

Interview with Roger Bodman

Michael Aron: It's the morning of January 27, 2009, a Tuesday. I'm Michael Aron, Acting News Director of NJN News. We're here at the Eagleton Institute at Rutgers for the Rutgers Program on the Governor, the Thomas H. Kean Archive. This morning we're going to be talking to Roger Bodman. Roger is one of the more prominent lobbyists in Trenton today, but many years ago he was a young Republican campaign operative who managed Tom Kean's first successful gubernatorial campaign in 1981, went on to serve in the Kean cabinet, first as Commissioner of Labor, later as Commissioner of Transportation. Ready. Roger, how did you get involved in Republican politics?

Roger Bodman: Well, I was always interested in politics, certainly when I was in college, I went to school at Ohio University Michael, and it evolved out there. But when I graduated, which was in 1974, I came back to New Jersey to my hometown of Bernardsville, and that was a year that a woman named Millicent Fenwick was running for the Congress. It was an open seat for Congress. Peter H. B. Frelinghuysen was the incumbent who was retiring after 20 whatever years. And it was smack in the middle of the Watergate scandal also. And my father, who was chairman of The Planning Board in Bernardsville for many years, knew Millicent Fenwick who was on the town council back in the 50s and early 60s, anyway, had a relationship, and my dad was involved in a variety of civic opportunities and circumstances in Bernardsville. And anyway, long story short, he introduced me to her. She had already won the primary against a gentleman named Thomas H. Kean, who was a former Speaker of The Assembly and current, I think at that time, Minority Leader, who also ran in the primary for that open seat. And I met with Mrs. Fenwick in Somerville, New Jersey, was hired as her driver for that campaign, and that was my opening involvement in New Jersey Republican politics.

Q: What did your father do for a living?

Roger Bodman: My dad was an engineer for AT&T and in the phone company for many years. AT&T was kind enough to move their world headquarters from downtown New York out to Basking Ridge, New Jersey, four or five miles away from where my father lived. He commuted in and out of the city for 20 plus years until they were nice enough to move their headquarters five miles away. And he worked for his whole career at the phone company.

Q: Where did you go to high school?

Roger Bodman: Bernardsville High School, class of 1970.

Q: Brothers, sisters?

Roger Bodman: I have— I'm the youngest of four. I have two older brothers and a sister, all of whom live out of state.

Q: What did you think of Millicent Fenwick when you were introduced to her?

Roger Bodman: I thought she was a character. But I was very impressed. She spent a good— here I was, a kid right out of college, probably as naïve as they came, and she spent a good hour with me in her campaign office, which was at 41 North Bridge Street in Somerville, I remember this, for many years the Republican headquarters was on the bottom part of that building, the first floor. And on the second floor, I spent a good hour with her, speaking to her about a whole host of issues, I was just very impressed that she would take the time in the middle of a— what was it? A tight gubernatorial race to--

Q: Congressional race.

Roger Bodman: Excuse me, a congressional race, I'm sorry, to speak with a young student or just previously graduated student. I was impressed with her.

Q: What had she been doing that prepared her to make a run for Congress? Was she a local official?

Roger Bodman: Well, she had been in— as I said, she was on town councils, I think she was on the Board of Education in Bernardsville many years prior. But more recently she had been in the state legislature, she was an Assemblywoman and had been appointed by Governor Cahill as a Director of Consumer Affairs. Now this was right after Governor Byrne won elections in 1973, this was 1974, as I mentioned, and so she was recently out of a job as Consumer Affairs Director. But in those days, a Consumer Affairs job was quite prominent, or she made it quite prominent. She had quite a bit of publicity surrounding her activities there.

Q: Was she eccentric? Her reputation many years later was as— I mean, she was the model for Lacey Davenport in, what was it, in Doonesbury.

Roger Bodman: Doonesbury cartoon. Well, she was colorful is the word we use, not eccentric, Michael. But she also was a very smart politician. She's a woman, in fact, here at Eagleton a year or two or maybe longer, they had a symposium on her here, or at least an evening with a woman that wrote a biography on her, the author's name is Amy Shapiro. It's a fascinating book about the history-- almost a tragic life that she had, if you knew anything about Millicent's background, her mother died on the Lusitania in World War I and her father remarried and it was sort of the evil stepmother, and Millicent did not get along with the stepmother and was somewhat disowned. She ended up marrying this fellow, Hugh Fenwick was a divorcee, which was scandalous in those times, and had sort of an on and off— she basically gave up, I think it was fair to say, on a personal life, in the late forties, had money problems. And she wrote The Vogue Book of Etiquette in the late forties, she had to work even though she was from money, because of the family relationship with her father and this marriage that her father did not approve of, she had issues. Anyway, so long story short, she dedicated herself to public service. But she was a patrician, she was a character, she smoked that pipe when she wanted to and--

Q: Even back in '74 she was a pipe-smoker?

Roger Bodman: Oh yeah, oh yeah, always had it in her pocket and would say to reporters or for the news photographers at the time or folks in your business "Don't take the picture of me with that pipe", except when she wanted it done, which was at key moments when she thought she would get the most bang for the buck. She was a politician.

Q: Wasn't she a Vogue model in the thirties?

Roger Bodman: I believe she was a model, I don't know whether it was for Vogue or not, but I know she worked at the magazine, that's where she wrote their Book of Etiquette in 1948, I believe it was.

Q: Did you say that you were introduced to her after she had defeated Tom Kean in a primary?

Roger Bodman: Very close primary.

Q: Very close primary. Had you met Kean prior to that?

Roger Bodman: I had not.

Q: When did you first meet Kean?

Roger Bodman: I met Kean during that campaign. The district was then the fifth congressional district, and it ran from sort of the southern half of Morris County and ran down to essentially all of Somerset and then down into Mercer and to Princeton, it was the Princeton township, and I think West Windsor township and Princeton. But it also included Livingston and Essex County and that's where Kean was from. So I remember having met him during that general election of that congressional race in 1974. And Kean, as he would later, was very heavily involved in the congressional race. He did everything he could— he was never the type of individual that was a sore loser. He

did everything he could to help Millicent win that race. And it was later true of when Ray Bateman defeated him in the primary. And that's one of the things that impressed me with Tom Kean when I first met him.

Q: Did you know of the Kean family heritage?

Roger Bodman: I came to learn of it during that campaign, who his father and grandmother and so forth. So originally I did not know, but certainly having been as close as— there's no better job in a campaign, by the way, then to be a driver, because you're right next to the candidate and you're in the middle of every decision and you hear everything's that's going on. So it was one enormous quick study course in New Jersey politics and some of the individuals that had been involved. So I came to learn of the Kean family heritage at that point.

Q: In fact, many New Jersey political figures started as somebody's driver, isn't that correct?

Roger Bodman: Oh yeah, there have been a number of articles about that. I think Jamie Fox and Peter Verniero, who I actually hired when I was Campaign Manager for Governor Kean in 1981, I hired him, I could tell you stories about him from even earlier, was a driver for a period of time.

Q: Did you get to see Kean as a candidate at that point in time?

Roger Bodman: No, I did not. I mean, again, I arrived in New Jersey in mid-June of that year, the primary had just been held a week or two earlier. And by the time I ended up meeting Mrs. Fenwick, I think it was mid-July or thereabouts. But I did not see Kean as a candidate. I saw him as a former candidate.

Q: What was his reputation at that point?

Roger Bodman: Well, as just a class act. Recall that there was this sort of infamous story how he became Speaker after only— he was elected in 1967, I of course, came to learn all this later, but was elected in 1967. By 1971 or thereabouts he was Speaker, and that's a pretty rapid rise to get a top job in Trenton, as you well know. And so that and the manner in which he got there with Hudson County votes and--

Q: It's more famous— it was one of the most famous stories in modern New Jersey political history.

Roger Bodman: You may remember some of the details better than I, but the gist of it was that in that election, I believe it was 1971, which was the mid-term election for Governor Cahill, who was a Republican elected in 1969. If I recall, when the election was over in the assembly out of an 80 member body, I think there was 40 Democrats, 39 Republicans and 1 independent. And obviously, that became the issue of who becomes the Speaker when you need 41 votes becomes kind of a rather significant hill to climb, so to speak. And Kean managed to put together an oddball coalition, which included Hudson County Democrats in order to gain the number of votes, the appropriate number of votes, to become Speaker. And as I was not around in those days, but as I understand the story, he gave certain committee chairmanships and so forth to some of the Democrats from Hudson. And one notorious fellow there was a fellow named David Friedland, who went onto become a very infamous character in his own right.

Q: So Kean made a deal with the devil is sort of how it boils down historically?

Roger Bodman: He— for a fellow that always would position himself above politics, he was smack in the middle of it in that situation.

Q: What does that say about Kean?

Roger Bodman: It says that he's a very clever politician. And believe me, I came to learn that very well in 1981 when I managed his campaign, where he— he was also a very good public servant, but he certainly understood that in order to get there from time to time, you had to do certain things as long as they were ethical and, in his mind, proper. He did what he had to do, but he was a tremendous political strategist, absolutely tremendous. And

still is, I might add.

Q: Had he ever employed that on behalf of others? Had he ever been somebody else's strategist?

Roger Bodman: Not really, maybe his son, or tried to be in more recent years, but as far as I know, he— and I'm sure he did when he was in the Assembly in terms of trying to keep his majority and so forth and how to run the Assembly staff and subsequent campaigns. But now remember, when he was Speaker, I mean, it was— 1973 was a very tough year for Republicans, obviously. The incumbent Governor was defeated, incumbent Governor Bill Cahill was defeated in a primary by a very conservative Congressman, Charlie Sandman from Cape May, who went on to lose in a landslide to Brendan Byrne, and with that went the legislature, the Republican majorities that were in office during the Cahill administration were all gone by 1973. I think there was 14 or maybe 15 Republicans left in the Assembly after the— and this was smack in the middle of Watergate, so it was obviously a huge Republican scandal, but Cahill had some of his own scandal issues.

Q: So 1974, you're just out of college, you sign on as Millicent Fenwick's driver. What were your typical duties during that campaign?

Roger Bodman: Driving her, making sure she— we didn't have GPSs in those days, Michael, you had maps and making sure she got to where she was going. And I mean, she— from early in the morning, the train stations from six in the morning till in those days we still had some manufacturing plants in that area to plant gates to all kinds of events and parties. And I got to know Somerset and Morris County pretty darn well, let me tell you. But just getting her where she had to go. And campaign manager, by the way, was Jack Ewing, Assemblyman Jack Ewing was the campaign manager for that campaign. He was really my boss, he was the guy that hired me technically. He always reminds me of that, by the way. And I said later "Well, I must've done a good job as your driver 'cause they made me DOT Commissioner in the Kean administration."

Q: And that was only about 10 years later?

Roger Bodman: It was in fact, almost exactly 10 years later.

Q: Who were the other key Republicans of that time?

Roger Bodman: Well, you know, I'm sure there were many outside the area that I knew. But after that election, there was only three Republicans left in the congressional delegation. One of whom was Matt Rinaldo, who just recently passed away, and the other was Ed Forsythe, who was a Congressman in South Jersey in the Burlington County area. And I believe the delegation was 16 at that time, we're now down from that, but it was the so-called "Watergate Babies" that were elected in 1974. One of whom was future Governor Jim Florio.

Q: So Fenwick must have had an easy time in that district winning the general election?

Roger Bodman: It wasn't easy by those standards.

Q: Do you recall who the opponent was?

Roger Bodman: The opponent was a fellow named Fred Bohlen, he was a college professor at Princeton who would run two years prior against Frelinghuysen in 1972. Now of course, that was Nixon's reelection year prior to all the Watergate stuff breaking in a significant way. And Fred Bowen was somewhat of a sacrificial lamb, I'd call it, in that district against Frelinghuysen, who was a 20 year incumbent, very popular, and of course Nixon won New Jersey substantially that year and so forth. By 1974 the political climate had changed substantially as a function of the Watergate scandals and obviously the interim election of Governor Byrne. And I think Fenwick, I don't recall specifically, but she only won that race by 5 or 6,000 votes in that district where you'd normally win it by 60,000 or more.

Q: Did you do work for her when she went to Congress?

Roger Bodman: I did, I became her District Director running her two district offices, one of which was in Somerville and the other which is in Morristown . And so I ran her district operations. She had three or four staff people in each of these offices and did a lot of case work and typical kind of congressional duties. But I represented her at events around the district when she couldn't be here. Of course, she was in Washington most of the time. And on weekends did the same thing, I was still her driver and travelling aid, a little more responsibilities at this point. But I spent a lot of time with her. I got to know her quite well and became very fond of her. I'll tell you a story later about a statue they have for her in my hometown of Bernardsville. I was pleased to have been the MC when it was dedicated some many years later.

Q: Tell us now.

Roger Bodman: Well, this was in the mid 1990s I want to say, I will say about, there was a group of people that she was— she was revered in Somerset County and particularly in Bernardsville. She was the— there's two favorite daughters from Bernardsville, Millicent Fenwick and Meryl Streep. And I joked I think at the time the only reason they asked me to be MC of this was because Meryl couldn't make it. But anyway, they had a committee that was called "The Millicent Fenwick Monument Committee" and they put together a life-size statue. You would never— unless you really knew where it is, you really wouldn't see it. It's on the side of the little train station right across— if you know Bernardsville, there's a restaurant called The Bernards Inn, and right across the street there's a train station there. And there's a statue, it's a life-size statue of her, it's just kind of— and a little garden around it, and it's not enormous or it's not on a big pedestal, it's just there. And when they dedicated it, Governor Whitman was there and Congressman Roukema and a whole host of others that came to— her son Hugh Fenwick, by the way, was the Mayor of the town at the time. But I was honored to be asked to be the MC at that program because of my relationship.

Q: When did you next interact with Tom Kean?

Roger Bodman: Really it was probably in 1977. I ran Mrs.— I was Mrs. Fenwick's campaign manager in 1976, which was a fairly easy campaign. Gerald Ford was up for election, of course he didn't win the presidency, but he did win New Jersey in 1976. Fenwick had a fairly easy reelection run.

Q: Against Fred Bohen again?

Roger Bodman: No. Bohen— it was a freeholder— in 1973, Somerset County which was rock-ribbed Republican, elected a Democratic freeholder, his name was Frank Nero. He was from North Plainfield . And he was the congressional candidate in 1976. And it was again, a sacrificial lamb situation, Fenwick by then was well-loved throughout that district and won easily. So it was nearly 1977 there was the local State Senator there who I had gotten to know as the District Director for Fenwick, and his name is Ray Bateman. I got to know Senator Bateman very well and wanted to get involved in his campaign for Governor. I wanted to be involved in a statewide race. And I got to know Bateman very well, to this day I'm very close to Senator Bateman, he's a very dear friend.

Q: Bateman ran for Governor in '77 and Kean ran for Governor?

Roger Bodman: Against Kean.

Q: Was there a third candidate, do you recall?

Roger Bodman: I don't believe so. There may well have been, but it may have been a minor candidate. Certainly it was the two of them that were the key candidates. And it was very interesting dynamics if you'd like to discuss that race a little bit.

Q: Go ahead, please do.

Roger Bodman: Tom, as I just said, had run against Fenwick in '74 for Congress, this is now three years later, '77 ran for Governor. He was the Chairman of the— excuse me, of the Gerald Ford campaign in 1976, Tom Kean was. I know Bateman was annoyed about that because he felt that an individual taking that position as Chairman of the President's reelection campaign shouldn't use that as a jumping off point for a gubernatorial the next year. But anyway, that's— Bateman was unhappy about that situation. But the bottom line was is Bateman really was the organization candidate. And in 1977 he had the lion's share of the county chairmen's support, the organizational lines, and Kean was sort of the upstart, but ran a very effective campaign, but not effective enough to win certainly. But it's really where I got to know Kean and really it was after— I was a field person during the primary and in the general election I was what they now call "The Body Man", I was the traveling aide for Ray Bateman. I literally lived with his family for six months or whatever and got to know the family very well. Some tragedies in his family, his oldest son died, Raymond, some years later. Kippy, now a State Senator of course, his son. But anyway, got to know the Bateman family very well. But almost the day after that primary in our headquarters, which was in East Brunswick, right down the road here on Road 18 right around here from Eagleton, Tom Kean walked in the building probably within a week of that primary and said "What can I do to help?" And was there frequently, this was not just perfunctory, this was very much like the '74 situation I described earlier, which Fenwick— did everything he could possibly do to try to be helpful to that Bateman campaign. Of course, they end up losing to Brendan Byrne but Kean, again, impressed me very much. So that's when I really got to know him.

Q: Was he still an Assemblyman?

Roger Bodman: He was an Assemblyman, exactly right.

Q: Did he have to give up his Assembly seat in order to run for Governor?

Roger Bodman: He did, he was— he did, so he was in his final term as an Assemblyman.

Q: Was he still the leader?

Roger Bodman: He was, I believe he was a minority leader, Michael, yeah, I'm quite sure he was. And he was the— they had picked up a couple more seats I guess in the— I don't recall specifically, I guess it was '73, '75. They picked up a couple of seats in the '75 election, so he had more than the 13 or 14 he had, after the Byrne landslide, but yes, he was a leader, but he was in his final term. He did have to give up his seat, both Bateman and Kean both gave up their seats to run for Governor.

Q: Was he the same generation as Ray Bateman or was he of a younger generation?

Roger Bodman: They're pretty close in age, they're probably seven or eight years apart. I think Bateman just had a— I think an eightieth birthday, and Tom is what, 74 or 5 in there somewhere.

Q: Why did Bateman beat Kean?

Roger Bodman: Organizational support. It was— Bateman had run around— he had been Senate President, he was the first— back in those days, as you know, they used to rotate leadership positions, the Senate Presidency rotated year to year, not like we have now where you have— like Senator Codey had been Senate President for years or Don DiFrancesco was and so forth. Back in those days they literally rotated the Senate Presidency every year. And Bateman was the first to serve I think two or maybe three years consecutively. He was— interesting times, I can tell you tremendous stories about him, but the bottom line was is that he had all sorts of support around the state in what I would call "the Republican infrastructure", in particular the Republican County chairmen and the resulting organization lines, which, as you know, are very important.

Q: Who were the key Republican County chairmen of that era?

Roger Bodman: Oh boy. There was a fellow named Phil Matalucci who was the Chairman of Cape May County, he

was a real colorful character. He was the guy that always used to go to the Republican conventions and wear these huge hats with elephants and stuff all over them. He was a character. Larry Pepper, who just recently retired from Cumberland, Tony Statile, this was when Bergen County was heavy Republican, heavy Republican, and you know you didn't win, still don't win, as a Republican in New Jersey, which is getting more and more difficult to do, as we know, but you certainly didn't win without Bergen County. And Bergen County was pretty solid. There was a split in the county organization up there, and Tom had a part of it, but Tony Statile was really kind of a— if there was a Republican boss, he was one of them. And also in Somerset County, an infamous gentleman named Luke Gray. Luke was an old-time county boss. And we, by the way, made a— in that primary— of course, Tom was from Essex County, now Essex of course is heavily Democrat with a lot of Republicans there in a primary, and it's obviously a much bigger county than Somerset. And our goal was to match, offset Essex and Somerset Counties, and we did. We ran a— they called me “The Postmaster General” during that primary, because we had to hand-address mail, I mean, you didn't have the labels and all the technology you had now, so I mean, we had hundreds and hundreds of volunteers in an old— I think it was a bowling alley or something, in Manville, New Jersey, where we had hundreds of volunteers one night, and I was directing this thing, and sacks of mail going out, because you'd literally get voter lists from every county in the state and hand-address things and— and then that night we had phone banks going until the polls closed at eight o'clock, and three minutes of eight, we're still calling in a primary, people in Somerset to turn out. I mean, so much so that we're annoying them to death. I mean, “You called me 16 times, leave me alone”, you know? But in fact, Bateman offset Essex County with Somerset in that primary.

Q: Do you recall who the Essex County Chairman was?

Roger Bodman: I do not, I do not.

Q: Was it John Renna?

Roger Bodman: That was later. I don't think John was there at the time. John was in the cabinet with me, he was the Community Affairs Director. Well, he may have been Chairman, I frankly don't recall. I know he was— I thought it was later, but he may have been Chairman at the time.

Michael Aron: Why did Bateman lose to Brendan Byrne?

Roger Bodman: The income tax. Clearly it was an infamous story. Bateman— the income tax was the issue. The State Supreme Court shut down the schools in the summer purposely presumably in the summer of 1976, I think it was, in order to get a stable funding source. The whole case regarding school funding had been dealt with by The State Supreme Court saying it was unequal funding for the schools, and we had to find a way to make this— to solve this problem. And hence, the income tax was voted in, and it was a very difficult process, as you know, and the state legislature was really— and Governor Byrne worked very hard to get it done, he believed it was the right way to do it, and in fact, did. And the bottom line was that— and if I remember right, Kean voted for it at one point, but I don't recall, maybe someone else will. Anyway, the bottom line was it was the issue of 1977. It was due to sunset, typically in Trenton fashion, they didn't install it permanently, they put it in, the income tax, I guess it was in '75 or '76 I think it was, and it was due to expire at the end of 1977, so it was a sunset provision. Hence, the obvious question was “How are you going to run the state without the income tax?” And Bateman came together with this “cobbled together plan”, I'd call it, which he conceived along with the former Treasury Secretary, a fellow named Bill Simon who lived in Morris County in Harding Township in Vernon. And Bill Simon was Nixon's Treasury Secretary. So this plan came to be known as “The Bateman/Simon Plan”, and Brendan Byrne, in an infamous press conference, stood up with his dry wit and said “This plan will soon be known by its initials.” It was one of the more infamous campaign stories I've ever heard, and it was delivered in typical Brendan Byrne fashion, as dryly as possible with just a huge round of laughter from the resulting press corps. And it was cobbled together things and literally included off-shore oil revenues and I think a penny increase in the sales tax and a variety of other things that was going to replace the revenue for the schools, and thereby let the income tax lapse. Obviously that didn't happen. And by the way, the whole question of rebates was a key question. If Bateman were sitting here, he would tell you that he lost because of the rebates. That the rebates were rather blatant in those days, they came

out a few days before the primary and the general, with Governor Byrne's name blazoned all over the check. And it was the first time we had this property tax rebate program, and it was very effectively done.

Q: Bateman did tell us for the Brendan Byrne Archive here at Rutgers that he knew he had lost the election a few days before the election when he went home after a hard day of campaigning, checked the mail and found his rebate checks in the mail.

Roger Bodman: Yeah, I'm sure. I'm sure.

Q: So what did you do after, what was your role in the Bateman campaign?

Roger Bodman: Bateman? Well, as I said, in the primary I was really a field guy in the early part of the thing, organizing certain counties, going down and meeting with the county chairman and organizing municipal leaders and so forth and so on. Later in the primary I was, as I said, the Postmaster General, I was doing all that mail operation. And in the general election I was his traveling aid, I was the so-called Body Man, I traveled with him everywhere.

Q: What did you do after he failed?

Roger Bodman: Well, I was unemployed for a while. This is when I started to learn that politics wasn't necessarily a stable occupation. But I was hired by an upstart Assistant County Prosecutor in Warren County named Jim Courter. This was 1978, so I _____

Q: An Assistant Warren County Prosecutor?

Roger Bodman: He was an Assistant Warren County Prosecutor, his name was Jim Courter from Hackettstown. And he wanted to run for Congress. And I actually got involved with him, there was a woman who was the County Chairman of Morris at the time, her name was Eileen McCoy. And I was friendly with Eileen from my days with Fenwick and later. And she was enamored with Mr. Courter. And this was the adjoining congressional district to the Fenwick district, this was the thirteenth congressional district, which ran, at that time, from essentially western Morris County, the Rockaway area, and west up into Sussex, all of Sussex, all of Warren, all of Hunterdon and a little piece of Mercer, in this case I believe it was Ewing Township. So it was basically the whole west coast from along the Delaware River from Trenton to High Point . Anyway, and it was one of the so-called Watergate Babies I discussed earlier, when then Congressman Florio was elected in 1974, one of the others elected that same year was the wife of the former Governor Bob Meyner, whose name was Helen Meyner. So she was elected in '74, was reelected in '76, running against a Republican State Senator named Bill Schluter, there's a name you're probably familiar with and who's been around for a good number of years. Schluter had lost his Senate seat in the Watergate elections of— I guess it was '73 to Anne Martindell who was an Ambassador later, a Democrat who recently passed away. And he was running for Congress in 1976 against Meyner in a race that a lot of us, myself included, thought he should have won. He didn't. as I said, Jerry Ford won that year, won New Jersey by about 50,000 votes, won that district by a lot more than 50,000 votes. But he was unable to unseat Mrs. Meyner, and he wanted to run again in 1978. And he also— the Congressional Republican National Committee in Washington wanted him to run again under the theory that he had name ID, he'd had a pretty good run the previous time, he was the favorite, and so forth and so on. We didn't quite see it that way. And I was hired by Courter and ran a very— well, it was a very close primary, about 150 votes he won by, very close. But Courter, we ran a very I think it was— it's sort of— if you know how Bill Baroni, the State Senator runs his campaigns now, going door to door and is very religious about it and does it in a very concentrated way. Well, Courter did the same thing. We ran a door to door campaign in that primary. Now mind you, this is a sprawling congressional district. I mean, as I said it goes from Trenton to Sussex County , and these houses aren't nice little— alongside each other in a nice little development, they're miles apart in certain cases. But you knew, and at the time you had county records, voting records that could tell who the— what we would call "The Four out of Four Voters" were, the most dedicated primary voters, who the people would actually turn out. So we ran a very targeted door to door campaign, and this guy worked his tail off for months and months and months and knocked on doors.

Q: What does “Four out of Four” mean?

Roger Bodman: It means that the people vote in the last four elections, they vote in every primary election. So if you're going to vote when the Assembly is the top of the ticket in a primary, you're going to vote in non-Presidential, you're at non-gubernatorial, you're so forth, you're a pretty dedicated voter. And therefore, you don't waste your time with folks that go vote one out of four, because the chances are they're not going to vote. And again, this was— the US Senate race was up in New Jersey, Cliff Case was running for reelection, unfortunately he was defeated in the primary that year, but this was a race that would— you would really have to look at a very dedicated primary voter, and that's what we focused on.

Q: So Courter beat Schluter in the primary, and then what happened in that general election?

Roger Bodman: We went onto take on Helen Meyner in the general election and did some of the same things, obviously we broadened the strategy regarding this door to door thing, because there's a lot more people in general election to focus on than there was in the primary obviously. But he did a fair amount of the door to door campaigning as well and just worked it very hard. Basically said she was out of step, nice lady, out of step with the district. This was a very conservative Republican district, I mean, she— and she was isolated and she was out of step with the district, I mean, the reality is she was--

Q: Was she a liberal Democrat?

Roger Bodman: Liberal, yeah, moderate to liberal, more liberal. And she actually was an interesting issue. She had met— one of the curious issues, she had met with Yasser Arafat at one point as a member of Congress for whatever reason. I guess presumably she thought this was something worthwhile to do. And as a result, from a financial point of view, she was very much disliked by the Jewish community. Not just the Jewish community in New Jersey, the Jewish community nationally. And we would get checks from Miami, Florida, unsolicited, and I'm not talking little checks, I'm talking a thousand dollar, which was the maximum you could give, I mean, hundreds of thousands of dollars donated from around the country. And that was really because of that, that was a considerable factor, certainly from the point of view of financial support.

Q: Was Brendan Byrne's record in the state an issue in that federal campaign?

Roger Bodman: In '78, not really. He had just gotten reelected. And fairly easily over Bateman, I don't recall the specific numbers but it was not a close race. And Byrne, who everyone called “One Term Byrne” obviously it was “Two Term Byrne.” And so he really wasn't a record, really we focused on Meyner's congressional record, and she pretty much toed the Democratic line down in Washington. And we had sufficient moneys to run an effective campaign, and Courter ended up winning— I remember very well, we were in Hackettstown election night. And there was one particular— Lopatcong Township, which is down near Phillipsburg, New Jersey, it's one of the townships in southern Warren County, her power base was from Phillipsburg. That's where her husband was from, where Governor Meyner was from, he was a State Senator for years prior, this was back in the fifties and before. Anyway—and this is an adjoining town. And I remember to this day, one election district, Lopatcong district three. It's a fairly rural area, but it was a Democratic area in the southern part of Warren County. And we ended up winning that district, and I picked up the phone and I said “Congratulations Congressman.” He says— this was 8:32, I mean, we had no results, and he says “Are you sure?” I said “I'm absolutely sure.” And—

Q: Figuring if you could beat her in Lopatcong you had to beat her district-wide?

Roger Bodman: You are going to win the Republican areas of course.

Q: Did former Governor Meyner campaign for his wife, do you recall?

Roger Bodman: I don't recall specific— I think he did from time to time, but I don't specifically recall honestly.

Q: What was Tom Kean doing at this point in time?

Roger Bodman: Tom Kean was a retired Assemblyman at this time. And he was not involved in this particular campaign to my memory, in this congressional race, and again, it was outside his base area. And I suspect he was contemplating his future. But I came to know later he was clearly watching this race very carefully.

Q: Why?

Roger Bodman: Well, because when he asked me to run his 1981 campaign, it was based upon my performance on that 1978 campaign— this was one of very few races, Michael, if memory serves me, where a Republican defeated a Democrat in that election cycle. I don't recall the stats— but it was a relative handful of races around the country where an incumbent Democrat was defeated, this was one of them. And so therefore it was somewhat notable. And I got— deservedly or not, a reputation of being one of the— I was 25 years old, I was one of these young, smart political operative types, and caught Tom Kean's eye. We had known each other, not well, because I was a relatively junior staffer on the Bateman campaign, but we certainly knew each other from that. But now I had a bit of a reputation.

Q: What did Kean do to retain his visibility while out of office?

Roger Bodman: Not a lot. Though he was very close to— believe it or not, and still is, to Governor Byrne. And Byrne appointed him to the Highway Authority, which I know to this day that Governor Kean very much appreciates, and they were friends. But it's hard to maintain your visibility, particularly when you're out of office, and he was. But I think he still went from time to time on the so-called “Rubber Chicken Circuit” dinner thing. But to my knowledge, he really wasn't— there was not an overt plan to say “Gee, I'm going to run again four years from now.” In fact, I would suggest he was— I won't use the word “Reluctant”, but certainly not sure he was going to run for Governor another time. Recall that he already lost two Primaries. He had lost a congressional race against Fenwick that we discussed, he lost the gubernatorial primary against Bateman that we discussed. And this is— sort of in this business it's three and you're out. And I think Kean had— if he wanted to run for statewide office again or any office again, he had to be very careful how he chose-- when he chose to run and in what circumstance, because he really couldn't afford another primary loss.

Q: I'm reminded that he also appeared on television regularly.

Roger Bodman: That's true. In 1980, and I appreciate your— and in fact, with New Jersey Network, and he was an Analyst for NJN for a good number of years. I don't know who the Democrat was that--

Q: Dick Leone.

Roger Bodman: Dick Leone, okay.

Q: Two very smart guys.

Roger Bodman: Very smart guys. I remember him going— and in fact, as we were preparing for the campaign in 1981, and a key actor in this, by the way, was former Republican Chairman, former Congressman, former Assemblyman Bob Franks, he was a key actor in helping Tom decide to run for Governor in 1981. I can get on that in a minute. But as we were preparing for this, and as I had signed on to run the camp— it was the early part of 1980, I was in Washington as Chief of Staff to Courter, running his congressional offices down there at the time. But I had agreed really with Bob Franks as the intermediary, he's a dear friend of mine, as you probably know, to sign onto this gubernatorial campaign once Kean decided he was going to do it. And I want to say it was in the spring or summer of 1980. Now, this is right in the middle of the Presidential race of Ronald Reagan versus Jimmy Carter. And the Republican Convention that year was held in Detroit . I was there with Courter, again I was at the time Courter's Chief of Staff, so it was in the summer of 1980. Kean— and there was a character that came on the political scene named Bo Sullivan. And Bo was a businessman from Totowa and a gregarious Irishman and wanted

to run for Governor and threw this big lavish party out at their convention in Detroit that year, and Kean showed up as an analyst for NJN and got a lot more publicity and a lot more out of it, we think, as the NJN Analyst than Bo did spending hundreds, whatever, certainly thousands of dollars on his lavish party.

Q: So tell us the story of how the Kean campaign incubated.

Roger Bodman: Well, and I say this with all due respect to some others I'm sure you'll interview as some point, I mean, as I just mentioned, they had lost two primaries, and good people, Tony Cicatiello who was one of them who was his Campaign Manager at least in one, if not both, I don't recall, of his earlier Primaries. But I think they realized that one more primary loss and that would be it— it would be tough for him to resurrect himself, whether a congressional opportunity presented itself or another run for Governor, whatever. So they were— I think Kean was rightfully concerned about picking the moment, so to speak. And I think they saw us— I say "Us" I mean, it was Bobby Franks and myself and others that were really— I'd met Bob on Bateman's campaign, by the way. He had just graduated from law school down at SMU, and we met each other on that campaign, and we became very close friends then, and we were kind of in the primary doing field work together and whatever. You know, I think Kean got to know us and said, "You know, these guys at least they win primaries! Bring them on!" And I think that's essentially what happened.

Q: In what year?

Roger Bodman: That happen?

Q: When do you think it all started coming together?

Roger Bodman: It started to gel, I want to say, in early 1980. Rob was elected in 1979. It was an open seat for the legislature, and he was a very young assemblyman. He was in his 20s, 26 or 27 years old. He was the youngest assemblyman at the time. He was elected in the county convention situation for an open seat. But he was enamored with Tom Kean. Just thought the world of this man. And so he would go up and see him. Go to his house and talk to him all the time, and convince him. And ultimately, I think played a significant role, I'm sure there were others, but in convincing Kean that this was the right year for him. He should do it. You know, and he helped put the team together, and I was one of the team.

Q: Who else was on that team?

Roger Bodman: Well, there was a character named Al Fasola, who was a friend of Bob's from college that he went to undergrad at DePaul in Indiana . And Fasola came onboard. And once Kean chose to run, and he started to put together-- he had a lot-- of course, his many supporters from before. I'm talking about some of the Bateman-types he brought over. I call them Bateman-types, I mean myself and Fasola and Bobby Franks. But he had many, many people. You know, Jane Burgio, a whole host-- Phil Kaltenbacher- a whole host of folks that were-- and a whole host of others that were friends and former assembly people and associates of his, Cary Edwards and others. But I'm talking about the fulltime campaign types. And once he decided to run again in the early part of 1980s, this whole thing started to gel, you know, he also had an infamous Republican consultant. His name was Roger Stone. And Roger Stone has a curious reputation out there of being sort of the dirty trickster from the Nixon years. He's sort of an odd character in my opinion to be affiliated with a fellow like Kean, who had this sort of squeaky clean, you know, above it all non-political type approach to politics. And Stone was viewed as just a hardball political actor. But as I like to joke now, we had to sort of make Kean a temporary conservative. And that was to win a primary. You know, and he knew it, and I knew it, and that's why he wanted Stone. Our media consultants was a firm at the time called Bailey and Deardorff, John Deardorff in those days, I think he was involved in President Ford's reelection. Anyway, so.

Q: Did you work with Roger Stone or was it a separate operation?

Roger Bodman: Oh, yeah! Oh, no, no. I work very much with Roger Stone.

Q: What was he like?

Roger Bodman: Oh, Stone is, I guess, he was a little more mellow perhaps in those days than he is now. Or at least by reputation. I actually got along with him well. I mean, there was typical, well, you have your consultant, and you have your day-to-day campaign manager. And you know, in that role, sometimes that can be a tough relationship sometimes. The outside consultant is trying to go around your-- in some way causing problems, or there's not a warm relationship, or a good working relationship. In this case there was. And Stone, he had some good ideas. More importantly, he had good contacts at the national level. Now mind you, by the time we're into this primary, it was the Spring of '81. This was when Reagan was just inaugurated.

Q: Had Stone worked on Reagan's campaign?

Roger Bodman: I don't believe so. His partner, Charlie Black, certainly did. And he may have had some role, but I'm not sure he had a direct role. But in this particular instance he was our general consultant, amongst other interesting things he did was we had to discuss-- I say, I joke about it, but I'm really not joking that much-- we did have to make Kean a temporary conservative. I mean, and we were running in a Republican primary. And it was also the first primary that was publicly financed. It was different from 1977. And there was numerous candidates. I think there were eight. I'm not sure I could remember all of them. A key opponent was not Bo Sullivan, the fellow I mentioned with the lavish party earlier, our key opponent was a fellow named Pat Kramer/. And Kramer had been the mayor of Paterson , bi-partisan, or non-partisan, May election. But also he was a cabinet officer in the Cahill administration. I think he was Commissioner of Committee Affairs. But he was the organization choice. He was the Ray Bateman of 1981, had most of the county chairmen. Still Kean was always viewed as somewhat of a maverick. He was a John McCain-esque type of guy, you know, and was not necessarily favored by the county organizations. He had bucked the county organization in Essex , when he first got elected to the assembly. He has run as a reform ticket. So he was always viewed as a long-time member of the NAACP. I mean, the very attributes that helped him as a general election candidate, did not help him as a primary candidate. Certainly amongst many of the organization types. Anyways, and there was a variety of others that ran for Governor that year. Jim Wallwork, a former senator from Essex, a conservative. Barry Parker ran. Mayor Jack Rafferty, Tony Imperiale, the infamous character from Newark . I may be forgetting some, but anyway, there was eight. I think there was seven on the Democrat's side. I think there was 15 candidates in that election. And in my opinion, the primary reason there was 15 candidates is that a lot of them were just sort of up-or-out attitude. At the time it was a relatively small threshold you had to raise in order to get this two-to-one matching program under the state's gubernatorial public financing law. And so some of these folks, "Eh, I'm giving up my seat in the legislature. Let's run for Governor." You know? "Why not?"

Q: I was the editor of New Jersey Monthly Magazine at the time. And I recall that there were 21 candidates for Governor.

Roger Bodman: You may well be right.

Q: We put them all on the cover of a magazine.

Roger Bodman: The cover was that big? Like Look Magazine?

Q: We made each of them a sardine in a can of sardines. And I think there were 21 sardines in the can.

Roger Bodman: You may well be right. But anyway, there was lots. Anyway, and that particular-- and one of the dynamics of that campaign was, as I just mentioned, was that Kean was not loved by the county organizations. Let me go back to Stone for a minute. Again, and one of the benefits of having Roger Stone. There was a congressman from Upstate New York-- Buffalo, New York -- who was a darling of the conservatives. Do you remember his name?

Q: Jack Kemp.

Roger Bodman: Jack Kemp. Jack Kemp was a darling of the conservatives, right? Well, he has a very close relationship with Stone. And Stone got him to come in and endorse Kean in the primary. Now it's unusual for a sitting congressman or anyone to endorse Kean. It was more unusual to have a darling of the conservatives to endorse Kean. Again, there was some others that could really lay out credentials that are much more conservative by-far than Tom Kean. Jim Wallwork, for one. And but that became very helpful again. It has to do with this so-called temporary conservative situation.

Q: Did Kemp do that simply as a favor to Roger Stone, or did he know Kean?

Roger Bodman: He really didn't know Kean. They had met each other, I think, briefly, or they had some minimal relationship, I think from the Ford campaign. But remember, I think Kemp was a big Reagan guy when Reagan ran against Ford in the primary in '76. So it really was, in my opinion, you know, if my memory serves me, 90 percent Stone that brought that in. And if I remember, I think Gerald Ford also endorsed him in that primary, if I recall. It may have been the general election. I don't remember, but either way.

Q: Why would Ford do that?

Roger Bodman: Because he was his campaign manager in 1976, as I mentioned earlier.

Q: New Jersey campaign Chairman.

Roger Bodman: Exactly. But really worked it. I mean, again, Kean was very heavily involved in '76. And I think that was the circumstance there. There was a very close relation. And remember, Ford won New Jersey in '76. I mean, he lost the Presidency, but he won New Jersey statewide by 50,000 votes, a relatively close election. Unfortunately, he didn't win the Presidency, but he did carry New Jersey, and therefore Kean had a pretty good reputation with Gerald Ford.

Q: What else did he do to try to push back against Pat Kramer's organizational strength?

Roger Bodman: Well, in those days, there was-- as there still is-- there's a series of county conventions. And three of them come to mind here. You know, Kramer was the organization candidate, as I mentioned. He was the Ray Bateman of 1981. He had the lion share of county chairmen supporting him, and so forth, and he was clearly the front-runner. No doubt. And in January and February of 1981. So we did two things. One was make a good stand in these early conventions. The first one was in Middlesex County. And as you know this is where the county Republican organization types, the county committee people, go to these conventions. Each convention had a different set of rules. But by and large it's the county committee types go and they have-- on a Saturday, on a given Saturday, and they make an endorsement. And that's how they award their line. Each county does it differently, but there are those counties that hold these types of conventions, it's generally speaking, how it's done. First one was in Middlesex County, and we won. That was great, okay. So the organization guy, Pat Kramer, who had all of this organization's support, loses the first convention. The second one was a week or two later in Union County. Now, you know, Kean could lay some claim to Union County. That's where Kean University is, and then his Elizabethtown Gas for the family business for many years, and so forth. Bo Sullivan made a real effort in Union County in this convention. When the first bout was over, no one had enough votes to win. So it came time for the second bout. The Kramer campaign manager came to me and said, "I'll make a deal with you. I'll tell you what, you throw your votes to us in the second ballot to defeat Sullivan," who I think had come in second in the first bout, but not enough-- you needed 50 percent or whatever to win. "You can throw your votes to us, so we win. And then in Ocean County, which will follow, we'll throw our votes to you." I'm like, "Yeah, I was born at night. But not last night, you know?" And I said, "No." I said, "Let Sullivan win." You know, in fact, that's exactly what happened. And Sullivan won on the second ballot. The reason we did that, Michael, was that we weren't worried about Sullivan, we worried about Kramer. 'Cause Kramer had the organization support that I mentioned earlier, in a whole bunch of other counties. I wanted to knock him off in all these early counties, so even if we didn't win, he was no longer. We ran in '77, we had name ID. If we could stop the-- or at least slow down the Kramer machine by defeating him in these early organization tests, we thought that was the right thing to do. And sure enough we come

through later in Ocean County . We didn't have the sufficient votes to win on the first ballot. We threw our votes to none other than Barry Parker. And Barry Parker, who had represented-- a portion of his senate district was in Ocean County at that time. So he was sort of quasi-favorite son, so Barry ends up winning Ocean County . Now, again, the theory was that we wanted, you know, to knock off Kramer. So of the first three significant organizational tests that year, Kramer won none of them. And it did a pretty good job to derail the campaign. The story gets better however, because this falls in the classic case, "If you don't like the rules, change them." I mentioned the relationship that Kean had with Governor Byrne. Governor Byrne was now in the latter part of his second term. Couldn't run again. And as you mentioned, there was numerous Democrats attempting to succeed Governor Byrne, one of whom was John Degnan, who was his Attorney General. And John Degnan was then a young guy, and had the Governor's support. He was very much in the same boat that Kean was. He was not the favorite of the Democratic county organizations, as Brendan Byrne was not the favorite of the Democratic county organizations. So, doing what two politicians do best-- remember Kean was the Assembly Leader for many years, and still had many, many friends in the Assembly-- they passed a piece of legislation that prohibited county organization endorsements, or awarding of the organization line, in gubernatorial primaries only. By the way, blatantly unconstitutional, as it 15 years later, in fact, was declared unconstitutional. Well, by the time...

Q: Open primary.

Roger Bodman: It was an open primary law, but it didn't deny them in senate primaries or anything, just gubernatorial, and it took effect that year. So effectively, it wiped out all the organization lines in 19-- in that primary of 1981. And did all the way up, I think-- by the time the lawsuits caught up with the law, it was Whitman's second term. Anyway, so that was-- and it was done as a function of the relationship that Kean and Byrne had, because they both had a common interest in doing away with that particular organization law.

Q: So the large field worked to Kean's advantage, would you say?

Roger Bodman: Oh, yeah, no doubt about that. Once you eliminated the organization line situation-- and I said in the early part before this law was passed-- that law was passed, I want to say in March or even late April, I forget-- in that timeframe-- but these conventions were earlier, and our goal was to knock off Kramer on those-- and we did, in those three county conventions. One of which, we won, but we made sure he didn't win the other two either. And there may have been other ones, but those three were the ones that come to mind. But after that, you know, once the law was passed and just eliminated, it just took the wind out of Kramer's sails. He did end up coming in second, about 30 or 40,000 votes behind Kean.

Q: Did any of the usual Republican litmus test issues play into this primary? Abortion, gun control, death penalty? Do you recall?

Roger Bodman: Some. Death penalty did. I think Kean endorsed it, though very reluctantly. He signed it when he was Governor, and never was, as you know, was never implemented in any way. And then most recently, they eliminated it. The others, Kean was pro-choice, but I don't remember the issue being significant. It was, it was there certainly, and it was out there. But again, this is where the massive field helped us. Kean won with, I think, about 30 percent of the votes. Of course, there's no run-offs here. But you know, 30 percent of the vote was enough in an eight-way field, or whatever it was. But he did have his so-called tax plan. I forgot to mention that one of the reasons Kenp came in here, I mean, he sort of coined this interestingly. He sort of endorsed Kean's plan, but not Kean. I mean, I guess it was sort of this-- and this was a plan to reduce the income tax, and the sales tax, both of which Kean reversed exactly 100 percent when he got to be Governor. But we'll talk about that later.

Q: So Kean ran in the primary promising that he would reduce the income tax-- not eliminate-- just reduce the income and the sales tax.

Roger Bodman: Yes, sir. And I remember sitting in Walter Kavanaugh's bedroom in Somerset County when we were getting the mail ready and going...

Q: Who was Walter at that time?

Roger Bodman: Walter was an assemblyman at the time. You know, the late Walter Kavanaugh was a supporter and a wonderful man. For whatever reason, we were in Somerville, and we were in his house, and we're literally sitting in his bedroom, Kean and I, going over this piece of mail we're about to mail, which detailed this tax plan. And looked at Kean, he was like fretting, he did not-- I know in his heart of hearts, he did not want to do this, or say this. So it was probably one of the more difficult moments for him I would suspect. And he said, "Okay, fine." Because I need him to sign off on-- it's one thing for us to talk about it, and conceptually it's another thing to put a couple million pieces of mail out there with this thing detailed for the world to see, and you guys to criticize, and somebody to tear it apart and whatever. And he was reluctant, but ultimately did it.

Q: Because?

Roger Bodman: Because he knew the fiscal problems of the State. I mean, he'd been the Speaker, he understood the whole issue of what this would mean, and budget cuts, and as his governorship later proved, he wasn't afraid to spend the taxpayer's dollar.

Q: But you put it out anyway, because...

Roger Bodman: Because we had to make him a temporary conservative in the primary, Michael. I mean, remember, he was-- I think he really did believe. Remember this was in the era of Reagan had just gotten elected. Supply side economics, Reaganomics, those were the code words of the day, right? You know, supply side being the Laffer Curve, all this kind of stuff. And I think there was-- I think Kean was-- I should be fair about it, probably betwixt and between, let me put it that way. He probably-- I'm not sure he was born into the whole supply side thing totally. But I think he did realize, or did believe that if he could cut taxes to a degree that it would help spur the economy. Now when he became governor in the early 1980s it was a very difficult time. We were in a recessionary period. I can discuss that. I was Labor Commissioner by then. I could tell you well what the unemployment was and so forth.

Q: How did you get your message out in those days in the primary. All mail?

Roger Bodman: Mostly. But we had some television. We could afford some television. Again, it was publicly financed. Let me talk about the financial side of this for a minute. One of the reasons that Jim Courter, situation became very-- Jim became his statewide Honorary Chair. And when Kean ran for Governor in 1977, he did not have a broad-based fundraising operation. He was a well-to-do fellow and he had some good friends, but there was no limits, I don't believe, in the campaign back then unless you took-- public financing only was effective in the general election, not the primary in '77, I'm talking. And therefore, he had a relatively small group of wealthier people that wrote large, relatively large, checks to support his candidacy. He did not have a strong or wide fundraising base. By 1981, the rules, as I just said, had changed. The primaries were now publicly financed, and you had to-- I forget what the limit was-- \$800, I think it was that you could raise. But you had to raise a whole bunch of \$800 checks from a very broad base in order to get the matching funds, the two-to-one formula that still exists in today's law. And obviously, the numbers are a lot higher. But anyway, it was very helpful to have Jim Courter as a financial list. In other words, when he had run for congress in '78, and reelection in 1980 now, he had run his reelection-- it was kind of a perfunctory reelection-- but ran his reelection in '80, you know, he had a broad-based fundraising list, and I was not reluctant to tap into that list, and use Courter as our primary fundraiser for Kean in the primary. Because obviously we're very happy to have the wealthy individuals that Kean had as previous supporters, but they were limited to 800 bucks! And you need a whole bunch of \$800 checks in order to get that matching formula. And obviously, the general election was the same. So Courter was very helpful in that regard, just having the apparatus of his congressional fundraising. You know, it was very helpful.

Q: What Kean like as a recap campaigner back then?

Roger Bodman: If I could get him out of the house, he was fine. You know, I'd go up to his house-- god love him! I

mean, we used to call-- he was two hours late to everything in his life-- I mean, we used to call it "Eastern Kean Time," which was about two hours behind the rest of the world. And this, by the way, continued throughout his eight years as Governor, and probably till today. He, and is one of the things, ultimately, I believe, ultimately why he was elected. This very much was a personality driven contest. But the bottom line was is that he-- I'd go up to his house and he'd be looking around for his socks and his shoes, and this and that. I'd, "Governor?" We didn't call him Governor in those days, but by the way, ever since he was elected Governor, I never referred to him to his face by his first name. I've always called him Governor, since the election night of 1981. Anyway, but then I called him Tom, or "Assemblyman," when I was mad at him. And said, "Let's go!" But getting him out of the house. But he was a great campaigner. He loved to campaign; you know, almost too much! He'd complain about his schedule typically. "I don't want to get up at 6:00 in the morning and go to the train station," this kind of stuff. But by-and-large he was very good. But he would talk to-- if anyone wanted to talk to him, he'd have a 20-minute conversation with anybody. And that's why he was two hours late to everything. I mean, that was a plus and it was a minus. I mean, everybody-- he was affable, he was friendly. People enjoyed him, talking to him. And he enjoyed talking to them. But from a campaign manager, when you have 24 hours in a day, or 12 or 14 or 15 that are hours that you need to have him hit six or eight events, keeping him on schedule was a chore.

Q: You say that Pat Kramer was your principal rival going into the primary. What kind of retail campaigner was he?

Roger Bodman: I think he was good. To this day-- I saw Pat out at the Republican convention this year. He's a wonderful man. He's a nice guy. But I just think he banked too much on the organization support, and when that went away, it really sunk his campaign. And the fact that Kean had run four years prior. There was some folks out there within the organizations and elsewhere that felt it was Kean's turn. You know, he had run in '77 in the primary. He lost. There was some residual name ID, certainly amongst the Republican primary voting electorate. So I think Kramer was a good campaigner. I mean, he was an affable guy. He was the Mayor of Paterson. He was a very affable kind of fellow. But Kean, I think was better.

Q: You alluded to the fact that you had some money for television. Do you recall how much TV you used?

Roger Bodman: Not much. We did have some, and I'd have to-- I was telling Don Linky here that I would try to come up with some of the primary television spots. I think I may have some of them sitting in the attic someplace, if I can find a dusty old box and bring them down here, I'll do so. But I don't recall the amount. I don't even recall the amount, the limits. There was severe limits, as you know, with accepting public financing. The good part was that state tax payers were kind enough to match your donations on a two-to-one basis. The bad part was that they'd cap you at a certain amount. And it's a relatively low amount, so even in those days. So but we did have some TV, but I don't recall the budget.

Q: Do you recall if there were debates in that primary?

Roger Bodman: Oh, yeah, there were. I don't remember any notable moments from them, but they were clearly there, and you had this small army of people sitting up there, so everybody got to say 14 words, and that was it.

Q: How did Kean do?

Roger Bodman: Kean did fine. You know, again, Kean, of all of those individuals, I mean, his experience in the legislature, and others were legislators-- Barry Parker and Wallwork and so forth-- but Kean had been a statewide candidate once in the Bateman primary, and he'd been a congressional candidate in the Fenwick primary, and his father had been a congressman, and so forth. He's good in that forum. And he knows the issues, of course, he was the Speaker.

Q: Kean speaks like a patrician. We've all gotten used to it, but I would imagine that the New Jersey electorate, the first time it encountered Kean, might have a hard time embracing a man who spoke like that. Was there any thought given, or effort made, to change him, and change the way he spoke?

Q: Not really. He had a speech impediment as a child, and I think it was a stutter circumstance of some form or another. So we did try to get him to enunciate his words. And if I can find some of these spots, some of them you can see there were almost trying too hard, so to speak. You can just see the movements of his mouth where he was trying to enunciate his words. And it was more based upon that earlier speech issue, than it was upon this Bostonian or New England accent that he seemed to have. God knows where he picked that up. I mean, I know he was up in New England for many years. But you know, it is what it was. Also, there was the infamous gap in his teeth. Where he had to-- and people, "Oh, go take him to the dentist and get that," I mean, no. I mean, Tom Kean, you could never do that stuff with Kean. Kean was, and is what he is. And I can tell you stories about his clothing, which would...

Q: Tell me one.

Roger Bodman: Well, when he ran in the primary, I mean, he was not the most debonair character you've ever met. And he had a sport jacket, not unlike this, with these leather patches on the thing, which had holes in them, literally. And I swear, I said that was the Hamilton F. Kean Memorial Sport Coat. I'm sure it was! You know, that was his grandfather, the Senator. Anyway, I asked Tony Cicatiello at one point to take him to a clothing store and get some new suits, because his suits were just awful! Just old and just ill-fitting and so forth. Anyway, the long and short of it was is that he I made Tom break out his American Express card. I think it was the first time it was out of his wallet, and send Cicatiello, I said, "Go get him some decent clothes. Get him a couple of suits." They went and bought him a couple of very nice suits, you know, pinstripe, dark gray, whatever, charcoal. You know, nice suit. I also told him, "By the way," you know, he used to wear this belt. This belt that he had made when he was a camp counselor. This belt was like one of these beaded kind of belts, had his initials in the back. It was like a camp counselor type thing that some kid made, or he made. I don't know. And half the beads were falling out of it, and an old ratty looking thing. I said, "Get a nice black leather belt to go with his new suit, so it would look very nice."

Q: So you literally redressed this man.

Roger Bodman: Oh, absolutely! Trust me, he needed to be redressed. If you saw some of the clothes he had, it was just awful. So we got him a couple of decent suits. But here's the story about the belt. He would come into his office, and I can't do it, when I stand up with this thing on, but he would literally pull his arms back like this and stand in my office at the campaign headquarters, and just pull his jacket back, and just saunter around the room while he was talking to me. And he would do it specific, because he was wearing that darn belt! And he would do it just to annoy me. And that was his way. You know, "You can do so much with me." That was his message. "You can do so much. You can push me so far in this stuff, but some things I'm just not going to give up." And he wouldn't give up that darn belt. He still wears the darn thing. I've seen it. He still has it and he still wears it. The ironic thing, and this is the hilarious part, in its first year as Governor, he was named as one of the Ten Best Dressed Men in America . Because his Press Secretary, Carl Golden, called. I was at the Labor Department at the time, called me, said, "You're not going to believe this." They thought it was a joke, literally. They called. They thought it was a bogus organization, somebody making a joke. Absolutely, he was named one of the Ten Best Dressed Men in America . It was hilarious!

Q: You got Kean to open his wallet and pull out his American Express card.

Roger Bodman: The moths flew out.

Q: Yeah, well, some people think that wallet was held together by rubber bands.

Roger Bodman: Clearly, no doubt about it. One story I had with him was when we took him to-- I think this was maybe the general-- the candidate can put in X-number of dollars. I think it was \$25,000 that the candidate can give under the public financing rules to their own campaign. That was the max. He says to me, "I don't have \$25,000." I said, "What do you mean you don't have 25?" I mean, everyone thought Kean was this well-to-do fellow.

Q: He lived in a mansion.

Roger Bodman: Well, he lived alongside the mansion, really. His house was on the parents' property. The mansion was around the corner. Anyway, it was a beautiful house. He certainly, by all appearances, be able to have \$25,000. So I took him to the bank, which was one of the banks that the family had started, Livingston National, whatever it was, and I drove him to the bank, and I said, "This man wants to borrow \$25,000." He's like looking at me. He did! I said, "Governor" now then, "Tom, I said if you expect other people to donate these monies to your campaign, you can put in this 25." I think we may have repaid him. I don't remember, but it may have just been a loan. But regardless, I drove him to the bank literally.

Q: He's notoriously...

Roger Bodman: Frugal? Cheap?

Q: Frugal, yes.

Roger Bodman: Cheap. Let's call it what it is. The joke used to be when he and Kaltenbacher was his assembly running mate, used to drive through the parkway tolls, and he'd pretend he was sleeping. Kaltenbacher put the 35 cents into the bucket.

Q: In those days it probably only was a quarter.

Roger Bodman: Probably was a quarter in those days. Whatever, yeah, right. You know, anyway. That's our Governor, god love him!

Q: Who were the key money people?

Roger Bodman: Jon Hanson was probably the primary money guy.

Q: Who was Jon Hanson?

Roger Bodman: Jon Hanson is a real estate developer in Bergen County and a good friend. Kaltenbacher was also. Kaltenbacher was, as I said, was his assembly running mate, was the President or Chairman of a major company in Newark at the time called Seton Leather. I don't know if they're there any longer, but Phil's long retired, but John's still around. And they were really two of the key finance guys during that campaign, and they were very helpful. Very helpful, as I said.

Q: So going into primary night, was Nick Brady also involved?

Roger Bodman: Nick was somewhat involved. Nick was actually very close to Bateman in the Bateman primary. I knew Nick very well. He was later Treasury Secretary under both Reagan and Bush, the father, Bush Number 41. And he was involved to a degree, but not as much as these other two.

Q: Kean named him a temporary Senator.

Roger Bodman: He did, in fact, in early 1982, when Harrison Williams had to resign under the Abscam scandal.

Q: So tell us the story of how the Kean campaign incubated.

Roger Bodman: Well, and I say this with all due respect to some others I'm sure you'll interview as some point, I mean, as I just mentioned, they had lost two primaries, and good people, Tony Cicatiello who was one of them who was his Campaign Manager at least in one, if not both, I don't recall, of his earlier primaries. But I think they realized that one more primary loss and that would be it— it would be tough for him to resurrect himself, whether a congressional opportunity presented itself or another run for Governor, whatever. So they were— I think Kean was rightfully concerned about picking the moment, so to speak. And I think they saw us— I say "Us" I mean, it

was Bobby Franks and myself and others that were really— I'd met Bob on Bateman's campaign, by the way. He had just graduated from law school down at SMU, and we met each other on that campaign, and we became very close friends then, and we were kind of in the primary doing field work together and whatever. You know, I think Kean got to know us and said, "You know, these guys at least they win primaries! Bring them on!" And I think that's essentially what happened.

Q: In what year?

Roger Bodman: That happen?

Q: When do you think it all started coming together?

Roger Bodman: It started to gel, I want to say, in early 1980. Bob was elected in 1979. It was an open seat for the legislature, and he was a very young assemblyman. He was in his 20s, 26 or 27 years old. He was the youngest assemblyman at the time. He was elected in the county convention situation for an open seat. But he was enamored with Tom Kean. Just thought the world of this man. And so he would go up and see him. Go to his house and talk to him all the time, and convince him. And ultimately, I think played a significant role, I'm sure there were others, but in convincing Kean that this was the right year for him. He should do it. You know, and he helped put the team together, and I was one of the team.

Q: Who else was on that team?

Roger Bodman: Well, there was a character named Al Fasola, who was a friend of Bob's from college that he went to undergrad at DePaul in Indiana . And Fasola came onboard. And once Kean chose to run, and he started to put together-- he had a lot-- of course, his many supporters from before. I'm talking about some of the Bateman-types he brought over. I call them Bateman-types, I mean myself and Fasola and Bobby Franks. But he had many, many people. You know, Jane Burgio, a whole host-- Phil Kaltenbacher- a whole host of folks that were-- and a whole host of others that were friends and former assembly people and associates of his, Cary Edwards and others. But I'm talking about the fulltime campaign types. And once he decided to run again in the early part of 1980s, this whole thing started to gel, you know, he also had an infamous Republican consultant. His name was Roger Stone. And Roger Stone has a curious reputation out there of being sort of the dirty trickster from the Nixon years. He's sort of an odd character in my opinion to be affiliated with a fellow like Kean, who had this sort of squeaky clean, you know, above it all non-political type approach to politics. And Stone was viewed as just a hardball political actor. But as I like to joke now, we had to sort of make Kean a temporary conservative. And that was to win a primary. You know, and he knew it, and I knew it, and that's why he wanted Stone. Our media consultants was a firm at the time called Bailey and Deardorff, John Deardorff in those days, I think he was involved in President Ford's reelection. Anyway, so.

Q: Did you work with Roger Stone or was it a separate operation?

Roger Bodman: Oh, yeah! Oh, no, no. I work very much with Roger Stone.

Q: What was he like?

Roger Bodman: Oh, Stone is, I guess, he was a little more mellow perhaps in those days than he is now. Or at least by reputation. I actually got along with him well. I mean, there was typical, well, you have your consultant, and you have your day-to-day campaign manager. And you know, in that role, sometimes that can be a tough relationship sometimes. The outside consultant is trying to go around your-- in some way causing problems, or there's not a warm relationship, or a good working relationship. In this case there was. And Stone, he had some good ideas. More importantly, he had good contacts at the national level. Now mind you, by the time we're into this primary, it was the Spring of '81. This was when Reagan was just inaugurated.

Q: Had Stone worked on Reagan's campaign?

Roger Bodman: I don't believe so. His partner, Charlie Black, certainly did. And he may have had some role, but I'm not sure he had a direct role. But in this particular instance he was our general consultant, amongst other interesting things he did was we had to discuss-- I say, I joke about it, but I'm really not joking that much-- we did have to make Kean a temporary conservative. I mean, and we were running in a Republican primary. And it was also the first primary that was publicly financed. It was different from 1977. And there was numerous candidates. I think there were eight. I'm not sure I could remember all of them. A key opponent was not Bo Sullivan, the fellow I mentioned with the lavish party earlier, our key opponent was a fellow named Pat Kramer/. And Kramer had been the mayor of Paterson , bi-partisan, or non-partisan, May election. But also he was a cabinet officer in the Cahill administration. I think he was Commissioner of Community Affairs. But he was the organization choice. He was the Ray Bateman of 1981, had most of the county chairmen. Still Kean was always viewed as somewhat of a maverick. He was a John McCain-esque type of guy, you know, and was not necessarily favored by the county organizations. He had bucked the county organization in Essex , when he first got elected to the assembly. He has run as a reform ticket. So he was always viewed as a long-time member of the NAACP. I mean, the very attributes that helped him as a general election candidate, did not help him as a primary candidate. Certainly amongst many of the organization types. Anyways, and there was a variety of others that ran for Governor that year. Jim Wallwork, a former senator from Essex, a conservative. Barry Parker ran. Mayor Jack Rafferty, Tony Imperiale, the infamous character from Newark . I may be forgetting some, but anyway, there was eight. I think there was seven on the Democrat's side. I think there was 15 candidates in that election. And in my opinion, the primary reason there was 15 candidates is that a lot of them were just sort of up-or-out attitude. At the time it was a relatively small threshold you had to raise in order to get this two-to-one matching program under the state's gubernatorial public financing law. And so some of these folks, "Eh, I'm giving up my seat in the legislature. Let's run for Governor." You know? "Why not?"

Q: I was the editor of New Jersey Monthly Magazine at the time. And I recall that there were 21 candidates for Governor.

Roger Bodman: You may well be right.

Q: We put them all on the cover of a magazine.

Roger Bodman: The cover was that big? Like Look Magazine?

Q: We made each of them a sardine in a can of sardines. And I think there were 21 sardines in the can.

Roger Bodman: You may well be right. But anyway, there was lots. Anyway, and that particular-- and one of the dynamics of that campaign was, as I just mentioned, was that Kean was not loved by the county organizations. Let me go back to Stone for a minute. Again, and one of the benefits of having Roger Stone. There was a congressman from Upstate New York-- Buffalo, New York -- who was a darling of the conservatives. Do you remember his name?

Q: Jack Kemp.

Roger Bodman: Jack Kemp. Jack Kemp was a darling of the conservatives, right? Well, he has a very close relationship with Stone. And Stone got him to come in and endorse Kean in the primary. Now it's unusual for a sitting congressman or anyone to endorse Kean. It was more unusual to have a darling of the conservatives to endorse Kean. Again, there was some others that could really lay out credentials that are much more conservative by-far than Tom Kean. Jim Wallwork, for one. And but that became very helpful again. It has to do with this so-called temporary conservative situation.

Q: Did Kemp do that simply as a favor to Roger Stone, or did he know Kean?

Roger Bodman: He really didn't know Kean. They had met each other, I think, briefly, or they had some minimal relationship, I think from the Ford campaign. But remember, I think Kemp was a big Reagan guy when Reagan ran

against Ford in the primary in '76. So it really was, in my opinion, you know, if my memory serves me, 90 percent Stone that brought that in. And if I remember, I think Gerald Ford also endorsed him in that primary, if I recall. It may have been the general election. I don't remember, but either way.

Q: Why would Ford do that?

Roger Bodman: Because he was his campaign manager in 1976, as I mentioned earlier.

Q: New Jersey campaign Chairman.

Roger Bodman: Exactly. But really worked it. I mean, again, Kean was very heavily involved in '76. And I think that was the circumstance there. There was a very close relation. And remember, Ford won New Jersey in '76. I mean, he lost the Presidency, but he won New Jersey statewide by 50,000 votes, a relatively close election. Unfortunately, he didn't win the Presidency, but he did carry New Jersey, and therefore Kean had a pretty good reputation with Gerald Ford.

Q: What else did he do to try to push back against Pat Kramer's organizational strength?

Roger Bodman: Well, in those days, there was-- as there still is-- there's a series of county conventions. And three of them come to mind here. You know, Kramer was the organization candidate, as I mentioned. He was the Ray Bateman of 1981. He had the lion share of county chairmen supporting him, and so forth, and he was clearly the front-runner. No doubt. And in January and February of 1981. So we did two things. One was make a good stand in these early conventions. The first one was in Middlesex County. And as you know this is where the county Republican organization types, the county committee people, go to these conventions. Each convention had a different set of rules. But by and large it's the county committee types go and they have-- on a Saturday, on a given Saturday, and they make an endorsement. And that's how they award their line. Each county does it differently, but there are those counties that hold these types of conventions, it's generally speaking, how it's done. First one was in Middlesex County, and we won. That was great, okay. So the organization guy, Pat Kramer, who had all of this organization's support, loses the first convention. The second one was a week or two later in Union County. Now, you know, Kean could lay some claim to Union County. That's where Kean University is, and then his Elizabethtown Gas for the family business for many years, and so forth. Bo Sullivan made a real effort in Union County in this convention. When the first bout was over, no one had enough votes to win. So it came time for the second bout. The Kramer campaign manager came to me and said, "I'll make a deal with you. I'll tell you what, you throw your votes to us in the second ballot to defeat Sullivan," who I think had come in second in the first bout, but not enough-- you needed 50 percent or whatever to win. "You can throw your votes to us, so we win. And then in Ocean County, which will follow, we'll throw our votes to you." I'm like, "Yeah, I was born at night. But not last night, you know?" And I said, "No." I said, "Let Sullivan win." You know, in fact, that's exactly what happened. And Sullivan won on the second ballot. The reason we did that, Michael, was that we weren't worried about Sullivan, we worried about Kramer. 'Cause Kramer had the organization support that I mentioned earlier, in a whole bunch of other counties. I wanted to knock him off in all these early counties, so even if we didn't win, he was no longer. We ran in '77, we had name ID. If we could stop the-- or at least slow down the Kramer machine by defeating him in these early organization tests, we thought that was the right thing to do. And sure enough we come through later in Ocean County. We didn't have the sufficient votes to win on the first ballot. We threw our votes to none other than Barry Parker. And Barry Parker, who had represented-- a portion of his senate district was in Ocean County at that time. So he was sort of quasi-favorite son, so Barry ends up winning Ocean County. Now, again, the theory was that we wanted, you know, to knock off Kramer. So of the first three significant organizational tests that year, Kramer won none of them. And it did a pretty good job to derail the campaign. The story gets better however, because this falls in the classic case, "If you don't like the rules, change them." I mentioned the relationship that Kean had with Governor Byrne. Governor Byrne was now in the latter part of his second term. Couldn't run again. And as you mentioned, there was numerous Democrats attempting to succeed Governor Byrne, one of whom was John Degnan, who was his Attorney General. And John Degnan was then a young guy, and had the Governor's support. He was very much in the same boat that Kean was. He was not the favorite of the Democratic county organizations, as Brendan Byrne was not the favorite of the Democratic county organizations. So, doing what two

politicians do best-- remember Kean was the Assembly Leader for many years, and still had many, many friends in the Assembly-- they passed a piece of legislation that prohibited county organization endorsements, or awarding of the organization line, in gubernatorial primaries only. By the way, blatantly unconstitutional, as it 15 years later, in fact, was declared unconstitutional. Well, by the time...

Q: Open primary.

Roger Bodman: It was an open primary law, but it didn't deny them in senate primaries or anything, just gubernatorial, and it took effect that year. So effectively, it wiped out all the organization lines in 19-- in that primary of 1981. And did all the way up, I think-- by the time the lawsuits caught up with the law, it was Whitman's second term. Anyway, so that was-- and it was done as a function of the relationship that Kean and Byrne had, because they both had a common interest in doing away with that particular organization law.

Q: So the large field worked to Kean's advantage, would you say?

Roger Bodman: Oh, yeah, no doubt about that. Once you eliminated the organization line situation-- and I said in the early part before this law was passed-- that law was passed, I want to say in March or even late April, I forget-- in that timeframe-- but these conventions were earlier, and our goal was to knock off Kramer on those-- and we did, in those three county conventions. One of which, we won, but we made sure he didn't win the other two either. And there may have been other ones, but those three were the ones that come to mind. But after that, you know, once the law was passed and just eliminated, it just took the wind out of Kramer's sails. He did end up coming in second, about 30 or 40,000 votes behind Kean.

Q: Did any of the usual Republican litmus test issues play into this primary? Abortion, gun control, death penalty? Do you recall?

Roger Bodman: Some. Death penalty did. I think Kean endorsed it, though very reluctantly. He signed it when he was Governor, and never was, as you know, was never implemented in any way. And then most recently, they eliminated it. The others, Kean was pro-choice, but I don't remember the issue being significant. It was, it was there certainly, and it was out there. But again, this is where the massive field helped us. Kean won with, I think, about 30 percent of the votes. Of course, there's no run-offs here. But you know, 30 percent of the vote was enough in an eight-way field, or whatever it was. But he did have his so-called tax plan. I forgot to mention that one of the reasons Kenp came in here, I mean, he sort of coined this interestingly. He sort of endorsed Kean's plan, but not Kean. I mean, I guess it was sort of this-- and this was a plan to reduce the income tax, and the sales tax, both of which Kean reversed exactly 100 percent when he got to be Governor. But we'll talk about that later.

Q: So Kean ran in the primary promising that he would reduce the income tax-- not eliminate-- just reduce the income and the sales tax.

Roger Bodman: Yes, sir. And I remember sitting in Walter Kavanaugh's bedroom in Somerset County when we were getting the mail ready and going...

Q: Who was Walter at that time?

Roger Bodman: Walter was an assemblyman at the time. You know, the late Walter Kavanaugh was a supporter and a wonderful man. For whatever reason, we were in Somerville, and we were in his house, and we're literally sitting in his bedroom, Kean and I, going over this piece of mail we're about to mail, which detailed this tax plan. And looked at Kean, he was like fretting, he did not-- I know in his heart of hearts, he did not want to do this, or say this. So it was probably one of the more difficult moments for him I would suspect. And he said, "Okay, fine." Because I need him to sign off on-- it's one thing for us to talk about it, and conceptually it's another thing to put a couple million pieces of mail out there with this thing detailed for the world to see, and you guys to criticize, and somebody to tear it apart and whatever. And he was reluctant, but ultimately did it.

Q: Because?

Roger Bodman: Because he knew the fiscal problems of the State. I mean, he'd been the Speaker, he understood the whole issue of what this would mean, and budget cuts, and as his governorship later proved, he wasn't afraid to spend the taxpayer's dollar.

Q: But you put it out anyway, because...

Roger Bodman: Because we had to make him a temporary conservative in the primary, Michael. I mean, remember, he was-- I think he really did believe. Remember this was in the era of Reagan had just gotten elected. Supply side economics, Reaganomics, those were the code words of the day, right? You know, supply side being the Laffer Curve, all this kind of stuff. And I think there was-- I think Kean was-- I should be fair about it, probably betwixt and between, let me put it that way. He probably-- I'm not sure he was born into the whole supply side thing totally. But I think he did realize, or did believe that if he could cut taxes to a degree that it would help spur the economy. Now when he became governor in the early 1980s it was a very difficult time. We were in a recessionary period. I can discuss that. I was Labor Commissioner by then. I could tell you well what the unemployment was and so forth.

Q: How did you get your message out in those days in the primary. All mail?

Roger Bodman: Mostly. But we had some television. We could afford some television. Again, it was publicly financed. Let me talk about the financial side of this for a minute. One of the reasons that Jim Courter, situation became very-- Jim became his statewide Honorary Chair. And when Kean ran for Governor in 1977, he did not have a broad-based fundraising operation. He was a well-to-do fellow and he had some good friends, but there was no limits, I don't believe, in the campaign back then unless you took-- public financing only was effective in the general election, not the primary in '77, I'm talking. And therefore, he had a relatively small group of wealthier people that wrote large, relatively large, checks to support his candidacy. He did not have a strong or wide fundraising base. By 1981, the rules, as I just said, had changed. The primaries were now publicly financed, and you had to-- I forget what the limit was-- \$800, I think it was that you could raise. But you had to raise a whole bunch of \$800 checks from a very broad base in order to get the matching funds, the two-to-one formula that still exists in today's law. And obviously, the numbers are a lot higher. But anyway, it was very helpful to have Jim Courter as a financial list. In other words, when he had run for congress in '78, and reelection in 1980 now, he had run his reelection-- it was kind of a perfunctory reelection-- but ran his reelection in '80, you know, he had a broad-based fundraising list, and I was not reluctant to tap into that list, and use Courter as our primary fundraiser for Kean in the primary. Because obviously we're very happy to have the wealthy individuals that Kean had as previous supporters, but they were limited to 800 bucks! And you need a whole bunch of \$800 checks in order to get that matching formula. And obviously, the general election was the same. So Courter was very helpful in that regard, just having the apparatus of his congressional fundraising. You know, it was very helpful.

Q: What was Kean like as a retail campaigner back then?

Roger Bodman: If I could get him out of the house, he was fine. You know, I'd go up to his house-- god love him! I mean, we used to call-- he was two hours late to everything in his life-- I mean, we used to call it "Eastern Kean Time," which was about two hours behind the rest of the world. And this, by the way, continued throughout his eight years as Governor, and probably till today. He, and is one of the things, ultimately, I believe, ultimately why he was elected. This very much was a personality driven contest. But the bottom line was is that he-- I'd go up to his house and he'd be looking around for his socks and his shoes, and this and that. I'd, "Governor?" We didn't call him Governor in those days, but by the way, ever since he was elected Governor, I never referred to him to his face by his first name. I've always called him Governor, since the election night of 1981. Anyway, but then I called him Tom, or "Assemblyman," when I was mad at him. And said, "Let's go!" But getting him out of the house. But he was a great campaigner. He loved to campaign; you know, almost too much! He'd complain about his schedule typically. "I don't want to get up at 6:00 in the morning and go to the train station," this kind of stuff. But by-and-large he was very good. But he would talk to-- if anyone wanted to talk to him, he'd have a 20-minute

conversation with anybody. And that's why he was two hours late to everything. I mean, that was a plus and it was a minus. I mean, everybody-- he was affable, he was friendly. People enjoyed him, talking to him. And he enjoyed talking to them. But from a campaign manager, when you have 24 hours in a day, or 12 or 14 or 15 that are hours that you need to have him hit six or eight events, keeping him on schedule was a chore.

Q: You say that Pat Kramer was your principal rival going into the primary. What kind of retail campaigner was he?

Roger Bodman: I think he was good. To this day-- I saw Pat out at the Republican convention this year. He's a wonderful man. He's a nice guy. But I just think he banked too much on the organization support, and when that went away, it really sunk his campaign. And the fact that Kean had run four years prior. There was some folks out there within the organizations and elsewhere that felt it was Kean's turn. You know, he had run in '77 in the primary. He lost. There was some residual name ID, certainly amongst the Republican primary voting electorate. So I think Kramer was a good campaigner. I mean, he was an affable guy. He was the Mayor of Paterson. He was a very affable kind of fellow. But Kean, I think was better.

Q: You alluded to the fact that you had some money for television. Do you recall how much TV you used?

Roger Bodman: Not much. We did have some, and I'd have to-- I was telling Don Linky here that I would try to come up with some of the primary television spots. I think I may have some of them sitting in the attic someplace, if I can find a dusty old box and bring them down here, I'll do so. But I don't recall the amount. I don't even recall the amount, the limits. There was severe limits, as you know, with accepting public financing. The good part was that state tax payers were kind enough to match your donations on a two-to-one basis. The bad part was that they'd cap you at a certain amount. And it's a relatively low amount, so even in those days. So but we did have some TV, but I don't recall the budget.

Q: Do you recall if there were debates in that primary?

Roger Bodman: Oh, yeah, there were. I don't remember any notable moments from them, but they were clearly there, and you had this small army of people sitting up there, so everybody got to say 14 words, and that was it.

Q: How did Kean do?

Roger Bodman: Kean did fine. You know, again, Kean, of all of those individuals, I mean, his experience in the legislature, and others were legislators-- Barry Parker and Wallwork and so forth-- but Kean had been a statewide candidate once in the Bateman primary, and he'd been a congressional candidate in the Fenwick primary, and his father had been a congressman, and so forth. He's good in that forum. And he knows the issues, of course, he was the Speaker.

Q: Kean speaks like a patrician. We've all gotten used to it, but I would imagine that the New Jersey electorate, the first time it encountered Kean, might have a hard time embracing a man who spoke like that. Was there any thought given, or effort made, to change him, and change the way he spoke?

Q: Not really. He had a speech impediment as a child, and I think it was a stutter circumstance of some form or another. So we did try to get him to enunciate his words. And if I can find some of these spots, some of them you can see there were almost trying too hard, so to speak. You can just see the movements of his mouth where he was trying to enunciate his words. And it was more based upon that earlier speech issue, than it was upon this Bostonian or New England accent that he seemed to have. God knows where he picked that up. I mean, I know he was up in New England for many years. But you know, it is what it was. Also, there was the infamous gap in his teeth. Where he had to-- and people, "Oh, go take him to the dentist and get that," I mean, no. I mean, Tom Kean, you could never do that stuff with Kean. Kean was, and is what he is. And I can tell you stories about his clothing, which would...

Q: Tell me one.

Roger Bodman: Well, when he ran in the primary, I mean, he was not the most debonair character you've ever met. And he had a sport jacket, not unlike this, with these leather patches on the thing, which had holes in them, literally. And I swear, I said that was the Hamilton F. Kean Memorial Sport Coat. I'm sure it was! You know, that was his grandfather, the Senator. Anyway, I asked Tony Cicatiello at one point to take him to a clothing store and get some new suits, because his suits were just awful! Just old and just ill-fitting and so forth. Anyway, the long and short of it was is that he I made Tom break out his American Express card. I think it was the first time it was out of his wallet, and send Cicatiello, I said, "Go get him some decent clothes. Get him a couple of suits." They went and bought him a couple of very nice suits, you know, pinstripe, dark gray, whatever, charcoal. You know, nice suit. I also told him, "By the way," you know, he used to wear this belt. This belt that he had made when he was a camp counselor. This belt was like one of these beaded kind of belts, had his initials in the back. It was like a camp counselor type thing that some kid made, or he made. I don't know. And half the beads were falling out of it, and an old ratty looking thing. I said, "Get a nice black leather belt to go with his new suit, so it would look very nice."

Q: So you literally redressed this man.

Roger Bodman: Oh, absolutely! Trust me, he needed to be redressed. If you saw some of the clothes he had, it was just awful. So we got him a couple of decent suits. But here's the story about the belt. He would come into his office, and I can't do it, when I stand up with this thing on, but he would literally pull his arms back like this and stand in my office at the campaign headquarters, and just pull his jacket back, and just saunter around the room while he was talking to me. And he would do it specific, because he was wearing that darn belt! And he would do it just to annoy me. And that was his way. You know, "You can do so much with me." That was his message. "You can do so much. You can push me so far in this stuff, but some things I'm just not going to give up." And he wouldn't give up that darn belt. He still wears the darn thing. I've seen it. He still has it and he still wears it. The ironic thing, and this is the hilarious part, in its first year as Governor, he was named as one of the Ten Best Dressed Men in America . Because his Press Secretary, Carl Golden, called. I was at the Labor Department at the time, called me, said, "You're not going to believe this." They thought it was a joke, literally. They called. They thought it was a bogus organization, somebody making a joke. Absolutely, he was named one of the Ten Best Dressed Men in America . It was hilarious!

Q: You got Kean to open his wallet and pull out his American Express card.

Roger Bodman: The moths flew out.

Q: Yeah, well, some people think that wallet was held together by rubber bands.

Roger Bodman: Clearly, no doubt about it. One story I had with him was when we took him to-- I think this was maybe the general-- the candidate can put in X-number of dollars. I think it was \$25,000 that the candidate can give under the public financing rules to their own campaign. That was the max. He says to me, "I don't have \$25,000." I said, "What do you mean you don't have 25?" I mean, everyone thought Kean was this well-to-do fellow.

Q: He lived in a mansion.

Roger Bodman: Well, he lived alongside the mansion, really. His house was on the parents' property. The mansion was around the corner. Anyway, it was a beautiful house. He certainly, by all appearances, be able to have \$25,000. So I took him to the bank, which was one of the banks that the family had started, Livingston National, whatever it was, and I drove him to the bank, and I said, "This man wants to borrow \$25,000." He's like looking at me. He did! I said, "Governor" now then, "Tom, I said if you expect other people to donate these monies to your campaign, you can put in this 25." I think we may have repaid him. I don't remember, but it may have just been a loan. But regardless, I drove him to the bank literally.

Q: He's notoriously...

Roger Bodman: Frugal? Cheap?

Q: Frugal, yes.

Roger Bodman: Cheap. Let's call it what it is. The joke used to be when he and Kaltenbacher was his assembly running mate, used to drive through the parkway tolls, and he'd pretend he was sleeping. Kaltenbacher put the 35 cents into the bucket.

Q: In those days it probably only was a quarter.

Roger Bodman: Probably was a quarter in those days. Whatever, yeah, right. You know, anyway. That's our Governor, god love him!

Michael Aron : Who were the key money people?

Roger Bodman: Jon Hanson was probably the primary money guy.

Q: Who was Jon Hanson?

Roger Bodman: Jon Hanson is a real estate developer in Bergen County and a good friend. Kaltenbacher was also. Kaltenbacher was, as I said, was his assembly running mate, was the President or Chairman of a major company in Newark at the time called Seton Leather. I don't know if they're there any longer, but Phil's long retired, but Jon's still around. And they were really two of the key finance guys during that campaign, and they were very helpful. Very helpful, as I said.

Q: So going into primary night, was Nick Brady also involved?

Roger Bodman: Nick was somewhat involved. Nick was actually very close to Bateman in the Bateman primary. I knew Nick very well. He was later Treasury Secretary under both Reagan and Bush, the father, Bush Number 41. And he was involved to a degree, but not as much as these other two.

Q: Kean named him a temporary Senator.

Roger Bodman: He did, in fact, in early 1982, when Harrison Williams had to resign under the Abscam scandal.

Q: Going into primary night, do you recall whether you knew it was in the bag?

Roger Bodman: We felt pretty good about it. We had both of our campaign headquarters, or parties, if you will, that evening, at a Holiday Inn, it used to be on Route 10 in Livingston, that traffic circle there. And we felt pretty good about it.

Q: What do you mean, "Both of your parties?"

Roger Bodman: Well, the general election also. So in the primary, we went into things feeling pretty good. In fact, there was not a lot of primary polling that I remember. I'm not even sure we had internal polls. I think we didn't want to spend the money on them at the time, candidly. But we went in there with a pretty good feeling.

Q: You didn't do issue polling in those days?

Roger Bodman: We did an early benchmark poll. Probably in..., I may have it. If I can find it, I will. Probably in the early, early part of '81, I would say February or March or thereabouts. And but the ballot test polls were-- our tracking poll was well outside our budget in those days. But anyway, I remember that primary night very well. And again, who shows up? Gregarious Bo Sullivan, you know, comes running into the room! I think Tom was out

making his victory speech, and there's Bo comes bounding in, and sort of unlimited energy that he had.

Q: Did Bo get anything out of that? Did Bo get appointed to something?

Roger Bodman: Bo was Chairman of the Turnpike Authority later, after Kean was elected and was one of the chairmen, I think, of our inaugural. One of the other finance guys, by the way, was Fletch Cramer, Senior. Fletch Cramer was a contractor. And Larry Bathgate. Bathgate was a big supporter of George H. W. Bush 41, when he was Vice-President, when he was running for President in 1980 against Reagan. Of course, he became the Vice-President nominee at the Detroit convention I discussed earlier. Anyway, I had known Larry by reputation. But I'd never met him. And during that primary, I went down to see him, because I knew he was a young attorney at the time, in his late 30s, early 40s. And was a prolific fundraiser, and had been very heavily involved in that Bush campaign, as we Nick Brady, I might add, they were close. Anyway, the long and short of it was is that he had already signed up for Bo Sullivan. And I said, "Okay, fine. I'll come see you after the primary. We're going to win and I'll come see you after the primary." And I sure, absolutely, I did. I went down, he lives in Bay Head, I went down to Bay Head after the primary, he took me to dinner at the Bay Head Yacht Club, and I said, "You're on our team now, sir." He said, "Absolutely!" And he really was helpful, because I think the three chairman of the inaugural, if I recall, we had tri-chairmen. I'm jumping ahead here, but was Fletch Kramer, was Larry, and was Bo Sullivan.

Q: Do you recall who the key issues people were around camp?

Roger Bodman: I know Gary Stein was really one of the primary. Ken Merin, who was on our staff, who later was Insurance Commissioner in the administration. I'm sure there were others. Jean Burgio was involved in that to a degree. She was later Secretary of State. But Gary probably was sort of chief amongst them. He, of course, later was a Supreme Court Justice.

Q: You say you remember primary night well. What do you remember?

Roger Bodman: I remember Bo Sullivan bounding into that room, and I remember winning with 31 percent of the vote by about 30,000. I remember the general election much better, because it was somewhat infamous. But I remember Bo who was just a character. You had to love this guy, rest his soul.

<crew talk>

Q: Confident of winning. Was Kean confident of winning?

Roger Bodman: The general election?

Q: The primary.

Roger Bodman: I think he was. I don't know, frankly. I think he was sort of fatalistic about it. Tom, I believe that he thought we did everything we had to do. Particularly the fact that it was an open primary. There was no organization lines. I think he had a significant number of endorsements around the state amongst-- we really held our own in the endorsement game. As I said, the organization lines having been taken away was vitally important to him. So we did everything we could reasonably do. The tax plan that we talked about. The Kemp endorsement. We really had some wind in our sails going into that primary, no doubt.

Q: Do you recall how he responded that night to victory? How he reacted?

Roger Bodman: Obviously, he was thrilled, but we were trying to set the tone for the general election. And he...

Q: What kind of tone did you try to set for the general election?

Roger Bodman: Inclusion, which became the hallmark of his Governorship as you know. He talked about education, he talked about much a much broader realm of issues than sort of just tax policy and sort of things that you would really address in a primary.

Q: This was his first primary win after two defeats. Was he ebullient, was he elated?

Roger Bodman: He was elated. I know, I remember talking to him while he was at his home still in Livingston , it was just up the road from where this Holiday Inn was I mentioned, on Route 10 there. And he was thrilled. But we also knew the realities. I mean, we were real underdogs going into the general election.

Q: Why?

Roger Bodman: Florio won the Democrat primary. Popular Congressman from South Jersey . And the early polling, including Eagleton Polls here showed that we were substantial underdogs. I don't remember the exact number. Kean says it was 30 points. I don't think it was quite 30, but it was 20-something. And we knew that we had a strong hill to climb.

Q: How quickly did the temporary conservative move to the middle?

Roger Bodman: Go away? Well, the whole issue of the tax plan followed him around certainly. People in your profession and others were certainly were going to not let him get away from it. But it wasn't necessarily a negative. Remember the climate we're in. This was Ronald Reagan. Okay, Reagan's first term. Reagan's first year. You had the assassination attempt on Reagan, which was in March or thereabouts in 1981. Now we're fast forward to June or July, the Summer of '81. His tax cuts were very much going through, and so it was not-- but he didn't run away from the tax plan by any means. What he did do, however, was just broaden the scope of issues. As I said, education, inclusion and things that he also-- environment. He sponsored the bill that created the Department of Environmental Protection. And we started in the Summer of 1981 we created what we called the City Tour. And what that was, it's the dead time in the summer, and now sitting in the doldrums of July and August, whatever, and we created a tour from it, and sent him to every major urban center in New Jersey. Called up the Democratic mayor, said, "Republican nominee for Governor, Tom Kean, wants to come see you." What are they going to say? "No, I'm not going to visit with this guy?" Some of them, I'm sure, didn't want to, but of course, we had-- whatever press we could have tagging along, and the point of this was to create-- here's a man that's going to walk-- I mean, he's card-carrying member of the NAACP. He always did very well in Newark , had relationships in what I would call non-traditional Republican-type constituencies, African-American groups, other minority groups, arts groups. And he would-- we sent him on this tour, and he'd go around to each of the cities, New Brunswick and Camden and Paterson , and Newark , and you name it. Asbury Park, whatever, Atlantic City. And we'd meet with the mayors. And we'd always get a little bit of press. Sometimes a little more than a little bit. And it started to create the image, the legitimate image, that this man was not your average, you know, he was certainly not a right-wing Republican, he was very much a moderate, and he very much cared about these, and he could talk-- gave him an opportunity to talk about some of this own experiences in terms of when he represented portions of the City of Newark while he was in the assembly and so forth.

Q: How did Republicans react to this non-traditional method of courting the public?

Roger Bodman: I think they were fine with it. I mean, the only general election, or immediate general election problem I had was with then Assemblyman Bill Gormley, whom as you know, is not a sedate individual, to put it kindly. And Assemblyman Gormley at the time was our sole supporter in Atlantic County, and he won almost unilaterally due to his own-- I think he went out and dragged every individual personally out of Atlantic County, "Vote for Tom Kean." And we ended up winning, even though the County Chairman there was a fellow named Fritz Hahnemann, who was one of Gormley's mortal enemies. Gormley had many, as you know. And long story short, I had to then-- I thought it was appropriate to send Kean to an organizational breakfast in Atlantic County , trying to put everything back together, peace, unity, that kind of stuff. Gormley went absolutely nuts! I mean nuts! In only the way he can. You know, it was one of the-- I can gauge my relationship with Bill Gormley over 20 years

like a curve, like this. He either hates you or he loves you; hates you, loves you, for whatever the issue was at that time. Boy, did he hate me! And let it be known to me and a lot of others in no uncertain language.

Q: We're going to take a break, and we'll get into the '81 general election campaign when we resume.

Roger Bodman: Very good.

Michael Aron: Tom Kean on a sort of city tour in the summer of 2000-- of 1981.

Roger Bodman: Right.

Q: You were taking the campaign to Jim Florio's turf, is that essentially what you were doing?

Roger Bodman: Well, his turf, to Democratic turf, to areas that Republicans had, at least historically, conceded. We weren't about to concede the urban centers of New Jersey, Michael. We thought that our candidate, Tom Kean, given his district, his legislative district included portions of many urban areas, portions of Irvington and portions of Newark, I mean, and he did well in some of those areas. So we were not going to concede the urban centers to the Democratic Party, in this case, the nominee, Jim Florio.

Q: How formidable was Florio as an opponent?

Roger Bodman: Very formidable. I mean, he had a tremendous record in the congress. He was the father of the superfund law, so to speak, and had really very strong environmental credentials and came from Camden County, which was a notorious, some might say infamous, Democratic stronghold. In other words, he had a huge base and he was still a sitting congressman. Our friend, Tom Kean, as we've mentioned, was a former assemblyman, having left office four years prior. So he was very considerable and formidable, I should say, and he also had a significant lead in the polls, in the early polls. Eagleton was the place to go, so to speak, in terms of New Jersey polling in those days. So we were clearly the underdogs.

Q: Did Florio have any obvious weakness that could be exploited?

Roger Bodman: Well, you know, I believe, at the beginning of the campaign, it was hard for us to determine. In any election like that, you're always looking for some hook. There was not major issues driving New Jersey. There was not huge budget deficits. The income tax issue we talked about during the Bateman, Byrne race of '77 had been resolved and the people seemed to have accepted it by then. There was not any burning issues. The economy, at least in 1981, was still in pretty good shape. The Reagan presidency was in its infancy. Supply side economics, as we mentioned, was sort of the, Reaganomics was the kind of code word of the day. So this was the atmosphere in which this campaign was being conducted. Reagan, of course, from Reagan's point of view, this was one of the first tests of his presidency, both New Jersey and Virginia and I can tell you some interesting stories about that when he came in to campaign for Tom and when he did a TV spot for us.

Q: When did he come in to campaign?

Roger Bodman: In October, I want to say, or September. I don't remember, but it was in the early fall. And he did a TV spot. This is the story. I remember flying down. The president had a stop in Philadelphia for some luncheon or some speech he had to make and we met him. I flew down in a helicopter with Tom Kean and we were in a hangar in the Philadelphia airport and they had set up this temporary little television studio with the blue curtains hanging around and so forth. We did a TV spot. They taped it in that airplane hangar. The president was in this thing and, you know, those things have to be, you know, coming from television, you know very well, 29.3 seconds, whatever it was, the exact thing that you had to have this done. Reagan rattles on saying, "I'm not in the business of telling people how to vote, except, you know,...but, in this case, I really like this man, Tom Kean," you know? He goes into his own thing. 29.2 seconds. Right on the money. Okay. Except, at the time, an airplane took off in the background, you know? So we had this background noise so we had to do it a second time, two takes, 29.2 seconds.

This time, no airplane in the background and it was perfect. I mean, it was just classic Reagan and then he came up and they went to Morristown. They landed in Morristown airport and went to I think it was one of the hotels in Whippany or in Parsippany, that area.

Q: The debate Kean and Florio, they must have debated.

Roger Bodman: Oh, sure. Under the public financing law, there's a requirement for a certain number of debates, I forget, two or three, and they had them and I think we were pleased with Tom's performance. One I remember very specifically was in South Jersey, I forget where it was. It was in the suburbs of Cumberland County somewhere or maybe Gloucester County and, obviously, Florio's home area. I remember going down with Tom and, you know, we tried to prepare him somewhat. Anyway, there was some road that was being rebuilt or reconstructed, I forget the name of it, but it had a kind of a curious name and Kean made a mistake. He tried to pronounce this name and fumbled it and, of course, Florio jumped on him, "Oh, it's pronounced such and such," you know, assemblymen. It was a clearly favorable audience. You asked the question was there a weakness there. What, in my opinion, came out of that campaign was the weakness that Florio ultimately had was his own personality. What I mean by that, he was a very driven kind of steely, hard person, you know, very punctual, very much on time. As we talked about Kean, I joked about the eastern Kean time earlier. My observation of his campaign was that this was, you know, Mr. Discipline. I mean, there was never a second to spare. He wouldn't speak to anybody. He'd, boom, in, boom, out, you know, onto the next stop. The print media in New Jersey was very important in those days, much more so than now, in my opinion, and, if you saw the adjectives that your colleagues of that era utilized to describe Kean, they would talk about affable, nice, friendly, those kinds of adjectives to describe him. And Florio was driven and hard. In fact, one of Florio's TV spots, I remember to this day, I'm sure you'll interview Governor Kean for this process, hopefully, he will well remember this. Florio ran a TV spot and it was supposedly of his mother. It was a woman sitting in the background, like, making spaghetti or making dinner in the back of this and he was complaining about Reagan, budget cuts and basically the gist of the commercial was that, you know, Tom Kean is Ronald Reagan and Ronald Reagan was a hard-nosed, you know, guy that's going to hurt people. But it was done in black and white, the TV spot, for whatever reason. I don't understand why they didn't use color and he references his mother, presumably an actor or actress, I should say, I don't know if it was his real mother but never said, "Hello, Mom" or, you know, kissed Mom or "Thanks for dinner, Mom." It was just, like, you know, all right, "Where's my dinner?" It just drove home, I believe, the image that was already starting to form. Now, this is, you know, stuff that's very hard to quantify in any campaign. I can't say, no one can for certain, that this was a factor. I believe it was a factor and I've read those pieces, you know, the bio-type puff pieces that are inevitably done in any campaign but even in other pieces that were done, it just seemed to me that an image was created of Kean. As history will show, by a very slim margin, enough people voted for him over the other guy but the polls continued to narrow throughout the fall of 1981.

Q: Was that the strategy, to showcase a contrast in personalities?

Roger Bodman: No. It wasn't. It was more default than it was by design, frankly.

Q: What was the design?

Roger Bodman: We were trying to, you know, that's the problem with that campaign. We were looking for a hook. That's the exact word we used. What's the hook in this election? What's going to get in what otherwise was a sort of nondescript political environment, what do they care about? Because they seem to be reasonably happy, I'm talking about the voters here, the electorate, and there wasn't any driving issues of the day. So one of which we went after was the code word change. With all due respect to Governor Byrne, the Democrats had run New Jersey for the previous eight years and so we focused on that, on the word change, as much as we could. Governor Kean did very well, then candidate Kean, did very well amongst the newspaper editorials. He was supported by many, if not most. I don't recall the specifics at all but I know he was endorsed, I think the New York Times, amongst others, endorsed him. So there was a series of newspaper editorials and, generally speaking, you know, do they matter? Maybe. Do they influence? In a close election, they certainly matter. When you win by 1,797 votes, they matter. We also highlighted-- when the word "change" was used in any of them, we would highlight that and we'd just pull up--we

did a TV spot for endorsement, okay, New York Times says this, you know, change would be, you know, Tom Kean is a great candidate, change in Trenton would be welcome, you know? The Woodbridge News Tribune says that, you know? And if the word "change" was in there, that's the only-- it was sort of a feeble attempt to find a hook in this election and it was the only thing we could find but I suspect that, with what I call the affability factor, and it was a factor, I believe, put him over the top by the narrowest of margins.

Q: Was there a TV spot that showcased the affability at a bar in Jersey City ?

Roger Bodman: That was in the primary. That was the Bayonne beer situation. That was Bo Sullivan, god bless him. Bo Sullivan was, you know, viewed Tom and tried to portray Tom in the primary as a patrician, you know, sort of silver spoon in the mouth kind of character and he, Bo, could have a beer in Bayonne, you know? Only he, Bo, could have a beer in Bayonne because Tom would never have a beer any place, that was the gist of that. So that was Bo Sullivan saying, you know, we have bottles of beer around here, it says, literally, have a false label and it says Bayonne beer on it, you know, someplace that was coming off of that campaign but that was Bo Sullivan's gig.

Q: Who bellied up to the bar in the commercial? Bo? Or you did?

Roger Bodman: Well, after Bo made it an issue, now, I don't know if we ran a TV spot on it, I don't recall, but he certainly made the comment and it was rather widely reported, you know, that Kean can't have a beer in Bayonne so we took him to a bar in Bayonne, I think that's where we had all those phony beers made up, you know, with the Bayonne beer on it, we had a media stunt there and we took Tom into it. That was the only time, I guarantee you, the only time an ounce of beer went into Tom Kean's mouth was out of that bottle at that bar that year.

Q: Were you running against Brendan Byrne's record?

Roger Bodman: To a degree. Not against his record so much. I remember we made an issue of the Brendan Byrne Arena. That was a backdrop in one of our spots, you know, so it was really trying to highlight the word and it was more of a backdrop, of him talking about not going at Byrne, per se, I don't believe. I'd have to review those television spots, though. If I can find them, I'll refresh my memory but the bottom line was it was a-- we didn't go after his record per se but I think the whole concept of it's time for a change was...

Q: Was that a tricky line for Tom Kean to walk?

Roger Bodman: Walk? Yes.

Q: Given that Byrne had put him on the Highway Authority and that they had a cordial relationship?

Roger Bodman: Exactly. That's why, I think, there was some inference, and I use the word inference, trying to infer the fact that it was time for a change. We'd had eight years of Democrats. Byrne was, you know, obviously, the incumbent but there was not direct attacks at Governor Byrne, I don't recall, at all. Primarily because Tom Kean wouldn't have it.

Q: Did Roger Stone stay on with Kean?

Roger Bodman: Oh, yeah.

Roger Bodman: Oh, yeah, he worked in the general election of '81, yeah. And, you know...

Q: Play any kind of significant role? Do any dirty tricks?

Roger Bodman: Hopefully not, no. I don't think his role was as significant as it was in the primary. As I mentioned, the Jack Kemp situation and others and sort of the formulation of that tax plan, but he was still on board, as was Bailey Deardorff, John Deardorff was our media guy, and...

Q: Did you have contact with John Deardorff?

Roger Bodman: Oh, yeah. Sure. Regularly. You know how those-- you try to save every dollar, particularly in the general election, for your television. I don't remember what the limits were. I think it was four or five million dollars, it was in that ballpark, what the cap was, the max that could be spent, it may have been less, in the general election and we tried to save every darn penny that we could, you know, to put on television. One of the interesting dynamics, by the way, was how the election law enforcement commission governed what you could or couldn't do under the public financing scheme. Ray Bateman, unfortunately, back in 1977, in the general election, was fined, fined is not the word but basically docked off of his cap because Republican party money was spent that was perceived or at least ruled on by ELEC to be- should have been properly under the cap limit. So, in other words, the rule, what can the organization do? We had a whole series of rulings that we asked for early on, right after the primary. Okay, what can the party do, that's regular party building, you know, registry, voter registration, turnout the vote, all this kind of thing, that does not count against the cap? Because we didn't want him to be placed in the circumstance that Ray Bateman was four years prior with regard to having, you know, late in the game, someone come in, all right, you know, you already spent this money, you can't spend this last million dollars you want to spend under your cap on television, you know, in the last week of the campaign. And that's essentially what happened to Bateman.

Q: In hindsight, was there another Democrat that year who would have been tougher to beat than Jim Florio?

Roger Bodman: I don't know. Degnan may well have been, because of the relationship he had with Byrne, I think it would have been much more difficult for Tom as a candidate against Degnan. I don't know if he liked Degnan, as I said, he very much liked Byrne so I think just the personal dynamics of that may have made it more difficult. I don't know how John would have done as a statewide candidate, what his positions were, what his standing would have been with the electorate. So that's a possibility.

Q: So let's go to October of '81. What's your expectation, going into the final couple of weeks?

Roger Bodman: There was an Eagleton poll that came out around the first of October thereabouts, the first week of October, and, if memory serves, it showed Kean down eight to ten points, which was significantly less than it had been in the previous poll, which was around labor day or earlier. It was heading in the right direction but we were still behind. Again, at that point, we were searching for the hook, you know, as I called it. That's when this whole change thing started coming up. Tom Kean, god bless him, you know, as I said, performed extraordinarily well with these editorial boards. And, again, you know, his message was inclusion, his message was education, his message was environment and a whole host of others. He won the lion's share of those endorsements, which really, you know, we focused on in terms of the campaign. Save every dollar we could possibly save and, for the last two or three weeks, to put it up on television. You know, we had the Reagan ad I mentioned earlier and then we started to go to these change, you know, time for a change type thing, which was really our closing round of media. As you know, you can only get two or three spots up there with enough points behind him to make them effective, to burn them in, so to speak, in terms of having the electorate see them enough times that they make an impression. So you have to be very careful about what you run and how you do it because you don't get a second chance. But that's how we closed the campaign on those editorial-type spots.

Q: Did you have internal polls?

Roger Bodman: We did and they tracked pretty much with Eagleton. I forget exactly when our internal polls were taken. I know we had one, I think, again, was about early October. Again, we didn't have the money to do, you know, tracking polls and benchmark polls, certainly, head to head type polls that you would like to have. Frankly, at that stage of the game, when you get to late October, there's not much you can do with them anyway, you know? So we were relying on public polling, particularly Eagleton. By the way, Eagleton had a poll that came out just before the election that showed it dead even. Dead even. I was quoted in a paper someplace saying it's going to be a cliff hanger. I didn't know how prophetic I was.

Q: You say that you think the preponderance of the editorial endorsements went to Kean?

Roger Bodman: Yes, I do. I don't remember how many but I think it was a significant number, certainly enough significant newspapers that we could pluck out particularly those phrases that we wanted, that change phrase which was our final attempt to persuade the electorate that Tom Kean would be their best governor.

Q: Who did the Newark Star Ledger endorse?

Roger Bodman: I think they endorsed Kean but I don't remember. I really don't.

Q: On election day that year, as I recall, something called the ballot security task force appeared and became an issue.

Roger Bodman: Yes, it was.

Q: What was that?

Roger Bodman: It was an attempt by the Republicans and, really, it was primarily done through the Republican state committee that we were intrinsically tied, to make sure that the elections were properly conducted. It got a little out of hand, to put it mildly, but I'll tell you how they did it. What they did was, is sent, in many cases, first class letters to voting lists in certain urban areas, certain voting districts of urban areas. Why a first class letter? Because, if it was non-deliverable, it would get returned. And, in many cases, there were thousands of them that were-- this was to voters, mind you. Get the voter file for Newark or Jersey City or Camden or whatever and you sent first class letters into certain voting districts in those towns, those cities. You would get thousands back as non-deliverable. So now you had a record, okay? Because, if it was a third class letter, they didn't have to send it back to you. First class, they would. So we had a voter file of people that were not living at the place where the voter file said they were living. That became very handy in what subsequently was the recount but we never had to use it because Kean was ultimately declared the winner and so forth. What we were trying to do, what the attempt was, certainly, was trying to prevent voter fraud. We believed, rightly or wrongly, that there was a tradition of this sort of activity in certain corners of this state and we were going to do what we could to make sure this election was conducted fairly amongst properly registered voters. Now, on election day itself, this is where the thing got out of hand, there was these-- there was a fellow from the Republican national committee, whose name I don't recall, who-- it wasn't Stone but it was sort of Stone-esque, if you will, who was tasked by the Republican national committee, and through the state Republican party, to go out and they had these folks running around with so-called arm bands on, you know, that were getting overly zealous, let's put it that way, and, in certain cases, intimidating voters or perceived as intimidating the voters, you know? This became the subject of post-election inquiries and a variety of legal activities that prevented this Republican party, to this day, from performing those kinds of tasks.

Q: Besides Reagan, do you recall any national figures who came in on either side that year?

Roger Bodman: As I said, I think Gerald Ford was in the primary. I don't- not specifically. I don't remember. I don't know if President Carter came in for-- I just don't recall, Michael.

Q: Carter's standing was not terribly high in 1981.

Roger Bodman: I would think they probably would not for those reasons. He was just defeated in the election the previous year and was probably not a popular figure, I would guess.

Q: All right. Take us to election night. You're at the Holiday Inn in Livingston, returns are coming in.

Roger Bodman: Well, let me repeat what I just said. What was interesting was Eagleton did a poll right on, I think it came out the Friday or the Thursday before the election, and the poll said it was dead even. Dead even. I was quoted, as I said, I said, "It's going to be a cliff hanger." And it surely was. We get to election night at the same

Holiday Inn, on route 10 in Livingston and it's 8:02 . I'm back in our suite of rooms watching returns and talking to folks we had in a variety of the county courthouses, getting the results. We had learned, by the day, we had learned, throughout the day, of course, that many of the TV networks were doing exit polling. Unfortunately, back in those days, they announced their exit poll results two hours before the polls closed. They don't do that any longer but one of the New York stations announced that Florio had a lead of whatever, four or five points, on their 6:00 news, two hours before New Jersey closed its polls which, as you might imagine, was none too pleasing to us. Thankfully, folks in your profession have mended their ways and they no longer do that sort of thing because that could well have had and may well have had a significant impact on that election. People that were going to vote for Kean may not have. Late voters may not have gone out and so forth. Anyway, so that was annoying enough, to put it mildly, when I learned about that on the 6:00 news of election night that year. A couple of hours later, about 8:05, one or two and I think some of the same offending television stations from New York announced that Florio was the winner, based on election poll results. Obviously, as history will prove, that was not the case. It was, again, embarrassing to the New York television stations that chose to do two very stupid things. One was, you know, announce exit poll results two hours before the Jersey polls closed and, secondly, to improperly predict the outcome of that election. I said exactly that, I think, on your network, on NJN, I, as campaign manager, was asked to come out and speak-- I had a predetermined stand up with you guys at some hour that night, I think it was 9:00 or thereabouts or 10. Meanwhile, this station from New York had to pull back its improper prediction. So, needless to say, it was a bizarre political occurrence, by any measure and, to the Kean campaign, mightily annoying, to put mildly. I went out that night and let it be known how mightily annoyed I was as a campaign manager. I said something to the effect that, you know, these New York stations ignore New Jersey for 364 days and, on the 365th day, they come in here and feel the need to improperly predict our elections. Stay home, fellas. You know? I was just absolutely irate about that and so was Tom Kean, for that matter, you know? Thankfully they have amended their ways since then and, to my knowledge, have not either-- I think they made the same mistake in Florida in 2000 or somebody did but, at least here, have not made that mistake. Anyway, so I was looking at one count in particular. In fact, here's the interesting thing that happened. I'm in the suite. Tom is at his home in Livingston, which was all of five miles away, and it's about 9:00 or thereabouts, after the TV stations have predicted Florio, and he calls me up and says, "Well, I want to come down and concede." He does not want this to go long, you know? I certainly understood he didn't want this thing to go all night long. If he lost, that's it. I had not prepared- he prepared both an acceptance and concession speech. I had not- I don't remember having seen them. I may have seen them but I don't remember having seen them. Long story short, by the time he left his house and the time he got to come down, to concede this election and what he believed he was coming to concede this election, which was, you know, half an hour, maybe, between the 9:00 or so conversation, 9:30 or whenever he got to that campaign hotel and into our suite. When he got there, I said, "Governor, hold it up." Tom, I didn't call him governor, "Hold it up," you know, "there's some funny things happening out there. You're not going to go concede yet." He was, like, looking at me. And I showed him some of the numbers, particularly in Middlesex County. Middlesex County was a bell weather county that year it turns out. You know, the phrase Reagan Democrat we all hear from time to time? Well, you know, the most notable place where Reagan Democrats resided, at least in that election, was in Middlesex County, places like Fords and Sayreville and those kinds of towns, you know? Really, it's a catchword for conservative Democrats. Kean ended up losing that county by less than 5,000 votes. Normally, in a Republican statewide election, you'd lose by 25,000. So this is not all that different from that Lopatcong Township I was talking about when Jim Courter on a microcosm of this. Middlesex County, as a whole, I mean, I saw those numbers, I said, you know, this is not adding up here. We saw how we were doing in other more traditional Republican counties, we were winning by the margins that, you know, a Republican would win and, in fact, doing better in certain cases, in Ocean County, Morris County, Bergen County but we were not losing in some of these Democratic counties by the margin that we had- we had done all sorts of models, of course, of what we thought we would win, county by county and even certain election districts. It just wasn't adding up so I held Kean back. I said, "No, you're not going to concede this thing." Meanwhile, it's 10:00 , it's 11:00 . I went out to complain about the New York media, as I mentioned. I came back in and it's midnight, it's one in the morning. Finally, about one in the morning or thereabouts and said, in so many words, you know, I sent Tom out, you know, thank you very much for coming. Obviously, this isn't going to be decided tonight. Thanks for coming. Go home, you know? We'll let you know. That was essentially it.

Q: I'm told that Camden County ...

Roger Bodman: Didn't report.

Q: ...report.

Roger Bodman: Until late, yeah. And made us very nervous. And, as it became obvious that this election was going to be a cliff hanger, as I predicted the previous Friday, we got in touch with Governor Byrne and I think Tom called him directly and Governor Byrne moved to impound all the machines. We were very nervous about what was going on. You know that ballot security thing I talked about earlier? You know, with all due respect to our friends in Camden County at the time, we didn't exactly trust what was going on down there and they were reporting-- those numbers were not coming in. We had reason to believe that, if there was any hanky panky going on, it could well be going on in that corner of the state and Byrne sent state police down there to impound those machines that night.

Q: So Kean goes out on television and says, obviously, this is not going to be decided tonight. Then what did you do?

Roger Bodman: Well...

Q: Go home and get some sleep?

Roger Bodman: I cancelled my trip to Florida. This is a classic case. It's, like, you flip a coin and it lands on its edge, you know? That's literally what happened here. We didn't know what to do, to be rather blunt about it. I mean, we went home. Got up the next morning and started dealing with-- the whole issue of the recount was obviously upon us. No one knew how to deal with it. Remember that this was a publicly-financed election, election law enforcement commission had very strict rules, how much you could donate, how much you could spend, cap on election, all kinds of reporting responsibilities, audit responsibilities of the public money you got, so forth and so on. We were meticulously careful about all that stuff, obviously. I'm sure Florio people were also. Now we're in a recount situation. I go to campaign headquarters. I'm the campaign manager, you know? You wake up the next morning, you're supposed to shut this place down, padlock it, go home and either you lose or you win and you do what you do. In this case, we didn't know what to do. So we immediately jumped into recount mode. One of the first things we had to do was, as I said, talk to election law enforcement commission, how do I pay the campaign staff here? The rental of this office? How do you do it? There's no rules, there's no campaign limits, nothing. So we get some emergency rulings from them, basically the Florida people had the same problem. The state was just ill prepared in terms of its oversight role with regard to how to govern this post-election circumstance, this very curious, post-election circumstance. Once that happened, we then started to formulate, you know, talk to-- an army of lawyers showed up, I think led by Cary Edwards but an army of lawyers showed up, you know, on how to deal with this whole recount issue. I recall that, in those days, some of our counties had paper ballots and we knew all about the pregnant chads and the hanging things and all that stuff long before Florida did, trust me. Sussex, a couple of them down south, maybe Salem or Gloucester, I mean, they still had those paper ballots where you stuck the stylus thing through. So you had literally thousands upon thousands of these things sitting around in county courthouses and those areas. Other counties had different kinds of mechanical machines, the whole debate now of electronic machines and the record, as you know, is a current debate within our legislature and an issue. Back then, they were countered, a variety of machines. I mean, you had the Ford type machine, the Cadillac type machine, the Chevy type machine, all different brands, every one of which was different. All were impounded under Governor Byrne's order. Then, you know, friendly county clerks were saying, you know, everybody's looking at numbers and they're, I got a couple hundred votes for you here, there was a miscount in this township district four and, you know, you got 200 votes here. So we started to be the repository of this sort of running total statewide or we tried to be. Now, god knows, it was an ever-changing-- you know, it was a changing circumstance. We just saw this situation in the senate race in Minnesota this year, which came down to even closer than this one. Nonetheless, it was all new territory for everyone, including the attorneys. Once the picture became clear, if memory serves me, the secretary of state has to certify the winner. I think it's within seven days of the election or thereabouts. In fact, they did and Kean was certified the winner. Then it's incumbent upon the loser to make the move. In this case, we were certified at, I forget the first count, I remember 1,797 votes was after the recount. That was the exact number. But we were certified as the winner by, you know, less than 2,000 votes, 1,500 or thereabouts at about 2.4 million that

were cast. It came down to be about one-tenth of one percent. It was incumbent upon the Florio campaign to challenge those and decide where and if to recount. Therefore, they had to decide what districts. So they had to go. We were technically the winner. It goes back to those letters, those first class letters I was talking about earlier and that ballot security thing. The reason that they wanted those was, again, to have a record and, believe me, we started the process of going out and the lawyers did, of getting depositions from individuals that we had reason to believe were participating in a phony election process. We had many, many where people said, you know, signed books and vote, signed books and vote. I mean, there was, in my opinion, this is 25 years later, there were certainly indications of voter fraud out there. We didn't need to do it. We didn't need to deal with it. We were the winner, okay? This was the kind of stuff that you would certainly utilize if you were the Norm Coleman, you know, versus Frank-- in other words, if you were the loser and had to prove or attempt to prove that this election was somehow fraudulently conducted and that the true person that was declared the winner was, in fact, not the winner because of significant voter fraud. Anyway, so, as the rules became clear and as the counties figured out when and how they're going to recount this thing, again, it was up to Florio to determine what districts he wanted to recount and they had to pay a certain amount per election district. It was incumbent upon them to do it. So we were, you know, we were somewhat in the better position, certainly, as the declared winner. Long story short, with our army of attorneys, we went about training these lawyers on how, because no one knows to do this stuff, how to look at these variety of voting machines. You go into some, you know, dusty warehouse in Jersey City where thousands of voting machines are stored and they're going to open up the ones from district 5 of Jersey City and district 3 of Bayonne and whatever from Union City and, you know, and each county had potentially different brands of machines. They have counters on the back of them like a car odometer. So what we did was we rented two machines, two of the most predominant type of machines. Obviously, the paper ballots I described earlier are done differently, in certain cases, hand counted, but the Florio campaign would look through the total. We did the same. We really wanted to know where we were going here, to see if there was any obvious anomalies, you know, transposed numbers or something or voting districts that, you know, normally voted Republican but, somehow, Florio won by 300 votes or whatever, some sort of obvious stuff. So we were literally crawling all over these results on a district by district basis in order to try to figure out where there may have been a legitimate transposed number or whatever the case may be. We kept trying to keep this running total of the whole circumstance statewide. We talked to the media every day about what our total was. Florio, for whatever reason, didn't do this. He did not keep a running total. That's why we became the repository of every-- we kind of dominated the news because we're the only one talking to them because, for whatever reason, they chose not to try to keep this running total, maybe because they were the loser, we were the winner, but the numbers, based upon what we knew, we tried to share with the media on a daily basis. We had, like, a 2:00 press conference every day, here's what we know today.

Q: The staff or Kean did as well? The press conference.

Roger Bodman: Kean did not. Usually, we did most of them. Every now and then Kean would do it but, normally, we wanted to keep him- we kept Kean out of this. I mean, we just thought this was the mechanics of the process and this was really not his-- as far as we were concerned, he was the governor elect and he was working on transition issues.

Q: Were you calling him governor by this point?

Roger Bodman: I don't think I called him until he was certified. There is a picture of he and I taken two or three days after, I think he did have one press conference, like, the day after the election where we didn't have a lot of further information. I think it was the day after. We basically said, "We're in for a recount, hang on." I remember going back to his house up in Livingston, there's a picture of him sitting on a couch in his den and the two of us are sitting there with our heads down. He's here and I'm here, like, sitting like this, like, oh, my god, what did we get ourselves into here? Anyway, we went out and found out the brand of these particular types of machines, the ones that were most predominantly used. We now knew, because Florio had to determine where he wanted the recount to take place, didn't recount the entire state, it would cost X number of dollars per election district. But there was a significant number of districts that he wanted to recount around the state, almost every county in some form or another. So you had to go out and learn how to do a recount and what to look for. So we had seminars with attorneys. We bought, in those times, they didn't have digital cameras that you could plug into a computer, you had

Polaroid cameras. It would buzz and a little thing zips out the front of it, you know? Those old Polaroid cameras. We had tape recorders and flashlights. We taught these lawyers to go- and we actually had certain accountants and attorneys and we had an army of these people and, as these recounts were scheduled, and each county held them at a different time, 10:00 on whatever Thursday morning, we're going to go to Huntington County on such and such a day, in Somerset County, whatever it may be, and we had our people there as observers. So, when you opened up the back of the machine, sometimes the car odometer, ticker thing, is up top, sometimes it's down below, it depends, so we rented two machines. I'm leading up to a point here. We took these machines to a hotel and sent them right here in New Brunswick somewhere and brought all the attorneys and these accountants in and said, "All right, if you're in such and such a county, they use this type of machine. When they open up the back, take a picture of that count. The minute they open that machine." So you can see that car odometer thing, as I describe it. We had tape recorders running so, if anybody says anything, we have it on tape. Flashlights, obviously, so you can see because you're in a dusty warehouse, right? So we taught them, okay, this is the type of machine they use in this county, this type of machine used in the other county. Anyway, we had to two of these machines rented from the manufacturers. Mind you, all the machines were impounded in New Jersey, right, under the Byrne order? So after we did this one day, this was probably two weeks after the election or thereabouts, ten days, whatever it was, we had a Jeep and a trailer and these two machines are sitting on this trailer in the parking lot of our campaign headquarters, right down near Elizabeth and Union on Morris Avenue. Well, all of a sudden, it's 10:00 in the morning, this ruckus goes out, all these media, all kinds of people come running into our office and a whole bunch of media and a bunch of cop cars come racing in. The local county prosecutor from Union County, whose name I don't remember, Cary Edwards will clearly remember, he was not reappointed, shows up and raids the machines, okay? The theory being, well, how can Tom Kean have two voting machines sitting in a trailer on a Jeep in his campaign headquarters when every machine is supposed to be impounded? This was the ultimate ridiculous publicity stunt. TV cameras there, they had alerted the media about this raid and they come in and they have all these machines and they're unpalletted and they grab them and they take them away and off they go in this great big production. I was mad as hell. I mean, I had all kinds of documentation, where we rented them from, you know, documenting we rented them from such and such a voting machine company, whatever, you know? These were obviously not legitimate machines, these were ones we used for demonstration purposes. But this county prosecutor felt the need to come and raid our office and grab these machines and off he goes with them. I am just mad as hell. Tom Kean shows up a little bit later, the media is still hanging around, and his comment was quoting from Alice in Wonderland, "Well, it gets curiouser and curiouser." That was the exact phrase. Meanwhile, the end of the story, 10:00 that night, some detective or whatever from the union county prosecutor's office comes into my office, comes back with the machines, drops them back in the parking lot and says, "You got to sign for these machines." I said, "I got to sign for what machines?" "Well, those voting machines I just dropped in your parking lot." I said, "You mean the ones you stole from my office at 10:00 this morning?" "We didn't steal them. We had a subpoena, we had a dah, dah." I said, "You know, where's the media? I don't see all the television cameras out there showing you bringing the voting machines back at 10:00 at night. I just saw them here at 10:00 this morning when the big production-- where's your boss? Where's the prosecutor? He can't make it?" I was mad. I wouldn't sign for them. "Take that piece of paper and you know what you can do with it, pal, and you can take those damn machines with you." I never signed for them. It was just the most ridiculous thing that I'd ever seen. As I said, I assume it was the prosecutor that was probably up for reappointment. Cary and others would remember as he was counsel in Kean's first term. I'm quite confident that prosecutor did not get reappointed.

Q: We're going to break for the day. When we get you back, we'll declare Tom Kean the winner of the '81 election and look at the government of the Kean years.

Roger Bodman: Very good. Thank you.

End of Roger A. Bodman 1-27-2009 interview