's not their function," and to this day, the success of these institutions has been extraordinary, but it's been in spite of the state not because of the state. And so the institutions that have been most entrepreneurial and the most-- and that have done the best job of breaking out of the box, they haven't been celebrated. They've been punished. So it-- so that's the cultural challenge, but I want to get back, though, to your role in this though because none of this would have been possible had you not been out-- I mean, the challenge-- it would be-- all of these initiatives from Connecticut-- the challenge grant thing was connected to the autonomy thing because the issue was that autonomy was not the objective. The objective was to create excellent institutions, and so first, you had to have the tools to do it. Then, you had to have the resources, and then you had to look at the accountability and this concept of mission differentiation, which I'm sure we'll talk about later, but think of those things together. We got attention. I know the K-12 people-- some got celebrated nationally, but fewer higher education initiatives were celebrated nationally as well. Public college presidents in this state would go to national meetings, and we got tired of hearing about Governor Hunt because the new book-- because those presidents were going around saying, "We have the best Governor in the world." By the time you left office, people were saying, "We wish we were in New Jersey," and so none of that would have happened though without you, essentially, setting the standard, defining the expectation, and giving permission, and using the influence of your office to say that for this to work right, the aspirations of these institutions have to be very, very high-- not just the state colleges that are in a box and that are getting too big for their britches, but the biggest problem we have, then and now to this day is, that there is no aspirational expectation for these sets of institutions. And that was one of the advantages that Rutgers did have. People did say that Rutgers should be the university, and that has not yet come into place for the rest of us.

**Linda Stamato:** One-- I thought this wasn't going to be an appropriate segue, but as it turns out, it is. Having been on the board of higher education and the chairman of the Rutgers' board in the early days of your administration, it was obvious to me that having a deep and personal relationship that you had with Ed Bloustein from your appreciation of opera to your appreciation of much of the institution. There was a palpable sense, and I think Ed felt he had died and gone to

heaven because both Brendan Byrne and he were lawyers. They had a contentious relationship. Brendan looked a little bit too closely at our budget, I think, we felt, but there was a sense that in subtle as well as significant ways, higher education mattered to you. So-- but it wasn't just Rutgers. It would be going to The State Board of Higher Education meetings, and you would come. I mean, I don't think anyone ever since has, and I think that the notion that this mattered-- it got the attention of a lot of people in a lot of different places-- not just higher education. So, in a sense, by raising not only the expectation of the institutions, but the place of higher education in the state was part of your significant legacy. And I have to say that it's too bad that it hasn't been more closely emulated.

**Marla Ucelli-Kashyap:** Harold, and then I think we should start to segue a little more specifically into challenge grants that people have mentioned a bit.

**Harold Eickhoff:** I'd like to say a word about trustees. When I became president, I was blessed with a wonderful board of trustees, and I'll name the person who was chair for, I think, six years, Erna Hoover. Here was a very dedicated, highly capable layperson who kind of loaded the college on her back--

**M1:** Fierce.

**Harold Eickhoff:** --and she was something fierce. You're right. There was no one I'd ever known had-- no layperson-- board member-- ever had the passion for making the college what it is today than Erna Hoover, and that, to my mind, was a key to the implementation of autonomy. She was there before autonomy came and lived through the early days of it, and was simply a splendid example of what trusteeship can mean to a college. And I go back to her passion for the cause, and she had it before Tom Kean was elected, and then he just poured octane on to that high octane already, which was a very good thing to keep the expectations before-- not just the president and college community, but for the trustees as part of that community.

**Thomas Kean:** I always, I remember once when Ted Hollander came out with two or three people. He said, "These are the candidates for, I guess, the Rutgers' Board of Governors," and I said, "Okay, Ted, I'll think about them." So I picked up the phone. I called up Bloustein. I said, "Is this who you want?" He said, "No." I said, "Who do you want?" And he gave me a list, and I went back to Ted. I said, "I think we're going to appoint these people." And he sort of looked at me wondering where I got those names. I never told him I got them from the college president.

**Donald Edwards:** Governor, I told this story before, but I can say it publicly because he's been very public about it. When you came into office, we had a board member appointed by the previous administration who freely admitted that he'd been put on the board to get Ed Bloustein fired. You, on the other hand, appointed Tony Cicatiello, who came in, and said, "Hey, I went to Ohio State. Why can't Rutgers have the kind of excellence, clout, and so forth that Ohio State did?" Tony had so much to do when raising expectations of what's possible within our board. Thank you for that and many others.

**Nancy Becker:** I'm just going to add. Tony is flying back from London today. Otherwise, he would have been with us today, too.

**Linda Stamato:** Steven Bailey, who most people will know was one of the eminences in higher education had the following to say about boards of trustees. He said, "An institution can be worse than its board, but it's seldom, if ever, better." And I think that it's-- one of the things we don't often appreciate when we look at corporate boards, and we see how wanting they can be when it comes to things of great significance within the economy and corporate world generally, but with higher education, this was something that often happened just because someone came to someone's attention not because there was a full understanding of what a trustee could actually mean to an institution, and I agree with Harold. Erna Hoover and I had many battles, but they were very principled and fun to have. I think that the effort that the State Board made to vet candidates helped to reduce the number of political appointees that tended to come forward, but I think in your case, Governor, there was an effort to actually raise the level of commitment and conviction on the part of the people that you appointed, and I think that made all the difference in the success of that time we had.

**Marla Ucelli-Kashyap:** Thank you. A lot of times when we use the word challenge, it's a euphemism for something we really don't want to have to deal with, but there it is in front of us, and we have to. But in the case of The Challenge Grant Program, it was the challenge that everyone wanted to face eventually. And many got the opportunity to do that, and I wonder if we could hear from the perspectives of the different types of institutions-- some of-- how that evolved from one sector to the other and what it meant. Again, looking at the impact. Anyone want to kick that off?

**Donald Edwards:** Yes, we were that early with the distinction, and the first set of appropriations-- the \$20 million for Rutgers-- for our world-class scholarly leaders became The Challenge Grant Program more and more broadly. That actually grew

out of a sophisticated, I think, strategic approach that the Governor fully appreciated. We knew when you came into office, Governor, that you didn't have two nickels to rub together, but we talked about how to put together for the long haul a strategy that it would not just involve state funding, but would involve private sector, corporate, research partnerships, tuition, but the full range of support. And we decided to put together a blue ribbon committee, and we identified Harold at PSE&G, a Rutgers alum who'd had little involvement with the university-- to lead it. And we went and asked you to encourage him to accept, which you did, and he did, and then a year later, he came back and asked you for money for Rutgers. It worked very, very nicely, but the condition was-- the accountability was that the use of that money really had to be for new initiatives and absolutely the best people. And the Governor later remarked that he had heard criticism that Rutgers was raiding Oxford and other places, and I think that gave you a lot of pleasure and pride, but I remember escorting that first cohort of scholarly leaders down to Trenton for your State of the State address, and you had them up in the balcony and introduced them as though they had won a football championship. It was really very exciting.

**Thomas Kean:** Well, there was a reason for that. I told Ed Bloustein-- I said, "Here's the money. You have to convince me that every one of these people you're bringing in is a scholar of world renown in his or her field, and maybe the best in the world in that area. And if you can convince me of that, then we'll pay for them. We'll pay for their research assistant. We'll pay for their whole thing on a continuing basis in addition to your budget." And he took up that challenge-- brought in remarkable people. The problem we got in trouble with the United Nations was when we took the best plant biologist in the world out of Oxford, and the British delegate to the United Nations complained American universities were raiding the best minds in England just simply by offering them more money and used this guy as an example. I was so proud of that, but the time-- Joe, I used to meet often with the legislative leadership, and they'd-- they were very cooperative except they're a little annoyed by some of the things I kept going after them for. They thought I was always giving a little too much to the arts, and so they'd say, "Well, we're not going to give you that in next year's budget." And after we did, I guess, the original big appropriations for higher education, they said to me, "And by the way, you've increased higher education enough. Don't expect any additions in the next budget." So I said, "Well, I think I'll put in some money. You guys want to take it out? That's fine." And so when I gave my-- I think it was the Budget Address on the-- and I got this from Ronald Reagan, who was a master at this kind of thing, that's when I asked Ed to have these people come down. And when I finished the budget address, I said, "And by the way, many of you are saying, 'What do you get for putting money into higher education? What do you really get?'" And I said, "Well, I'll tell you what you get. Sitting in the balcony here-- I want to introduce you to this

gentleman. He is the best plant biologist in the world. He used to be at Oxford-- renowned there-- guess what? Now, he's at Rutgers-- at our state university." He stood up and everybody applauded. I said, "And by the way, the best young black historian in the country was-- I don't remember the name. And I said, "You know something? We have him now in New Jersey. Aren't you proud of that?" Legislature-- all of them applauded, and I had went through about four or five of them, I guess, and they're all very distinguished fellows. They all got up and bowed. It was the end of my tour. And I said, "And you want to know what you get for properly spent money? That is what you get." And they all gave a standing ovation -- they stood. So I didn't have any problem with the increase in higher education funding that year, but that's-- they were very helpful for all of you-- all the rest of higher education because of that.

**Marla Ucelli-Kashyap:** Frank, and then Norman.

**Francis Mertz:** I think we were the end of the Challenge Grant-- the independent sector, and Tom was critical there in being the catalyst and endorsing a change that we crafted together, which talked about accountability with the funding, but it also-- for the sector because I think-- many had a view that--

**Marla Ucelli-Kashyap:** Frank, move your microphone, please.

**Francis Mertz:** Many had a view that Princeton was the only one of the really quality places, and this gave a chance for everyone to show the contribution that, at that point, the other 15 were making to the independent sector in New Jersey, but it also, in a sense, brought credibility to what we were doing through Ernie Boyer who became the chair of that group. And somebody was also mentioning this morning Greg Amrick, and Greg sat on that same group. Marla became part of the-- as we finished Marla was working, I guess, with Ernie, and it was actually 25 years ago next month that the Report on the Commission on the Future of Independent Higher Education in New Jersey came into being, and I think what it did internally in the schools did an awful lot, but it also, I think, identified a credibility beyond those 16 institutions because not long after that, the Education Commission on the States, also formed a special study group on state policy independent higher education. That was chaired by John Ashcroft and Clark Kerr. But I think that continuing a presence and making clear that independent higher education was integral to the fabric of higher education in this state, and it wasn't the money that we were looking for. It was to make better what we already were doing, but even more importantly, what we knew we had to do for the future. And I think looking back on this, that we plant seeds today that have to be harvested at another time.

We talked about the JEC 1988. It took what-- 24 years for the second one? And the bond issue before that might have been in the 1960s--

**Joe Doria:** Eighty-four.

**M3:** Eighty-four.

**Francis Mertz:** Well-- the science and tech, but the big one was the 1966 one, which was a \$250 million one.

**M3:** And we lost one in '79.

**Francis Mertz:** Oh, yes.

**Francis Mertz:** But in this environment we constantly have to be turning over the ground, planting the seed, but I think what you gave us was a vision for education both as part of the legislative group as well as part of being the Governor. And I think that our gratitude did not end when you left that office and joined us as colleagues not long after, but I think today, your legacy still lives on for what you planted then. And our job is to continue to plant seeds.

**Norman Samuels:** Just to give you the perspective of somebody who was a working provost at that time, and in a sense, I look at each of these separate elements, and they're really all part of a single flow, but I mentioned the world-class scholars. And by the way, one of the people who should be mentioned in this session is Alec Pond, who was really the motor, and, for me personally, the guide as to how you do these things because the way to get those people from Oxford and all the rest of it is itself a deep and arcane skill. It doesn't just happen by calling them up, but each of these things led to others. It was a way of inspiring provosts, deans, department chairs-- that this isn't a joke anymore. This isn't something that well-- lip service is going to be paid. We're really for real. We really want to bring the quality of the place up, and when you watch the first group come in, I can't really describe to you at this point the excitement. One rarely uses the word excitement in the context of the bureaucracy of higher ed, but it was really exciting. You bring these people in. One of the wonderful things about recruiting people at that level is that one of the conditions they invariably place is that, "If I'm going to come, there are two very promising young researchers in my lab that I need to bring with me, and there's a technician without whom I can't do any of my work." And usually, there's a team of six or seven that come along, so before you know it,

you have added not five or six people that you first saw, Governor, but you've added 40 people-- all of them accustomed to working in the very best places with the very best goals and in the best methods. They then come back to you, and they say, "I can't work here. What we've got to do is take these labs, and turn them into the best in the world."

So that leads you into the next bond issue, and the next bond issue in turn leads you to The Commission on Science and Technology. So really what Frank says about planting seeds, I would have talked about getting the ball rolling. Any one of those phrases really is the same. Once you get it started, it's going to build, and it's going to increase. There's another way that I think you've had that kind of impact that really isn't specifically listed in here, but I think it should be spoken to as well. I spent 20 years of my childhood as Provost of the north campus of Rutgers University, and one of the things that Saul Fenster, Stan Bergen, Zach Yamba, and I, who constituted ourselves as CHEN, The Council on Higher Education Newark, spent an enormous amount of time-- as we really tried to connect the two portions of today's meeting-- that is to say-- the higher education part and the general education part, and one of the enormous frustrations of working in Newark and being part of a university was watching the-- adjectives are not of any use. Everybody in this room knows them-- the desperate state of the school system in a place like Newark, and the countless numbers of evenings which all of us spent with the schools working with them-- working with people like Ray Chambers and so on and so on. A good part of that was deeply, deeply, discouraging-- deeply frustrating. I must say that the knowledge that you were there, and the knowledge that you cared about it, and the knowledge that when we needed to, we could go around whoever it was we needed to go around. We may have needed to go around Ted Hollander. I must confess and my colleagues, Linda and Don, know that I had to go around Ed Bloustein, but whoever it is we needed to go around, we understood that there was somebody in Trenton. That there was a Governor who cared about education. As a political scientist, I usually encourage my Ph.D. students that you're going to have to have data. You're going to have to collect these things. So we divide things into categories, but I think if I had one of my students here listening to all parts of today, they'd come away without a fully adequate or correct impression of your Governorship because I think the most important single thing that leaders do is provide tone. You provide the tone, and that, in turn, gets translated into the concrete of programs and of laws and the specific-- and you provided that tone, and you provided a sense that education was a primary concern and a primary objective. And without making invidious comparisons either with the present or with other Governors since then, that tone has not been there. And so for all of us, perhaps, because we're all getting a little old, but I think for good and objective reasons, the tone that you set of the importance of education at all levels gets translated into these specific programs

and to programs that are not on here into a willingness of people to working to keep at it because they knew that, ultimately, they'd be supported, and we thank you for that.

**Marla Ucelli-Kashyap:** Okay, thank you for the comment.

**Thomas Kean:** Okay, thank you for the comment. I-- as he probably knows, I always had a soft spot for the Newark campus at Rutgers partly because I used to work for you at one point not-- in between my runs for Governor, I was a faculty member teaching at-- then I went through when I was a legislature-- went through the whole process-- I was negotiating with the kids who occupied the building. I was Chairman of the Education Committee. I just-- anyway, I always have had a soft part for that part of Rutgers.

**Norman Samuels:** Maybe you can translate that soft spot-- carry-- pass it on.

**George Pruitt:** I'd like to make a few points about-- brief points about the challenge grant. One, about funding accountability initiative. I think we should talk about mission differentiation, a valuable outcome of the challenge grant. From a funding perspective, it did something very important, and as I went back, and checked the numbers-- and part of the argument I've had with other State Treasurers is that, "Well, yes, but he had all that money and the economy was going, and he spent all of this money. That-- we don't have all of this money." And you really didn't spend all that money-- all that much money. I mean, prior to you coming into office, as I looked and followed the appropriations, they were formula-driven and incremental, so we had a pretty big budget and the incremental spending was pretty big. You just confiscated all that incremental funding, and put it in our pot, and you targeted it, but if you look at the total dollar amount that was spent-- and it was increased, but it had an impact bigger than a dollar figure. And so the assumption went that it was this huge mega amount of money that was going in that was just used better and was more cleverly done, and so that was a very clever and wise thing to do, and you got great benefit from doing it. You certainly got more productivity out of resources than the way it had been spent before. In terms of the accountability issue, we're always swimming upstream. The college presidents and I are not afraid of accountability. In fact, we kind of demanded it for ourselves. That was an extraordinarily scary thing-- the challenge grant because every president that applied for one and got one, we knew we were putting our careers and our jobs on the line because this was-- it was a definable, expected outcome that had to be independently verified and evaluated. This wasn't a "well, is he a good person? Is the faculty happy?" This was, "Were these

measurable objectives achieved?" And the person who's on the hook for that is the president, and we all knew it at the time, and we welcomed it, and we loved it. And we used it well. Every penny of it was accounted for. There was never an allegation of one dime of it being misspent, and in every case that I think I'm right-- and in every case, the objectives that we committed ourselves to were achieved.

The final part of that was-- again, these were all means to an end. It really created something that we fight very hard to maintain, and that is for a little state. So we're not a big state that has to worry about geography. So we have the benefit of focusing our resources and really being good at what we do. And this notion of mission differentiation that came out of challenge grant, which we separated ourselves from each other-- not qualitatively, but in terms of distinctiveness. That was the key of that initiative. So you can't-- institutions like Jersey City University under Bill Maxwell was one of the finest universities in the country, and it celebrated people that viewed our city as a collaborative-- as a teaching laboratory. On the other screen, you have the College of New Jersey, which was a traditional place for very smart selective 18-year-olds, and then you have my place that's just off-the-charts from either of them. I mean, I had the parents up there-- very different institutions, but all very high quality, and by differentiating ourselves, we could really be excellent, and focus the resources, and do a lot with not a lot of money. And we have-- that has been our lasting legacy. We still talk about that as we acculturate the new class of presidents because that has been our lasting legacy, and we have-- the naysayers to autonomy said that we would not cooperate and work together. They said we would have mass hysteria. We would cannibalize each other. We have a higher level-- and have always had a higher level of voluntary inter-institutional cooperation in New Jersey than any state in America. Some of the most difficult challenges, like articulation, differential funding. We came-- we had a bond proposal several years ago, where every college president in the state, signed off on the allocation among the institutions and the institutional project. That wouldn't have happened in another state in the country, and all that came from the notion about how we differentiate ourselves as a set of institutions provided people can say we've got quality institutions.

**Thomas Kean:** I must say this was really challenge grants. You got to remember-- you didn't necessarily get the grant. There are only a certain number every year, so the institutions were competing with each other, and if they didn't differentiate well enough or spell it out well enough, they got their application sent back to apply another year. And that happened to a number of institutions, and eventually they got it right. And, eventually, we went forward, but it was really-- that was also a risk. I mean, you presented your plan, and I could've got turned down and did in a number of cases until we got it right. So it was-- I understand initiative, you mentioned the name once, but he's not here and couldn't be here, but Rick Mills

deserves a lot of credit for the negotiations-- talk-- pushing to get the thing on the right track.

**Marla Ucelli-Kashyap:** Absolutely.

**Linda Stamato:** I think it's worth noting that the genuine competition that you alluded to is what took place, and so people accepted the outcomes because they recognized they were being judged on their merits. I think maybe we've lost a little bit of that in recent days-- probably one of the reasons the stem cell bond issue went down was because of the effort to have a little piece here for this-- a little piece there for that. So instead of concentrating on what was important for the state-- but I also think as I'm listening to this, I'm thinking about the role of the legislature. And one of the things-- and Don alluded to this when we talked about Harold and the effort that we had tried at Rutgers. But one of the other things we did was because Rutgers tends to often think less well of itself on the inside than we come to hear people think of it from the outside, the Board of Governors at one point decided, "Well, let's see what the expectations of the state are for Rutgers," and we undertook quite an elaborate process. And one of the things that struck me as really quite surprising at the time is when members of the legislature were interviewed, and we, frankly, expected to hear that, well, they wanted Rutgers' football team to be doing so much better. And instead, what we heard were, "We think Rutgers should have three-- four Nobel Prize winners." "Really?" So what was happening was you were raising the legislature's expectations as well, and I think the coalescing of all of these things at one time meant that not only Rutgers was raising its own expectations, but we knew that more was expected of us by the Governor and the legislature. But I think that also meant in the system of higher education as well because when the colleges thrived, so did Rutgers.

**Thomas Kean:** I just said, "Well, it doesn't change. Call my office a little bit. Check in, and they said, "A reporter from The Ledger really needs to talk to you about higher education." And I said, "Well, what about higher education? Find out what he wants to talk to me about." She came back, and she said, "This business about getting into the Big Ten."

<Laughter>

**Governor Tom Kean:** I have not called him back yet, and I don't know what I'd say, but--

**Donald Edwards:** Well I can remember when Ed Bloustein called you out of a meeting to tell you that Rutgers had been admitted to the Association of American Universities.

**Marla Ucelli-Kashyap:** Oh yes, exactly.

**Governor Tom Kean:** Yeah, yeah.

**Donald Edwards:** And really the culmination of this and that seed, those seeds, you had planted, because it was those people who impressed the rest of higher education to finally let us into that club.

**Marla Ucelli-Kashyap:** Harold and Darryl look like they want to say something, and then I want to switch gears a little bit.

**Harold Eickoff:** One description that I haven't heard here today, that would apply at least from my point of view, to Governor Kean, and that is unorthodox. He-- and I mean that in a very complimentary way. I remember a personal reminiscence of the challenge grant process. I remember a call I got from Rick Mills, there's that wonderful man's name again. Rick called and said, the Governor has some money that he thinks could be well applied to higher education, but he wants to be sure that he gets all the best advice he can get on how it should be done. He is a bit skeptical about turning it over to the Board of Higher Education. And I-- if he were here, he could either verify that, or say I didn't remember it right. In any case, the progression of events then was that Rick came to the college, and we went down to the student cafeteria for breakfast, and found a corner, and we ate some very bad scrambled eggs, as I remember it, and we sketched the outlines of what I thought would work well, at least for our institution, and that was to be very, very cautious about making money available for catch up. You know, all institutions are underfunded over here, and we've got roofs that we can't afford to fix, that not one penny should be allowed for that kind of allocation in the challenge grants. Then the word, distinction, was there, that the institutions, yes, they should be challenged, but they should be challenged to become distinctive, that they should stand out, and not just in New Jersey, or not just in the region, but any place in the world. It was put that way. And then Rick went away with our legal pads in his hands, our writing on legal pads, and I was happy to see the emergence of the challenge grant structure along the lines that we talked about. But then I'll give you a-- shed a little tear here. When the first challenge grants were awarded, we were not among them.

<Laughter>

**Donald Edwards:** Can I say one other thing about the challenge, not the challenge grant, as such perhaps, but the challenge to the institutions. Part of that was for us to take more responsibility and have more success at raising money ourselves from the private sector. That was clearly part of the expectation and another piece of that. It went beyond, however, simply setting expectations. Not only did you agree to be the honorary chair of the first comprehensive campaign we ever did, the campaign for Rutgers, which we assumed we could put your name in the front of the program. The Governor made it clear he was coming to the kick off dinner and was going to speak. And it went beyond that as you well remember, you went on fundraising calls to individuals with Ed Bloustein on a number of occasions. It wasn't always bad duty. I remember you and Ed took Janice Levin to dinner. Unfortunately she gave her French impressionists to the Metropolitan. It was a good dinner, anyway.

**Governor Tom Kean:** It was.

**Donald Edwards:** But you went way beyond what we expected and what I think other Governors, not only here, but in other states have done to help carry the message for us.

**Darryl Greer:** I'm going to-- maybe a fitting anecdote on this topic, and Norm, you just expressed it well, what the Governor did to raise expectations among the state colleges, especially after autonomy, and George and Harold know this and have articulated, and you have, the purposes. But kind of inside, Governors need to be careful sometimes about what they wish for, even someone as eminent as our Governor Kean. One thing Rick and Marla did with knuckleheads like me, was we conspired and as you did want to move education and the state of New Jersey forward, and you made that very clear, as Norm just said, it set a tone, well Rick came to me one day and said, you know, the Governor has got lots of road trips planned, and he's going to go out there and talk about what we do in New Jersey, as you've said, Governor, and Harold and George and others were part of this. And so they looked at the relatively new executive director, and said, you know, do something. And Rick said, the Governor has nothing to take with him to give to his peers to talk about the challenge grants and what they mean, so again, with the help of Mike Klein, who heads the Association of State Colleges and Universities, in 1987, we made this little pamphlet and we had to wait until the second round of challenge grants and one college, one never got a challenge grant, Stockton, and of course Vera was one of your favorites. But it was peer review, and Stockton, for

whatever reasons, didn't get a grant. Some colleges got two, and of course Rutgers led the way, and Frank, the independents, and others came along. But the point is, Rick liked it so much, and as I recall, you were on the program at the American House of Education, American Association of State Colleges and Universities, AGB, the Independent Colleges and Universities, just on and on, and boy, it was a great road trip, because we were in Seattle and LA, and San Francisco, and Rick calls, and he says, "I need 5,000 of these little pamphlets." The point-- it was a way that I can't describe. I think you know, Governor, that the aspirations, the level of aspirations that you raised for the institutions and for the state, and where Joe Doria comes into this, who was also, a godfather who helped create the association. I remember when I was hired, and Joe, always being honest, said, "Darryl, I love you, but they should have hired a New Jersey guy."

<Laughter>

**Darryl Greer:** Now what's that got to do with challenge grants. Right about this time, I found out-- I went to see Rick, and I went to see Dick Standiford, and Rich Keevey, who were in budget, and said, "I think the chancellor is taking four percent of these grants to run his own stuff." And Bob Scott, who was the president of Ramapo, he really didn't like that, and again, the president said, "You need to do something about this." I'll never forget when I went to see Standiford, and he said-- He said, "This isn't the Governor's idea," he said, "This is Ted's idea." And I went to legislature, and said, "You know, we need to get some of that money back to the state colleges." I'll never forget, Ted called me one night about 11, and he had the habit of eating carrots and apples, and he was just spitting mad and told me to show up in his office. But the important thing is, it gets-- the challenge grants were just tremendous-- that's when I became a Jersey guy. But they were tremendously, tremendously successful in raising expectations, not only for our leaders here, but also to put New Jersey in the spotlight nationally, and we're in your debt for having provided that leadership.

**Marla Ucelli-Kashyap:** So one of the things that seems like a real question to me from this conversation, and if I link it to the conversation we had this morning, I'd love to hear your reaction to it, including you, Governor, is that it seems like what we're talking about is actually a systemic view. It adds up to a systemic view of what the state's education system needs to provide for the state, effectively, and for the state's future. And you saw the linkages, Norm, that you talked about, from one to the other. I think we didn't get a chance to talk much this morning about the pre-college academic program, stuff that helped kids who were at the margins, make sure that they could get onto four year institutions, and not sort of thinking of money as the answer. But that money used well is a significant part of the answer.

And I think that the age we live in now, that systemic view is really challenging to have, and we see more and more one issue and two issue Governors particularly when it comes to the education sector. I'm wondering if anyone can kind of put a frame around what it was about the Kean administration and the time, that really enabled the space to be created in the public discourse. These kinds of conversations, and these kinds of initiatives that built upon one another and went through, over the course of several years, were actually enabled to happen, because you don't see it very much anymore. Joe.

**Joe Doria:** I'm going to just go with the fact that the Governor had a unique perspective. He was someone who had been born and raised in New Jersey, he was in the legislature, he had been Speaker, he understood what New Jersey was about, he understood because of his background in education, having taught, the importance of education and he understood how to bring it all together. I think he brought a very unique perspective. Everybody wants to be the education Governor. I don't think, Governor, you ever said you wanted to be the education Governor, but you were and are the education Governor, because you brought all those perspectives together. You know, Darryl teased about the Jersey thing, but I think you have to have an appreciation of the system and how the system works, and how you go about accomplishing the goals that you have, and Governor Kean had that, and he had the ability to bring it all together, his background in education, his background as a legislative leader, as someone with a good education himself who could bring it all together, and also saw the future. Now it's a jump to the next thing, science and technology. He understood that that was the future, that if you were going to create jobs, and if you were going to bring Nobel scientists to New Jersey, you were going to have to bring those people into an educational system and a governmental system that appreciated that the world was changing and that we needed to emphasize something, as technology and science, you know, the CAD-CAM system, all those things. So the Governor was able, in my opinion, to bring it together and to use all of his background and experience to move it forward. And we started in 1984 with the Job, Science and Technology bond issue, and let me tell you the story about that. It was going to be a higher ed bond issue, but the higher ed one in 1979 failed, and we were all saying, we can't call it higher ed, because we're afraid it's going to fail, and we came up with working with, at that time, the Governor's office and people like Rick, and then yourself, Marla. We called it jobs. We figured everybody needed jobs. The economy was just starting to get better, everybody needed jobs, science, technology, we didn't make it a big number, we made it \$90 million, and it passed, and that was the beginning, and then the Governor pushed the Science and Technology Commission, and Gil and myself sponsored that, but the Governor had the ability to bring everything together, which no other Governor, in my opinion, really had that experience and background, and also the willingness to deal with it, to not get hung up on the

problems that exist. Everybody else-- and the other thing, I think, and Governor, you can tell me if I'm wrong, the Governor listened to his advisors, he paid attention, but then he did what he thought was right. And unfortunately, some other Governors listen too much to the naysayers and didn't take the bull by the horns and make the decisions themselves, and that was a problem.

**Governor Tom Kean:** I'll tell you what was very helpful to me, and I feel a little sorry for Governors, if most of them don't have this background. But the fact I'd been in the legislature for ten years, that I've been in the majority, the minority, and in the process, made some very, very good friends in both parties, lifelong friends. Many of us still get together, and it doesn't matter Republicans or Democrats, we still see each other and get together, Al Burstein people like that. So when I got elected by a very narrow margin, which made life very difficult the first year or so, there were a number of people in the Legislature, by that time, some of them had moved on to the State Senate, but people like Chrissy Jackman, who had worked with me, knew my word was good, I mean, knew if I said something, that was it. Knew I was probably going to have the right motivation, because I had as long as they'd known me, so that was-- and those kind of relationships were a tremendous help those first couple of years in particular, to work with people who had known me. And second thing is, I always think if you're looking at somebody who runs for a position like Governor, look at who they are and what they've done in the past. I mean, anybody who really looked at me hard, was going to find out that education was going to be a priority. I mean, I taught, I had been involved in education one way or another most of my life, I'd been adjunct professor at a couple of institutions in the state, higher education, and in the legislature, I'd been chairman of the Education Committee. My proudest accomplishment, maybe including my time as Governor, was the Education Opportunity Fund. I'm probably prouder of writing that, than almost anything else I ever did in life, because of the impact it's had on people, but I-- if you looked at me and really studied what I'd done with my life, and what I was interested in, it was going to be education. It was going to be the environment, because I was a-- had been-- I guess I sponsored every major bill on the environment when I was in the legislature. And it was going to be the arts, because it's my life, I mean, I loved the arts and always have. So you look at anybody running for office or in an administrative position, if you find out really what have been their passions, that's probably going to be what they're going to do-- will be interested in particularly, when they get into the office. And that was my background and my interest.

**Marla Ucelli-Kashyap:** Norm, you're next, and then back to Mike.

**Norman Samuels:** I just feel an obligation, I must pick upon on one of the Governor's comments. I should have picked up on it earlier, and that is the EOF funding. The Rutgers Newark has had a very heavy reliance on EOF students. One of the proudest days for me in particular, was years and years ago, when we found that our EOF students were graduating at a better rate than our regularly admitted students. Governor, I can't tell you what an enormous impact that has had on the lives of thousands and thousands of students in this state, and I cannot imagine-- you're terribly proud of it, but I've got to tell you that every one of us who's been deeply involved, is equally proud of it, and if this session is going to be a record of your achievements, we really should underscore five times the importance of that EOF program to students, to the institutions themselves, to the education of people, from trustees to faculty, who were enormously skeptical, if not outright racist, about the program at its start, to the point where they came to understand, that with that kind of assistance, you have these students just flourishing in every possible way. The record that they have made, which is greatly to your credit, has, as I said, not only transformed their lives, but the understanding, the broader understanding of whole ranges of people who have been involved with them. I thought we needed to say--

**Governor Tom Kean:** You know, just because it is important, I'll give you a little background on EOF. Things start in funny ways. It was after the riots, and I'd been down to a meeting in Newark and I was right on Broad Street there, and in those days, Essex County College had its office there. And a friend of mine then was president, a guy called, J. Harry Smith, who I'd known for a number of years. He was the president of Essex County College, so I stopped in to see Harry, and said, "You know, I'm on the street, Harry, stopped in to see how you're doing." He said, "Well, got problems, you know, there are so many people who could benefit from what we're doing, and the only thing that's keeping them out is money. We don't have very large tuition here, but kids can't even afford that." And I've always believed that anybody who's capable, ought to be able to have a college education. Money should never stand in the way. So I said, "Harry, I'm going to put something--" I had just been elected, I was leader of the-- had just been elected leader of the Essex delegation, the largest delegation in the legislature, and I said, "We're going to try and do something about that, Harry, I'm going to try to put in something," so I started to put in a bill, and the Chancellor heard about it, Ralph Dungan, who was working for Dick Hughes, and Ralph called me, and said, "Will you come in and see me about your bill before you put it in?" I said, "Yeah, sure." And he said, "I've got a bill," he said, "That I want to put in, because a lot of these kids aren't getting-- particularly needy kids, aren't getting the best preparation in the schools and they're getting into college and they can't do the work. So we've got to have some way of mentoring them and providing the help they need, so they can stay in college once they get in college. Do you think there's any way we can

combine the two bills?" And working with him, we combined the bill and put it in as the Education Opportunity Fund, and then, this will interest you, I think, Frank, I put it in because I was the head of the largest delegation, I was able to get it through the Assembly. And it got stuck in the Senate, and there was a guy called Bill Herring, who was a Senator, and he was head of the Education Committee in the Senate, and he would not move it. He said, "I've given enough money to Newark and all of that. I'm not going to--" I have no interest in my district. He lived in Ocean County, he said "it's of no interest to us whatsoever." And so, all right. There was a bill that Herring put in, to include independent colleges in the state aid formula. And so that came out of the Senate, and I, by that time, was Chairman of the Education Committee, so the bill came in, I put it in my pocket. And so sooner or later, old Herring comes down the chamber-- between the two chambers. He said, "You know, something has happened to my bill in the Assembly, what is it? And I said, "It's not going to pass." And I said-- he said, "Why not?" And I said, "Well, the Chairman of the committee is not going to release it." And he said, "That's you." And I said, "I know." "Are you against it?" I said, "Not particularly, but you know, there's a more important bill that you said you're not going to pass, called Education Opportunity Fund." And he said, "Oh." And I said, "You release that, I'll release this." So he said, "Okay."

<Laughter>

**Nancy Becker:** Old fashioned horse trading.

**Governor Tom Kean:** And that's how legislation works. That's how we got the Education Opportunity Fund, but I'll tell you, now as President of Drew, I was watching these opportunity scholars, because I was particularly interested in them, and they graduated, not only at the same rate as the school-- students who were admitted in the ordinary process, they got honors at the same rate. So the students who graduated with honors were exactly at the same rate among the OEF students as they were the regular. My frustration is, I think many of you were still around higher education, Rutgers, particularly, nobody has ever written up that program. It was the first of its kind in the country. It probably is the most successful one of its kind in the country, and somebody should write about that. Somebody should write either a dissertation or a book, or something, because it's a remarkable success.

**M1:** I'm going to get on that.

**Marla Ucelli-Kashyap:** Still giving assignments, though no longer Governor. George, and Mike, and then we're going to get started wrapping up.

**George Pruitt:** I'm going to answer your question about the systemic stuff.

**Marla Ucelli-Kashyap:** Oh good.

**George Pruitt:** You know, Darryl mentioned the meeting at American Council on Education, and I introduced the Governor at that meeting, and my introduction, I think, was rather colorful. But I was in Illinois and Maryland and Tennessee before I came to New Jersey, over my career, probably-- I tried to count them, probably 12 or 14 Governors that I've worked with. And so I've had some good, three went to jail.

<Laughter>

**George Pruitt:** But I had a chance, and I mentioned this to him, and I think it embarrasses him, but the reason that we had these good results was that extraordinary leadership ability is not a common thing. It is rare to find someone that has both the combination of vision, capacity, experience, conviction and the unique ability to bring disparate and diverse points of view and individuals around and organize around a common purpose. And Cary made a comment, Cary Edwards made a comment to me one day when we were talking about that, and he said, "The public interest is the best politics." And to get elected by one of the smallest margins in history, and to get reelected by the largest margin in the history of the state, carried every demographic group that you could mention, more Democrats voted for him than voted for the Democrat. That's an unusual an extraordinary thing. And that's not a function of tactics or election analytics or campaign stuff, that's a testimony to a very extraordinary capacity of a person. They don't come along very often. And I know that embarrasses him a little when I talk about that.

**Governor Tom Kean:** It does.

**George Pruitt:** But I think it's true. And it's amazed me that politicians, one of the things that every politician has in common, every elected official has in common, is they all want to get elected and they all want to get reelected. And I was amazed that they have not modeled him, because the results that he generated, seem to me, if nothing else, would have gotten attention. I think part of it is because they don't have the ability to do that, to do what he did, because they're not him. And actually, to look at the Governors, people talk about what Camelot was like, we were-- those of us who were fortunate enough to be here and be a part of that, we were a part of something very special. And all of us that were part of that know it.

That hasn't been replicated since. I want it to be, I really hope it does. I think our state needs it, and the more extraordinary the times are, the more extraordinary the need for the leadership. But I do think we were just very fortunate. And I know I'm embarrassing you, but you should be very self-satisfied with the contribution that you've made to the people of this state in so many ways, you ought to feel good about doing it, because you really did an extraordinary job.

**Marla Ucelli-Kashyap:** Mike?

**Michael Klein:** Let me embarrass the Governor just another couple of seconds more, and also follow up on Norm's point, to get the totality of the Governor's influence on higher education, both as a legislator and we haven't talked about Drew, but what I wanted to mention was his chairmanship of Governor Christie's Higher Education Task Force on Higher Education, vitally important that the Governor's-- Dr. Pruitt, George served on that, along with a friend of all of ours, Peggy Howard, Bob Campbell, from Johnson & Johnson, John McGoldrick, a lot of us know from his work at New Jersey Transit, a terrific attorney. The recommendations in that report resonate incredibly, and did the whole gamut of higher education from funding to mission differentiation, a lot of the things we've talked about. I think the bond issues passage, 750 million dollars on election day, is a direct result of the Governor's call to action for greater funding, making Rutgers grow from good to great, the restructuring Governor Christie and Senator Sweeney and the Speaker were able to accomplish this year. Maybe I'll hurt Frank's feelings, but the-- changing the Commission of Higher Ed, to having a more focused Secretary of Higher Ed, all recommendations in this report and so Governor-- I know he's awfully proud of EOF. There was increase in EOF funding for Fiscal Year '13, the greatest increase in years, as a direct result of the call to action in the Taskforce report. So I didn't want that to go unsaid. I wanted to also ask Marla and the Governor to help answer Marla's question about the systemic nature of this, and I'm sorry if it came up this morning's session, and I missed it. I wonder how much influence the Nation At Risk Report had on your thinking and the systemic approach to pre-K through college education.

**Governor Tom Kean:** It created-- helped create the climate. The Nation At Risk hit the country like a bomb, I mean, nobody had-- I think everybody had been pretty self satisfied up to-- before the Nation At Risk Report about how things were going. They just thought we were always great in the United States, we were the best and we'll continue the best. The Nation At Risk said we weren't, and used language which was particularly good and it came out of a conservative Republican administration which made it even more powerful. So that created the climate in which all of us, not just myself but people like Jim Hunt and Lamar Alexander, and

Dick Riley, and Bill Clinton and so many of us made education our priority. That gave us the political support, created the climate. No matter what you were trying to do, you could find a quote from that report to back it up. So the fact that was there, was just very, very helpful, I think to all of us, and put pressure on the administration nationally, and every Governor to do something.

**Linda Stamato:** One-- Phil Baker, who sat on the State Board of Higher Education at the time, was one of the people who drew up that report, and consequently it became part of the constant conversations at the Board, but I think it led to one of the frustrations which you allude to, Marla, in the sense that there was always this, I think, artificial separation between primary, secondary and higher education, and while the county colleges and vocational technical schools, to a certain extent, helped make some of the segue between and among them, there has been lacking any genuine effort to see how these institutions can, even on faculty teaching levels, actually work more effectively together and as I was looking through my collection of savings over the weekend, and read Tom Friedman's column in yesterday's Times, I don't know if you saw it, but clearly, you read through that, and you recognize this is again, in some respects, a nation at risk, because we have significant employment opportunities that are not being filled, and we have significant people who are unemployed. And when you see a situation like that, you have to say that your institutions may not be doing the job that needs to be done for this period of time. How do we go about rectifying that, and it seems to me that the institutions have to have some conversations among them as to how that should happen, and obviously even within Rutgers, we need to have more collaborative efforts. It's not simply between this sector and that. But I remember, Governor, particularly working with some of the pre-college programs, that the Chancellor almost, by sort of deft of hand, said, let's do these-- we'll call them pre-college programs, because otherwise it will get in the way of the \_\_\_\_\_ Commission, and so we'll create these things, we'll see-- we'll admit-- have the colleges admit students who would not otherwise be admissible and then we'll work with them intensely over the summer to get them up to that point. To work with those students was a privilege, and it would seem to me that that kind of effort between the two boards, we should have more of that. Now, of course, we only have one board, not two.

**Marla Ucelli-Kashyap:** Well I have to say that I feel like we, although we have touched all the issues we were asked to touch on, all the initiatives, I feel like we're just scratching the surface and just getting warmed up, in terms of all that there is to talk about, and frankly, in terms of, I think, an extraordinary group of people talking about an extraordinary time, and an extraordinary Governor.

**Governor Tom Kean:** <inaudible>

**Marla Ucelli-Kashyap:** You get to have the closing words.

**Governor Tom Kean:** Okay, well all I want to say is there's one whole area I'll just mention, I want to get in. The whole science and technology effort. I mean, we identified, with the help of the top people at Rutgers, and Princeton, the-- what we said were going to be emerging sciences in the next century. And we identified, I think, five of them as I remember, and we worked with the State University in particular, to say how we're going to build and fund the laboratories in these areas and how are we then going to tie that to the business community so it creates jobs. And it was a very successful initiative, based on the recommendations of the Science and Technology Commission. Bill Baker was part of that, too. And it-- and what I-- it's getting to be around the 25th anniversary of all this stuff. It doesn't seem like it, but it is. And I'm getting contacted constantly by people who were part of that initiative and say, we're going to celebrate now, and you should come. And I went to oceanography at Rutgers this year, and found they have little submarines now that go around the world, and they're being funded by the Defense Department, I think so they can listen in on the Chinese while they're underwater.

<Laughter>

**M1:** Just Chinese fish.

**Governor Tom Kean:** Yeah, that's right, yes. But it's-- I ran into a guy who, a very young fellow who came in that period, who wrote the book on analyzing the dust from the World Trade Center. The book is called, "Dust," and now, if anybody wants to find out what it was like, in these court case and everything, they go to his book. And so many other things. I mean, but out of that-- it's still a thing we ought to do, connecting where the scientific advances are going to come from to how do we make sure we're ahead of them in higher education, and how do we connect that to the business community in the state to enhance jobs. I mean, those-- that we did, I think, successfully in the '80s, but we need to do it again.

**Donald Edwards:** And Governor, it had an impact on Rutgers, and I'm sure on other places as well, that went far beyond the five areas or the specifics, because when Ed came to Rutgers as president in '71, we were still growing out of the private university that we had been, and for a state university, it was really pretty embarrassing how little connection Rutgers had, academically, to the economy of

the state. We had a pharmacy school that educated pharmacists, it did not educate research people for the pharmaceutical industry, only one small example. We could go-- Norman and Linda, know this as well as I do, go through, area by area. And so this tying of the state university to the needs of the state, the economy of the state, and the emerging economy of the state, really had an impact all over the university, that really has transformed the place.

**M1:** We graduated lots of lawyers, Don.

**Marla Ucelli-Kashyap:** Yeah.

<Laughter>

**Linda Stamato:** Don't hold that against us.

**Marla Ucelli-Kashyap:** I'm respectful of people's time, and I know we've gone over a bit, and I am going to blame that all on my good friend, Saul Cooperman, and the amazing accomplishments of Governor Kean's administration in K-12 education, but we have already overrun a little bit. This has been delightful and we get to hear the final words on your higher education legacy from you, Governor Kean.

**Governor Tom Kean:** Well, look, we haven't talked about anything that I haven't been able to point out to the people in this room and outside this room, who were responsible. We had wonderful people to work with, in the higher education sector, who were willing to catch visions, to help me implement them, who took on some very courageous positions that might have affected their own jobs had they not been successful. And so working with that community, working with people like Rick Mills and Marla, that, by the way, Ted Hollander was never happy, and neither, frankly, was Saul Cooperman, because they complained, they complained a lot to my chief of staff, not so much to me, but they said, you know, every other cabinet member comes up with their own programs, and then comes to the Governor trying to get them in the budget or whatever, they said, in education, the Governor thinks he knows more than we do.

<Laughter>

**Governor Tom Kean:** And not only that, he's-- it's the only subject where he's got an aide in his office who looks at everything we do and criticizes and changes. So I thank them for putting up with that. But Rick and Marla and people in that position

were enormously helpful and of course the legislature. Much of this could not have been done without the legislature, and it was a bipartisan legislature. My-- all eight years, I never had a Republican legislature in both houses. So we worked-- everything we did, we did in cooperation with good legislators, many of them from the other party, and the wonderful thing was, and this is in an era which I hope someday to get back to, where, if you presented a good idea, and it was really a good idea, you could sell it on that basis, and find enough of a coalition in the legislature between Republicans and Democrats, and sometimes my coalition was Democrats more than Republicans, but find a coalition in the legislature with enough votes to put it together, and people who listen to it on the merits, not say it's a Republican idea or a Democratic idea, therefore it's got to be supported or opposed on those grounds. And so whatever we did was because of a lot of good people on a bipartisan basis, working together to get something accomplished, and if we can ever get back to that time, Joe, I'll be very happy. Thank you all so much for everything.